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FOREWORD
The present collection of research papers, focusing on the analysis of the 
current ethnic situation in Moldova was a natural follow up of the researches 
developed between 2000 and 2006 by the Institute of Public Policy in the field of 
transformations and reforms in Moldovan society.
Most of the countries can be presently characterized through cultural diversity. 
According to the recent estimations, in the 180 independent countries of the 
world there are 600 spoken languages and 5000 ethnic groups. Only in a small 
number of countries, citizens speak the same language or belong to the same ethno-
national group. The diversity generates a set of important and controversial issues. 
The minorities and majorities more and more often disagree on the rights related 
to language, regional autonomy, political representation, education curricula, 
terri torial claims, immigration and naturalization policy, even national symbols, 
national anthem, music, dances and political holidays. From the human deve-
lopment perspective, finding answers to this issue, that are justifiable from the 
moral and viable, and from the political standpoint, is the greatest challenge of 
the current democratic governments, including Moldova, which passes through 
an interminable period of transition. 
After the national liberation movement, adaptation of various European cri-
teria, laws and standards, radical transformations in the political, economic and 
spiritual life, as well as modification and intensification of migration processes, 
the ethnopolitical, ethnocultural and ethnogeographical picture of Moldova expe-
rienced essential changes. Several of these changes were outlined and analyzed 
in a series of studies and researches. The recent multi-disciplinary studies, the 
studies in the field of public policies developed within the programs of the 
Institute for Public Policy, as well as the results of the „Public Opinion Barometer“ 
illustrate new evolutions of the national identity issue and attitudes regarding 
the general values of modern society. The experience of organizing and admini-
strating surveys in 2000-2006, within the „Public Opinion Barometer“ program, 
shows interesting and conclusive data about the real picture of the current ethnic 
composition and the attitudes of respondents. These results suggested the need 
for a thorough interdisciplinary study of the ethnopolitical and demographical 
situation in our country, as well as a set of surveys focused on ethnic issues and 
policies. 
Thus, we would like to thank our project partners, the Institute of Marketing 
and Surveys IMAS Inc. from Chisinau and Mircea Kivu, international consultant, 
the authors of research papers, as well as the representatives of mass media who 
reflected the events within this project and who informed constantly the public 
opinion about the experts’ conclusions and recommendations. 
Arcadie Barbarosie, PhD 
Viorel Cibotaru, PhD
AN EMPIRICAL MODEL 
OF INTERETHNIC RELATIONS REFLECTED 
IN THE ETHNOBAROMETER
Doru Petruţi 
The recent history after the 90’s, if we relate ourselves to Eastern Europe, has shown 
the importance of understanding the motivations, attitudes and options of ethnic groups. 
The lack of such knowledge, generally, resulted in underestimation or overestimation of 
potential sources of tension, both approaches being as harmful. The failure to understand 
or the partial understanding of certain realities, referring to interethnic phenomena, lead 
to conflicts such as the one from Tirgu Mures (Romania) or the war in Yugoslavia, and 
these are just a couple of examples. 
This research program (generically called Ethnobarometer. Interethnic Relations in 
Moldova) was produced by the Institute of Marketing and Surveys IMAS Inc Chisinau at 
the request of the Institute of Public Policies with the financial support of Soros Founda-
tion-Moldova, and provides additional information about the nature of interethnic rela-
tions in Moldova. The research intended to offer scientifically fundamented data about 
the present ethnic situation in Moldova, the dynamics of representations and stereotypes 
of different ethnic groups, the knowledge and impact of public policies in the field of 
ethnic minorities in Moldova. The six-month research (September 2004-February 2005) 
started with a Delphi Study of people from different social sectors (political, academic, 
nongovernmental, local authorities, media). The Delphi study was exploratory in nature 
and its objective was to collect the necessary information for the development of working 
tools for a quantitative research; to identify the important issues on the Moldovan public 
agenda; the topics, which have generated or generate controversies/conflicts; the most 
important positive and negative attributes describing the ethnic groups; the represen-
tations defining the national identity from different perspectives; the perceptions and 
attitudes towards the political sector, as well as the practical policies in Moldova; and the 
relevant opinion leaders or reference groups that could influence the relationships between 
different ethnic groups from Moldova. All of these topics were included in the question-
naires used for the survey. 
Taking into consideration the share of ethnic groups within the Moldovan population, 
for the quantitative stage the study investigated 2550 persons from five representative 
samples: S1 – Moldovans/Romanians (822); S2 – Russians (412); S3 – Ukrainians (413); 
S4 – Gagauz (472); and S5 – Bulgarians (431). The measured indicators can be grouped 
into the following topics: 
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■ General interethnic climate;
■ Identity – self-identification;
■ Social capital (trust, social distance, participation);
■ Representations – stereotypes;
■ State and minorities;
■ Perception of minority-related legislation;
■ Public agenda (political, economic, social);
■ Political options and orientation;
■ Communication with people belonging to other ethnic groups;
■ Native language and nationality, mutual knowledge of language;
■ Sociodemographic data
Significant Issues and Concerns 
The present research is an attempt to analyze the ethnic situation in Moldova. Thus, 
it bears a rather descriptive and explanatory character. For many analyzed aspects, we 
resorted to a sociodemographic classification by gender, age, education, residential area, 
etc. The sociodemographic characteristics represent one of the most important determi-
nants of social action, regardless of the application field; therefore, the analysis of the 
sociodemographic structure and its influence upon the behavior have been considered a 
mandatory stage in our approach. Obviously, analysts will interpret the results of this 
research before they draw conclusions on the approached topics. 
The survey comprised a subset of questions particularly related to the public agenda, 
political orientations (doctrinary), perceptions regarding the political class and its role 
in the improvement of the interethnic relations, intention to vote for one party or another. 
We will also try to analyze the situation from the perspective of public agenda perception, 
in close connection with the perception of political environment. 
The current concerns, known in the Anglo-Saxon literature as „issues“, influence 
largely the vote. The voter’s interest or concern about different personal or general issues 
(unemployment, crime level, corruption, education, etc.), directs the vote to those political 
parties or candidates who are able to tackle these issues in the most adequate manner. 
The respondents were asked to estimate the severity of the following issues of national 
interest: unemployment, terrorism/violence/guerilla wars, low salaries, violation of human 
rights, health condition, environmental issues, corruption, crime level/insecurity, drug 
trafficking, armed conflicts, ethnic conflicts/tensions, lack of rule of law, lack of press 
freedom, drug abuse, trafficking in women, relations with the Transnistrian region. 
For a better understanding of the respondents’ options from the perspective of prio-
rity given to the above-mentioned issues, we analyzed the common variation of the 16 
issues1 through the factorial analysis2. In our case, we identified three significant factors 
1  I will read a list of issues that our country is currently facing with. Please tell me if you consider each issue crucial, severe 
or not too serious. 
2  Th e factorial analysis allows to outline some „latent variables“ (factors) that determine the common variance of some 
measurable variables. In our case, this is the extent the respondents consider a certain issue important. By defi nition, the 
outlined factors are independent from one another. 
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(explaining 55 percent of the total variation of the 16 issues included in the analysis). 
The following table reflects the matrix of the correlation coefficients3 between each 
statement and factor:
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Trafficking in women 0,737 0,075 0,236
Relations with the Transnistrian region 0,675 0,112 0,148
Drug abuse 0,673 0,290 0,086
Corruption 0,599 0,095 0,372
Drug trafficking 0,559 0,404 0,100
Environmental issues 0,551 0,346 0,213
Crime level/insecurity 0,525 0,306 0,290
Ethnic conflicts/tensions 0,209 0,796 -0,031
Armed conflicts 0,199 0,787 0,029
Terrorism/violence/guerilla wars 0,005 0,697 0,309
Lack of press freedom 0,369 0,639 0,004
Lack of rule of law 0,484 0,531 0,124
Violation of human rights 0,304 0,455 0,438
Low salaries 0,143 -0,023 0,813
Unemployment 0,192 0,057 0,768
Health condition 0,339 0,212 0,572
The factorial analysis outlines three main factors, which explain the variation of 
answers: Society Factor (F1), Conflict Factor (F2) and Poverty Factor (F3). Depending on 
the affirmations (variables) with which they correlate more, these three factors, can be 
characterized as follows:
■ Factor 1 - Society Factor
– Trafficking in women
– Relations with the Transnistrian region
– Drug abuse
– Corruption
– Drug trafficking
– Environmental issues
– Crime level/insecurity
■ Factor 2 - Conflict Factor
– Ethnic conflicts/tensions
– Armed conflicts
– Terrorism/violence/guerilla wars
– Lack of press freedom
3  Th e coeffi  cients vary between -1 and +1. Th e closer the absolute value is to 1, the stronger is the connection between this 
factor and the measured variable. A value close to 0 indicates the absence of a connection between the variable and the factor. 
Th e negative values indicate a negative correlation (the factor determines the disagreement with the statement). Th e coef-
fi cients were calculated through Varimax method. 
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– Lack of rule of law
– Violation of human rights
■ Factor 3 - Poverty Factor
– Low salaries
– Unemployment
– Health condition
Each of these factors has a variable importance for each individual, giving it a specific 
importance. An individual can be influenced in his/her perceptions and attitudes by one 
factor, more factors (equally or differently) or by none.
Through the cluster analysis,4 we determined the existence of five types (classes, seg-
ments) of respondents from the sample. They differ by the relevance of the three factors 
(expressed through average values of the factorial scores):
Segment Respondents’ share within the sample Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
1 19.2% weak rejection -0,348
strong 
rejection -0,745
strong 
rejection -0,945
2 7.1% strong attraction 1,297
weak 
attraction 0,239
strong 
rejection -1,144
3 20.1% strong attraction 0,955
strong 
rejection -0,861
strong 
attraction 0,738
4 35.9% neutral -0,028 strong attraction 0,940 neutral -0,176
5 17.7% strong rejection -1,164
weak 
rejection -0,217
strong 
attraction 1,001
Classification of segments 
Segment 1: „Our problems are not too serious“ – 19.2%
■ This is the segment, considering that Moldova’s problems are not very serious: the 
social problems (corruption, drug abuse/drug trafficking, environmental issues, 
etc.) or conflicts (armed, ethnic, lack of press freedom, human rights etc.) are not 
4  Th e cluster analysis groups the individuals in exclusive categories depending on the resemblance of the 
answers to a set of questions (in our case it is the agreement or disagreement with the ten statements). We 
used the K-means method, with tens of iterations.
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considered to be serious, while poverty (unemployment, low salaries, health con-
dition) represents a phenomenon which requires, however, more attention5;
■ This segment is specific to the individuals with higher education, people living in 
urban areas and Russians; 
Segment 2: „The problems are very serious in the absence of a rule of law“ - 7.1%
■ This is the segment of respondents, which considers the social problems (especially 
trafficking in human beings, relations with the Transnistrian region), very critical. 
The social problems are followed by conflicts (especially armed and ethnic conflicts, 
the absence of rule of law), while poverty (unemployment, low salaries, health con-
dition) is considered less serious than the above-mentioned phenomena; 
■ This segment is specific to individuals living in urban areas, Moldovans and Russians;
Segment 3: „Corruption and poverty“ – 20.1%
■ This is the segment of people who consider that social problems (particularly 
trafficking in persons, corruption, relations with the Transnistrian region) and the 
problems generated by poverty are very critical. 
■  Violations of laws and human rights are issues that need to be addressed. The issue of 
potential armed and ethnic conflicts or tensions is less perceived by this segment;
5  Th e values that are signifi cantly higher than the total per sample, are circled.
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■ This is specific to people living in rural areas, people with secondary education, 
and Moldovans;
Segment 4: „If our rights are not respected, we will fight for them“ – 35.9%
■ This is the segment of people who consider that human rights are not respected 
and that this is a major issue; conflicts (ethnic or eventual armed confrontations, 
even terrorism) are perceived as highly possible.
■ This is specific to people living in urban areas, Gagauz and Bulgarians;
Segment 5: „Poverty is everywhere“ – 17.7%
■ This is the segment perceiving poverty and unemployment as crucial problems;
■ This segment is specific to people living in rural areas, people with general and 
vocational education, Ukrainians and Gagauz; 
Thus, we can also notice in the following table (Table 1), that throughout the sample, 
poverty is perceived as being the most serious problem in Moldova; the society is also 
concerned with high crime level, corruption, trafficking in women, an unsatisfactory 
relationship with Transnistrian region (issues generically grouped under Society) 
The violations of rights, whether mass media or human rights in general, the potential 
ethnic conflicts, armed confrontations or even terrorist threats are considered to be 
issues that have reached the limit to become also serious. The order of these factors is not 
preserved for all population segments, in other words, the priority of issues does not 
coincide with the order of priority at the national level. 
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Segment Total
Sample1 2 3 4 5
PO
V
ER
T
Y
Fa
ct
or
Low salaries 2,1 2,1 2,9 2,4 2,9 2,5
Unemployment 2,0 2,2 2,9 2,5 2,8 2,5
Health condition 1,9 2,2 2,6 2,4 2,4 2,3
Total factor: 2,0 2,2 2,8 2,4 2,7 2,4
SO
C
IE
T
Y
Fa
ct
or
Trafficking in women 2,0 2,8 2,8 2,3 1,9 2,3
Relations with Transnistria 2,0 2,7 2,7 2,3 1,8 2,2
Drug abuse 1,9 2,6 2,4 2,3 1,8 2,1
Corruption 2,0 2,6 2,8 2,4 2,1 2,3
Drug trafficking 1,8 2,5 2,3 2,3 1,8 2,1
Environmental issues 1,8 2,5 2,4 2,4 1,9 2,1
Crime level/insecurity 1,8 2,5 2,5 2,3 2,0 2,2
Total factor: 1,9 2,6 2,5 2,3 1,9 2,2
C
O
N
FL
IC
T
S
Fa
ct
or
Ethnic conflicts/tensions 1,3 2,2 1,5 2,3 1,6 1,8
Armed conflicts 1,3 2,2 1,5 2,4 1,6 1,8
Terrorism/violence/guerilla wars 1,4 1,8 1,7 2,4 1,9 1,9
Lack of rule of law 1,7 2,4 2,2 2,4 1,7 2,1
Lack of press freedom 1,5 2,3 1,8 2,3 1,5 1,9
Violation of human rights 1,7 2,1 2,3 2,4 2,1 2,1
Total factor: 1,5 2,2 1,8 2,3 1,8 1,9
Table 1. The average values for the following question: „I will read you a list of issues our country 
is facing with. For each issue, I would like to ask you to tell me if you consider it crucial (3 points), 
serious (2 points), or not too serious (1 point).
We deal with a different perception of daily realities, which differs depending on the 
level of education, residence area and ethnic background. We notice two worlds: a rural 
world, which perceives poverty and unemployment as crucial (85 percent of the 
households live below decent conditions); and an urban world preoccupied mostly with 
the respect of human rights, rule of law and includes a significant segment of people who 
consider that the problems are not as bad as they seem. Thirty percent of these can afford 
to live a decent life. Another clear differentiation can be noticed in the perceptions at the 
ethnic level: 
– Moldovans are mostly preoccupied with issues included in the Society category 
(trafficking in persons, corruption, settlement of the Transnistrian issue) and 
issues related to Poverty; 
– Russians form an ethnic group with the highest share of people who consider that 
the situation is not very serious; 
– Gagauz and Bulgarians complain about violation of rights. They also represent the 
segment of people who believe that there is a high potential of conflicts, therefore, 
this issue should receive maximal attention;
– Ukrainians and Gagauz have the highest share in the number of population that 
perceives the issues of poverty and unemployment as extremely serious.
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A different perception of the daily realities, which noticeable varies depending on 
the ethnic background, is the first sign confirming the central hypothesis of our work. 
A brief analysis of the living standards, income, and occupations reveals again the 
differences between ethnic groups: Russians and Bulgarians are the ones who declare 
that they manage to save or even buy more expensive things. Incomes over 1,000 Lei are 
more frequent among them. Moldovans and Ukrainians dominate the other extreme 
 Sample Total
Moldovans Russians Ukrainians Gagauz Bulgarians Sample
Are you pre-
sently employed?
Yes
No
33% 35% 27% 32% 39% 33%
67% 65% 73% 68% 61% 67%
What is your 
household inco-
me?
Under 400 Lei 39% 24% 40% 30% 24% 32%
401-1000 lei 30% 31% 33% 40% 42% 35%
Over 1000 lei 14% 25% 16% 11% 24% 17%
Don’t know/No answer 17% 21% 12% 19% 10% 16%
How do you es-
timate the cur-
rent income of 
your family
Money is not enough 
even for food 40% 33% 41% 46% 34% 39%
Money is enough only 
for food…. 43% 39% 39% 37% 42% 40%
We have money for 
food and clothes, we can 
even save some money.
14% 21% 18% 15% 21% 17%
We can afford to buy mo-
re expensive things... 3% 6% 2% 1% 3% 3%
We can afford to buy 
anything we want 1% 1% 0% 1% 0% 1%
The values that are significantly higher than the total per sample are highlighted
Interethnic Climate
In order to provide more details about the analysis of perceptions regarding the evolu-
tion of interethnic relations, the respondents were asked to make a qualitative assessment 
of these relations at different times in the history of the Republic of Moldova. 
Ethnic 
group
Sample
M
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ns
+ - + - + - + - + -
Moldovans 30% 27% 24% 28% 31% 18% 29% 18%
Russians 28% 35% 15% 8% 29% 4% 28% 6%
Ukrainians 23% 19% 20% 9% 24% 7% 25% 7%
Gagauz 16% 17% 14% 7% 6% 6% 27% 9%
Bulgarians 14% 15% 15% 6% 5% 4% 23% 5%
Table 2. In your opinion, are the present relations between [sample] and [ethnic group] from 
Moldova better or worse than 15 years ago? „+“ – percentage for answers much better and 
somewhat better; „-“ – percentage for answers much worse and somewhat worse. 
ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 17
Ethnic 
group
Sample
M
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+ - + - + - + - + -
Moldovans 28% 24% 21% 13% 28% 15% 30% 12%
Russians 26% 28% 14% 6% 24% 6% 30% 4%
Ukrainians 20% 14% 18% 9%  19% 6% 26% 4%
Gagauz 13% 17% 11% 8% 4% 5% 27% 8%
Bulgarians 13% 11% 12% 7% 4% 4% 19% 6%
Table 3. In your opinion, are the present relations between [sample] and [ethnic group] from 
Moldova better or worse than 5 years ago? „+“ – percentage for answers much better and somewhat 
better; „-“ – percentage for answers much worse and somewhat worse. 
Ethnic 
group
Sample
M
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+ - + - + - + - + -
Moldovans 22% 21% 19% 10% 29% 12% 28% 9%
Russians 21% 24% 13% 6% 25% 5% 28% 4%
Ukrainians 17% 14% 14% 9% 21% 6% 23% 5%
Gagauz 13% 13% 8% 8% 4% 4% 27% 6%
Bulgarians 12% 8% 10% 7% 4% 3% 19% 6%
Table 4. In your opinion, are the present relations between [sample] and [ethnic group] from 
Moldova better or worse than last year? „+“ – percentage for answers much better and somewhat 
better; „-“ – percentage for answers much worse and somewhat worse. 
■ Only among Moldovans the dominant opinion of their relations with Russians is 
that these were better 15 years ago. However, Moldovans do not have a dominant 
opinion regarding their relations with other ethnic groups (Ukrainians, Gagauz, 
and Bulgarians). In other words, there is no significant difference between the 
shares of those who consider that the relations with other ethnic groups are better 
or worse, regardless if they consider the period before the independence or a more 
recent time;
■ The relationship between Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians and Moldovans 
is rather perceived as improving, however it has a specific: Next to the relationship 
with Moldovans we find significant shares of those who consider that this relation-
ship was better before the nineties;
■ The relationships between Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians are generally 
perceived as obviously improving. 
■ Bulgarians are more convinced that the interethnic climate that exists between 
them and other ethnic groups is continuously improving. In their opinion, there 
are no major differences between them regardless of the period. Almost 30% 
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believe that the relationships with other ethic groups are better or much better 
than 15 years ago, 5 years ago or last year, while the share of those, who believe that 
the relations are worse, is much smaller. One should mention that the relationship 
with Moldovans was regarded by one in five Bulgarians as much better than before 
the independence of Moldova. 
State and minorities
This section investigates the perception of the role of state: both the role of the 
external national homeland towards its ethnonational kin (Russia for the Russians living 
in Moldova, Moldova for Moldovans living in other countries, etc.), and the role of the 
nationalizing state. 
The role of state
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support […] 
students stu-
dying abroad
92% 3% 87% 6% 86% 6% 77% 10% 80% 8% 90% 3%
support […] 
businesses 
abroad
75% 13% 78% 13% 78% 12% 70% 16% 72% 14% 85% 5%
support […] 
cultural organi-
zations abroad 
81% 8% 78% 14% 77% 14% 68% 18% 71% 17% 82% 8%
Table 5. Perception of the roles of different states (results from Moldovans sample) The brackets 
[…] should be filled in with ethnic groups related with the associated state e.g. Russia’s role is to 
„support Russian students…“, Ukraine’s role is to „support Ukrainian students…“, etc. 
When evaluating the role of the external national homeland in similar situations, 
Moldovans are consistent, regarding the roles of Russia, Ukraine and Romania. However, 
they tend to be inconsistent when speaking about the role of Turkey or Bulgaria in suppor-
ting the Gagauz and Bulgarians from Moldova. One can notice differences particularly 
regarding the support that the Moldovan state should offer to Moldovan students stu-
dying abroad, and acceptance of Turkey and Bulgaria’s support of Gagauz and Bulgarian 
students. In other words, Moldovans do not recognize and do not accept in the same 
manner the prerogatives of Turkey and Bulgaria towards their ethnonational kin living 
in Moldova, especially when the support of students or cultural organizations is involved. 
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This is explained by a lower trust in these ethnic groups, which generates a desire for a 
larger social distance from these groups (see results from Social Capital chapter). In 
addition, the Gagauz autonomy and their desire to separate have affected the trust and 
tolerance of Moldovans towards this group, especially when the Transnistrian conflict 
risks resulting in another separation. The same inconsistency of appreciations is found 
among Russians and Ukrainians, when these refer to the support offered by Turkey and 
Bulgaria to their ethnonational kin living in Moldova.
Sample
Moldovans Russians Ukrainians Gagauz Bulgarians
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a. Russians have… 22% 4% 5% 20% 6% 11% 9% 7% 9% 14%
a. Ukrainians have… 11% 6% 3% 19% 1% 16% 3% 9% 3% 17%
b. Gagauz have… 10% 7% 3% 19% 2% 10% 6% 15% 10% 13%
a. Bulgarians have… 7% 6% 2% 20% 2% 11% 3% 9% 2% 22%
b. Romanians have… 6% 10% 13% 10% 6% 7% 6% 3% 9% 8%
Table 6. Perception of legislation on minorities. How do you appreciate the Law on the rights of 
minorities in Moldova?
One of the most debated issues when speaking about minorities is related to their 
rights, especially the sufficiency or insufficiency of these rights. Of course, in our case 
we deal with a subjective understanding of the terms „sufficient“ and „insufficient“, the 
meanings assigned by the majority or minorities are probably different, based on personal 
experiences“. However, the tendency is clear and can be easily observed in Table 6. Mol-
dovans (as majority population) consider Russians as being the ethnic group benefiting 
from most privileges, while the differences for the rest of the ethnic groups are minimal. 
The minority ethnic groups (Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians) believe that they 
are deprived from some rights that they are entitled to. 
Identity and otherness
The way people identify themselves depends on the way they act and relate to the 
others. The perceptions and practices of individuals are structured according to the way 
they identify themselves. We identify ourselves with a certain culture (language, traditions, 
customs, specific ways of doing things, etc.), with a certain collective history, as well as 
with a certain potential for mobilization when ethnic/national issues are con cerned. 
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The term identity is difficult to grasp and to conceptualize in measurable indicators. 
Concerning nationalism and interethnic relations, one reached a consensus on the inter-
pretation of ethnicity and ethnic identity by applying a constructivist approach; Thomas 
Eriksen6 stresses that „ethnicity appears and becomes relevant in and through social 
situa tions and interactions, and the way people react to these situations“. Identification 
also means appeal to certain categories of representations and descriptions.
The opposition is considered a universal mechanism in the process of identification: 
one individual or group identifies itself in opposition to other individuals or groups; very 
often one tends to attribute positive features to his/her ethnic group in opposition to the 
other groups (which are assigned with the opposite negative features). We will ana lyze 
the data from the Ethnobarometer survey in accordance with this theoretical framework, 
looking at some aspects of self-identification and hetero-identification. We will examine 
the existence of a different potential in the way one defines one’s own identity and the 
identity of other ethnic groups. The starting premise is that the logic of their definition is 
different in case of the ethnic groups covered by us. On the other hand, we aim to detect 
the similarities and differences between hetero-identification and self-definition for each 
ethnic group, as well as the similarities and differences regarding the fundamentals in 
the definition of our own identity and the identity of other ethnic groups. 
SELF-DEFINITION HETERO-DEFINITION
Moldovans define …the identity fundamentals of Moldovans
…the identity fundamentals of other 
ethnic groups
Russians defines …the identity fundamentals of Russians
…the identity fundamentals of other 
ethnic groups
Ukrainians define …the identity fundamentals of Ukrainians
…the identity fundamentals of other 
ethnic groups
Gagauz define …the identity fundamentals of Gagauz …the identity fundamentals of other ethnic groups
Bulgarians define …the identity fundamentals of Bulgarians
…the identity fundamentals of other 
ethnic groups
Table 7. Analysis scheme of identity definition 
The perspective adopted by this research is constructivist: the identity is formed based 
on certain social processes; it changes and reforms itself through the means of social 
relations. The social structure determines the social processes involved in the emergence 
and preservation of identity. The causality between identities and social structure is 
circular, thus, identities can influence the social structure. Alternatively, the specific 
social structures generate certain types of identity, which are relatively stable and whose 
stability level is determined socially. 
6  Eriksen, T. H. (1993), Ethnicity and Nationalism. Anthropological Perspectives, London, Pluto Press.
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We will undertake a brief discussion on a functional conceptual couple and speci-
fically identity-otherness, the mandatory task for the approach of the present research. 
The identity, the capacity of an object to be itself, can be understood only in relation with 
the otherness, explicitly in relation with the assumption that an external reality of the 
analyzed object exists, a relation which is different from the internal reality attributed to 
the object. The theory of social identity outlines briefly the relation between the individual 
and collective identity, and this relation is built up on a difference, contrast development 
and emphasis on an otherness.7 Social identity is the psychological structure that links 
the individual with the group and accepts categorial processes and behaviors: that part 
of the concept of oneself (Mead’s „I“, 1934), which derives from the conscience of affilia-
tion with one or more social groups or categories8. The distinction between the self-per-
cep tion, as a single individual, and the self-perception as a pattern belonging to a category, 
could explain the different psychological functioning at individual and group level. 
In order to understand the mechanisms of self- and hetero-definition, it is necessary 
to understand the relationships between the identity and self-identification, between 
other ness and hetero-definition, accordingly. 
a) The differences between the in-group and the out-group are established mainly 
based on mechanisms of opposition or polar organization of information;
b) Self- and hetero-identification are linked to a series of psychological rules and 
constants related to the attribution processes;
Attribution is ‘rendering a judgment, inferring something, an intuition, a quality, a 
feeling of one’s own condition or the condition of an individual starting from an object, 
a disposition, position in space, a gesture, a state of mind“9. In other words, the attribution 
is nothing else than the process of emergence of a causality for explaining the events and 
processes around us. It has a significant explanatory function, being the individuals’ 
causal interpretation of the social world. In 1972, Schopler and Layton emphasized on 
the scholars’ tendency to relate the internal causes to success (accordingly, own skills and 
own qualities) and external causes to failures (accordingly, students’ indiscipline, their 
incapacity of studying). Beyond the fact that this became a classic example, quoted 
by the social psychologists, when talking about attribution processes, we should keep 
in mind that when we relate ourselves to success - we make internal attributions for 
in-group and external attributions for out-group. We find, thus, the following arguments: 
we owe our success to our qualities and ourselves, while the failure is the work of the 
others. This way, we try to maintain a relatively high self-esteem, relating our successes 
to internal causes and our failures to external causes. We emphasized this example in 
7  Lorenzi-Cioldi, F.-Doise, W., (1997), „Identitate socială şi identitate personală“, citat în Bourhis R. Y.-Leyens, 
J-F. (eds.), Stereotipuri, discriminare şi relaţii intergrupuri, Iaşi: Polirom, p. 53.
8  Capozza, Dora, Volpato, Chiara, (1997), „Relaţii intergrupuri: perspective clasice şi contemporane“, citat 
în Bourhis R. Y.-Leyens, J-F. (eds.), Stereotipuri, discriminare şi relaţii intergrupuri, Iaşi: Polirom, p. 22.
9  Moscovici, S., (1972), L’homme en interaction: machine a repondre ou machine a inferer, în Moscovici, S. (ed.) 
Introduction a la psychologie sociale (vol. 2), Paris: Larousse, p. 60.
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order to distinguish the bipolar logic where the self- and hetero-definitions emerge. By 
projecting the mechanisms of affiliation to ethnic groups, we can identify the ethnocentrism 
as the main error of attribution. 
The term ethnocentrism, introduced by Summer in 1906, means „bias in favor of 
in-group, a phenomenon where the members of a group favor the peers within their group 
(showing them positive attitudes and assigning positive stereotypes), at the expense of 
the individuals belonging to different group of affiliation“10.
We will use the theory of social identity developed by Tajfel as a starting point in 
the conceptualization of identity, underlining several key-elements that will support our 
analysis:
• Internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity is one of the principles of 
in-group11 and out-group structure. The tendency is to perceive the out-group more 
homogeneously due to proximity and visibility reasons. The studies showed that 
the minorities perceive themselves and are perceived by others as being more 
homogeneous12. 
• Another key-element is the representations of differences in status among the 
groups. The groups with a higher status tend to perceive in a more homogeneous 
and general manner than the group with a lower status. 
• An important distinction we must make in our research is the distinction between 
primordialists/ericksonians and interactionists/optionalists.13 The primor dia-
lists conceptualize the identity as an objective and unalterable gift, a substantial 
and structural element of genetic nature, while the interactionists view it as 
something developed in interaction with others, therefore it can be changed and 
restructured. 
We start from the hypothesis that there are potentially different reasons for the way 
in which the Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians define their own 
identity and the identity of other ethnic groups. Therefore, we will try to see if there are 
elements that could lead to substantial differentiations among the ways in which the 
above-mentioned ethnic groups relate to their identity. 
The first typology we will use is the hard definition versus soft definition. 
a) The hard definition includes sets of criteria of „objective gift“ type, more precisely, 
10  Dechamps, J.C.-Beauvois, J.L., (1997), „Atribuiri intergrupuri“, în Bourhis R. Y.-Leyens, J-F. (eds.), Stereoti-
puri, discriminare şi relaţii intergrupuri, Iaşi: Polirom, p. 53.
11  In-group=group of affi  liation, the group with which the individual affi  liates based on resemblance and 
inclusion reasons. 
12  Mullen B.-Hu, L., (1989), „Perceptions of In-group and Out-group Variability: A Meta-Analytic Integra-
tion“, Basic and Applied Psychology, 10, pp.233-253, citat în Bourhis R. Y.-Leyens, J-F. (eds.), Stereotipuri, 
discrimi nare şi relaţii intergrupuri, Iaşi: Polirom, p. 22.
13  Gleason, P., (1983), „Identifying Identity: A semantic Hystory“, citat în Soreanu, Raluca, (2005), „Auto-
defi nire şi heterodefi nire a românilor şi maghiarilor“, în Bădescu, G., Kivu, M., Robotin, M. (editori), (2005), 
„Barome trul Relaţiilor Etnice 1994-2002. O perspectivă a climatului interetnic din România“, Cluj-Napoca: 
Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală“, p. 68.
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criteria that are independent from the individual’s will, like parents belonging to a 
certain ethnic group. Next to this, in the answer grid, we can find criteria such as 
territorial (be born in Moldova, Russia etc.), linguistic (speak Romanian, Russian, 
Ukrainian, etc as native language or speak Romanian, Russian, Ukrainian in the 
family) and legal (hold Moldovan, Russian etc. citizenship)
b) The fundamentals of the soft definition are found at the intersection of the cultural 
sphere and subjective revaluation of symbols and practices (to honor the national 
symbols, particularly the flag, to feel a culture as one’s own, to respect the traditions 
of a culture, to feel Moldovan, Russian etc.).
First 
choice
 Second 
choice
 Third 
choice Total
a. Must have Moldovan parents 36% 10% 5% 51%
b. Must speak Moldovan/Romanian in the family 19% 20% 9% 48%
c. Must respect Moldovan traditions 8% 16% 12% 36%
d. Must feel Moldovan 8% 11% 11% 30%
e. Must perceive Moldovan culture as his/her own culture 3% 10% 10% 23%
f. Must perceive Romanian culture as his/her own culture1 2% 3% 3% 9%
g. Must respect the Moldovan national flag 1% 3% 5% 9%
h. Must live in Moldova 5% 6% 14% 26%
i. Must be a native Moldovan/Romanian speaker 5% 7% 9% 21%
j. Must have Moldovan citizenship 4% 8% 9% 21%
k. Must be born in Moldova 7% 4% 8% 18%
Table 8. Self-identification Moldovans 14 
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a. Must have Moldovan parents 45% 40% 48% 55%
b. Must speak Moldovan/Romanian in their family 33% 25% 32% 35%
c. Must respect Moldovan traditions 31% 30% 27% 34%
d. Must feel Moldovan 37% 29% 29% 36%
e. Must perceive Moldovan culture as his/her own culture 31% 26% 20% 27%
f. Must perceive Romanian culture as their own culture 6% 5% 11% 11%
g. Must honor the Moldovan National flag 9% 6% 11% 12%
h. Must live in Moldova 27% 21% 26% 24%
i. Must be a native Moldovan/Romanian speaker 29% 35% 25% 25%
j. Must have Moldovan citizenship 16% 13% 18% 13%
k. Must be born in Moldova 12% 10% 6% 9%
Table 9. Hetero identification Moldovans15
14  Th e Moldovans defi ne the Moldovan ethnic group. Th e question from the survey reads: „In your opinion, 
which are the three most important things that give a person the right to be considered a MOLDOVAN? Th e 
respondents were asked to provide maximum three options. Th e diff erence to 100 percent for each column 
represents the unaswered questions. Same requirements were applied to other ethnic groups. 
15  Th e other ethnic groups (Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians) defi ne the fundamentals for the iden-
tifi cation of the Moldovan ethnic group.
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First 
choice
 Second 
choice
 Third 
choice Total
a. Must have Russian parents 34% 6% 6% 46%
b. Must speak Russian in the family 14% 13% 11% 38%
c. Must respect Russian traditions 9% 12% 9% 31%
d. Must feel Russian 13% 18% 11% 42%
e. Must perceive Russian culture as his/her own culture 8% 12% 9% 29%
f. Must honor the Russian national flag 1% 5% 4% 10%
g. Must live in Russia 4% 7% 8% 19%
h. Must be a native speaker of Russian language 7% 12% 15% 34%
i. Must have Russian citizenship 2% 4% 8% 14%
j. Must be born in Russia 5% 5% 8% 18%
Table 10. Self-identification Russians 
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a. Must have Russian parents 48% 44% 47% 51%
b. Must speak Russian in the family 38% 27% 33% 37%
c. Must respect Russian traditions 32% 30% 27% 34%
d. Must feel Russian 26% 29% 24% 36%
e. Must perceive Russian culture as own culture 21% 25% 23% 30%
f. Must honor the Russian national fl ag 10% 8% 9% 12%
g. Must live in Russia 21% 12% 19% 21%
h. Must be a native speaker of Russian language 26% 37% 33% 32%
i. Must have Russian citizenship 23% 15% 18% 19%
j. Must be born in Russia 23% 12% 14% 10%
Table 11. Hetero-identification Russians 
First 
choice
 Second 
choice
 Third 
choice Total
a. Must have Ukrainian parents 33% 11% 7% 48%
b. Must speak Ukrainian in the family 10% 15% 7% 29%
c. Must respect Ukrainian traditions 7% 10% 15% 29%
d. Must feel Ukrainian 11% 16% 13% 37%
e. Must perceive Ukrainian culture as own culture 6% 10% 12% 25%
f. Must honor the Ukrainian National flag 1% 3% 3% 6%
g. Must live in Ukraine 4% 4% 5% 12%
h. Must be a native speaker of Ukrainian 20% 9% 14% 40%
i. Must have Ukrainian citizenship 2% 4% 8% 13%
j. Must be born in Ukraine 3% 3% 7% 12%
Table 12. Self-identification Ukrainians 
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a. Must have Ukrainian parents 49% 47% 49% 53%
b. Must speak Ukrainian in the family 37% 34% 31% 39%
c. Must respect Ukrainian traditions 32% 32% 29% 32%
d. Must feel Ukrainian 27% 37% 24% 38%
e. Must perceive Ukrainian culture as his/her own culture 22% 27% 22% 30%
f. Must honor the Ukrainian National flag 9% 10% 10% 13%
g. Must live in Ukraine 20% 20% 18% 18%
h. Must be a native Ukrainian speaker 24% 28% 34% 30%
i. Must have Ukrainian citizenship 22% 13% 15% 15%
j. Must be born in Ukraine 20% 16% 13% 10%
Table 13. Hetero identification Ukrainians 
First 
choice
 Second 
choice
 Third 
choice Total
a. Must have Gagauz parents 40% 9% 7% 56%
b. Must speak Gagauz in the family 13% 16% 8% 38%
c. Must respect Gagauz traditions 9% 9% 15% 33%
d. Must feel Gagauz 9% 13% 9% 31%
e. Must perceive Gagauz culture as his/her own culture 3% 11% 11% 25%
f. Must honor the Gagauz National flag 2% 7% 5% 14%
g. Must live in the Gagauz region 7% 11% 14% 32%
h. Must be a native Gagauz speaker 6% 11% 14% 31%
i. Must be born in the Gagauz region 3% 6% 6% 16%
Table 14. Self-identification Gagauz 
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a. Must have Gagauz parents 48% 47% 39% 55%
b. Must speak Gagauz in the family 37% 33% 21% 41%
c. Must respect Gagauz traditions 35% 29% 22% 35%
d. Must feel Gagauz 26% 34% 25% 36%
e. Must perceive Gagauz culture as his/her own culture 23% 30% 23% 29%
f. Must honor the Gagauz national flag 9% 8% 8% 18%
g. Must live in the Gagauz region 27% 33% 24% 27%
h. Must be a native Gagauz speaker 24% 27% 32% 27%
i. Must be born in the Gagauz region 22% 17% 14% 10%
Table 15. Hetero identification Gagauz 
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First 
choice
 Second 
choice
 Third 
choice Total
a. Must have Bulgarian parents 45% 7% 6% 59%
b. Must speak Bulgarian language in the family 18% 22% 7% 46%
c. Must respect Bulgarian traditions 9% 10% 17% 36%
d. Must feel Bulgarian 12% 13% 13% 38%
e. Must perceive Bulgarian culture as its own culture 3% 13% 16% 31%
f. Must honor the Bulgarian national flag 0% 7% 6% 13%
g. Must live in Bulgaria 2% 5% 3% 10%
h. Must be a native Bulgarian speaker 2% 13% 17% 32%
i. Must have Bulgarian citizenship 2% 4% 6% 12%
j. Must be born in Bulgaria 3% 1% 3% 6%
Table 16. Self-identification Bulgarians 
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a. Must have Bulgarian parents 49% 48% 36% 49%
b. Must speak Bulgarian language in the family 38% 34% 22% 32%
c. Must respect Bulgarian traditions 34% 29% 24% 33%
d. Must feel Bulgarian 26% 36% 25% 25%
e. Must perceive Bulgarian culture as his/her own culture 22% 29% 22% 21%
f. Must honor the Bulgarian national flag 8% 8% 7% 11%
g. Must live in Bulgaria 15% 14% 10% 17%
h. Must be a native Bulgarian speaker 24% 32% 35% 30%
i. Must have Bulgarian citizenship 18% 13% 11% 14%
j. Must be born in Bulgaria 19% 15% 13% 13%
Table 17. Hetero-identification Bulgarians
Tables 8-17 show that the members of the five ethnic groups mainly choose the hard 
criteria for the definition of their identity. These, in fact, refer to objective conditions, 
which do not depend on the individual decision or subjectivity, particularly the blood 
relations and language. This „hard“ core mentioned by the participants in the research is 
followed by the „soft“ criteria in the hierarchy of self-definition criteria. At this time one 
can notice a first differentiation between the ethnic groups: while the Moldovans choose 
the traditions as identification element, the other ethnic groups choose a vaguer and 
more general element included in the statement „I feel Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, 
Bulgarian“. 
The identity is seen mainly in terms that emphasize the kinship and the language 
crite rion, and then subjective elements become valued. The Moldovans express their 
affilia tion with a culture by respecting the traditions, while the rest of the ethnic groups 
have the tendency to choose a vaguer and more general criterion, which is the one to 
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„feel Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz or Bulgarian“. This proves that for the rest of the ethnic 
groups, their cultural identity and the links with a certain culture are vague. 
One can notice a tendency of using the same definition pattern for all ethnic groups, 
both for their own identity and for the identity of other ethnic groups. The scheme from 
below tries to synthesize these patterns, showing small nuances and differences:
Ethnic 
group
Main elements used 
in self-identification
Main elements used 
in hetero-identification
Specific 
elements
Moldovans
Blood relations
Language spoken in the 
family
Respecting traditions
Blood relations
Language spoken in the 
family
Respecting traditions
x
Russians
Blood relations
Language spoken in the 
family
To feel Russian
Blood relations
Language spoken in the 
family
 To feel Russian, Bulgarian
-hetero-identification for 
Gagauz:
To live in Gagauzia region
Ukrainians
Blood relations
Mother tongue
To feel Ukrainian
Blood relations
Mother tongue
-hetero-identification for 
Moldovans:
Respecting traditions
Gagauz
Blood relations
Language spoken in the 
family
Blood relations
Language spoken in the 
family
-hetero-identification for 
Russians and Ukrainians:
 Mother tongue
-hetero-identification for 
Bulgarians:
Respecting traditions
Bulgarians
Blood relations
Language spoken in the 
family
To feel Bulgarian
Blood relations
Language spoken in the 
family
 To feel Russian, Bulgarian
-hetero-identification for 
Russians, Ukrainians and 
Gagauz:
Respecting traditions
-hetero-identification for 
Russians:
Mother tongue
Table 18. Elements used for self and hetero-identification.
We can assert that there are no major differences in reasoning one’s own identify and 
the identity of other groups. Thus, hard criteria are used. Regarding the soft criteria, the 
only nuance which can be noticed is the selection by Moldovans self- and hetero-identi-
fication element, the criteria of respecting traditions, while the tendency for other ethnic 
groups (Russians, Ukrainians and Bulgarians) is to choose a more general criterion, the 
one to feel Moldovan, Russian, etc. The conformity of the definition models refutes a 
hypo thesis of the present research or, to be more precise, its confirmation that could be 
only partial and related to two cultural elements, used for identification. The theoretical 
expectation was that the ethnic groups develop different models of reasoning their iden-
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tity and the identity of other groups. This agreement could be interpreted as an openness 
of the ethnic groups from Moldova towards inclusion practices, with mechanisms for 
gene ration and justification of identity, perceived in a (relatively) similar manner. 
Another classification relates to identity alternatives such as civic identity, defined 
in relation with the state structure (and which implies a legal-formal affiliation), ethnic 
identity, which implies a kind of cultural affiliation, and the alternative identity, parti-
cularly local and regional (CIS, Europe). 
Concerning self-identification based on civic, ethic/national and local/regional 
dimen sions, the answers to the question, „Which of the following statements describe 
best your identity?“ were the following16. 
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Moldovan/Russian/Ukrainian/ Gagauz/Bulgarian 81% 58% 71% 81% 79%
Romanian 14% - - - -
Resident of this locality 32% 36% 42% 43% 34%
Citizen of Moldova 57% 68% 64% 46% 55%
CIS Resident 3% 12% 12% 14% 15%
European 6% 7% 3% 6% 10%
Eastern European 0% 1% 0% 1% 0%
Don’t know/No answer 7% 18% 8% 9% 7%
We can see again a valuation of ethnic identity, with the exception of Russians who 
chose rather a civic identity. It is surprising that Moldovans did not choose more often 
the territorial elements (to be born in Moldova, to live in Moldova) or the legal-formal 
elements (to have Moldovan citizenship), which shows an identity that is not fixed in a 
clearly determined space. The young nature of the Moldovan state and the Transnistrian 
conflict sustains the above-mentioned statements. 
For comparison, we present you the data of the 2002 Barometer of Ethnic Relations 
in Romania17, which shows that Romanians often perceive their identity in very different 
terms. The Romanians particularly focus on civic identity (to be Romanian is… to be 
born in Romania (64 percent), to have Romanian citizenship (37 percent) combined 
with elements of ethnic identity of linguistic nature (to be Romanian is to …be a native 
Romanian speaker (42 percent). 
The mixed strategy, which combines a local territorial identity with larger spaces 
(Europe, Eastern Europe, CIS) was not chosen by many respondents. However, one can 
easily notice the tendency of other ethnic groups to lean towards CIS space rather than 
Europe. Considering their background and the geographic position of the country, Bulga-
rians tend to equal these two identity options (CIS/Europe). It is worth mentioning that 
16  Th e respondents had the opportunity to provide maximum two answers.
17  Conducted by Metro Media Transilvania, Cluj-Napoca. 
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the lowest share among the ethnic groups, that chose to identify with CIS Space, is repre-
sented by Moldovans (3%). However, the share of other ethnic groups that identified 
themselves in a similar manner varies between 12 and 15 percent, which means that the 
chances that these groups develop a supra-national identity are directed towards CIS, 
rather than European or Eastern European space. 
As a final remark, regarding this chapter of identity, we could outline the existence 
of certain automatisms, answers that can also show an insufficiently shaped image, 
regarding other groups. Ukrainians, for example, tend to perceive the identity of other 
groups through the prism of parents and mother tongue- this is the order for all their 
hetero-identifications of other ethnic groups. This could be a sign of „transfers“ from the 
model of identification applied to their own group, to others, transfers that could be in 
fact based on the non-recognition of the other. 
Native language and nationality. 
Mutual knowledge of language
As we emphasized in the previous chapter, most of ethnic groups from Moldova define 
their ethnic affiliation through native language (or the language spoken in the family).
The tendency, as we can notice in table 19, is to preserve the native language; in other 
words, there is congruence between nationality and declared native language. We want 
to emphasize that a significant percentage of people from other ethnic groups, except for 
the Moldovans, declare their native language as Russian, even though they belong to a 
different ethnic group. 
Ethnic 
group
Declared mother tongue
Romanian Russian Ukrainian Gagauz Bulgarian
Moldovans 98% 2% 1% - -
Russians 9% 94% 3% 1% -
Ukrainians 4% 25% 82% - -
Gagauz - 14% - 97% 1%
Bulgarians 7% 22% 1% 2% 92%
Table 19. Nationality and declared native language (respondents were given the possibility to offer 
more answers to the question about their native language. 
Probably, the percentage of Moldovans declaring Russian as their native language 
would have been higher several years ago, when Russian was the official language. 
The results registered after the analysis of the answers to the questions backed these 
affirmations. According to them, 7 percent of Moldovans speak Russian more frequently 
than Romanian in their family; one in five Moldovans considers that there should be two 
official languages (these are usually persons aged 30-44, who have not completed their 
high school education) and approximately 85 percent of Moldovans manage to make 
themselves understood when speaking Russian. 
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Ethnic 
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Language
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1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Moldovans 91% 5% 2% 56% 32% 7% 27% 35% 24% 2% 4% 13% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 1%
Russians 12% 20% 23% 7% 14% 20% 98% 1% 0% 16% 11% 20% 2% 0% 1% 0% 1% 1%
Ukrainians 11% 19% 26% 7% 15% 20% 80% 14% 4% 89% 5% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Gagauz 1% 2% 18% 1% 2% 11% 60% 29% 8% 1% 2% 8% 97% 0% 1% 1% 1% 5%
Bulgarians 12% 14% 19% 10% 11% 10% 67% 23% 8% 4% 2% 12% 8% 3% 4% 89% 6% 2%
Table 20. „How well do you speak…?“, where 1 = „Speak perfectly“, 2= „Speak very good, though 
with an accent’ and 3= „I manage to be understood in most of the situations“.
Thus, we can talk about congruence between nationality and declared native language 
but, on the other hand, this fact is doubled by a natural consequence of the recent history: 
only 45 years ago, Russian was the state official language. 
Ethnic 
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1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Moldovans 98% 0% 0% 95% 1% 1% 86% 11% 2% 19% 42% 37% 1% 7% 89% 1% 7% 88%
Russians 55% 37% 5% 41% 36% 14% 99% 0% 0% 47% 35% 15% 3% 13% 75% 2% 18% 73%
Ukrainians 56% 38% 4% 42% 32% 15% 98% 1% 0% 98% 2% 0% 0% 7% 78% 0% 8% 77%
Gagauz 21% 45% 33% 14% 34% 50% 97% 2% 1% 11% 31% 57% 98% 1% 1% 7% 27% 64%
Bulgarians 45% 40% 14% 31% 33% 30% 98% 1% 0% 18% 44% 36% 15% 33% 50% 97% 2% 1%
Table 21. „How well do you speak….?“, 1) „I am fluent in it“, 2) „I have the minimal knowledge“ 
and 3) „I do not know the language“.
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If we take into account a typology that distinguishes between language compe tence,18 
which facilitates active communication, and a minimal level of knowledge19, which offers 
the subjects the opportunity to exchange a minimal amount of information in that 
particular language, we get the following image at national level. We saw that language 
(native or spoken in the family) is an essential factor in defining the identity of an ethnic 
group; it can be regarded as a factor of oppression, intolerance, and rejection of others. 
Perhaps, this partly explains the hostility towards Russians, who are seen as an obstacle, 
because Russian language is more spoken than Romanian is in daily life, media, and rela-
tions with other people, orientation through communication towards a certain value level, 
towards one culture or another. We should also notice that Romanian and Moldovan are 
perceived as two different languages, regardless of the ethnic group we relate to, percep-
tions regarding the ability of speaking one language or another being different. 
Stereotypes and Social Distance
When approaching interethnic relations, it is important to understand how the groups 
perceive otherness, stereotypes and the influence of these stereotypes on behavior and 
attitudes towards others. The stereotypes are based on previous discussions about identity 
and otherness. Walter Lippmann made an analogy between „the images from the mind“ 
and the term stereotype, which has existed since 1798, and, which was associated at that 
time with the mould in which lead was poured. Generally, stereotypes have a large 
emotional charge. They originate within society and offer the opportunity to explain the 
nature of the relationships between groups and nations. The definition accepted by most 
of the authors would be the one that represents the stereotypes as an „aggregate of shared 
convictions about personal characteristics, personality features, as well as a behavior spe-
cific to a group of people20.
A person belonging to a specific category (gender, ethnic background) bears the quali-
ties associated with that particular category. When our perceptions and memories refer to 
complex or confusing situations or realities, we resort to stereotypes to compensate for 
the elements that are missing from our social judgments. The Psychological Encyclopedia21 
lists the factors that determine this process:
a. Quality of information processing;
b. Quantity
18  Th e adequate knowledge of language will cumulate the percentage of the answers 1) „I speak the language 
fl u en tly“, 2) „I speak the language but I have an accent“ şi 3) „I can make myself understood in most situations“.
19  Th e minimal level of language knowledge will include the percentages of the following answers: 4) In some 
situations I make myself understood but with diffi  culty“ and 5) „I know only a couple of words“
20  Leyens, J.-Ph.-Yzerbyt V.Y.-Schadron, G., (1994), „Stereotypes and Social Cognition“, London: Sage, 
quoted in Leyens, J.-Ph.-Yzerbyt V.Y.-Schadron, G., (1997), „Stereotipuri şi judecată socială“, in Bourhis 
R. Y.-Leyens, J-F. (eds.), Stereotipuri, discriminare şi relaţii intergrupuri, Iaşi: Polirom, p. 98.
21  Chelcea, S. şi Iluţ, P. (coord.), Enciclopedie de psihosociologie. Bucureşti, Editura Economică, 2003, p.345.
32 ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
c. Classification (favoring your own group (in-group), and depreciating the group you 
do not belong to (out-group));
d. Extend of involvement of the social observer;
e. Cognitive solicitation of the information processor;
f.  Need for structure and coherence;
g. Affective emotional state (positive state facilitates the use of stereotypes, if the 
accuracy is not pressing);
h. Affective source:
i.  Illusion of correlation or the competition between two incentives;
j.  Pre-existent mental schemes;
k. Self-achievement prophecy or meeting the expectations;
The psychosocial perspective on the inter-group behavior is based on the mutual 
social perceptions, regardless that they are the product of a direct experience (contact 
groups) or the result of prejudices, ideologies or information transmitted through inter-
generational communication. Does our affiliation to a certain group have an impact on 
our behavior towards other groups? Can our affiliation to a certain ethnic group generate 
predictable orientations for the members of another group?
In order to avoid conceptual confusions and interchangeable use of terms, we will 
make some delimitation between stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. Prejudice is 
the act through which we „judge in advance“ or base ourselves on „an opinion taken for 
granted“. It implies a negative, depreciating judgment, based sometimes (and partly) on 
positive assumptions. It refers to objects (material, symbolical, social), groups or persons 
characterized from sociodemographic or cultural point of view, by a specific, very often 
minority feature. The stages of the analysis will include affective plan (evaluations gene-
rated by prejudices: disdain, rejection, denial, hatred, love, etc.), cognitive plan (the world 
seen through prejudices, based first on stereotypes and categorizations) and behavioral 
plan (the space of practices and actions which should derive directly or indirectly from 
prejudice). Alternatively, discrimination represents a negative behavior on behalf of an 
out-group towards prejudiced individuals. 
In order to be able to identify the representations through which the ethnic groups 
from Moldova define themselves, we started from the analysis of the qualities attributed 
by each individual group to their own group, and to other groups. Thus, we analyzed 
the way in which the respondents belonging to a certain ethnic group characterized the 
in-group and out-group. 
The respondents of the quantitative research were asked the following: „This is a list 
with different features. Please find three positive and three negative features that would 
describe best the Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians from 
Moldova.“ Respondents were given a list of qualities and were asked to choose the ones 
defining their own ethnic group, as well as other groups. The list in fact included pairs of 
positive and negative features (e.g. hard working (+)/lazy (-), united (+)/ divided (-) etc.).
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In-group representations22 
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Decent 22% 26% 27% 27% 21%
Kind-
hearted 27% 32% 26% 24% 25%
Hearty 23% 26% 23% 21% 17%
Independent 8% 18% 7% 9% 9%
Civilized 5% 17% 5% 9% 6%
Educated 13% 18% 10% 18% 17%
Resourceful 12% 14% 10% 10% 14%
Joyful 28% 21% 24% 17% 15%
Clean 7% 5% 4% 9% 12%
Religious 18% 7% 13% 13% 10%
United 4% 10% 5% 8% 11%
Honest 6% 9% 13% 12% 14%
Modest 5% 4% 7% 9% 13%
Hard-
working 57% 15% 50% 32% 41%
Intelligent 2% 12% 6% 7% 9%
Hospitable 41% 8% 14% 7% 7%
None 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Table 22. Positive features 
■ We notice two qualities chosen by Moldovans to describe themselves that clearly 
stand out: Hard-working (57 percent) and hospitable (41 percent). We also should 
mention that Moldovans are considered to be the most joyful and religious group. 
Surprisingly, Moldovans have the most negative representations of their own group 
and Russians; much less negative features are selected for the rest of ethnic groups 
(Ukrainians, Gagauz, and Bulgarians). Moldovans consider themselves obedient, 
neglectful and divided. All other ethnic groups, except the Gagauz, perceive them-
selves as obedient and this is a major if not the main shortcoming attributed to itself 
by each ethnic group. 
■ It is interesting to emphasize that Russians share disparate opinions concerning 
positive and negative representations. On one hand, they consider themselves 
kind-hearted (32 percent) and on the other hand, aggression is perceived as their 
22 In-group=own group representations
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Selfish 14% 10% 11% 10% 10%
Aggressive 10% 17% 9% 9% 4%
Apathetic 15% 13% 7% 9% 12%
Obedient 30% 13% 14% 6% 17%
Backward 11% 4% 10% 5% 11%
Uneducated 9% 11% 9% 8% 10%
Careless 18% 12% 16% 8% 11%
Sad 11% 7% 14% 4% 10%
Dirty 4% 5% 6% 6% 10%
Superstitious 7% 7% 20% 5% 11%
Divided 19% 7% 11% 8% 18%
Thieves 13% 3% 5% 6% 5%
Vainglorious 6% 7% 6% 5% 11%
Lazy 3% 13% 9% 4% 4%
Stupid 3% 2% 3% 2% 2%
Hostile 3% 2% 2% 4% 1%
None 14% 17% 19% 12% 10%
Table 23. Negative features
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main shortcoming (17 percent). They also consider themselves hearty and decent, 
getting the highest scores for features like independent, civilized and educated. At 
the same time, they consider themselves the laziest ethnic group;
■ Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians have a common representation, being charac-
terized by three features: diligence, the fact that they are decent, kind and hearty. 
This is close to the way Moldovans perceive themselves, the latter considering 
them selves more hospitable. Ukrainians consider themselves the most superstitious; 
Bulgarians (like Moldovans) think they are divided, while the Gagauz do not have 
any negative outstanding stereotype. 
■ We should not forget the joy, as the national characteristic which earns a significant 
score in every ethnic group. 
There are two types of differences concerning hetero-image: a type that contains diffe-
rences between self-image and hetero-image (i.e. the way we see ourselves, our affiliation 
group and how other people see us) and a type related to the existence of a disagreement, 
representations that are not common for a single ethnic group (Russians, for example, 
are not regarded the same way as other ethnic groups). Although the table in Annex B is 
relatively difficult to read because of data volume, we will try to provide some explanations 
about the differences mentioned above.
■ Moldovans have stated previously that they perceive themselves being hard wor-
king and hospitable, their diligence registering significant scores; others consider 
Moldovans rather kind-hearted, joyful, and Gagauz people see Moldovans as hearty 
and decent. 
There is a major difference between Moldovans’ share who perceive themselves as 
hard-working (57 percent) and the Gagauz and Bulgarians’ share who think the same 
about Moldovans (20 percent and 29 percent, accordingly). Similar to the case of posi-
tive representations, there is a consensus of the groups regarding Moldovans’ obedience: 
Moldovans perceive themselves as obedient and are generally viewed as such. Others 
add to Moldovans’ negative image with features such are: being backward and aggres-
sive (Russians’ opinion), superstitious (Ukrainians), backward and uneducated (Bul-
garians);
■ Russians consider themselves as kind-hearted, decent and hearty. If Gagauz and 
Bulgarians agree that Russians are kind-hearted and Ukrainians see them as decent, 
then Moldovans have a different image of Russians, considering them rather 
resourceful, united and independent. Joy is the only characteristic of Russians that 
is agreed by all the other groups. There is an agreement concerning Russians’ 
shortcomings, namely the aggression, a feature that is accepted even by Russians. 
It is necessary to notice one thing related to the attributed aggression: it is certain 
that other ethnic groups perceive Russians’ with feature such as: high aggres-
sion, but Russians feel the same aggression from other ethnic groups. Russians and 
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Moldovans register the highest score for aggression: Russians perceive conflict 
more intensely (31 percent consider Moldovans aggressive), while Moldovans 
think that aggression comes from Russians. Besides aggression, Russians’ negative 
image is completed with attributes such as: being neglectful (Ukrainians and 
Bulgarians’ opinion), uneducated, apathetic and selfish (Gagauz and Bulgarians’ 
opinion). 
■ Ukrainians perceive themselves as hard working, decent and kind-hearted. Other 
ethnic groups consider them, first, joyful, then hard working (Moldovans’ opinion), 
kind-hearted and hearty (Russians, Gagauz and Bulgarians’ opinion). Also, in the 
case of Ukrainians, there is no agreement concerning self-identification and hete-
ro-identification related to their negative image. If Ukrainians consider themselves 
superstitious and obedient, Russians and Moldovans perceive them as aggressive 
and selfish, Moldovans and Bulgarians – apathetic, Russians, Gagauz and Bulga-
rians – neglectful, Bulgarians – vainglorious. 
■ Gagauz and Bulgarians consider themselves hard working, decent and kind-hear-
ted. There is not sufficiently shaped image of these ethnic groups among Moldo-
vans, meaning that the contacts with other ethnic groups are rather low. However, 
territorial concentration of Gagauz and Bulgarians in the southern part of the 
country limits these contacts and leads to a lack of communication and information 
about who these people are and how they live. Russians think that Gagauz and 
Bulgarians are hard working and united, and Ukrainians add qualities: religious 
and independent. Ukrainians have the most negative representation about the 
Gagauz and Bulgarians, considering that Gagauz are aggressive and uneducated, 
and Bulgarians - neglectful and vainglorious. 
Social Capital
„The other one is doing better!“
Another interesting topic related to social representations is the forms of capital 
possessed by ethnic groups. The survey within Ethnobarometer has included several 
simplified forms of capital:
• Economic capital, measured by the following question: „Which of the following 
groups from Moldova are the richest?“
• Political capital, measured by „Which of the following groups from Moldova have 
the biggest influence?“
• Symbolic capital, measured by „Which of the following groups from Moldova are 
the most respected?“ 
• Social capital, measured through the level of trust and social networks developed, 
especially, through voluntary associations. 
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Richest Most politically influential Most respected
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Moldovans 43% 50% 33% 36% 43% 50% 57% 40% 35% 55% 50% 50% 31% 31% 45%
Russians 60% 42% 37% 30% 29% 57% 40% 33% 35% 34% 44% 48% 31% 25% 20%
Ukrainians 11% 7% 9% 5% 6% 9% 4% 6% 5% 5% 8% 3% 11% 2% 7%
Gagauz 5% 4% 5% 14% 18% 4% 5% 4% 11% 14% 2% 4% 1% 18% 8%
Bulgarians 4% 7% 3% 6% 15% 3% 3% 2% 3% 8% 3% 3% 2% 5% 18%
Romanians 7% 4% 2% 1% 2% 8% 10% 5% 3% 5% 10% 3% 3% 4% 5%
Other 3% 3% 1% 1% 5% 0% 2% 0% 0% 2% 1% 3% 0% 0% 1%
Don’t know/
No answer 67% 82% 110% 107% 83% 69% 79% 110% 108% 77% 82% 86% 121% 115% 86%
Table 24. Perception of the richest, most politically influential and most respected groups in Moldova
The analysis conclusions from the above table are suggestive and linked to the previous results. 
Two poles of power are outlined: the first group is represented by Moldovans and Russians, 
per ceived as having material resources (wealth), largest political influence, and being the most 
respected; the second group is represented by Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians, perceived 
as the most disadvantaged, and marginalized from this perspective. Moldovans are perceived 
by all other ethnic groups as the richest, and most politically influential. Moldovans are 
tempted to give the political and economic power to Russians. „The other has more privileges, 
the other does better“, seems to be the rule that most of ethnic groups follow. The existence 
of a dispute between these two ethnic groups (Moldo vans and Russians) for holding diffe-
rent types of capital is outlined by the given scores, which have relatively close values.
In the context of the present research, the concept of social capital is related to the 
level of general trust and the share of members from the networks founded on voluntary 
association. Further, we will be interested in the relationships that emerge between the 
elements of social capital and the characteristics associated to tolerance and interethnic 
cooperation. In order to be able to explain better the nature of interethnic relations in 
Moldova, we will try to answer the following questions: which are the dimensions of 
association? Can we talk about a participative political culture (the main element in the 
consolidation and functioning of a democracy)? Does the social capital influence the daily 
interethnic relations and does it also have an effect on the attitudes towards the symbolic 
issues that emerge in intercommunity relations? Putnam’s studies showed the link estab-
lished between social capital and good democratic functioning: societies characterized by 
large, numerous and overlapping social networks are the most favorable for the develop-
ment of values such as mutual respect, tolerance, civil cooperation and commitment.23 
We are interested in the role of social capital as a favorable factor for the development of 
common values, such as ethnic tolerance, respect and interethnic cooperation. 
23  Dragoman, D., (2005) „Capital social şi relaţii etnice. Toleranţă, încredere şi cooperare în comunităţi multietnice“, în 
Bădescu, G., Kivu, M., Robotin, M. (editori), (2005), „Barometrul Relaţiilor Etnice 1994-2002. O perspectivă a climatului 
interetnic din România“, Cluj-Napoca: Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală, p. 143.
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According to Dietlind Stolle, the social capital is, „a societal good which links people 
and allows them to pursue their common objectives more efficiently24. For Francis 
Fukuyama, the social capital is ‘a set of informal values shared by the members of a group 
which allows them to collaborate among them. If the members of the group get to expect 
that the behavior of the others is confident and honest, they will start trusting each other25“. 
Robert Putnam synthesizes the effects of social capital in the following directions: trust, 
reciprocity is beneficial for the whole society and can be revaluated privately as well as 
publicly, in the community interest; beneficial effects on democratic functioning; effects 
on the level of civic participation and exercise of control over governance. Putnam even 
resorts to a generalization, which uses social capital to explain the institutional perfor-
mance, stating that the (Italian) regions characterized by lack of trust and social frag-
mentation are performing less at institutional level. 
The level of affiliation to any organization is very low, between 5 and 11 percent, 
regardless of the ethnic group taken into consideration. Concerning trust, Russians have 
nearly the same trust in Moldovans as in the other members of their own ethnic group. We 
cannot say the same thing about Moldovans, whose level of trust in other ethnic groups is 
very low, with the exception of the Romanian group, from reasons that are easy to imagine.
Sample
Moldovans Russians Ukrainians Gagauz Bulgarians
People from Moldova 58% 69% 75% 66% 68%
Moldovans from Moldova 63% 71% 73% 65% 70%
Russians from Moldova 36% 78% 75% 76% 77%
Ukrainians from Moldova 31% 70% 80% 67% 68%
Gagauz from Moldova 18% 56% 43% 78% 63%
Bulgarians from Moldova 21% 58% 45% 67% 81%
Romanians from Moldova 42% 52% 44% 38% 47%
Table 25. „How much do you trust…?“ Percents for „Very much“ and „Much“
Surprisingly, Moldovans represent the group with the lowest level of trust in the 
members of their own ethnic group. The young people (18-29) have the lowest level of 
trust in the members of their own ethnic group and every other person has „little“ or 
„very little“ trust in Moldovans. As we analyze the following age groups, the level of trust 
grows, reaching 81% among persons over 60 (much and very much trust). The relationship 
between education and trust level in Moldovans is reverse proportional: the higher the 
level of education, the lower the trust (among persons with higher education, 59 percent 
24  Stolle, D., (2000) „Social Capital – A New Research Agenda? Toward an Attitudinal Approach“, work presented at the 
European Consortium for Political Research Workshop, Copenhaga, quoted in Dragoman, D., (2005) „Capital social şi 
relaţii etnice. Toleranţă, încredere şi cooperare în comunităţi multietnice“, in Bădescu, G., Kivu, M., Robotin, M. (editori), 
(2005), „Barometrul Relaţiilor Etnice 1994-2002. O perspectivă a climatului interetnic din România“, Cluj-Napoca: Cen-
trul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală, p. 139.
25  Fukuyama, F., (2003) „Marea Ruptură. Natura umană şi refacerea ordinii sociale“, Bucureşti: Humanitas, p.23, quoted 
in Dragoman, D., (2005) „Capital social şi relaţii etnice. Toleranţă, încredere şi cooperare în comuni tăţi multietnice“, in 
Bădescu, G., Kivu, M., Robotin, M. (editori), (2005), „Barometrul Relaţiilor Etnice 1994-2002. O perspectivă a climatului 
interetnic din România“, Cluj-Napoca: Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală, p. 143.
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show much or very much trust, among persons with secondary education the value is 73 
percent). Students have the lowest level of trust in Moldovans, and only one third of 
them (32 percent) trust the Moldovans. There is also a predominant lack of trust in 
Moldovans in urban areas. 
Ethnic group
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18 -29 years 50% 30% 21% 13% 16% 38%
30 -44 years 57% 32% 27% 16% 19% 36%
45 -59 years 61% 36% 34% 18% 21% 41%
60 and above 78% 46% 38% 23% 26% 51%
Education
Incomplete secon dary education 71% 40% 33% 19% 23% 44%
General or vocational school 61% 36% 29% 16% 19% 37%
High-School, Post high school 58% 35% 32% 13% 15% 43%
Higher education 55% 33% 30% 26% 27% 52%
Occupation
Employed 58% 30% 29% 16% 19% 42%
Student 32% 32% 12% 2% 7% 32%
Retired 77% 46% 38% 23% 27% 50%
Housewife 61% 29% 26% 15% 19% 37%
Unemployed 57% 35% 29% 17% 20% 36%
Residence area Urban 51% 35% 28% 18% 19% 38%
Rural 69% 38% 32% 18% 22% 45%
TOTAL 63% 36% 31% 18% 21% 42%
Table 26. Share of people with much and very much trust (result from Moldovan sample). The 
categories with the lowest level of trust are highlighted.
We find a slightly different pattern of trust among Moldovans, when they relate them-
selves to other ethnic groups. Young people and students show a low level of trust; higher 
edu cation is associated with a higher level of trust for Gagauz, Bulgarians and Romanians, 
while the resistance environment is no longer a factor that influences the level of trust, 
except when the Moldovans relate to Romanians, urban areas being associated with a 
lower level of trust. We should also emphasize that the values for Moldovans’ trust in other 
ethnic groups are rather low. In this aspect, the treatment of other ethnic groups is diffe-
rentiated: Moldovans show more trust towards Russians and Ukrainians, and very little 
trust towards the Gagauz and Bulgarians.
In tables 27-28, we can notice that the Russian-Ukrainian group shows a lower level 
of trust among young people, students and people living in urban areas. The level of trust 
is higher for Moldovans, Russians and Ukrainians and lower for Gagauz and Bulgarians. 
The Gagauz-Bulgarian group maintains a relatively uniform level of trust in other ethnic 
groups, values which are approaching the level of trust in the members of their own ethnic 
group. Young people, students and people living in urban areas are the categories with less 
trust, but, compared to the Moldovans, Russians or Ukrainians ‘ evaluations, a higher edu-
cation level, in the case of Gagauz and Bulgarians, is associated with a lower level of trust. 
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18 -29 years 58% 74% 65% 45% 45% 42%
30 -44 years 67% 72% 62% 51% 56% 49%
45 -59 years 70% 77% 70% 54% 56% 51%
60 and over 80% 84% 78% 64% 66% 58%
Education
Incomplete secondary education 75% 83% 75% 59% 61% 47%
General or vocational school 69% 78% 68% 54% 57% 53%
High school, post high school 65% 76% 67% 47% 49% 41%
Higher education 73% 75% 70% 54% 57% 54%
Occupation
Employed 70% 76% 70% 54% 58% 55%
Student 46% 82% 64% 43% 43% 36%
Retired 78% 82% 76% 63% 63% 56%
Housewife 75% 75% 71% 54% 64% 50%
Unemployed 60% 69% 56% 47% 47% 42%
Residence area
Urban 69% 76% 70% 56% 59% 52%
Rural 78% 87% 73% 52% 54% 52%
TOTAL 71% 78% 70% 55% 58% 52%
Table 27. Share of people with much and very much trust (result from Russians sample). The cate-
go ries with the lowest level of trust are highlighted
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Age
18 -29 years 60% 64% 64% 22% 27% 24%
30 -44 years 70% 72% 76% 40% 40% 37%
45 -59 years 74% 77% 82% 45% 45% 49%
60 and over 78% 79% 83% 50% 50% 49%
Education
Incomplete secondary education 80% 80% 83% 49% 52% 52%
General or vocational school 68% 73% 76% 36% 36% 35%
High School, Post High school 78% 81% 89% 46% 46% 51%
Higher education 72% 72% 78% 54% 50% 50%
Occupation 
Employed 71% 71% 75% 45% 46% 44%
Student 80% 80% 100% 0% 0% 20%
Retired 78% 78% 83% 48% 48% 48%
Housewife 52% 68% 60% 24% 32% 36%
Unemployed 69% 75% 80% 39% 38% 34%
Residence area
Urban 62% 62% 66% 38% 39% 36%
Rural 82% 87% 90% 49% 48% 51%
TOTAL 73% 76% 79% 44% 44% 44%
Table 28. Share of people with much and very much trust (result from Ukrainian sample) 
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Ethnic group
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18 -29 years 45% 56% 48% 66% 41% 32%
30 -44 years 59% 73% 60% 72% 63% 28%
45 -59 years 68% 78% 71% 82% 73% 36%
60 and over 75% 83% 79% 83% 77% 51%
Education
Incomplete secondary education 74% 83% 80% 85% 77% 47%
General or vocational school 60% 74% 63% 77% 65% 33%
High School, post High school 48% 52% 52% 57% 52% 35%
Higher education 59% 63% 56% 66% 54% 34%
Occupation
Employed 68% 79% 72% 80% 72% 37%
Student 58% 58% 42% 67% 58% 50%
Retired 73% 83% 78% 83% 78% 49%
Housewife 63% 70% 58% 72% 56% 33%
Unemployed 49% 65% 51% 71% 51% 27%
Residence area
Urban 58% 65% 59% 66% 57% 48%
Rural 67% 80% 71% 83% 72% 34%
TOTAL 64% 75% 67% 78% 67% 38%
Table 29. Share of people with much and very much trust (result from Gagauz sample) 
Ethnic group
M
ol
do
va
ns
Ru
ss
ia
ns
U
kr
ai
ni
an
s
G
ag
au
z
Bu
lg
ar
ia
ns
R
om
an
ia
ns
Age
18 -29 years 55% 61% 48% 42% 73% 31%
30 -44 years 66% 74% 66% 59% 75% 44%
45 -59 years 71% 78% 71% 67% 82% 48%
60 and over 80% 85% 76% 72% 89% 56%
Education
Incomplete secondary education 80% 85% 73% 65% 90% 49%
General or vocational school 71% 76% 69% 67% 82% 48%
High school, post high school 66% 66% 56% 56% 72% 44%
Higher education 57% 70% 62% 50% 72% 39%
Occupation
Employed 66% 74% 68% 62% 77% 45%
Student 44% 44% 61% 22% 72% 17%
Retired 79% 83% 74% 70% 88% 58%
Housewife 65% 74% 70% 65% 74% 61%
Unemployed 71% 78% 62% 64% 82% 39%
Residence area
Urban 54% 68% 60% 42% 75% 41%
Rural 77% 80% 71% 73% 84% 49%
TOTAL 70% 76% 68% 63% 81% 47%
Table 30. Share of people with much and very much trust (result from Bulgarians sample) 
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The intensity and availability of getting in contact with others, demonstration of 
openness, and the possibility of closeness with others, say a lot about the daily life in 
multiethnic communities. Beyond the ambivalence of trust-tolerance relationship (also 
outlined by other researchers), there is a meaningful correlation between two variables 
(as we can no tice in table 15 and tables from annexes A), which means that an intervention, 
for example, on trust level would determine a higher degree of tolerance and of accepting 
the other. 
Tolerance, seen as ‘an agreement of living together or act with people who are very 
different than you, but also as an understanding of those who act differently than you, 
based on other believes or life styles“26, can be perceived as an integrated characteristic 
in the social capital or as a correlated one. We will further observe the relationship 
between social capital and other indicators of interethnic relations.
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N=775 N=734 N=631 N=629 N=721
a. Live in Moldova 0,242** 0,287** 0,306** 0,291** 0,203**
b. Live in your locality 0,259** 0,297** 0,306** 0,291** 0,212**
d. Be your neighbor 0,245** 0,287** 0,307** 0,311** 0,141**
d. Be your friend 0,242** 0,283** 0,302** 0,316** 0,145**
b. Be part of your family 0,209** 0,260** 0,278** 0,282** 0,155**
Table 31. The values of Pearson’s coefficient27 for the correlation between trust and social distance 
(Moldovans sample)
Social Distance
Social distance is the effect of stereotypes on the behavior. The individuals or social 
groups outstrip other groups through taking stands, certain behaviors, attitudes etc. The 
scale used in Ethnobarometer derives from social distance scale developed by Emory 
 S.Bogardus, the oldest attitude scale. He defined social scale as „the degree of under-
standing and affection persons feel for one another28. Starting with the subjects’ attitudes 
and using the scale from the questionnaire, one can build and calculate a series of 
26  Sandu, D., (2003), „Sociabilitate în spaţiul dezvoltării. Încredere, toleranţă şi reţele sociale“, Iaşi: Editura Polirom, p. 22. 
** Signifi cant for p<0,01.
N=number of cases taken in consideration when computing the coeffi  cients.
27  Th e Pearson correlation coeffi  cient R is a measuring unit for the association between to variables. Th e values of this 
correlation coeffi  cient vary between -1 and +1. + or - shows the direction of the relationship.
28  Bogardus, Emory S., (1933), A social distance scale. Sociology and Social Research, XVII, 265-271, quoted in Chelcea, S., 
(2004), Metodologia cercetării sociologice. Metode cantitative şi calitative, Bucureşti: Editura Eco nomică, p. 359.
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parameters, which would express mathematically the extent to which one accepts other-
ness. We will calculate these parame ters by adapting the calculation formula to the scale 
used in the above-mentioned survey29: 
1. The social distance index (SDI) represents the number of possible rejected social 
contacts. The lower the value of SDI (less contact possibilities were refused), the 
more reduced the social distance towards the relevant group members. 
Please specify what 
your reaction would 
be if the persons 
belonging to the 
following ethnic 
groups in Moldova:
a. 
Moldovans
b. 
Russians
c. 
Ukrainians
d. 
Gagauz
e. 
Bulgarians
f. 
Romanians
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a. lived in Moldova 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
b. lived in your locality 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
c. were your neighbors 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
d. were your friends 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
e. were part of your 
family 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
Table 32. Scale used in the Ethnobarometer survey. 
In our case, the mark „5“ will be given to those who chose „disagree“ to all five ques-
tions (would live in Moldova, would live in your locality etc.), mark „4“ will be attributed 
to those who chose four „disagreements“ and one „agreement“ etc. Thus, the maximum 
value of SDI is five and signifies a deeply negative attitude. The lowest mark expresses a 
largely positive attitude towards the discussed ethnic group. 
Ethnic group
SDI SCI
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Moldovans 0,17 0,24 0,42 0,42 4,83 4,76 4,58 4,58
Russians 1,11 0,23 0,44 0,48 3,89 4,77 4,56 4,52
Ukrainians 1,26 0,23 0,51 0,57 3,74 4,77 4,49 4,43
Gagauz 1,74 0,84 1,34 0,88 3,26 4,16 3,66 4,12
Bulgarians 1,54 0,75 1,36 0,55 3,46 4,25 3,64 4,45
Romanians 0,70 0,87 1,39 0,97 1,16 4,30 4,13 3,61 4,03 3,84
Table 33. Values of social distance index (SDI) and social contacts index (SCI)
29  For technical details, see Chelcea, S., (2004), Metodologia cercetării sociologice. Metode cantitative şi calitative, Bucureşti: 
Editura Eco nomică, p. 359-364
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2. Social contacts index (SCI) also shows the openness towards other ethnic groups 
through a number of accepted social contacts. This index is reverse proportional 
to the social distance index. Maximum value shows a largely positive attitude and 
minimum value 0 shows a highly negative attitude. 
Three thresholds of tolerance emerge and revive the discussion regarding the idea of 
disputes, competition among the three ethnic groups, which we represent as „Moldovan 
group (MG)“, „Russian-Ukrainian group (RUG)“, and „Gagauz-Bulgarian group (GBG)“.
1. High level of tolerance, which, however, shows a distance between us (MG and 
RUG) and others (GBG). It is characteristic to RUG and has a high level of tolerance 
towards MG (SDI between 0.17 – 0.24), a high level of tolerance within the group 
(SDI=0.23 for Russians, as well as for Ukrainians) and a low level of tolerance 
towards GBG. If SDI for Russians varies between 0.75 and 0.84, in the case of 
Bulgarians and Gagauz, then Ukrainians want a larger distance from previously 
mentioned ethnic groups, SDI reaching, in this case, the value of 1.34 for Gagauz 
and 1.36 for Bulgarians.
2. Average tolerance, specific to GBG. It has a relatively similar level of tolerance 
towards MG and RUG. In this context, it is necessary to note one thing: Bulgarians 
show the lowest level of tolerance towards Gagauz, i.e. towards the ethnic group 
they mostly interact with. It is known that there are communities in the southern 
part of Moldova where these two ethnic groups represent the majority or, at least, 
numerically are important minorities. This is a sign that their coexistence has some 
problems and the Bulgarians are the ones who want a larger distance. 
3. Low level of tolerance, specific to MG. The difference between indexes is significant, 
Russians being a highly tolerated ethnic group. The highest rejection degree is for 
Gagauz (SDI=1.74! the highest value). 
Graphic representation of the social distances 
for diff erent ethnic groups from Moldova. 
Th e distances represent the SDI calculated for each group. 
44 ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Ethnic group
Russians Ukrainians Gagauz Bulgarians
Level of tolerance 
which does not 
differ significantly 
from the value 
registered for the 
whole sample
Level of tolerance 
significantly higher 
then the value 
registered for the 
whole sample
Level of tolerance 
significantly lower 
then the value 
registered for the 
whole sample
A
ge
18 -29 years - - - -
30 -44 years + 0 0 0
45 -59 years 0 0 0 +
60 and over 0 0 0 0
C
iv
il 
st
at
us
Married 0 0 0 0
Divorced 0 0 0 0
Widow(er) 0 0 0 0
Single - - - -
O
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up
at
io
n
Employed 0 0 0 0
Student 0 - 0 -
Retired 0 0 0 0
Housewife 0 0 0 0
Unemployed 0 0 0 0
R
es
id
en
ce
 
ar
ea
Urban + 0 0 0
Rural - 0 0 0
Table 34. Determinant factors of tolerance towards ethnic groups (Moldovans sample)
Ethnic group
Moldovans Ukrainians Gagauz Bulgarians
A
ge
18 -29 years - - - -
30 -44 years 0 0 0 +
45 -59 years 0 0 0 0
60 and over 0 0 + 0
Ed
uc
at
io
n Incomplete secondary education 0 0 0 0
General or vocational school 0 0 0 0
High school, post high school 0 0 0 0
Higher education + 0 0 0
C
iv
il 
st
at
us Married 0 0 0 0
Divorced 0 0 0 +
Widow(er) 0 0 0 0
Single - 0 0 0
O
cc
up
at
io
n
Employed 0 0 0 0
Student - - 0 0
Retired 0 0 0 0
Housewife 0 0 0 0
Unemployed 0 0 0 0
Table 35. Determinant factors of tolerance towards ethnic groups (Russians sample)
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Ethnic group
Moldovans Russians Gagauz Bulgarians
A
ge
18 -29 years - 0 0 0
30 -44 years 0 0 0 0
45 -59 years + 0 0 0
60 and over 0 0 0 0
C
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us
Married 0 0 0 0
Divorced 0 + 0 0
Widow(er) + 0 0 0
Single - 0 0 0
O
cc
up
at
io
n
Employed + 0 0 0
Student 0 0 0 0
Retired 0 0 0 0
Housewife 0 0 0 0
Unemployed 0 0 0 0
R
es
id
en
ce
 
ar
ea
Urban + 0 + +
Rural - 0 - -
Table 36. Determinant factors of tolerance towards ethnic groups (Ukrainians sample)
Ethnic group
Moldovans Russians Ukrainians Bulgarians
A
ge
18 -29 years 0 0 0 0
30 -44 years 0 0 0 0
45 -59 years 0 0 0 +
60 and over 0 0 0 0
O
cc
up
at
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n
Employed + + + 0
Student 0 0 - 0
Retired 0 0 0 0
Housewife 0 + + 0
Unemployed - - - 0
R
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ce
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Urban + - 0 -
Rural 0 0 0 +
Table 37. Determinant factors of tolerance towards ethnic groups (Gagauz sample)
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Ethnic group
Moldovans Russians Ukrainians Gagauz
Ed
uc
at
io
n Incomplete secondary education 0 0 0 0
General or vocational school 0 - - 0
High school, post high school - + + 0
Higher education 0 + + 0
O
cc
up
at
io
n
Employed 0 + 0 0
Student 0 + + +
Retired 0 0 0 0
Housewife 0 0 0 -
Unemployed 0 - - 0
R
es
id
en
ce
 
ar
ea
Urban - - 0 -
Rural + + 0 +
Table 38. Determinant factors of tolerance towards ethnic groups (Bulgarians sample)
Generally, we can find a significantly lower level of tolerance among young people 
(18-29 yrs), among students (except the students of Bulgarian background), among single 
people and people living in rural areas (with the exception of Gagauz and Bulgarians, who 
are tempted to associate with a lower level of tolerance rather than with the urban level). 
Analyzing the data from table 39, we consider that Moldovans have perceived to a 
larger extent a possible threat on behalf of other ethnic groups. Approximately 1 out of 4 
Moldovans believes that Russians represent a major source of threat both for the country and 
Moldovans as an ethnic group. 15 percent perceive this threat as being highly possible, 
considering that Russians could become a threat for their families or even a personal threat. 
 Since recent history shows us a relationship with the Gagauz and the fact that they 
already enjoy autonomy, the Gagauz are perceived as another possible threat, however, 
this time the threat is related to the country and to the majority of ethnic group (Moldovans), 
and less to the family. 
Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians feel more secure from this perspective. 
The potential threat perceived by these groups is significantly lower than in the case of 
Moldovans: around 5 percent at personal or family level, and about 8 percent believe that 
other ethnic groups could become a threat for the country or for them as an ethnic group. 
Think of the following ethnic groups from Moldova. 
Do you think they could become a threat in the future?
Russians Ukrainians Gagauz Bulgarians
a. for the country 27% 13% 15% 9%
b. for Moldovans 26% 11% 12% 7%
c. for you or your family 15% 7% 6% 4%
Table 39. Answers from the Moldovans sample for the question: Thinking of the following ethnic 
groups from Moldova, is it possible that they will become a threat? (Percents are accumulated for 
the answers „Definitely“ and „somewhat“)
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The question, regarding the way respondents perceive the relationships among ethic 
groups, is directly linked with this item. This time, the same share of Russians and Moldo-
vans (12 %) agree that there are conflict relationships between them. The first explanation 
for this is the lack of mutual trust, the low levels of trust, being associated with the nega-
tive perceptions of the relationships with other ethnic groups. Here is just one example: 
Almost 80 percent of Moldovans who consider that the relationships between them and 
Russians are conflicting, have very little trust in them. 
Ethnic group
Sample
Moldovans Russians Ukrainians Gagauz Bulgarians
a. Moldovans 12% 5% 4% 6%
b. Russians 12% 1% 3% 2%
c. Ukrainians 7% 4% 3% 1%
d. Gagauz 10% 5% 2% 4%
e. Bulgarians 6% 5% 2% 3%
Table 40. Results for the question: Which of the following expressions, which explain the relation-
ships between different ethnic groups in Moldova, seem to express the reality more accurately? Do 
the relations between [sample] and [ethnic group] express cooperation, conflict or reciprocal igno-
rance? (The percentage represents the answers for „Conflict relations“)
When asked about the nature of the same relationships, but this time at local level, 
the conflict aspects seem to be less emphasized. This entitles us to assert that conflict 
image is, in fact, built and maintained by events and phenomena outside the community, 
outside of an area where one is supposed to interact with other ethnic groups. 
Conclusions
The data analyzed above has showed that the main „problem“ of the existent inter-
ethnic relations in Moldova, is the fact that ethnic groups perceive differently the main 
problems, which are taken into consideration, when approaching mutual relations: from 
daily problems to topics related to the claims of each minority group, conflicts, identity 
related aspects, self-identification, stereotypical representations, level of tolerance and trust. 
In all these cases, the ethnic groups from Moldova think, perceive and behave differently 
towards each other.
The equation is complex and rooted in a historical context, where Russia is still consi-
dered by many people as the ‘big brother“. Russians are perceived as leaders, masters, and 
are associated with a strong component of aggression generated by Russia’s influence. 
This influence was felt in many aspects: a certain economic dependence on resources and 
commercial relations; geopolitical situation, which often confronts Moldova’s interests 
with Russia’s more or less radical positions, the eternal Transnistrian conflict, mass media 
with information more or less taken over from eastern channels etc. 
All of these facts, combined with the natural identity search of Mol dova as a young 
country (14 years of independence), lack of that ‘power idea’ of Moldovans, that could 
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channel and unleash unimaginable energies, make us witness, at least at the perception 
level, an interesting switch of roles between Moldovans and this informal group of leaders 
or masters. Moldovans, though numerically, representing a majority, could be considered 
a minority by the ways they perceive certain situations. 
However, the data also show a lack of communication, an intended isolation from 
the other, a rather low availability of acceptance, tolerance of the other. Surprisingly, the 
lowest levels of tolerance and trust are found not among the ethnic minority groups but 
among Moldovans, who are least inclined to tolerate and accept others. In addition, Mol-
dovans have the lowest tolerance towards Gagauz and Bulgarians, especially among young 
people. Resulting from categories, which include occupation, with the lowest scores, the 
school and university students are least inclined to accept others, a sign that a series of 
measures should start in the classrooms. 
In addition, we should not ignore the gap between rural and urban areas, manifested 
mainly by different levels of income, resources, unbalanced ethnic and demographic 
structure, rather different aspirations and perceptions. 
Despite academic debates, the lack of serious public debates on ethnicity fuels the 
tendency of latent association of these subjects with the Transnistrian conflict and the 
sad events from the nineties.  I believe it is necessary to give up on some of these tacit 
associations and discuss these aspects at a different level. One should promote the 
European values, which encourage diversity, tolerance, preservation and manifestation 
of identity, acceptance of diversity, democracy, etc. Regardless if Moldova materializes its 
wish to become a member of the European Union, it seems that soon these values will be 
waiting for us at the border with Romania and there will be no space for half measures. 
How possible is it that these values cross the border and are accepted unanimously and 
imposed by the European norms? When can we talk openly about these things at an 
academic level? These issues represent a normal direction and I hope that Moldova will 
follow this direction and hopefully reach its destination. 
The Transnistrian conflict is more of a political issue and not an interethnic one (as 
falsely believed). There is no ethnic conflict or even a conflict between Russians and Mol-
do vans. The identity however will not disappear; it cannot be erased or forgotten just 
because we do not talk about it. We can add new valences to it. The territorial concentration 
of Gagauz and Bulgarians, the „closed“ communities and those „Russian“ or Ukrainian 
villages are phenomena that do not encourage the interethnic communication. I believe 
there is a tacit agreement among people. Unfortunately, I do not think this is the way that 
will lead us to communication and collaboration. 
Maybe one way to solve this issue would be to develop some policies and programs 
in order to open up these communities, so they could become accessible to others, I do 
not think we can talk about a genuine mutual knowledge among the ethnic groups from 
Moldova. Therefore, in many aspects their perceptions, representations of the other vary 
so much. 
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ANNEX A
Trust in…
Moldovans Ukrainians Gagauz Bulgarians Romanians
N=405 N=397 N=346 N=352 N=358
a. Live in Moldova - 0,189** 0,242** 0,172** 0,212**
b. b. Live in your locality 0,110* 0,135** 0,296** 0,224** 0,289**
c. d. Be your neighbor 0,130** 0,108* 0,285** 0,270** 0,317**
d. Be your friend 0,212** - 0,257** 0,241** 0,324**
e. Be part of your family 0,196** 0,133** 0,179** 0,170** 0,278**
Table 41. The values of Pearson’s coefficient30 for the correlation between trust and social distance 
(Russians sample)
Trust in…
Moldovans Russians Gagauz Bulgarians Romanians
N=319 N=413 N=413 N=413 N=413
a. a. Live in Moldova - - 0,213** 0,141* 0,290**
b. b. Live in your locality 0,255** - 0,148* - 0,211**
c. Be your neighbor 0,319** - - - 0,223**
d. Be your friend 0,337** - - - 0,251**
e. Be part of your family 0,105* - - - 0,135*
Table 42. The values of Pearson’s coefficient for the correlation between trust and social distance 
(Ukrainians sample)
Trust in…
Moldovans Russians Ukrainians Bulgarians Romanians
N=452 N=455 N=447 N=439 N=337
a. a. Live in Moldova - - - - 0,149**
b. b. Live in your locality - - - - 0,218**
c. Be your neighbor 0,096* - - 0,173** 0,213**
d. Be your friend 0,372** 0,175** 0,372** 0,269** 0,341**
e. Be part of your family 0,244** 0,158** 0,234** 0,243** 0,366**
Table 43. The values of Pearson’s coefficient for the correlation between trust and social distance 
(Gagauz sample)
30  Pearson (R) coeffi  cient of correlation =measurement of association between two variables. Th e values 
of this coeffi  cient of correlation vary between -1 and 1. Th e sign of correlation implies the direction of 
association. 
N = number of cases considered in the calculation of coeffi  cients.
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Trust in…
Moldovans Russians Ukrainians Gagauz Romanians
N=416 N=418 N=399 N=412 N=339
a. Live in Moldova 0,227** - - 0,151** 0,244**
b. Live in your locality 0,275** - - 0,275** 0,220**
c. Be your neighbor 0,258** - - 0,293** 0,166**
d. Be your friend 0,185** - 0,132** 0,290** 0,252**
e. Be part of your family 0,255** 0,141** 0,147** 0,263** 0,301**
Table 44. The values of Pearson’s coefficient for the correlation between trust and social distance 
(Bulgarians sample)
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STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY AND INTERETHINIC 
RELATIONS: THE MOLDOVAN CASE
By Ala Rosca
The issue of correlation between democracy and interethnic problems is not new. It 
could be found on the agenda of the 17th century and particularly after the end of the 
Cold War and emergence of newly independent ex-soviet and ex-socialist states.31 The 
complexity of the issue calls for the determination of a theoretical and methodological 
basis for approaching the issues of democracy, democratization, and interethnic relations. 
The issue of democratic consolidation is complex and multiaspectual, and it is approached 
by several authors from the perspective of the present requirements. The approaches related 
to democratic theory include works, where citizens’ opinions and participation are central. 
Carole Pateman’s work, Participation and Democratic Theory (1970), has set a great part 
of the agenda of the contemporary participatory democratic theory. The work rearticulates 
the role of active discussion, citizens’ participation in decision-making and the means of 
democratic participation, which include in addition to the state, the social institutions 
where people’s actions are directly involved.32 The theoretical framework for the present 
research is determined by the works of J. Shumpeter33, R. Dahl34, which, among other para-
meters, include public competition and political participation in the notion of democracy. 
The phenomenon of democratization implies a study of the transition phase processes, 
or „democratic transition“35, resorting sometimes to generalizations, which require deter-
mi nation of common indices. 
The correlation between democratization and interethnic processes is also thoroughly 
studied, the researchers having formulated a hypothesis that the democratic consolidation 
will be easier in places where the national identity is well-developed, referring to the condi-
tion related to the completion of state formation.36 Researchers came to the conclusion 
that the chances for democratic consolidation in a multinational and multicultural society 
increase due to policies that grant full and equal citizenship and provide all citizens with a 
common „shelter“ regarding the individual rights mandated and applied by the state.37
31  Huntington S. Th e Th ird Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, 1991, p.9.
32  Pateman, C. Participation and Democratic Th eory. 1970
33  Shumpeter J. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 2-nd ed. New York, 1947, p 269. 
34  Dahl R.A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven. 1971.
35  O’Donnell G., Schmitter Ph., and Whitehead L., (eds). Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy. 
Baltimore: Th e Johns Hopkins University, 1986; Lasswell H.D. Th e future of the comparative me thod, Comparative Poli-
tics, 1968, p.3-18; Juan J.Linz, Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, 
South America, and Post-Communist Europe Baltimore: John Hopkins Uni versity Press, 1996. 
36  Whitehead L. Politica comparată: studii despre democratizare. Manual de Ştiinţă Politică. Polirom, 2005, p. 321. 
37  Linz Juan J., Stepan Alfred, Drumul spre o democraţie consolidată. Cum se consolidează democraţia. Poli rom, 2004, p.61.
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Starting from these theoretical assumptions, in this work we will analyze some aspects 
of democratization and interethnic processes, and namely: 
• What is the influence of the democratization process on interethnic relations? Is 
democratization in a multinational society possible? 
• What are the conditions that make the democratization process in post-totalitarian 
multinational states successful? 
• The democratization of the society, participation/affiliation with political parties, 
and civic identity formation. 
• Can multiethnic societies achieve stability compatible with the values of liberal 
societies? 
The analysis will be carried out based on the results of the Ethnobarometer survey, 
organized by the Institute of Marketing and Surveys (IMAS) at the request of the Institute 
for Public Policy (IPP) in December 2004-January 2005 on ethnic samples, that inclu-
ded 822 Moldovans/Romanians, 431 Bulgarians, 472 Gagauz, 412 Russians, and 413 
Ukrainians. 
Democratization Concept and Societies in Transition
The issue of correlation between democracy and interethnic issues is not new. It was 
on the agenda during the French Revolution from the 18th century and the first half of 
the 19th century with the national liberation revolutions from Europe and Latin America. 
The next phase of national liberation movements began with the anticolonial fight of the 
peoples from Asia and Africa at the turn of the 19-20th centuries, and after the end of the 
World War II, with the fall of the imperialist colonial system. The „third wave of 
democratization“, which at the beginning of the seventies embraced the countries with 
authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (military dictatorships and juntas in Southern 
Europe in the 1970s; military dictatorships in Latin America, single-party regimes in 
Eastern Europe and countries of the former USSR, and the apartheid regime in South 
Africa in the 1980s (beginning of the 1990s), brought back the issue on the agenda.38
The present problems result from modern realities of the globalization process: the 
change of emphases in the security system after the collapse of the socialist system and 
the end of the Cold War; the present crisis of the nation-state in the conditions of the 
increasing role of transnational movements and institutions. In this situation, it is 
necessary to update the scientific terms, which now have to reflect the new realities. We 
will start by defining the notions of democracy and democratization. 
In order to determine the meaning of the term „democratization“, we need to 
establish the essence of the key term from which it derives. The term democracy, which 
in the history of political thought is conceived as a form of government, derives from 
Greek philosophers. The modern use of this term by social scientists began during the 
revolutions from Eastern Europe and North America at the end of the 18th – beginning 
38  Huntington S. Th e Th ird Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, 1991.
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of 19th centuries. The French revolution, in the Modern Era, raised the issue of democracy 
and marked the beginning of an era of national movements, in the present meaning of 
these notions. 
Towards the middle of the 20th century, social scientists’ debates outlined three major 
approaches. As a form of government, democracy was defined as government’s sources of 
power, government’s goals, and procedures for forming a government. Meanwhile, many 
political scientists paid attention to the problems that emerged in case of idealization, 
the ambiguity and inaccuracy of the use of term democracy, both as source of power and 
as government’s goal. 
One of the mostly used definitions of democracy in the contemporary political science 
belongs to J. Shumpeter39 and is revealed in his work Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 
(1942). He defines democracy based on „the democratic method“, which he understands 
as an institutional organization, where certain people receive power in a competition 
over the votes of the population that form this society. After the World War II, most 
political scientists were adopting this particular approach as scientific term, considered 
a procedural approach.40 Towards 1970s, most theoreticians started making a distinction 
between the rational, utopist and idealist approaches of democracy and the procedural 
approach, considered unanimously more scientific. 
In order to outline the parameters that can be efficient in scientific research, a special 
interest raise the discussions held in the view of understanding the nature of democratic 
values and institutions, especially the specific nature of their functioning in different 
countries and societies in transition. Accepted by social and political sciences, the deter-
mi nation of democracy through elections represents a narrow definition of democracy. 
Democracy in a wider sense implies freedom, equality, efficient citizens’ control over 
the government, accountability of the government towards citizens, transparency and 
honesty of political decisions, equality in political participation and access to power. In 
this context, as stated by S. Huntington,41 the problems related to the understanding of 
democracy emerge as a source and purpose of power. The „narrow“ definition of democ-
racy is considered more concrete, and from this perspective the orga nization of elections 
represents the essence of democracy, the inevitable sine qua non. 
As constitutive principles of the „realist democracy“, one of the renowned authors of 
the democratic theory, R. Dahl42, mentioned the public competition and political par-
ticipation, implying that democracy includes the provision of civil and political rights, 
freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, existence of orga-
nizations necessary for the free competition-based elections. Thus, certain indices/indi-
cators have been introduced in the scientific usage and their use in the sociological and 
39  Shumpeter J. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 2-nd ed. New York, 1947, p. 269
40  Huntington S. Th e Modest Meaning of Democracy // Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum / R.A. Pas-
tor (ed.) New York, 1989, p.11-18; Kirkpatrik J. Democratic Elections, Democratic Government and Democratic Th eory 
// Democracy at the Polls / D. Butler, H. Penniman, A. Ranney (ed.) Washington, 1981, p.325-348
41  Huntington S. Th e Th ird Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, 1991
42  Dahl R.A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven, 1971
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political studies make it easier to determine how democratic a system is, to analyze the 
dynamics of development, and to compare the systems. 
The terms democracy and democratization correlate as state and process. Democra-
tization is the process of transition to a democratic form of government.43 As scientists 
note, the process of democratization is complex and could last for a long time. The 
authors analyzing and explaining „democratization“ must realize that this is an ongoing 
and dynamic process, and must consider the theoretic concepts and the real political 
processes from different countries. Laswell stated that „in order to be able to discover the 
main similarities and differences that must be studied, the full context must be perma-
nently scanned.. [and] the observation techniques must be multiple“. 44
The traditional approach of the democratization processes includes the requirements 
to limit or minimize the ideological and institutional discordances of the old regime, the 
autonomy from old powers, mobilization of the civil society, creation of a stable system of 
political parties.45 The new definitions of the consolidation concept also determine the 
consideration of the cultural realities, traditional culture from a given country. In this 
case it is necessary to reform the administrative-territorial structures, to develop the party 
system and different sociopolitical movements, corporatism, etc. One considers the 
international parameters of democratization, which could have a significant influence in 
some cases, as seen in the recent experiences of Georgia and Ukraine. As the researchers 
mention, countries that chose democratization do not necessarily follow the liberal 
model, democratization can be achieved in different ways and forms. In the context of 
democratization problems, one sees the need to determine the real meaning of the demo-
cratic consolidation processes. There is a need to institutionalize new democratic forms 
and structures, as well as increase their legitimacies. 
In the spotlight of researchers studying democratization are the issues of the dyna-
mics from the transition period processes or, according to the formulation proposed by 
Ph. Schmitter, the „democratic transition“, which includes the period of political develop-
ment from one political regime to another.46 The analysts believe that the rules of the 
game are not strictly defined, and the political relations are not clearly determined in this 
period. The rules of the political game are not only flexible and changeable, but also 
contes ted by the groups seeking power. Political leaders become involved in political 
confron tations not just for the achievement of their interests, or the interests of those 
whom they pretend to represent, they also tend to determine the rules of the political 
life, establish the political procedures for the organization of elections. These rules will 
determine who will get the power.47 
43  Huntington S. Th e Th ird Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, 1991, p.9.
44  Lasswell H.D. Th e future of the comparative method, Comparative Politics, 1968, p.3-18
45  O’Donnell G., Schmitter Ph., and Whitehead L., (eds). Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy. 
Baltimore: Th e Johns Hopkins University, 1986, p.73
46  O’Donnell G., Schmitter Ph., and Whitehead L., (eds). Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy. 
Baltimore: Th e Johns Hopkins University, 1986
47  Ibidem
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While analyzing and evaluating the dynamic democratization processes, the multitude 
of causes and interdependencies, researchers also distinguish some generalizations, which 
we will refer to in more detail. Reviewing the works on comparative politics, and referring 
to comparative literature about democratization, Laurence Whitehead mentions the follo-
wing aspects that could serve as a basis for prediction: 1) two of the most certain ways to 
disintegrate an authoritarian coalition, with opening the way to a possible democratic 
transition, are a succession crisis and the defeat in an external military conflict; 2) chances 
for democratization in any country will be materially affected by the results of similar 
processes from the dominant state at regional level; 3) democratic consolidation will be 
easier in the societies where state formation is complete (i.e. the borders are secure and 
the national identity is well-developed), as opposed to the societies where state-building 
and democratization have to be accomplished simultaneously.48 
Working with these generalizations, we can deduct several explanations. First, at the 
international level the regional aspect has an important political, economic and social 
influence on external as well as internal processes in different states from the region. In 
this case, one of the factors that influence the democratization processes, namely, the 
influence at regional and international level, is determinant. 
Another deduction relates to the issue of correlation between democratization and 
interethnic processes. Laurence Whitehead believes that the process of democracy consoli-
dation is easier in the societies where the national identity is well developed.49 In this case, 
one can assume that it is the national consolidation and national identity of the majority 
group that will be involved in the process of democratization in the society. However, 
another problem of the societies in transition in multinational states, that emerge in the 
process of democratization, is the issue of interethnic relations. 
Looking at the conditions of democratization in the countries of the former Soviet 
Union, authors try to compare these realities with apparently similar situations.50 However, 
what David Laitin calls „competitive-assimilation game“ in the case of the working class 
from Catalonia, could be inconclusive in specific situations from the Central Asian 
countries of the former Soviet Union.51 The use of the „competitive-assimilation game“ 
in these countries may be inadequate. 
In this context, problems emerge regarding the relationship between the state and 
representatives of different nations, living together in a multinational and multicultural 
48  Whitehead L. Politica comparată: studii despre democratizare. Manual de Ştiinţă Politică. Polirom, 2005, p. 321
49  It is important to add that Laurence Whitehead also refers to the condition for democratization related to the comple-
tion of state formation, which will refer to further in this work. 
50  Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, 
and Post-Communist Europe Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996
51  Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, analyzing the situation of the working-class Spanish immigrants from Catalonia, which 
was dynamic from the cultural and economic perspective, come to the conclusion that it is in the interest of these im-
migrants to be assimilated so that their chances in the new environment improve. Th e situation of Russians from Central 
Asia is diff erent. In 1989, in Almaty, the capital of Kazakhstan, Russians made up 59 percent of the population while the 
Kazakh, the title nation, represented only 22.5 percent. Less than one percent of Russians spoke Kazakh. In Bishkek, the 
capital of Kyrgyzstan, the percentages were almost identical. 
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state. If we are to examine democracy as a set of principles, then the process of democra-
tization can be defined as an attempt of the society to proceed to the implementation 
stage of these principles. Thus, one of the main principles of democracy is the principle 
of citizenship, which presumes citizens’ legislative equality. 
This means the right of the individuals to be equal and the duty of the authorities to 
be both accountable and accessible for the members of the political community.52
 The realization of this principle assigns equally all citizens the duty to respect the 
legitimacy of adopted decisions, and the right to act based on the authority received from 
citizens (or apply coercion, if necessary) in order to implement efficiently the proposed 
goals, but also to protect the society from threats. 
In this case, the issue is related to the attitude of the state towards the representatives 
of different nationalities, policies adopted by state, granting citizenship and provision of 
citizens’ rights and access to political and social life.
Analyzing the conditions of democracy consolidation in multicultural states, the 
resear chers made an assumption, according to which, democracy should not be consoli-
dated in multinational states: It is impossible for a nation-state to emerge voluntarily in a 
process of „competitive assimilation“, when there is a large number of „immigrants“ and 
majority nationalities. Investigations bring Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan to the conclusion 
that the higher the percentage of population born in a given state, or established there 
without considering themselves foreigners and subsequently were denied their citizenship 
of that particular state (thus affecting their living opportunities), the lesser the chances 
that this country will consolidate its democracy.53 They formulate the conclusion as 
follows: the chances for democracy consolidation in a multinational and multicultural 
society grow due to policies granting full and equal citizenship, and providing all citizens 
with a common „shelter“ for the individual rights mandated and applied by the state. 
Thus, the least conflicting solution for multinational, multicultural states and societies 
is to combine the collective rights of nationalities or minorities with the individual rights 
fully protected by state.54 One argues in favor of the idea that a certain notion of group 
rights is necessary. This term would define certain types of individual rights and im-
prove the universal norms concerning the rights raising controversies among scrupulous 
lawyers attached to the tradition of political liberalism, who oppose any definition of 
collective rights. 
These conclusions are also confirmed by the statistics (see Annex 1, table 1): analy-
zing the current level of development and stability of democracy in 114 countries, the 
American researcher Robert Dahl came to the conclusion that in the countries with less 
diversity, 58 percent reflects a high level of democracy (poliarchy), while in the countries 
with a pronounced diversity this percentage equals 13.55 
52  O’Donnell G., Schmitter Ph., and Whitehead L., (eds). Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy. 
Baltimore: Th e Johns Hopkins University, 1986
53  Linz Juan J., Stepan Alfred, Drumul spre o democraţie consolidată. Cum se consolidează democraţia. Polirom, 2004, p.61
54  Joseph Raz, Th e Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp.165-217, Kymlicka Will, Multicultural 
Citizenship: A liberal Th eory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.107-130
55  Даль Р. Введение в теорию демократии / Пер. с англ. – Санкт-Петербург: „Алетейя“, 1998, с.19
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These results confirm again that the diversity, as such, is not an obstacle in the way 
of democratization, and that the core of the problems is the essence of this diversity. The 
character and the orientation of those connections, which emerge between the social 
and ethnic groups, and their correlation with the state, represent a special importance. 
The social and political changes at the end of the 1980’s have changed the balance of 
powers between the ethnic groups from Moldova. The correlation of forces between the 
minority and the majority ethnic groups has changed. The Moldovans are no longer the 
minority ethnic group within the USSR, no longer a population threatened from the 
cultural perspective, living at the periphery of the great empire. The Moldovans became 
the majority group in an independent state, having the power to change the political and 
cultural trends of the soviet period. 
The political changes as well as the demographic realities from Moldova were impo-
sing the adoption of a policy in the field of interethnic relations. In 1990’s, Moldovans 
made up the majority in rural areas, while the main cities (Chisinau, Blati, Tiraspol and 
Bender, were multinational. Moldovans made up 80.2 percent of the rural population 
and only 46.3 percent of the urban population; they represented an absolute majority in 
most of the raions (districts), but not in important cities.56
At the beginning of the democratization of the country, two different trends in the field 
of interethnic relations emerged: 1) the panromanian project – arguing and cultivating the 
Romanian identity among the majority ethnic group and the reunification with Romania; 
2) a policy in the field of multinational interethnic relations oriented towards the consoli-
dation of the Moldovan national identity. These trends are kept until present time, fact 
confirmed by the results of the investigations of the experts within the Ethnobarometer. 
The adoption in 1989 of the laws regarding the language, the introduction of the 
Latin alphabet and the declaration of the state language on August 31, 1989 was followed 
by voting the law regarding the use of languages, which guaranteed bilingualism. These 
laws were highly appreciated by the European commissions as being democratic and 
guaranteeing „a real bilingualism“. 
The Law on citizenship, adopted in 1991 (article 2) stipulates that the citizens of 
Moldova are the persons who were permanently residing on the territory of Moldova at 
the moment of sovereignty proclamation. The adoption of the „zero variant“ in this case 
has allowed solving the problem of citizen affiliation of the representatives of national 
minorities who were residing in the country. 
The Moldovan Constitution from 1994 referred to the „people of the Republic of 
Moldova“ and not to a specific ethnic group as recipient of state sovereignty. 
The controversial Law of the Republic of Moldova regarding the rights of the persons 
belonging to national minorities, and the legal status of their organizations of 2001 stipu-
lates the rights to native language, culture, religion, education, organization, connection 
with the historical homeland, and ensures the rights of the minorities to be represented 
in the executive structures and courts, army and law enforcement bodies. 
56  Итоги всесоюзной переписи населения 1989 года. Minneapolis, Minn., East View Publication, 1993, 7, II, p.524-535
60 ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Similarly, the EU-Moldova Action Plan recommended for implementation by Brussels 
during the VII reunion of the Council for Cooperation Moldova-European Union (2005), 
committed the Moldovan authorities: 
• To guarantee efficient protection of the rights of national minorities;
• To react adequately to the conclusions and recommendations of the structures and 
experts regarding the framework convention on the protection of national minorities; 
• To develop and implement legislation regarding the exclusion of discrimination, 
and legislation which guarantees the rights of minorities in accordance with the 
European Standards;57
Thus, the state policies accepted in Moldova regarding the provision of a full and equal 
citizenship, and provision of a common „shelter“ to all citizens regarding the individual 
rights have created a real premise for the democratization of the society. 
Democratization in Post-totalitarian 
Multinational Countries
The democratic principles, which provide for free elections, and which would enjoy 
authority, the exercise of monopoly of the legitimate power by the elected officials, an 
efficient legal protection of the rights of citizens cannot be accomplished if there is no 
state. The democracy cannot exist without a state. 
As we have noted before, Laurence Whitehead mentioned that the democratic conso-
lidation will be easier in societies where the state formation is completed (i.e. the borders 
are secure and the national identity is well formed), than in societies where the emergence 
of state and democratization is accomplished simultaneously.58 Thus, the democratization 
processes will be facilitated in conditions where the national identity is well-established. 
Firstly, we will resort to the definition of national identity, to see later what is the corre-
lation between the national and civic identity, and what are the imperatives in this sense 
for Moldova. 
The national identity determines the individual to answer the sacramental question: 
Who am I? In this context, one has to determine who else is included in the term „We“ 
and to discover the limits of this group, that is who „They“ are. Thus, for millions of 
people the national identity is an objective reality and is not subject to reflection. It is 
formed during the process of socializing of the individual and understanding the national 
identity, and thus becomes one of the first forms of socialization of the individual. 
Nowadays, as stated by C. Calhoun, „the identity is mainly understood as national 
identity“.59 In the political terminology and sometimes in the scientific terminology, the 
terms national identity and ethnic identity are used as synonyms, and the reason to that is 
because „nation“ and „ethnic group“ are basic categories for the national classification. 
57  See: Moldova Suverană, February 25, 2005
58  Whitehead L. Politica comparată: studii despre democratizare. Manual de Ştiinţă Politică. Polirom, 2005, p. 321
59  Calhoun C. Nationalism and Contradictions of Modernity// Berkley Journal of Sociology. 1997-1998 Vol.42. issue 1, p.1
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The definition of national identity in the scientific literature from the former USSR 
and Western countries has different traditions. In the former USSR has predominated 
the concept that the nation is formed mainly by the domination of ethnic and cultural 
factors: similarity of language, traditions, customs, religion, etc. The national identity 
was considered an ethnic identity. The ethnic background is determined by the act of 
birth and was introduced in the passport of the citizens: since 1930’s in the passports was 
introduced the famous entry 5: nationality. In the case of mixed families, the parents or 
the individual when reaching maturity, were choosing the ethnic identity. 
According to tradition, the national identity in the Western world is conceived and 
often perceived as political, state identity and never as ethno-linguistic identity. 
The scientists say, „The nation shows the relationship between the state (real or 
aspired) and the citizens that form a pretended unity. The image of a community (if not 
biological then cultural) is spread at the state level. However, the ethnic identity does not 
imply a dimension at the state level“.60 In the context of studying globalization and moder-
nization, the spread of the idea that there will be a substitution of ethnic identity with the 
national one is not grounded. The ethnic identity and the national identity coexist as two 
forms of group identity: the cultural and language similarity is important for ethnic 
identity, while the political and state similarity is important for the national identity. In 
a modern state, there should be a unitary community, but this does not necessarily mean 
that all citizens belong to a specific ethnic community. The national identity can be, and 
often is, perceived as state identity. The existence of these two forms of identity proves 
the existence of the most essential forms of social identity of the individuals – ethnic and 
state identity. Each of them represents a multidimensional reality and the rapport between 
them is characterized through complex, interdependent relationships and occasionally 
mutual exclusion. 
The experience of national relations in the former USSR is analyzed today from diffe-
rent perspectives. We will refer to those aspects that explain the emergence of national 
identity. As mentioned, in the former USSR the national identity emerged primarily from 
the ethnic identity. Meanwhile, considerable efforts were made in order to build the 
„soviet people“ and its affiliation with the Soviet Union.61 The Soviet identity emerged 
from a double identity: from the ethnic/national identity, and at the same time, from a 
new cultural identity based on the historical perspective of „communism building“. In 
this context, the new identity also pretended to be a state identity but proved to be fragile, 
unstable and did not resist long after the collapse of the USSR. The authors also explain 
the paradox of the Soviet government: On one hand, they were suppressing the national 
feelings, but meanwhile, they were institutionalizing territorial-national units as cultural 
and social categories.62 Thus, the soviet identity was rather ideological and based not on 
60  Коротеева В.В. Теории национализма в зарубежных социальных науках. М., 1999, p. 93
61  Castells M. Th e Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture. Vol.2. Th e Power of Identity. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers.1977
62  Brubaker R. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 1996, p.17-18
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a modern definition of nation and state, but created artificially based on an imperial 
ideol ogy.63 At the same time, this was a closed and highly politicized identity.64 Being 
politicized, the ideological conscience linked to the soviet citizens’ concept of the world 
was ethnocentric and oriented towards a closed concept, manifesting itself under the form 
of „avoidance of freedom“. The national conscience in the soviet times was not oriented 
towards universal values, was not opened towards liberalization. 
The specific nature of the national conscience of the soviet period has manifested 
itself differently at the level of different social groups and, at the same time, in different 
regions of the Soviet Union, each region having a specific national conscience. For 
example, the scientists who analyzed the realities from Estonian communities sustain 
that in this former Soviet republic has persisted the identity of resistance, according to 
Castells classification,65 which was rejecting the state soviet identity and insisting on 
ethnic identity.66
At the same time, there were also common features, characteristic to all citizens of 
the USSR. The spreading in the entire society of the phenomenon of double conscience 
was determined by the character of official ideology, which was authoritarian and intole-
rant towards other points of view, especially towards the perspective of national identifica-
tion. The phenomenon of „double conscience“ was leading to the formalization of social 
behavior cases of the individual, and any acts of manifestation of the individual’s attitude 
towards different values and principles that were promoted by the official ideology. In 
addition, there was a ritualization of these strict acts and needs of citizens to demonstrate 
their implacable belief in the communist ideals. 
„The double conscience“ can be also found in sovereign Moldova, both at the level of 
mass conscience and at the level of mentality of national movements’ leaders. As a value 
category, Moldovian citizens do not consider the state important and do not trust its 
institutions, regardless of their ethnic background. Thus, the results of sociological studies 
developed by the Institute of Public Policy within the Public Opinion Barometer program 
in 1998-2005 prove that the attitude of citizens towards the state remains unchanged 
over the years. Only approximately 50 percent of respondents have „much trust“ and 
„some trust“ in the state institutions: government, parliament, army, law-enforcement 
(see annex 2, table 2).67 In this context, the following fact becomes interesting: Moldovan 
citizens have the highest level of trust (approximately 80 percent) in the Church, which 
63  Hosking G., Can Russia Become a Nation-State? Nations and Nationalism, 1998; 4, p.449-462; McDaniel T., T. Th e 
Agony of the Russian Idea. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1996; Rowley D.G Imperial versus National Dis-
course: Th e Case of Russia. Nations and Nationalism. 2000. 1, p. 23-42
64  Визитей Н. Национальная идея и проблема гражданской идентичности. – Unitatea poporului Republicii Mol-
dova şi problema identităţii etnice. Materialele conferinţei din 4-5 mai 1999. Chişinău 2000, p. 25-58. 
65  Castells M. Th e Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture. Vol.2. Th e Power of Identity. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers.1977
66  Vihalemm T. Th eoretical Perspectives on the Formation of the New Civic Identity in Estonia. Th e Challenge of the 
Russian Minority. Emerging Multicultural Democracy in Estonia. Tallinn. 2002, p. 168
67  We need to explain the rating regarding the trust in the President, which, according to the same survey is over 50 percent. 
Th is is largely due to Vladimir Voronin’s personality that is consistent with the masses and their expectations. 
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was eliminated from the social and political life in the former Soviet Union. During the 
period of transition and insecurity, when citizens lost their trust in state institutions and 
state social insurance, they found spiritual support in other non-state institutions, such as 
Church. It should be mentioned for comparison that the level of trust in state institutions 
is higher in countries with democratic traditions, for example in the United States.
The mass conscience cannot be changed rapidly therefore, national ideas persisted in 
the post-totalitarian period and were largely predetermined by Soviet times. The national 
idea was conceived as a center for shaping the new mentality, which was emerging during 
the democratization of post-soviet countries and was at the same time an important factor 
of this movement. But the essence, content, spiritual-practical and political-ideological 
forms of this idea in the conditions of Moldova proved to be a direct continuation of the 
Soviet traditions. At the beginning of restructuring period, the national idea was emer-
ging for many inhabitants of the country as a supreme ideological value and this idea 
mattered as much as the idea of socialism in Soviet times. This idea became supreme in 
the society, gained many supporters and was intensely promoted by national leaders. 
The ease, on which the defenders of „socialist ideals“ from Soviet period resorted to the 
promotion of national ideas during the restructuring period, can be considered as a solid 
argument in supporting the thesis that there is a continuity and an internal identity of 
these phenomena. Researchers also point out the „closed nature“68 of mass conscience 
during the social cataclysms; therefore, the phenomenon of national idea appeared in 
closed version, more precisely, in the ethno-cultural form. As in the Soviet period, mass 
conscience was not oriented towards openness, general and universal values, it was 
leading to deadlock, being also one of the causes for the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The openness resulted then in a chaos and the value-based orientations were lost. People 
developed a reaction of self-preservation, which lead maybe instinctively to withdrawal 
and isolation in a closed world vision that lead to an ethnocentric ideology. As a result, 
the closed form of conscience was transformed into another. 
The society became divided, and this split coincides with ethnic and linguistic differences, 
leading to a situation when the national groups oppose each other. The ethnic groups, 
being in fact very heterogeneous by social structure, join in responsibility according to 
the national principle in order to become opponents of another ethnic group. During 
Perestroika, the national revival ideas were usually followed by the ideal of sovereign 
national state based on the principles of democracy, rule of law, socially-oriented market 
economy, and civil society. These were the principles introduced in the Constitutions 
adopted in post-Soviet countries. However, in the opinion of majority of the population 
these principles had a formal character. The formalism of the Soviet period, the double 
conscience and the lack of trust in state structures were preserved during Perestroika. 
These were supplemented by a lack of trust in the new principles, which were unknown 
to the population. Together they led to the formation of a skeptical conscience. 
68  Визитей Н. Национальная идея и проблема гражданской идентичности. – Unitatea poporului Repu blicii Mol-
dova şi problema identităţii etnice. Materialele conferinţei din 4-5 mai 1999. Chişinău, 2000, p. 36
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The Etnobarometer results prove that the opinions regarding the perception of 
politics and democratization were divided in two large categories. The Delphi study 
results confirm two different ideological and normative perspectives: 
• The first perspective regards the independence from 1991 in a double aspect: as a 
moment of national revival and return to Romanian spirit and as a beginning of 
democratization of the political regime. The return to the Latin script, declaration 
of Romanian language as a state language, symbolic recovery of the relationship 
between the two banks of Prut River are related to the newly created historical 
reality. The free elections, multiparty system, creation of the Parliament, institutional 
reforms, adherence of Moldova to the main international institutions (the UN, CoE, 
and OSCE), and orientation of Moldova’s foreign policy towards the EU are the main 
achievements that contributed to the democratization of the political regime. The 
breakout of the Transnistrian war is regarded as an attempt of Russia to maintain 
its influence in the region. 
• The second perspective defines the period of independence as moment of emergence 
of a new nation – the Moldovans, a nation with a specific history and identity inclu-
ding a multiethnic mixture (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Gagauz 
etc.). For this, it is necessary to have at least two state languages – Moldovan and 
Russian. From this perspective, the newly created democratic institutions did not 
prove their advantages. The multiparty system and political instability linked to 
the fight for power of different political parties impeded the achievement of good 
and unitary governance, ultimately leadind to the division and impoverishment of 
the society, weakening the state authority, launching ungrounded and conflicting 
slogans during the elections in order to gain political capital. At the same time, 
Moldova did too little to affirm itself as a partner who has an important word to 
say within the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Transnistrian war broke 
out because of the Romanianization policy adopted by Chisinau at the beginning 
of 1990s and because of misunderstandings regarding the use of state languages. 
According to Delphi study results, the representatives of different ethnic groups took 
different ideological stands. The representatives of the majority ethnic group, Moldo-
vans, militate for democratization and perceive independence as national revival. The 
investigation participants belonging to national minorities perceive independence as an 
occasion for the emergence of a new nation and existence of a multiethnic mixture. 
Several positions could be identified regarding the attitude towards the Moldovan 
state: 
1. The national-optimists: Most of the participants said they were proud of the country 
where they were born and living, calling it their Motherland and associating it with 
the most beautiful metaphors and epithets (see Annex 3). 
2. The unionist perspective: The opinions regarding the perception of Moldova’s inde-
pendence are divided. Some participants salute the creation of the independent 
state believing in its future. Other participants conceive the country as a component 
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of a larger political entity, whether part of Romania or, more rarely, the Russian 
Federation. These feelings of coalition with a larger political unit represent another 
confirmation for consciousness leftovers from Soviet period, where the traditional 
affiliation to a more influential political community and the inability to exercise 
independently the political functions was customary. 
3. This gap is getting wider in a weak country whose territory is fragmented by a sepa-
ratist conflict, whose history is extremely short and turbulent and whose identity 
is insecure. (see annex 4). Meanwhile, the participants are concerned about the 
future of this country, worried about the economic decline, and they see Moldova 
hanging over an abyss because of poverty and its political inconsistency. 
Thus, in the perception of some survey participants, Moldova is a weak state that has 
not managed to create and consolidate its formal state institutions. 
The way the ethnic groups perceive themselves and are perceived in relation with 
the state can be characterized differently. The way the Moldovans perceive themselves as 
citizens of the Republic of Moldova can be also deducted from their position regarding 
the following statement: I am proud that I was born in Moldova… About 86 percent of 
Moldovan respondents agree totally or partially with this statement and only 11 percent 
of respondents are not proud of being citizens of Moldova. The following statement, which 
shows that Moldovan citizenship makes their life easier, was approved by 32 percent of 
Moldovan respondents (see annex 5). Only a few Moldovans (11 percent) feel ashamed 
of being citizens of Moldova, and 19 percent claim that it makes their life harder. In this 
case, the representatives of the main ethnic group have a more critical attitude about 
their country, feel a higher responsibility and are more demanding with regards to the 
events (see Annex 6). Some Moldovans consider that being citizen of Moldova implies 
an unformed ethnic identity, extreme poverty or, ultimately, emigration (see Annex 7). 
Some representatives of national minorities believe that they belong to a beautiful 
country where they are pleased to live, they believe in their future and consider that, 
regardless their ethnic background, they are all citizens of one country. The participants 
belonging to ethnic minorities living in Moldova also express opinions regarding the need 
for understanding civic identity and state affiliation (see Annex 8). Nonetheless, some 
people avoided answering the questions related to this topic (see Annex 9). Although 
Russians are perceived as being different and having a special status compared to other 
ethnic groups, the way Moldovans see Russians as citizens of Moldova was treated dis-
tinctly. Russians are viewed by many Moldovan survey participants as the ethnic group 
which has had in the past the advantage of power in the detriment of the other ethic 
groups and which has not yet given up the idea of maintaining this advantage: They are 
arrogant and continue to behave as foreigners or as conquerors (see Annex 10).
Many participants believe that the Gagauz minority perceives Moldova as their own 
motherland and that the autonomy granted to this minority was a good solution (see 
Annex 11). When speaking about the assistance provided by the neighboring states to 
different ethnic groups from the country, one can notice a concern regarding the future 
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development of the state and regarding preservation of national identity, and a rather 
suspicious attitude towards the assistance of these countries to different ethnic groups. 
Some participants view with suspicion the assistance provided by the neighboring 
countries to the relevant ethnic groups (setting up of universities, radio and television 
stations, newspapers, etc. financed by Russian for the Russian minority or by Ukraine for 
the Ukrainian minority, etc. ). The greatest suspicions are raised by the Romanian assis-
tance to Moldovans and Turkish assistance to the Gagauz. Romania’s case seems more 
special, and the ethnic minorities view the involvement of this state in supporting some 
cultural initiatives with suspicion. There are fears that, for example, a TV channel in 
Moldova funded by Romania could try to influence the opinions in favor of Romanian 
interests, which are strange to Moldova. The aid granted by Turkey to the Gagauz is also 
regarded with suspicion by some respondents. This help could separate even more the 
Gagauz minority from Moldova. 
At the same time, there are opinions regarding the best solution, which would be that 
each state should solve its problems alone and funding of schools, universities, and televi-
sion channels should be the responsibility of the government of the particular country. 
Among the most important political events, the respondents list those related to 
the emergence of the new state, such as the declaration of independence (1991) after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and adoption of the Moldovan Constitution in 1994. All 
survey participants, regardless of their ethnic background, consider these political events 
the most important. The granting of certain rights to national minorities, development 
of the poverty reduction strategy by the Government with the approval of international 
financial institutions were listed as the most important of the recent political events. 
The political events related both to domestic and foreign policy are appreciated diffe-
rently by the ethnic groups. Some issues are viewed only from the perspective adopted 
by the survey participants. Thus, the advocates of democratization, national revival and 
return to the Romanian spirit noted the success of the Ilascu Case at ECHR, negotiation 
of the EU-Moldova action plan, the corruption that exists at all administrative levels, 
unification of the leftist forces within a single political party, Democratic Moldova Bloc, 
violation of democratic freedoms by the communist government (since 2001), especially 
freedom of the press. 
The advocates of the perspective of Moldovans as a separate nation noted the aspects 
emphasizing and amplifying the Moldovanism, i.e. the inauguration of the monument of 
Stefan cel Mare (the Great), renovation of Capriana Monastery. Looking at things from 
this perspective, Moldova’s economy and politics stabilized in the last years, governmental 
policies were directed towards ordinary people, and services offered to citizens by state 
improved, Government elaborated social development and youth strategies. 
Nevertheless, as proved by the survey, some controversial issues on the country’s 
political agenda have a high potential of conflict that could place different ethnic groups 
in controversial or even conflicting positions. The different opinions regarding the 
Transnistrian conflict and the possible solutions put the representatives of different ethnic 
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groups in conflicting positions. The topics with the highest conflict potential identified 
by the participants in the first part of the survey were the state configuration: unitary 
state, federal state; strategic orientation of Moldova’s foreign policy: EU or CIS; topics 
related to the national identity (Romanians or Moldovans, history, state official language, 
the threat of Romanianization), threat of losing the Moldovan statehood either through 
unification with Romania or its dissolution through federalization or as a consequence 
of the pressures on behalf of the Russian Federation. This set of issues with a high 
potential for conflict generally identified by the participants is perfectly overlapping in 
the first part of the survey with the set of issues identified by the participants as having a 
potential of causing interethnic conflicts. 
In the second part of the survey, many participants considered the conflicting potential 
of all these topics, except for the Transnistrian issue, which had smaller conflict potential 
compared with the results of the Delphi study. This event could be explained in the follo-
wing way: in a more detailed analysis, the participants presented a more realistic evaluation 
of the situation in the country, the conflict potential of these issues being lower. 
During democratization period, one of the main problems the societies are facing 
with is the stabilization of the formal institutions. Thus, during the transition period, 
Moldova adopted several laws and took certain measures in regulating interethnic 
relations. In 1991, Moldova adopted the Law on citizenship,69 considered one of the most 
liberal in Eastern Europe. The law granted Moldovan citizenship to all persons living 
in the country at the time of declaration of the country’s sovereignty (June 23, 1990), 
regardless of their ethnic background, language, length of residence in the country or 
other crit eria. For conducting historical research and studying interethnic relations, the 
government created the State Department for National Relations and the Institute for 
Interethnic Relation within the Academy of Sciences. According to the survey results, 
the attitude of the respondents matches the attitude of the Delphi study participants. Con-
cerning these governmental structures, the participants’ opinions split in two different 
categories: 
• On the one side, those who believe that these structures are useful and contribute 
to the improvement of interethnic relations - the most frequently mentioned 
activities of these institutions being the organization of festivals and multiethnic 
cultural shows; 
• On the other side, those who consider that these structures are completely 
inefficient, their activities being unsatisfactory for solving the main problems (see 
Annex12).
In addition to the structures that are more or less dependent on the state (Department 
for Interethnic Relations, Institute for Interethnic Relations within the Moldovan 
Academy of Sciences), the groups or persons influencing (more in a negative way) 
the interethnic relations in Moldova are represented almost exclusively by politicians or 
political parties. 
69  Legea cetăţeniei Republicii Moldova (Law on citizenship of the Republic of Moldova). 1991
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Democratization of Society, Political Parties 
and Emergence of Multiple Identity
The traditional approach of democratization includes the requirements for limiting 
or reducing to the minimum the ideological and institutional noncompliance of the old 
regime, autonomy from old powers, mobilization of civil society, and creation of a stable 
system of political parties.70 The new details about the consolidation concept imply a 
consideration of the cultural realities and traditional culture from the particular country. 
In this case, it is recommended to reform the administrative-territorial structures, develop 
the party system, different social-political movements, and the corporatism.
The democratic transformations imply also the reformation of the political system 
within the society, including the establishment of a multiparty system. The political par-
ties have the mission to concentrate and represent citizens’ interests. The political parties 
have to crystallize the aspirations of individuals with the same tendencies and shape the 
positions from which population will have to choose during the elections. 
Nevertheless, although nobody denies the need for a multiparty system in transition 
countries, where the democratic principles only start to emerge, the political parties are 
not very popular. The results of Public Opinion Barometer from Moldova show that the 
political parties are the least popular among social organizations of the country. Over the 
years the surveys showed that less than 30 percent of respondents trusted political parties 
(The minimum (11 percent) was registered in 2001 and the maximum (28 percent) was 
registered in 2004-2005. This result is lower than the result registered for trade unions 
(14 -36 percent) nongovernmental organizations (20-36 percent) and much lower than 
the one for mass media (47-62 percent) (see Annex 2, Table 2). 
The level of trust for political parties is the lowest if compared to other institutions 
and organizations from the country. The skeptical attitude towards political parties is 
dicta ted by the Soviet legacy and the times of denial of social and political life. This 
explains why the political parties find it difficult to affirm themselves in society. People 
believe that political parties represent the influential groups of power controlled by the 
elites, whose purpose is to manipulate the public opinion. There are no considerable 
differences between political parties and there is little interest in citizens on behalf of 
them. Some people believe that political platforms of different parties are quite similar 
and see no need for the existence of more parties. The Public Opinion Barometer from 
April 2002 also outlined this aspect of citizens’ attitude towards political parties.71 The 
political parties are not deeply rooted in society, are unstable and sometimes provisional, 
and this explains largely the citizens’ attitude towards political parties. In societies in 
70  O’Donnell G., Schmitter Ph., and Whitehead L., (eds). Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy. 
Baltimore: Th e Johns Hopkins University, 1986, p.73
71  Th e 2002 Public Opinion Barometer survey also implied the determination of attitudes towards political parties and 
included two statements: 1.) Do you think that it would be better if there was only one party in Moldova or 2) Do you 
think that it would be better if there were several parties in Moldova. More than half of the respondents (69 percent) sup-
port the idea of a single party in Moldova and only 22 percent support the multiparty system
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transition, the rule of law is not established and political life is managed poorly, allowing 
the parties to commit abuses of authority and achieve their profit-driven trivial goals. In 
the conditions of a poor society, citizens are tempted to blame political parties for the 
poverty. The political parties are unevenly weak compared to the level of literacy of the 
population, a fact with a direct negative impact on the political sphere from the country. 
According to the Ethnobarometer studies, the political parties are often listed among 
the organizations or institutions influencing interethnic relations (see Annex 15). For 
political parties contributing to the improvement of interethnic relations, the represen-
tatives of different ethnic groups listed the Communist Party from Moldova: 6 percent 
of Moldovans and Bulgarians, 15 percent of Ukrainians and 17 percent of Russians. One 
percent of the Gagauz also listed the mayor’s offices. The respondents also mentioned 
other parties: Christian Democratic Party (2 percent of Moldovans), „Our Moldova“ 
Bloc (2 percent of Ukrainians and 8 percent of Russians), and Social Democratic Party 
(2 percent of Ukrainians and 5 percent of Russians). For organizations the respondents 
mentioned United Nations (1 percent of Moldovans), schools (1 percent of Gagauz), 
Parliament (1 percent of Gagauz), Ministry of Culture (3 percent of Bulgarians), and the 
House of Nationalities (2 percent of Bulgarians). 
The Christian Democratic Party was listed exclusively among the organizations con-
tri buting to the worsening of interethnic relations in Moldova: 5 percent of Moldovans, 
1 percent of Gagauz, 16 percent of Ukrainians, 20 percent of Russians and 8 percent of 
Bulgarians. The Communist Party was listed by 2 percent of Moldovans, Agrarian Party 
by 2 percent of Ukrainians and „Democratic Moldova“ Bloc by 4 percent of Russians. 
The respondents also mentioned the customs (3 percent of Bulgarians) and Parliament 
(2 percent of Bulgarians). 
The listed personalities from Moldova contributing to the improvement of interethnic 
relations are mainly political and public opinion leaders: The President of Moldova, 
Vladimir Voronin, is on top of the list being mentioned by 15 percent of Moldovans and 
Gagauz, 23 percent of Bulgarians, 31 percent of Russians and 39 percent of Ukrainians 
(See Annex 16) The Prime Minister Tarlev holds the second position being listed by 6 
percent of Moldovans, 8 percent of Ukrainians, 10 percent of Russians and 7 percent of 
Bulgarians. 
For personalities contributing to the worsening of the interethnic relations in Moldova, 
the representatives of different ethnic groups nominated unanimously Iurie Rosca, the 
leader of the Christian Democratic Party: 11 percent of Moldovans, 27 percent of 
Ukrainians, 36 percent of Russians, 6 percent of Gagauz and 19 percent of Bulgarians. 
Since the period of national revival, the ethnopolitical situation in Moldova has been 
an example of polarization of interethnic and intercultural contradictions. The national 
idea or the idea of defending the national interests can become the methodology for 
political consolidation. The ethnic groups cannot emerge as independent subjects in the 
political sphere because their actions do not bear a formal character of a group. Their 
interests are represented by the ethnic elites that get involved in the political struggle for 
power, in other words they become subjects of political struggle. 
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Presently, one can see the contradiction between the government on one side, and 
the ideological orientation of the political elites, on the other side. Any ideology is a 
project of the future society. The complexity of the ideas that represent the interests of 
the ethnos are systematized by the politicians in a set of norms, values, directions which 
allow for an influence on the ethnos or on each individual, and allow winning the 
political space. Thus, ideology justifies the government’s actions and represents a means 
for political struggle. The interests of the group are subordinated to the common idea, 
which directs the group in a certain direction for the achievement of the goal. 
The political leader presenting the interests of his or her group interprets them, turns 
them into an ideology, and subordinates them to his or her interests. The politicization 
of the ethnic factor occurs, which signifies a real transformation of the ethnic factor into 
a tool of political struggle. The political conflicts then become ethnic conflicts. 
Rothschild J. believes that politicizing the ethnic element means: 
1. To give individuals the possibility of understanding the role of politics in the 
preservation of ethnocultural values and vice versa;
2. To stimulate their attention towards this connection;
3. To mobilize people in forming ethnic groups with a collective self-conscience;
4. To direct them in the sphere of political activities, based on this understanding 
and collective self-conscience;72
In the case of ethnopolitical conflicts, we can outline some common aspects characte-
rized by set goals and ideology. In many cases, the conflicts start with an approach and 
discussion on the national language issue, and these particular conflicts changed from 
closed into opened conflicts. This sphere had a large mobilizing force because it resorted 
to all people of this ethnic group. Then the claims were generally entering the political 
sphere and were extending over the state. Consequently, one got the territorial claims, 
which implies conflicts regarding the resources of the relevant ethnic group. At this stage, 
one frequently invoked the historic past, certain events and traditions from the past. 
Moreover, both parties start using vast historical and archeological materials, which then 
come to justify the claims put forth by both parties. 
The congruence of the national claims with the struggle of political elites for power 
represents a reality of the transition period. The trends that follow in this situation can 
be different: in some cases, the importance of the ethnic factor grows and is then used in 
the political struggle. One must also consider these consequences generated by the wor-
sening of the living standards of the population, massive migrations that could generate 
a tension in the interethnic relations. 
Preoccupied with the national identity, the ethnic groups will continue to be an 
object of manipulation of the formal and informal elites during the political struggle for 
the division of power positions. Although there is an interdiction for the creation of 
political parties on ethnic principles, the politological analysis openly proves that there 
is a trend in the distribution of the electorate by national criteria. 
72  Rothschild J. Etnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework. NY 1981, p.9
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In the case of politicization of national issues, one focuses the attention on the „main“ 
identity and on the need to choose from mutually exclusive identities. In this case, politi-
cization represents an essential stimulus for the „nationalism“, which represents a poli-
ticized national idea. 
When the goal is a successful democratization, the researchers focus on the multiple 
identities, which represent the changing reality and which are build on the social basis 
of individual’s identities. The human capacity for complementary and multiple identity, 
besides guaranteeing the right for equal and full citizenship, represents a key factor that 
makes democracy in multinational states possible.73 The emergence of political and civic 
identities is considered one of the opportunities of democratic consolidation. 
We can distinguish several approaches of the concept of civic identity. One of them 
however can be considered the basic approach, which considers the political citizenship 
as the central point from which all other dimensions derive. For Barber, the civic identity 
represents the genuine affiliation to political community, which, despite the distinctive iden-
tity references, unites everybody through common preoccupations affecting everyone.74
Most authors outline that the concept of citizenship is getting wider within a general 
social change: transition from modern to post-modern societies David Miller conceives 
citizenship as practiced in several ways: Right of association, civil right to a relative 
freedom, the social right to a minimal standard of living ensured by the welfare state and a 
post modern warrant of access the communication technologies.75 Bryan Turner defines 
citizenship as a set of practices in a civil society.76
We agree with the larger concept according to which, the civic identity embraces the 
feeling of the individual to be included in the social contract, the conscience of being a 
member of a certain social group, one of the many groups from the political community. 
Derek Heather explains that the community and political affiliations are not mutually 
exclusive at the individual level.77 He argues that such a situation could lead to the 
emergence of a multiple identity: A person can be simultaneously a member of a state 
(through citizenship) and a member of civil society. The civic conscience is supposed to 
be assured by the daily process of negotiation between different groups. It is more of a 
process than a final destination. 
We can assert that the political identity, backed up by the right to participate and 
exercise political power, and the civic identity, as a feeling of belonging to a state and 
society, are mutually stimulating. The determinist correlation and the feeling of devotion 
towards a state, the common interest of all members of the society can have multiple 
sources with a different impact in varied contexts. 
73  Linz J., Stepan A., Drumul spre o democraţie consolidată. – Cum se consolidează democraţia. Polirom, 2004, p.51-68
74  Quoted by: Page, M. Pluralistic Citizenship: A Reference for Citizenship Education. Canadian Ethnic Studies, 29 (2), 
1997, p.22-32
75  Miller, D. Diff erentiated Citizenship. Paper for the International Conference „Cultural Plurality in Estonia: Policies and 
Solutions“, Tallinn, 1999
76  Turner B. S. Citizenship and Social Th eory. London: Sage, 1993
77  Heater, D. What is Citizenship? Cambridge: Polity Press; Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1999
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Thus, the empirical analysis suggests that the civic identity can be based on the state or 
local identity, implying rights and duties, economic interest, perceptions about common 
goals and a common future. 
Based on this understanding of the term of civic identity, the creation of a common 
civic identity of the representatives of different national entities from Moldova is defined 
through the relevance of determination of national identity, and establishing the clear 
lines between „us“ and „them’, adherence to democratic values, and nurturing the hope 
for the future. A common pattern for all citizens of Moldova can be also the aspiration 
towards democratization of the society, orientation towards European integration, which 
is currently supported by a significant part of the population.78 Largely, the emergence of 
civic identity is determined by the orientation towards the modernization of the society, 
a phenomenon conditioned by the inclusion in the contemporary global processes.79 
Conclusions and Recommendations
The issue of correlation between democracy and interethnic problems has been on the 
agenda since the French Revolution, experiencing a new impulse with the „third wave of 
democratization“, which in 1970s overwhelmed the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. 
Analyzing the definitions of the term democracy in the present political science, we 
notice that one of the most used definition includes, in addition to the traditional approach, 
the public competition and political participation, thus implying that democracy includes 
civil and political rights, freedom of expression, press, freedom of assembly, existence of 
organizations necessary for free competition-based elections. The relationship between the 
terms democracy and democratization is similar to the relationship between a state and a 
process. Through democracy, one understands the process of transition towards a democratic 
form of government. In the spotlight of researchers studying the issue of democratization, 
are the issues of the dynamics of transition period processes, of the „democratic transition“ 
including the period of political development between two regimes. 
78  In the case of the majority ethnic group, 62 percent of respondents believe that we should integrate wit the European 
Union and only 14 percent of people state that Moldova should remain in the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
About 7 percent of respondents think that we should not be part of any alliances. However, most of the Russian, Ukrai-
nian, Gagauz and Bulgarian respondents stated that Moldova should remain in CIS. Th us 41 percent of Russians believe 
that Moldova should not quit CIS, 38 percent believe that it should integrate with the EU, and 6 percent think that Mol-
dova should not be part of any alliance. About 49 percent of Ukrainians plead for CIS, 21 percent – the EU, and 3 percent 
of Ukrainians think that it should not be party of any alliance. About 24 percent do not know what the most adequate 
external policy of Moldova should be. Th e Gagauz believe that Moldova should stay within CIS, 48 percent; only 18 per-
cent believe that we should integrate with the EU, 8 percent plead for neither alliance and 19 percent of the Gagauz are 
undetermined. Th e Bulgarians’ options are 36 percent for CIS, 36 percent for the integration with the EU, 7 percent favor 
a neutral state, and 19 percent of Bulgarians are undetermined. In the case of the Bulgarians we have a balance between 
those who opt for the CIS and those who would chose the European Union. 
79  Kymlicka Will, (ed.) Th e Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford University Press, 1995; Kymlicka Will, Liberalism, Com-
munity and Culture, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989; Kymlicka Will, Norman Wayne, Citizenship in Diverse Societies, 
Oxford University Press, 2000; Will Kymlicka, Magda Opalski,(eds).Can Liberal Pluralism be exported? Kymlicka, Magda 
Opalski, (eds). Can Liberal Pluralism be exported? Oxford University Press, 2001; Will Kymlicka, Multicultural citizen-
ship, Oxford University Press, 1995; Will Kym licka, Politics in the Vernacular, Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizen-
ship, Oxford University Press, 2001
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Another deduction relates to the issue of correlation between democratization and inter-
ethnic processes and to the condition that the chances of democratic consolidation in a multi-
national and multicultural society grow due to policies applied by the state. The adopting of 
the laws on language, citizenship, Moldovan Constitution and other laws guaranteed a full 
and equal citizenship and a common „shelter“ for all citizens regarding individual rights. 
The analysis of ethnic and national identity in the Soviet period allows us to draw the 
conclusion that the „soviet identity“ which also claimed to be a state identity, was rather 
ideological, closed, politicized and ethnocentric. The phenomenon of double conscience 
spread and persisted at the beginning of the Perestroika, the attitudes towards state insti-
tu tions and the state being as low. At the same time, the level of trust in nongovernmental 
institutions, such as the Church, is high. Concerning mass conscience, the situation cannot 
be changed rapidly, that is why national ideas persisted in the posttotalitarian period and 
were largely predetermined by the Soviet legacy. At the beginning of Perestroika, the 
national idea was regarded by many people from the country as a supreme ideological 
value and this idea mattered as much as the idea of socialism in the Soviet period. Poin-
ting at these aspects, the researchers also mention the closed character38 of mass conscience 
during social cataclysms and, therefore, the phenomenon of national idea appeared in 
closed version, more precisely, in the ethnocultural form. Like in Soviet times, the mass 
conscience was not oriented towards openness, general and universal values; it was leading 
to deadlock, being also one of the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Consequently, 
the closed form of the conscience has changed. 
According to the Delphi study results, the representatives of different ethnic groups 
took different ideological stands. The Moldovans advocate democratization and perceive 
independence as national revival. The survey participants belonging to national minori-
ties perceive independence as an opportunity for the consolidation of a new nation and 
existence of poliethnic mixture. We identified several attitudes of the representatives of 
different ethnic groups regarding Moldova as a state. In addition, the ethnic groups 
provide different appreciations regarding the political events from the country related to 
domestic as well as external policy. Some issues are viewed only from the perspective 
adopted by the survey participants.
Nevertheless, as proved by the survey, some controversial issues on the country’s 
political agenda have a high potential of conflict that could place different ethnic groups in 
controversial or even conflicting positions. The different opinions regarding the Transnistrian 
conflict and the possible solutions put the representatives of different ethnic groups in con-
flicting positions. The topics with the highest conflict potential identified by the participants 
in the first part of the survey were the state configuration: unitary state, federal state; strategic 
orientation of Moldova’s foreign policy: EU or CIS; topics related to the national identity, threat 
of losing the Moldovan statehood. This set of issues with a high potential for conflict generally 
identified by the participants is perfectly overlapping in the first part of the survey with the 
set of issues identified by the participants as having a potential of causing interethnic conflicts. 
During democratization, one of the main problems the societies are facing with is the 
stabilization of the formal institutions. Thus, during the transition period, Moldova adopted 
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several laws and took certain measures in regulating interethnic relations. In addition to 
the structures that more or less dependent on the state (Department for Interethnic 
Relations, Institute for Interethnic Relations within the Moldovan Academy of Sciences), 
the groups or persons influencing (mostly in a negative way) the interethnic relations in 
Moldova are represented almost exclusively by politicians or political parties. 
Democratic transformations also imply the reformation of political system from the 
respective societies, including the establishment of multiparty system. Nevertheless, al-
though nobody denies the need for multiparty system in transition countries, where the 
democratic principles only start to emerge, the political parties are not very popular. The 
results of Public Opinion Barometer from Moldova indicate show that political parties 
have the lowest popularity among social organizations from country. 
Although there is an interdiction for the creation of political parties on ethnic prin-
ciples, the politological analysis openly proves that there is a trend in the distribution of 
the electorate by national criteria.
When the goal is a successful democratization, the researchers focus on the multiple 
identities, which represent the changing reality and which are build on the social basis of 
individual’s identities. The human capacity for complementary and multiple identity, 
besides guaranteeing the right for equal and full citizenship, represents a key factor that 
makes democracy in multinational states possible, and the emergence of political and 
civic identities is considered one of the opportunities of democratic consolidation.
Based on this, the creation of a common civic identity of the representatives of diffe-
rent national entities from Moldova is defined through the relevance of determination of 
national identity and establishing the clear lines between „us“ and „them’, adherence to 
democratic values and nurturing the hope for the future. As a common pattern for the 
citizens of Moldova could serve the aspiration towards democratization, modernization 
and social progress. 
Based on the research, our recommendations are: 
• Civil society sector: accept the education in minority languages and the existence 
of media in these languages; 
• Political society sector: legislation for open citizenship that would grant equal and 
full citizenship and a guarantee a common „shelter“ for all the citizens concerning 
their individual rights;
• Rule of law: provide a a full range of traditions, practices and institutions for all 
national minorities; 
• State bureaucracy: guarantee the access of different minorities to state services 
provided in their languages. 
• Economic society: guarantee the access of all ethnic groups to economic resources. 
If the ultimate goal is democracy building and consolidation, the quality of democra-
tic governance of political elites must be central. A successful democratization strategy 
requires less majoritarian and more consensual policies in each of these fields. This can 
be guaranteed by modernizing the society, changing the mentality of population as well 
as political leaders and determining the democratic values as unique and irreversible. 
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ANNEXES
Annex 1. Table 1. Formal and liberal democracies*
Year Formal democracies
Liberal 
democracies Total
1990 76 (46.1%) 65 (39.4) 165
1991 91 (49.7%) 76 (41.5) 183
1992 99 (53.9%) 75 (40.3) 186
1993 108 (56.8%) 72 (37.9) 190
1994 114 (59.7%) 76 (39.8) 191
1995 117 (61.3%) 76 (39.8) 191
2000 120 (62.5%) 86 (44.8) 192
Source: Freedom House//www.freedomhouse.org
Annex 2. Table 2. Level of trust in different institutions and organizations („Very much trust“/ 
„Some trust“) (in %)
Feb.
2001
Nov.
2001
Mar.
2002
Nov.
2002
Apr.
2003
Nov.
2003
May.
2004
Nov.
2004
Feb.
2005
Government 19 36 48 46 45 40 40 47 49
Parliament 10 30 39 40 39 36 35 45 46
President 15 58 65 63 63 57 50 56 61
Judiciary 26 29 33 30 31 30 27 31 41
Army 38 45 48 50 44 40 42 46 52
Church 77 79 80 78 78 71 75 79 80
Mayor’s Office 33 44 56 52 47 52 47 54 55
Political parties 11 15 21 16 19 24 18 28 28
Banks * 26 23 22 33 31 27 38 37
Police 23 31 34 32 31 30 24 29 38
Mass-media 53 58 48 52 54 57 47 62 61
NGOs * 22 26 20 28 29 23 36 34
Trade Unions 14 17 24 20 24 28 20 36 29
Annex 3. Answers of respondents who showed a national-optimist attitude towards the Moldovan 
state. 
„(Moldova) reminds me of a vine leaf; or it reminds me of Italy. Look at it and you will notice how 
much it resembles the Italian „boot“. Only Corsica and Sicily is missing“, M7;
„Back when I was in school, it was associated with a grape“, M17;
„I am proud to be a citizen of Moldova. When we were part of the USSR, I served in the army in the 
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Far East and when I was asked where I was from, I was telling them that I was from Moldova. They 
were surprised to hear that there are Bulgarians in Moldova. When I was asked „how is it over there“, 
I was answering them that Moldova is a flourishing country with many orchards, vineyards, grain 
fields and everything you wish“, M21;
„Its people, its land, its traditions. When we say Moldova, we see vineyards and blooming orchards, a 
good wine, vegetables, fruits and hard working people. This is the meaning of Moldova for us“ M24. 
Annex 4. Answers of respondents who showed a skeptical attitude towards Moldovan state. 
„Poor country“, M4; „Poor people“, M9;
„The country I live in. A poor country which has not yet determined itself where to go – towards 
East or West“, M11;
„Country full of miserable people, without future, who cannot clearly articulate what they want“, 
M12;
„Moldova is rather a territory than a country because it does not control a part of its territory 
(Transnistria)“, M13. 
Annex 5. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? The fact that I was born in 
Moldova 1) makes me proud, and 2) makes my life easier (in %), (cumulative answers for the two 
statements). 
Totally 
Agree
Rather 
agree Disagree
Totally 
disagree
Don’t Know/
No answer
Moldovans 74 44 58 14 8
Ukrainians 31 44 57 15 54
Russians 42 46 43 20 49
Gagauz 52 60 51 15 20
Bulgarians 49 54 55 19 24
Annex 6. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? The fact that I was born in 
Moldova 1) gives me a feeling of shame and 2) makes my life harder (in %), (cumulative answers 
for the two statements). 
Totally 
Agree
Rather 
agree Disagree
Totally 
disagree
Don’t Know/
No answer
Moldovans 7 23 63 95 13
Ukrainians 2 12 67 58 61
Russians 4 14 54 79 50
Gagauz 4 27 51 92 27
Bulgarians 5 33 52 83 26
Annex 7. Answers of Moldovans to the question „What does it mean to you to be a citizen of 
Moldova“. 
„It means to have little opportunities for existence, it means to want to leave the country and look for 
a job abroad, to speak a broken language and to be unclear about your identity“, M5;
„To strive to survive in a village by farming, in a town by doing retail business or to create an ideal to 
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leave the country and find a job abroad. To be Romanian and live in Moldova means to wait until the 
President comes up with another anti-Romanian initiative so that you can then react accordingly“, 
M12;
„Probably it means to be a person subject to the arbitrary influence of the state, almost uncontrolled 
acts of the state authorities; it means to exercise with great risks you civic and constitutional rights. 
It means to be unable to live a decent life from the incomes generated by local businesses but only 
from the income generated by foreign enterprises, businesses and non-commercial institutions. 
Despite this to be a happy, which probably helps Moldovans to keep away from depression“, M12;
„It means to think how to leave the country sooner to earn a living in Italy, Portugal or any other 
country. I do understand the people who leave the country because they feel humans. Many of them 
feel humans, I do not know why. Even though they work hard, they get paid for that and feel useful. 
Here they don’t feel that“. F10
Annex 8. The way people of other ethnic backgrounds perceive Moldovan citizenship: 
„I believe that we should be proud of belonging to this people because we live in such a wonderful 
country, we have the chance to admire all that and live a decent life“, M7;
„It is a pride. Especially that I have a job here. What else can make me happy?“ M15.
Annex 9. The way people of other ethnic backgrounds perceive Moldovan citizenship:
„It is difficult for me to give an answer to this question. I think Moldovans should answer this 
question“, M26
„I like very much the idea popular in America „there are no nations, there are only Americans“. 
Regardless if you are Russian or Ukrainian, you have to serve the country you live in, you have to 
love it and do something for it.“, M14.
Annex 10. The way Moldovans think of Russians from Moldova. 
„(Russians) are different and their situation is different. Maybe the climate here is much more 
favorable. Compared to Siberia, this is a beautiful and rich region. They should learn our language, 
culture and traditions. They should integrate and become true citizens“, F1;
„For Russians it is a problem because they do not identify themselves with this country because 
it is a young state and it’s normal not to identify yourself with a country that never existed“, M2;
„To continue to behave as if you are the nation that dominates this country. To promote your 
interest hoping that Russia’s policies would determine Moldova to adopt an Eurasian policy“, 
M12.
Annex 11. For the Gagauz ethnic group living in Moldova, the participants formulated the 
following idea: Gagauz feel at home in Moldova. 
„They have settled here a long time ago and I think they view Moldova as their motherland, have 
the possibility to develop themselves from the ethnic, social and cultural perspective“, F1;
„For the Gagauz that live here, this is also their motherland“, F25;
„For Gagauz I think this is great. The Gagauz practically live only in Moldova and they have mana-
ged to get autonomy. They enjoy many rights. They have opportunities for development“. F8 
Annex 12. „All these [institutions] are formal and only create a good impression –exhibits, folk 
festivals, etc. However, nobody cares about the problems of the ethnic groups that go much 
beyond these cultural dimensions. The leaders of these organizations are always the same. They 
sit at different cultural manifestations but don’t do anything real“, M27’;
78 ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Annex 13. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? People should support their 
country even if things are not quite easy 
Totally 
Agree
Rather 
agree Disagree
Totally 
disagree
Don’t know/
No answer
Moldovans 80 14 3 1 2
Ukrainians 75 22 1 0 2
Russians 85 11 1 0 2
Gagauz 70 19 4 1 5
Bulgarians 60 26 10 2 1
Annex 14. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? i. I prefer to be a citizen of 
Moldova than the citizen of any other country
Totally 
Agree
Rather 
agree Disagree
Totally 
disagree
Don’t Know/
No answer
Moldovans 39 28 15 8 9
Ukrainians 25 30 23 6 15
Russians 29 31 19 9 12
Gagauz 23 29 25 12 11
Bulgarians 26 25 30 12 6
Annex 15. How afraid are you of the disintegration of Moldovan state? (in %)
Very much Quite much
Quite a 
little At all
Don’t 
know No answer
Moldovans 23 29 14 14 12 8
Ukrainians 7 22 20 14 24 13
Russians 10 29 13 23 11 14
Gagauz 5 22 18 24 20 11
Bulgarians 5 19 26 26 20 5
Annex 16. Answers to question „Which organizations, institutions etc. improve and which worsen 
the relations between the ethnic groups living in Moldova?“ (in %)
Moldovans Ukrainians Russians Gagauz Bulgarians
Organizations 
which contribute 
to the improve-
ment of the rela-
tions between 
ethnicities in 
Moldova
% % % % %
Communist 
Party 6
Communist 
Party 15
Communist 
Party 17
Mayor’s 
Office 1
Communist 
Party 6
Christian-
Democratic 
Party
2
Democratic
Moldova 
Alliance
2
Democratic 
Moldova 
Alliance
8 Schools 1 Ministry of Culture 3
United 
Nations 1
Social-
Democratic 
Party
2
Social-
Democratic 
Party
5 Parliament 1 House of Nationalities 2
Organizations 
which contribute 
to the worsening 
of the relations 
between ethnic 
groups from 
Moldova
Christian-
Democratic 
Party
5
Christian-
Democratic 
Party
16
Christian-
Democratic 
Party
20
Christian-
Democratic 
Party
1
Christian-
Democratic 
Party
8
Com munist 
Party 2
Agrarian 
Party 2
Agrarian 
Party 5 Customs 3
Moldovan 
state 
structures
1
Democratic 
Moldova 
Alliance
4 Parliament 2
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Annex 18. Answers to question, „What personalities contribute to the improvement and what 
personalities contribute to the worsening of the relations between the ethnic groups in Moldova?“ 
(in %)
Moldovans Ukrainians Russians Gagauz Bulgarians
Personalities 
contributing to 
the improvement 
of the 
interethnic 
relations in 
Moldova
% % % % %
Voronin V. 15 Voronin V. 39 Voronin V. 31 Voronin V. 15 Voronin V. 23
Tarlev V. 6 Tarlev V. 8 Tarlev V. 10 Tarlev V. 5 Tarlev V. 7
Roşca I. 6 Ostapciuc E. 4 Urechean S. 6 Tabunşcic 5 Snegur M. 5
Personalities 
contributing to 
the worsening of 
the interethnic 
relations in 
Moldova
Roşca I. 11 Roşca I. 27 Roşca I. 36 Roşca I. 6 Roşca I. 19
Voronin V. 4 Cubreacov V. 3 Cubreacov V. 9 Urechean S. 1 Druc M. 6
Ostapciuc E. 2 Snegur M. 2 Urechean S. 5 Braghiş D. 1 Braghiş D. 4
THE ROLE OF THE NATIONSTATE IN THE RESOLUTION 
OF INTERETHNIC PROBLEMS IN MOLDOVA
Tamara Caraus
The Dialectic Relation between Emergence of Nation-State 
and Integration of Ethnonational Minorities
Multiculturalism and Liberal Nationalism
The theoretical framework, in which we will aim to analyze the resolution of inter-
ethnic problems in Moldova, is the liberal pluralism, as argued from the perspective of 
liberal political theory and philosophy, and on which public policies regarding ethnical 
and national minorities, adopted at the international level, are based. Authors like Will 
Kymlicka,80 Yael Tamir,81 Charles Taylor,82 David Miller,83 Joseph Raz,84 Margaret Moore85 
and others have contributed to the completion of a new approach of ethnocultural diver-
sity, which advocates for public recogni tion of diversity.This theoretical approach is quite 
recent, since the first works were published in the 1990s. During the 20th century, ethnicity 
and national diversity were considered in the political theory as marginal and disappearing 
with the full modernization of states. Although various sociological and anthropological 
approaches of the ethnicity phenomena existed in the 1960s, there have been no approaches 
regarding the rights of ethnic and national minorities. 
The classic liberal political theory considers that the state must be neutral regarding 
the ethnocultural identity of its citizens, and indifferent regarding the capacity of ethno-
cultural groups to reproduce, and last in time. Ethnicity was considered as something 
related to the private sphere, and the state had no interference with this area, as long as 
80  Kymlicka Will, (ed.) Th e Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford University Press, 1995; Kymlicka Will, Liberalism, Com-
munity and Culture, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989; Kymlicka Will, Norman Wayne, Citizenship in Diverse Societies, 
Oxford University Press, 2000; Will Kymlicka, Magda Opalski,(eds).Can Liberal Pluralism beexported? Kymlicka, Magda 
Opalski, (eds). Can Liberal Pluralism be exported? Oxford University Press, 2001; Will Kymlicka, Multicultural citizen-
ship, Oxford University Press, 1995; Will Kym licka, Politics in the Vernacular, Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizen-
ship, Oxford University Press, 2001.
81  Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, Princeton University Press, 1993, Yael Tamir, „Th eoretical Diffi  culties in the Study 
of Nationalism“, in J. Couture, K. Nielsen, and M. Seymour, Rethinking Nationalism, Canadian Jo urnal of Philosophy, 
Supplementary Volume 22, 1996.
82  Taylor Charles, „What is wrong with negative liberty?“ in Philosophy and Human science, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 
CUP, 1985; Taylor Charles , in Amy Gutmann, (ed.) Multiculturalism, Princeton University Press, 1994, Charles Taylor, 
„Nationalism and Modernity“ in Robert McKim and Jeff  McMahan, Th e Morality of Nationalism, New York; Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1997.
83  Miller David, Citizenship and National Identity, Polity Press, 2000; Miller David, On Nationality, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1995.
84  Raz Joseph, Ethics in the Public Domain, Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994; 
Raz Joseph, Th e Morality of Freedom, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986.
85  Moore Margaret, (ed.), National Self Determination, Oxford University Press, 1998.
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somebody’s private sphere did not affect the rights of other citizens. The neutrality of the 
state regarding ethnicity formed the basis of an older distinction between „civic nations“ 
and „ethnic nations“, between a „civic nationalism“ and „ethnic nationalism“, or „good 
nationalism“ and „bad nationalism“.86 Thus, the ethnic nations would consider that their 
goal is to guarantee the perpetuation of a certain culture and identity through the state. 
On the other hand, civic nations are neutral regarding the ethnocultural identity of 
citizens, and define the affiliation with the nation-state only through the respect for the 
democratic principles and human rights. 
According to the above-mentioned authors, the idea of state neutrality regarding the 
ethnic identity of citizens proved to be a myth, a false idea from the historical, as well as 
conceptual perspectives. Especially because historically the implementation of liberal 
democratic principles in Europe occurred simultaneously with the emergence of nation 
states.87 However, the liberal political theory of Locke, Kant, Mill and later Popper, Rawls, 
Dworkin did not provide any explanation in this sense. 
The most widely used example of „civic nation“, the United States of America, proves 
that there is no state ethnic neutrality. First of all, in the U.S. there is a legal requirement 
that all children must learn English in schools. In addition, there is a legal requirement 
that the immigrants up to the age of 50 must learn English in order to receive the American 
citizenship. Any employment with the local administration or any other government 
requires the candidates to be fluent in English. This thing is also mandatory in the govern-
mental institutions of each state of the federation. 
In the opinion of Will Kymlicka, ethnocultural neutrality is a myth. According to the 
traditional liberal concept, the state must guarantee fundamental individual rights regard-
less of the ethnic background, because these rights are universal, and the ethnic identity 
is something that can be expressed only in private life.88 However, Kymlicka says, the 
rights of minorities cannot be subordinated to the category of human rights. The traditional 
individual rights do not contain answers to the following questions: What language should 
be recognized in the Parliaments, what should be the language of bureaucracy, judicial 
courts, etc.? The right for free expression does not tell us what the adequate linguistic 
policy is. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees all people 
the right for free expression, but does not say anything about the language used for the 
exercise of this right. In addition, the right to vote does not say anything about the poli-
tical boundaries, where this right can be exercised.89 There is no separation between state 
and ethnicity, like in the case of separation between state and religion: „The state must 
and can replace the religious oath in courts with the secular oath, but it cannot replace 
English with another language“.90 
86  Distinction made by authors such as Ernest Renan in „What is a Nation?“, in Bhabha, Homi K., (ed.), Nation and Narra-
tion, Routledge, London and New York, 1990, or by Karl Deutsch in Nationalism and Social Communi cation, An Inquiry 
into the foundations of nationality, Massachsetts Institute of Technology, 1953.
87  Colley Linda, Britons: Forging the Nations, 1707-1837, London, 1992; Greenfeld Liah, Nationalism: Five Roads to Mo-
dernity, Cambridge. Mass. Harvard University Press, 1992; Weber Eugen, From Peasants to Frenchmen, Th e Moderni-
zation of Rural France, Chatto &Windus, 1977.
88  Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford University Press, 1995, p.3.
89  Will Kymlicka, ibid. p.5.
90  Will Kymlicka, ibid. p.111
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The public use of language in education, justice, government army, etc. has a vital 
importance for the perpetuation of an ethnic group. On the other hand, a state would 
not be viable if it did not guarantee the existence of a minimum common language in the 
public sphere. Any liberal democracy tends to create a common space. It would be impos-
sible to use the language of each ethnic group to the same extend in the public space. It 
seems that there is a legitimate public interest in promoting a common language in public 
institutions. All governments must use at least one language in order to carry out its activi-
ties and communicate with the population. Preferring an official language, the state gives 
privilege to those who already speak the language chosen by the state. While the majority 
uses the common good, which is the language for different individual options, members 
of the minority cultures are coerced to invest in learning the official language. Only after 
they learn the language, they can talk about freely expressed individual options. 
The idea of ethnocultural neutrality is abandoned by some theoreticians of liberalism. 
Moreover, both the needs of the nation-state and ethnocultural justice receive new theore-
tical foundations, known as liberal pluralism, liberal multiculturalism, liberal nationalism, 
depending on the authors who developed almost simultaneously similar theories.91 Of 
course, not all political theoreticians adopt these theoretical premises. Multiculturalism 
has its critics, and the idea of cosmopolitism also continues to be supported at the theore-
tical level as a worthy political ideal.92 
Regardless the theoretical position of the authors in the present work, we believe that 
liberal pluralism is a functional model for the analysis of the relationship between the 
state, ethnicity and national minorities. Particularly, because of the premises and approa-
ches of liberal pluralism, that have shaped the international provisions and legislations 
regarding this matter. The liberal pluralism takes into account both terms of the problem -
nation-state and ethnic identity- as having an equal theoretical dignity. For the advocates 
of national liberalism, the nation-state is no longer a prejudice. They have proved that 
the nation-state and some of its tools serve for the achievement of important and legi ti-
mate democratic purposes. For example, the modern economy requires an educated and 
mobile labor force; therefore, the standard public education in a common language was 
regarded as essential for the citizens to have real opportunities. 
Diversity and Ethnocultural Justice
However, when using these needed tools, such as a standardized common language, 
the state can create injustice for minorities or the so-called interethnic problems. The 
injustices are different for different ethnocultural groups. In this regard, relevant is the 
distinction between ethnic group and national minority. 
91  Th e author Yael Tamir uses the term „liberal nationalism“ in Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, Princeton Uni versity 
Press, 1993; the term „liberal multiculturalism“ is used by Joseph Raz in „Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective“, in Raz 
Joseph, Ethics in the Public Domain, Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994. In a more 
recent work, Will Kymlicka calls his approach „liberal pluralism“, see W. Kymlicka, Magda Opalski, (eds). Can Liberal 
Pluralism be exported? Oxford University Press, 2001;
92  Buchanan, „What is so special about nation?“ in J. Couture, K. Nielsen, and M. Seymour, Rethinking Natio nalism, Ca-
nadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 22; Brighouse Harry, „Against nationalism“ in J. Couture, K. Nielsen, and 
M. Seymour, ibid; Levy Jacob, Th e Multiculturalism of Fear, Oxford University Press, 200; Jones Charles, Global Justice, 
Defending Cosmopolitism, Oxford University Press, 1999.
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Will Kymlicka distinguishes two basic patterns of cultural diversity. A source of 
diversity represents the incorporation into a state of cultures that were previously self-
determined, and linked to a certain territory. These incorporated cultures are called 
natio nal minorities, and their characteristic feature is that they continue to claim different 
forms of self-government. The second pattern of diversity is individual or family migration. 
These form groups or ethnic minorities, which are usually integrated with the society 
where they settle.93 If diversity emerges from immigration, then the provision of linguistic 
and cultural rights to the individuals is not necessary. It is implied that the individuals 
made a free choice when they decided to leave their country, and their cultural rights are 
guaranteed somewhere else, unlike the national minorities, who are not supported by 
another country or homeland that would guarantee the perpetuation of their culture.94
Currently, all democratic states use the tools of nation-states being at the same time 
coerced by the claims of ethnic and national minorities. The minorities that feel threa-
tened claim and receive different rights. According to Kymlicka, „what we see in the real 
world of liberal democracies is a complex dialectic of emergence of nation-state (the state 
claims and sets conditions to minorities) and the rights of minorities (minorities have 
claims)“.95 Let us see more in-depth how is this dialect reflected. 
Tools for Creation of Nation-State
In order to create a framework where all people have equal chances and opportunities, 
the state resorts to several tools, as proved by the real existence of the states, tools that are 
currently analyzed also by the liberal political theory. Thus, the most important tools for the 
creation of nation-state are: language legislation, education policies, centralization of power, 
state symbols, citizenship, national holidays, national mass media, military service, etc. 
As we mentioned above, these tools generate a certain injustice for the ethnic and natio nal 
minorities from a state, and the approach, called liberal multiculturalism, has the very pur-
pose of creating justice by providing rights, compensating for the ethnocultural injustice. 
Types of Ethnocultural Rights
Different authors, in an avalanche of works published in the last decade, resorted to 
the definition and classification of the types of rights of ethnocultural groups.96 These 
are: a) exemption of the minority group from the provision of the laws prosecuting similar 
practices in the majority group (e.g. use of certain drugs during religious rituals by the 
93  Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, OPU; 1995, p.10 – 15.
94  Depending on these patterns, one can make a distinction between the multinational and multiethnic states: the multi-
national state is the one including national minorities, i.e. groups which previously were independent, for example USA, 
Canada, Switzerland; the multiethnic states are generally formed through immigration. 
95  W. Kymlicka, Magda Opalski, (eds). Can Liberal Pluralism be exported? Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 49.
96  Waldron Jeremy, Liberal Rights, Collected Papers, 1981-1991, Cambridge University Press, 1993; Kymlicka Will, (ed.) 
Th e Rights of Minority Cultures, Oxford University Press,1995; Dworkin Ronald, „Rights as Trum ps“, in J. Waldron, (ed.) 
Th eories of Rights, Oxford University Press, 1994, Joppke Christian, Lukes Steven, (eds), Multicultural Question, Oxford 
University Press, 1999, Reaume Denise , „Th e Group Rights to Linguistic Secu rity: Whose Right, What Duties?“, in Judith 
Baker, (ed.), Group Rights, University of Toronto Press, 1994; Wellman Carl, Th e Proliferation of Rights, Moral Progress 
or Empty Rhetoric, Westview Press, 1999.
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American Indians; hunting laws in the case of the American indigenous population, edu-
ca tion system in the case of Amish, etc.); b) affirmative action or assistance for the activi-
ties that in the case of the majority groups are unassisted (funding of ethnic associations, 
etc); c) self-government for ethnic, cultural and national minorities – territorial autonomy, 
federalization, special public policies (e.g. Puerto Rico); d) external rules limiting the 
freedom of non-members for the purpose of protecting a group (e.g. restrictions on the 
use of English in Quebec); e) acceptance of internal rules for the behavior of the group 
members fortified by expulsion and excommunication (e.g. disinheritance of children 
who marry someone outside the group); f) recognition of the traditional legal code within 
the dominant legal system; g) representation in government; recognition of symbolic 
claims of groups (national holidays, history education, etc). 
Will Kymlicka, in his work Multicultural Citizenship, distinguishes three types of funda-
mental ethnocultural rights: right to self determination, multiethnic rights, representation 
rights – a rather functional distinction which can become a reference for understanding 
the claims of ethnic/national groups from different regions. We can generally consider 
that the types of ethnocultural rights represent at the same time the standard claims of 
ethnic groups and national minorities. Obviously, there are many controversies regarding 
the rights of a group, which are provocative from a theoretical perspective, however, the 
purpose of this work is not the theoretical reflection of the group rights. We will mention 
that some theoreticians have signaled two causes that fuel the conflict regarding the rights 
of a group. Firstly, it is the fact that one cannot talk about a fixed group identity: often 
the claims of a group or nation – territory, borders, past, language – can be also claimed 
by another group. Secondly, the biggest concern is the fact that the group can have rights 
against its members,97 and then the liberal multiculturalism and national liberalism cancel 
their fundamental premise, i.e. the liberal idea: unconditional respect for the individual 
and inviolability of the person. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this work we will accept the statement „ethnocultu-
ral rights of a group“ as being non-problematic, and the granting of rights to ethnic and 
national groups as a necessary element in the emergence of any nation-state. We can 
probably say „in the emergence of any state“ and exclude the word „national“, because 
for now there has not been any state that did not have the attributes of a nation-state, 
neither at the theoretical level, nor at the level of real political life. There is no state that 
would not need a standardized and homogenous language in order to be functional from 
the economic, political and social perspectives. Moreover, in the conditions of ethnocultural 
diversity, selection and spreading of one language is already an injustice, but a necessary 
one, we could say. Despite the „need“, this injustice does not have to remain uncompensa-
ted. From these reasons, ethnocultural rights and the emergence of nation-state must be 
viewed and understood as being always in a mutual relationship. If we only see the claims of 
97  Hartney Michael, Some Confusion Concerning Collective Rights, in Kymlicka Will, (ed.) Th e Rights of Mino rity Cul-
tures, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.202-227 Kukathas Chnadron, Are Th ere any Cultural Rights? In Kymlicka Will, 
(ed.), op. cit.; Waldron Jeremy, „Rights in Confl ict“, în Waldron Jeremy, Liberal Rights, Col lected Papers, 1981-1991Cam-
bridge University Press, 1993.
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minorities, such as a special status or privileges, we do not understand the essen tial data 
of the problem: these claims represent a reaction to the emergence of the nation-state. 
Thus the claims must be understood as a response to the requirements of the state.98 
In order to keep the meaning of mutual relationship, we must ask ourselves what does 
exactly legitimize the state in imposing the minorities a national language, education 
systems, citizenship tests. As argued by the theoreticians of liberal nationalism, the are 
legitimate objectives that are valid when imposing these measures: equality of chances 
and opportunities, etc. 
The dialectic relationship does not imply a subordination of minorities by the state, 
followed by a series of claims on behalf of minorities (even though it happened in this 
chronological order), on the contrary, one always has to pursue a balance. The state tools 
and policies will be just and libertarian, only if they are accompanied by satisfaction of 
the rights of national minorities. In their turn, the excessive claims on behalf of national 
minorities can destroy this fragile balance between the policies of the nation-state and 
the minority rights. 
Dialectic of Emergence of Nation-State and Claims 
of Ethnonational Groups in the Case of Moldova
The Specific Nature of Emergence of Nation-State in Moldova
The Moldovan case seems to confirm the dialectic model between emergence of 
nation-state and claims of ethnic minorities. This occurance is obvious, especially, when 
we find that these two phenomena happened concurrently. Unlike western democracies, 
where the nation-state emerged first – the 19th century, and the first half of the 20th 
century – and only in the last decades of the 20 century one took into consideration the 
rights of minorities due to the wave of multicultu ral movements. In Moldova, chronolo-
gically these two phenomena took place at the same time. The building of rule of law in 
Moldova occurred simultaneously with granting of special rights to minorities, rights 
claimed in the name of fundamental human rights: for example, the declaration of the 
official language occurred simultaneously with the development of the law on the 
functioning of languages in Moldova; the adoption of the Constitution already provides 
for a status of Gagauz-Yeri, a special status for the left-bank districts (Transnistria), and 
multi ethnic and representation rights for ethnocultural groups. 
National Minority vs. Ethnic group
As we know, none of the approaches of this problem gives us a clear and unique defini-
tion of national minority: neither at the level of international relations theory, official acts 
of the UN, OSCE, CoE, nor in the theoretical approaches of the political philosophy and 
98  Th ere are more complex cases than this model with two variables: the multinational states, multinational federations, 
etc. E.g. Quebec region of Canada.
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political theory. The national, as well as the international legislation stipulates that each 
person chooses to affiliate with an ethnic or national minority. For example, the Law of the 
Republic of Moldova regarding the rights of persons belonging to the national minorities and 
the legal status of their organizations, article 2, stipulates that „any person belonging to a na-
tional minority has the right to choose freely to belong to that particular minority or not.“99
However, for the sake of the present work we will preserve the distinction between 
the two patterns of forming ethnocultural diversity mentioned by Kymlicka: incorporation 
of the pre-existent groups on a certain territory into the nation-state, and immigration. 
According to historians, ethnic diversity was formed by two large waves of immigra-
tion in Moldova: immediately after 1812, and immediately after 1945.100 In 1812 Bessarabia 
was scarcely populated. According to the cited sources, the Russian government attracted 
Russian and Ukrainian colonists by granting them privileges and land. In 1812, fearing 
Turkish reprisals, the Gagauz settled here. Another population growth was due to a sponta-
neous influx of Jews and serfs from the Tsarist Empire, allured by the favorable conditions 
from Bessarabia. In half a century, the population in Bessarabia tripled. A second wave 
that enhanced the ethnic diversity took place after 1945, when representatives of different 
ethnic groups, which were already part of the „Soviet people“, could settle wherever they 
wanted on the territory of the Soviet Union. However, it is considered that most of those 
who settled here after 1945 were Russians, who came to civilize the region, representatives 
of this ethnic group were settling for this purpose in different regions of the USSR, that 
were considered less developed. Given these diversity patterns, we can see the nature of 
ethnocultural diversity in Moldova, we see what is predominating: ethnic groups or 
national minorities. 
a. Russians when they settled in Moldova, as well as in other soviet republics, they were 
neither considered emigrants nor minority. They settled within the borders of their 
homeland. We should mention that the whole world recognized the borders of the 
USSR as legitimate and legal. Moreover, in accordance with the international law, 
they could move wherever they wanted within their country, i.e. they had the right 
to settle anywhere within the Soviet state. However, this settlement has features of 
emigration. Consequently, we can say that the Russians from Moldova are only an 
ethnic group or ethnic minority because representatives of this group have settled 
here via emigration. 
b. The Gagauz ethnic group, national minority or the „Gagauz people“? There was a 
legislative discussion in Moldova regarding the term „Gagauz people“: the preamble 
of the Law regarding TAU Gagauz Yeri used the term „Gagauz people“ which 
generated controversies. The „use in the preamble of the Law on the special legal 
status of Gagauzia of the term „Gagauz people“ and the subsequent development 
in paragraph 4 […] harms the sovereignty of the unitary state Republic of Moldova, 
99  Th e Law of the Republic of Moldova regarding the rights of people belonging to national minorities and the legal status 
of their organizations, no. 382-XV from 19.07.2001;
100  Wlhelmus Petrus Van Meurs, Chestiunea Basarabiei în istoriografi a comunistă, trad. I. Stanciu, ARC, Chi şinău, 1996, 
cap. „Politica naţionalităţilor“, pp.129-171; şi Charles King, Moldovenii. România, Rusia şi politica culturală, Editura 
ARC, Chişinău, 2002
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and is unconstitutional […]. The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova recogni-
zes the unity of the people from Republic of Moldova, which cannot be divided in 
more peoples, therefore, the use of the term Gagauz people is already a privilege“.101 
A justification for using the term was provided in article 1, paragraph 4, regarding 
the right to external self-determination of the TAU Gagauz Yeri: „In the case of a 
change in the status of Moldova as independent state, the Gagauz people have the 
right to external self-determination“.102 The answer provided in accordance with the 
political and legal framework of Moldova is the following: „The case of Gagauzia 
needs to be correlated with the obligation of the states, regarding the protection of 
human rights. The right to self-determination is considered an individual right. 
Otherwise, in strict legal logic any collective right or freedom is an individual right 
or a freedom, but can be only exercised through association“.103 The individual 
autonomy is considered as a foundation, both for democracy and for the right to 
self-determination, achieved through plebiscite.104 
Although settled on this territory as a result of emigration, the Gagauz could in fact 
be a national minority, not because they were incorporated in the state that emerged here, 
but because nowhere in the world there is a larger Gagauz community. Their situation is 
unique: a population of Turkic origin with a Christian orthodox religion. The Gagauz 
from Moldova represent the largest Gagauz community in the world, without a homeland, 
even though Turkey is the linguistic „motherland“ of the Gagauz, it is not their „religious 
motherland“. This justifies the Gagauz autonomy as a special right that cannot be granted 
to other ethnocultural groups from Moldova. 
c. Ukrainians and Bulgarians: In this case, we can probably say that we have ethnic 
groups formed by former emigrants who, of course, neither consider themselves 
emigrants, nor represent a national minority. The privileges they enjoy are related 
to the assurance of conditions for the preservation of their culture, language and 
traditions. In other words they enjoy the so-called multiethnic rights and not 
political rights as in the case of the Gagauz. 
d. Other groups: The Roma community is called „non-territorial minority“ or „trans-
lational minority“ because it is spread in many countries without having a „home-
land“. However, the representatives of this ethnic group, as the representatives of 
the Jewish ethnic group from Moldova, were not included in the Ethnobarometer 
101  Decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of the Article 1, paragraph 4 of the Law no. 344-XII 
from 1994 regarding the legal status of Gagauzia no. 35 from 21.12.95.
102  Th e notifi cation of a group of parliamentarians and the whole discussion resulted in a Decision of the Constitutional 
Court, which states that the „right of the Gagauz to self-governance would not reduce the content and the action of 
Moldovan sovereignty“, because the article is applied only in the case of change of status of Moldova as an independent 
country. Currently such conditions do not exist; therefore it does not mean that they reduce the content and the area of 
Moldovan sovereignty. Th is eff ect will not occur even in the case if Moldova loses its independence, because in this case 
the sovereignty will not exist either. It also does not confl ict with the international treaties that guarantee the right to self-
determination of people. Th e Decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of article 1, paragraph 
4 of the Law of the Republic of Moldova regarding the special lega status of Gagauzia (Gagauz-Yeri) no. 344-XIII from 
23.12.94 Monitorul Ofi cial al R.Moldova no.3-4/51 from 14-01-1995, no.35 from 21.12.1996.
103  Decision of the Constitutional Court, ibid
104  Decision of the Constitutional Court, ibid
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survey, which is the basis of this study, probably because they are numerically 
insig nificant groups. From this reason, there is no important need to categorize 
them in any way for the purpose of this study. 
Tools for the Creation of Nation-State in Moldova
According to the dialectic described above, we first present the tools used by Moldova 
in the attempt to emerge as a nation-state, and then the claims of the ethnic groups and 
national minorities. 
These „tools“ are in fact events that occurred in chronological order, and formed the 
recent history of the Republic of Moldova. 
■ Introduction of the Latin script and declaration of official language on August 31, 1989
■ The adoption of the tricolor flag on April 27, 1990
■ Introduction of the History of Romanians and Romanian literature in the education 
curricula in September 1990
■ Adoption of the national anthem „Desteapta-te Romane“ on May 23, 1990
■ Adoption of a new name for the country on May 23, 1991
■ Declaration of sovereignty on June 23, 1991
■ Declaration of independence on August 27, 1991
■ Readoption of the Romanian geographic names – 1990-1991
■ Adoption of the Constitution in July 1994
■ Declaration of Moldovan as the official language in July 1994
■ Adoption of a new anthem „Limba Noastra“ - 1995
Claims of Ethnic and National Minorities Satisfied 
by the Moldovan State 
The introduction of the official language in Moldova instituted the real „bilingualism“ 
provided by the status of the Russian language as „language of interethnic communication“: 
„Russian is used on the territory of the country together with Moldovan as a language of 
communication between nations, fact that assures a real national-Russian and Russian-
national bilingualism“ (The Law of the Republic of Moldova regarding the functioning of 
languages spoken on the territory of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, no. 3465 XI 
from 01.09.89, article 3)
■ The right to self-governance. This right is accomplished through the Law of the 
Republic of Moldova regarding the special legal status of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri) 
no. 344 XIII from 23.12.94, Official Monitor of the Republic of Moldova no. 3 4/51 
from 14 01 1995, which stipulates: „Giving priority to human rights, understanding 
the need for combining general human interests with the national ones, reiterating 
the equality of rights of all citizens […] the Parliament adopts the present Law“. 
(Preamble); „Gagauz Yeri is an autonomous territorial unit (TAU) with a special 
status, which is a form of self-determination of the Gagauz, being a part of the 
Republic of Moldova“ (article 1. 1)
ATU Gagauz Yeri realizes its self-governance through the following local political 
structures: 
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Legislative Assembly: „The popular assembly invested with the right to adopt normative 
acts, within the limits of its competence, elected for 4 years“, (article 7)
President: „the Governor (Bashkan) is the supreme official person of Gagauzia, elected 
by universal vote with the condition to speak the Gagauz language“. (article 14. 1).
The executive body: „The permanent executive body of Gagauzia is the Executive 
Committee formed by the Popular Assembly at the first seating for the period of its 
mandate. (article 16). Also, the TAU Gagauz Yeri has three official languages: „The official 
languages of Gagauzia are Moldovan, Gagauz and Russian“. (article 3)
In addition, according to the Moldovan Constitution, the right to self-governance 
can be potentially extended over other localities: „The localities from the right bank of 
Nistru River can be granted special forms and conditions for autonomy in accordance 
with the status adopted through organic laws“ (Constitution of the Republic of Moldova 
art 111, paragraph 1). 
■ Multiethnic rights and representation rights. These rights are provided in the Law 
of Republic of Moldova regarding the rights of persons belonging to national minorities 
and legal status of their organizations, nr. 382XV from 19.07.2001. According to 
this law, the fundamental multiethnic rights include the right to native language, 
culture, religion, education, organizations, links with historical homeland etc. The 
rights of representation are designed to prevent the discrimination of ethnic groups 
in official policy: „The persons belonging to national minorities have the right to 
an approximately proportional representation in the structures of executive power, 
judicial power at all levels, army, legal institutions“ (article 24). The body responsible 
for the promotion of state policy in the field of interethnic relations is the Depart-
ment for Interethnic Relations, also the Coordination Council composed of leaders 
of ethno-cultural associations, Parliamentary Commission for Human Rights and 
Ethnic Minorities and the House of Nationalities. 
■ Moldova has ratified several international acts regarding the protection of national 
minorities: 
1. The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, developed 
by the Council of Europe Directorate General of Human Rights and proposed to 
the CoE member states, ratified on October 22, 1996; 
2.  Charter for Protection of Regional and Minority Languages, developed by the 
Council of Europe Directorate General of Human rights and proposed to the CoE 
member states, in the process of ratification;105
105  In the discussions with the representatives of the Council of Europe about the „possibilities for the accession of 
Moldova to the European Charter of Languages“ it was mentioned that this act should refer fi rst of all to the protection 
of Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian languages. Th e status of communication language, or language of interethnic com-
munication granted to the Russian language in Moldova is original, and does not fall under this Charter, as the Charter 
does not provide the protection of offi  cial languages. Th e European charter of regional and minority languages stipulates 
that when the number of persons speaking a minority language is „signifi cant“, the refusal of a state to guarantee public 
services in this language would seem unreasonable and therefore discriminatory. Th us, the guarantee of language rights 
depends on the number of people who speak the language. Th e Charter excludes explicitly the languages of immigrants. 
Th e states that aim to ratify must specify what languages they want to cover within this Charter. Th e causes for the delay 
of ratifi cation of the Charter by Moldova could be related to the challenge caused by the the decision about the languages 
that the Charter will be applied to. 
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■ Plurality of citizenships. The Moldovan citizenship type implies civic and political 
participation, based only on the rationality law and human rights, regardless of the 
ethnic background: „Moldovan citizenship establishes a permanent legal-political 
connection between a physical person and the Moldovan state, that generates 
mutual rights and duties between the state and the individual“. (The Law on Moldovan 
Citizenship no.1024XIV from 02.06.2000, article 3.1.). In most theoretical and 
normative discussions about citizenship, this type of citizenship and this kind of 
political framework are considered democratic and correct. Meanwhile, the Mol-
dovan citizens are and may become citizens of Romania, Russia, Ukraine, countries 
that grant citizenship based on ethnic criteria. This citizenship is often based on 
ethnocultural affection and identity. Multiple citizenship was accepted in 2002 by 
amending the Law on Citizenship adopted at the beginning of 1990s. The new law 
introduced a whole chapter, chapter IV, and 3 articles (24, 25, 26), which provide 
for and regulate the multiple citizenship. 
■ Symbolic rights. We consider that Moldova recognizes a series of symbolic rights 
of ethnic and national minorities, such as, for example, the right to identity: „The 
state recognizes and guarantees the right to identity of persons from different 
nationalities“. (Constitution of Moldova, Article 10, Unity of People and Right to 
Identity, paragraph 2). This right to identity should not degenerate in privileges: 
that is why it is necessary to specify that the protection measures, undertaken by 
state for the preservation, development and expression of identity of persons of 
other ethnic backgrounds should comply with the principles of equality and non-
discrimination, in relation with other citizens of the state“.106
Symbolic rights are also instituted and guaranteed through other legislative acts. We 
can say that there is a symbolic dimension emphasized in the Moldovan legislation, 
regarding ethnic minorities, dimension that has a legislative-declarative character. The 
legislative-declarative aspect is illustrated by the articles from the Moldovan Constitution, 
such as the article about the above-mentioned right to identity, but also by other articles, 
regarding „Moldovan people“. „The state recognizes that this territory is populated only by 
one nation – the Moldovan people“ (Constitution of Moldova, article 10, paragraph 1.2.). 
The „Moldovan people“ includes „Moldovans and citizens of other ethnic backgrounds“ 
(preamble of the Constitution).107
106  Decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of article 1, paragraph 4 of the Law of the Repub-
lic of Moldova regarding the special legal status of Gagauzia (Gagauz—Yeri). 344-XIII from 23.12.94 Monitorul Ofi cial al 
R.Moldova no.3-4/51 from 14-01-1995, no.35 from 21.12.1996
107  Th e defi nition given to the „people“ in a decision of the Constitutional Court of Moldova: „People – superior form of 
human community which cannot be confused with other collectivities – isare not an exclusively ethnic or biologic phe-
nomenon. It is a complex reality and at the same time the product of a lengthy historical process, based on the community 
of ethnic origin, language, culture, religion, psychology, life, traditions and ideals, but especially the historical past and 
the desire to stay together of those who lived together on a territory“ - is a conglomerate of visions about the people: an-
thropological, ethnonational but also political and civic. Th is defi nition seems to contain a conglomerate of perspectives: 
sociological, anthropological, political theory, a conglomerate that tries to justify the very nation of „Moldovan people“. 
Decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of article 1, paragraph 4 of the Law of the Republic 
of Moldova regarding the special legal status of Gagauzia (Gagauz—Yeri). 344-XIII from 23.12.94 Monitorul Ofi cial al 
R.Moldova no.3-4/51 from 14-01-1995, no.35 from 21.12.1996
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Another illustration of legislative-declarative aspect is the controversial Law regarding 
the Concept of State National Policy of Republic of Moldova, no. 546XV from 19.12.2003.108 
According to the authors, this law was necessary for the „consolidation of country’s 
sovereignty and independence“ and for the „creation of favorable conditions for free 
development of all ethnic and linguistic communities, and for their integration with the 
people of Moldova“. The law abounds in expressions such as „development of correct 
tra ditional interethnic relations“, „consolidation and improvement of principles of multi-
ethnicity, multiculturalism and multilingualism in the process of consolidation of the 
Moldovan people“ etc., without specifying the meaning of most of the used concepts. 
However, despite the incoherence and contradictions, the legislative-declarative aspect 
identified the country’s desire to consolidate itself as a nation-state, as well as to integrate 
in harmony the ethnic and national minorities. The concomitance of these phenomena 
allows us to assert that the Moldovan state tried to form through the dialectics between 
the construction of the nation-state and institution of ethnocultural justice. This is obvious 
from the legislative, as well as from empirical perspective, i.e. granting real rights to mi-
no rities through organic laws that more or less function.
We will not adopt any important perspective/judgment regarding the actions and 
measures undertaken by the Moldovan state in this direction. The purpose of this work 
is not to make a critical analysis from the normative perspective of state measures under-
taken for establishing ethnocultural justice. The normative perspective is replaced with 
the perspective of the citizens of Moldova expressed by the respondents participating in 
the Ethnobarometer national opinion survey.The survey included representatives of the 
majority ethnic group and representatives of four minority ethnic groups: Russians, 
Ukrainians, Gagauz, and Bulgarians. 
Further, we will try to see how the representatives of majority and minority ethnic 
groups from Moldova perceive these attempts of the state. In other words, in the third 
part of this work we intend to analyze if these perceptions vary by ethnicity, if citizens 
perceived these attempts of building equilibrium or, on the contrary, they consider the 
state policies as being deficient. 
Citizens’ Perceptions and Attitudes Towards 
State Policies of Integration of National 
and Ethnic Minorities
The Perception of State’s Role in the Integration of Ethnic Minorities
Out of 67 questions included in the questionnaire, several refer exactly to the issue 
analyzed in our study. Question 32 from survey form is „crucial“ in this sense, because it 
generally includes all state actions towards minorities, listed in the theoretical framework 
outlined above. We will reproduce the question in order to have a clear picture of the 
issues discussed in this chapter.
108  www.parlament.md/download/laws
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„To what extent do you agree with the following statements: 
Moldova should…“
a. support Moldovan students studying in other countries
b. guarantee education in Russian for Russian children and teenagers;
c. guarantee education in Ukrainian for Ukrainian children and teenagers;
d. guarantee education in Gagauz for Gagauz children and teenagers;
e. guarantee education in Bulgarian for Bulgarian children and teenagers;
f. support Moldovan businesses abroad;
g. support Moldovan cultural organizations abroad; 
h. support cultural organizations of different ethnic groups in Moldova;
i. help develop the identity of the Russian ethnic group;
j. help develop the identity of the Ukrainian ethnic group;
k. help develop the identity of the Gagauz ethnic group;
l. help develop the identity of the Bulgarian ethnic group;
m. organize cultural events which would be attended by people of different ethnic 
backgrounds from Moldova;
n. grant a larger autonomy to districts where an ethnic group represents a majority. 
The options for the answer are „totally agree“, „rather agree“, „disagree“, „completely 
disagree“ and „don’t know/no answer“. 
This question requests, in a concentrated manner, the opinion of ethnic minority 
and majority representatives regarding the listed statements. The specific nature of the 
question is that it does not refer to actions that have already been undertaken by Moldova 
or actions that should be undertaken immediately. The formulation „should“ does not 
require any previous knowledge of the actions that have already been undertaken by the 
state. Unlike other relevant questions, for the analysis of the relationship between the 
Moldovan state and ethnic minorities, this question requires the respondents’ opinion. 
The question is rather complex and includes several aspects that require clarification. 
Thus, the statements a, f and g included in the question refer to the actions of Moldova, as 
a historic homeland, directed towards the Moldovans from abroad. Statements b, c, d, e 
relate to the educational and linguistic policies, that a state should implement for its national 
and ethnic minorities, policies that are part of the recognition of cultural rights. Points i, 
j, k, and l refer to a more abstract aspect – the state contribution to the develop ment of 
the identity of different ethnic groups. We can say that this is the most abstract and most 
challenging part of the question, because identity does not develop separately. It is develo-
ped as a consequence of educational and linguistic policies and provision of ethnocultural 
rights. Thus, if the respondents agree with education in minority languages and do not 
agree with development of the identity of different ethnic groups, as in the case of analyzed 
questionnaires, then the answers are quite confusing and are opened to many speculations 
and interpretations. Q32 m refers to the organization of cultural events with the participation 
of different ethnic groups, activity which received the agreement of all the respondents, as 
we can see further on. However, Q32 n refers to an aspect of minority rights, which pro-
ves to be the most controversial for the respondents: the idea of territorial autonomy. 
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One can say that the answers to this question are somewhat representative for the 
answers to the rest of the questions regarding integration of ethnic minorities, integration 
meaning the settlement of interethnic problems. 
Firstly, the answers „Totally agree“ and „Somewhat agree“ are predominant. The cases 
when the number of disagreements equals the number of agreements are rare; moreover, 
rare are the cases of answers when disagreements predominate. With the lack of diversity 
of answers one can say that we resort to an analysis of „minor differences“. 
■ The number of disagreements regarding state minority-related policies is higher 
among the respondents representing the ethnic majority. About 50 percent of 
Moldovan respondents agree that the Moldovan state provides an opportunity for 
children and teenagers of other ethnicities to pursue an education in their native 
language, the other 50 percent are divided among „disagreements“ and „don’t 
know/no answer“ options. Disagreements also predominate in the answers to the 
question if the state should help develop the identities of the four minority ethnic 
groups included in the research. The sum of „disagree“ and „totally disagree“ answers 
is 10-15 percent larger than the sum of „totally agree“ and „rather agree“ answers. 
■ The idea of territorial autonomy is the most controversial action undertaken by the 
state. There is a visible disagreement among the respondents who identify themselves 
as Moldovans (25 percent- „disagree“ and 29 percent „totally disagree“) regarding 
granting a larger autonomy to the districts where an ethnic group represents a majo-
rity. Russian respondents accept the idea of autonomy granted to these districts: 33 
percent „totally agree“, 26 percent „rather agree“, the disagreements represent only 
24 percent of answers and 17 percent chose „don’t know/no answer“. There is a 
small reticence regarding this idea among Ukrainians: 26 percent do not believe 
that autonomy is necessary, but the number of those who welcome it is much larger 
(26 percent „totally agree“ and 28 percent „rather agree“). The answers are similar 
in the case of the Gagauz respondents, although we would expect more specific 
answers, given the fact that this ethnic group has had a real experience of territorial 
autonomy for over a decade. 17 percent of these „do not know/do not answer“, 20 
percent „disagree“ and 4 percent „totally disagree“, while the rest of the respondents 
accept the idea. The fact that the answers of the Gagauz are grouped in a similar 
way as the answers of the Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian ethnic groups raises the 
question whether the Gagauz perceive the legal framework offered by TAU Gagauz 
Yeri as a real experience or just a formality with no concrete effects. In the case of 
Bulgarians, the number of people who agree with the idea of autonomy (47 percent) 
is not much higher than the number of people who do not accept the idea (40 
percent). The survey forms do not suggest a motivation for such a distribution of 
answers. Also, the answers to the other questions are not grouped in a similar way 
that would allow asserting that the respondents of this ethnic group count more on 
the reasonability and rationality of democratic principles, and do not plead for the 
organization of political life based on ethnic and affective bonds. 
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■ The most innocent aspect of interethnic relations proves to be the organization of 
cultural events with the participation of different ethnicities. These particular cultural 
events are associated by most of the respondents with the folk and food festivals. 
■ Among the respondents belonging to Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian ethnicities, the 
number of „don’t know/no answer“ choices regarding the actions the state should 
undertake for the solution of interethnic conflicts is rather large. This proves that 
these three ethnic groups are not aware of the problems they encounter. 
■ It can be noticed a slight opposition of Bulgarian and Gagauz ethic groups towards 
the actions the state should undertake for the integration of their ethnic group and 
for the development of their ethnic identity. 17 percent of Gagauz and 21 percent of 
Bulgarians do not agree that the state should guarantee the children of their group 
(Gagauz or Bulgarian) the opportunity to pursue an education in their native lan-
guage. Among these respondents, about 20 percent do not agree that state should 
contribute to the development of identity of ethnic groups from Moldova, including 
the identity of their own group. 
■ All respondents accept the actions Moldova should undertake, as historic homeland, 
for Moldovans abroad – pupils, students, enterprises. As we will see from the answers 
to the other questions, this acceptance is doubled by the request for action on behalf 
of other historic homelands towards the ethnic minorities from Moldova. 
■ Educational and linguistic policies – education in minority language–generate 
unconditional agreements among the ethnic minorities and a little disagreement 
among the ethnic majority. 
The Respondents’ Perception of Language Policies in Moldova
In this chapter, we will analyze the respondents’ attitudes towards the linguistic 
policies of the state. We will cover three main aspects: the official language, bilingualism 
and the use of minority languages in public sphere. The questions from the survey forms, 
which provide us with material for analysis are, questions Q41, Q61, Q64, Q65, Q66. It 
should be mentioned that we do not take into account the correctness of the terms 
„Moldovan language“ or „Romanian language“. We use both terms as presented in the 
questionnaires. 
a. State language and bilingualism
■ Only the majority ethnic group opts for one state language – the Moldovan language 
(77 percent) or Romanian language (25 percent), the other minority ethnic groups 
support the idea of two or even three official languages. There are, of course, repre-
sentatives of majority, who support the idea of two state languages and representa-
tives of minority, who support the idea of only one state language, but their number 
is insignificant. 
■ The Russians choose two state languages – Moldovan and Russian. The other ethnic 
groups, indicate, as a rule, three state languages: Moldovan, Russian and the lan-
guage of their own ethnic group. 70 percent of Russian respondents assert that 
there should be two official languages and only 16 percent choose one state lan-
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guage, and 9 percent consider the idea of three state languages plausible. Among 
Ukrainian respondents, 16 percent consider that one state language is sufficient, 63 
percent think that it is necessary to have two state languages, and 13 percent plead 
for three official languages. The three languages should be: Moldovan (93 per cent), 
Russian (76 percent), and Ukrainian (17 percent). Among Gagauz respon dents, 50 
percent opt for 2 state languages; 21 percent – more than 2, and 16 percent – only 
one state language. The Gagauz language should be official according to only 27 
percent of respondents, Moldovan/Romanian – for 92 percent and Russian – for 
83 percent. Similarly, most of the Bulgarian ethnics who participated in the survey 
(64%) plead for two state languages, 23 percent – for one, and 10% – for more offi-
cial languages. As in the other cases, the first two official languages are Moldovan 
(93%), Russian (75%), and the third language is Bulgarian (8%). 
■ The possibility of existence of two official languages leads to a real challenge, which 
was noted for the first time by the authors of the questionnaires. If there should be 
two or three official languages, then the following question becomes logical: Which 
languages should be official and Who should know these languages. In other words, 
who should know Moldovan/Romanian, who should know Russian and who should 
speak the languages of national minorities. The answers are rather predictable. 
Thus, 85 percent of Moldovan respondents (73% „totally agree“, 12% „somewhat 
agree“) believe that all residents of Moldova should know Moldovan/Romanian 
language. Only 26 percent of Moldovans consider that all residents of Moldova 
should know Russian (10% „totally agree“, 16% „somewhat agree“), and 36 percent 
of respondents do not agree with this, while 25% neither oppose nor advocate for 
another official language. Only in this case we have a clear option for the language 
that should be spoken by the residents of Moldova. In the case of the other ethnic 
groups who participated in the survey, the number of those, considering that all 
residents of the country should know Moldovan/Romanian equals usually the 
number of those, who believe that the residents should know Russian (average of 
60 percent).109 Only among the Gagauz respondents, the number of those conside-
ring that all residents should know Russian exceeds (by 6%) the number of those 
109  Russian ethnic group: Q64 i: „All residents of Moldova should know Moldovan/Romanian“- 47%- totally agree, 24% 
rather agree, 11% neither agree nor disagree, 7% rather disagree, 6% totally disagree. „All residents of Moldova should know 
Russian“-33%- totally agree, 31% rather agree, 15% neither agree nor disagree, 8% rather disagree, 7% totally disagree. 
Ukrainian ethnic group: Q64i „All residents of Moldova should know Moldovan/Romanian“-43%- totally agree, 25% 
rather agree, 14% neither agree nor disagree, 7% rather disagree, 6% totally disagree. 
Q64 j „All residents of Moldova should know Russian“-37%- totally agree, 30% rather agree, 16% neither agree nor dis-
agree, 8% rather disagree, 5% totally disagree, 5% don’t know/no answer. 
Gagauz ethnic group: Q64i „All residents of Moldova should know Moldovan/Romanian“-27 %- totally agree, 29% rather 
agree, 14 % neither agree nor disagree, 14% rather disagree, 9% totally disagree. 
Q64 j „All residents of Moldova should know Russian“-33%- totally agree, 30% rather agree, 11% neither agree nor dis-
agree, 11% rather disagree, 9% totally disagree. 
Bulgarian ethnic group: Q 64 i : „All residents of Moldova should know Moldovan/Romanian“-37%- totally agree, 24% 
rather agree, 12% neither agree nor disagree, 13% rather disagree, 7% totally disagree, 3% don’t know/no answer
Q64 j „All residents of Moldova should know Russian“-25%- totally agree, 30% rather agree, 27% neither agree nor dis-
agree, 26% rather disagree, 16% totally disagree. 
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considering that everyone living in Moldova should know Moldovan/Romanian. 
In the case of Bulgarian respondents, the number of those considering that every 
resident should know Moldovan/Romanian is a bit higher (also by 6%) than the 
number of those who believe all that residents should know Russian. These little 
gaps do not eliminate the option of the ethnic groups to set put Moldovan/
Romanian and Russian languages on one linguistic scale. (This balance is rather 
related to the intention and is not real since the answers to the questions about the 
languages they speak and understand - Q59, Q60, and Q51 – prove that they do 
not know these two languages. There is no single question that would ask the 
respondents what is needed in their opinion to know both languages by all residents 
or ask them to state what language needs to be spoken and where. Probably the 
assumption generating this answer is the idea of the „real and harmonious 
bilingualism“ used in Moldovan legislation and which, as proven by these answers, 
entered the perception (conscience) of the minorities. 
■ In parallel with the regulations about Who should speak the language and Which 
language there is a suspicion, that the representatives of a certain ethnic group 
know a certain language, but avoid speaking it. Question Q64 (e. f. g. h.) is 
structured according to some sort of principle of equivalence: thus the 
representatives of each ethnic groups participating in the survey are asked if they 
believe that the representatives of other ethnic groups, included in the research, 
know the language of their ethnic group, but avoid speaking it. The answers are 
more relevant in the case of the majority group and the Russian group. Thus, there 
is unanimity in the answers of the majority group representatives: they agree that, 
„many Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz, and Bulgarians in Moldova know Romanian/
Moldovan but avoid speaking it“. 
The Russians disagree that „many Ukrainians, Gagauz, and Bulgarians know Russian 
but avoid speaking it“, i.e. most of the answers are grouped in the categories „totally 
disagree“, „disagree“ and „neither agree nor disagree“. It seems that the Russians 
understand that other ethnic groups know and speak Russian, and do not express any 
suspicion in this sense. However, the opinions of the Russian respondents are divided 
when this statement refers to the majority group, i.e. „many Moldovans know Russian 
but avoid speaking it“ (Q64 e.). Thus, 16 percent „totally agree“, 21 percent „somewhat 
agree“, 20 percent „neither agree nor disagree“, 11 percent „rather disagree“, and 24 
percent „totally disagree“. 
In the case of Ukrainian, Gagauz, and Bulgarian groups, the answers „neither agree, 
nor disagree“, followed by „don’t know“ and sometimes „rather disagree“ are predominant. 
It seems that this question put the respondents of these three groups before an insecure 
situation: they indeed had no reason to say that the representatives of other ethnic groups 
know the language of their group, but avoid speaking it. Probably such a suspicion would 
be exaggerated in the case of the Gagauz respondents who, due to the legal framework of 
the TAU Gagauz Yeri, have the right to use the Gagauz in political sphere but seem to 
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know little this language. Thus, it is impossible to explain why an outside observer, when 
contacting with the public space of Gagauz Yeri, notices the use of only one language out 
of those provided in the special status of the region, and namely Russian. 
b. The use of minority languages in public sphere 
There is only one question regarding the possible linguistic policies to which most of 
the respondents, regardless of ethnic background, offer similar answers. This question asks 
for opinions of respondents regarding the statement „In regions where the Ukrainians/ 
Gagauz/Bulgarians are predominant, everybody should know Ukrainian/Gagauz/Bulga-
rian.“(Q 64 k, l, m). The respondents either reject this possibility („disagree“), or remain 
indif ferent („neither agree nor disagree“). In fact, these answers do not indicate a lack of 
tolerance, refusal of harmonious and mutual integration with the people of Moldova (as 
stipulated in the above-mentioned legal acts), but are rather an indicator of reasonability. 
If respondents believe that all residents must know at least one language and more of 
them consider that the residents should know even two languages, then the knowledge 
of a third language spoken only in a region probably seems too costly in terms of time, 
resources and effort. 
Respondents’ Perception of Education Policies of Moldova 
Regarding Ethnic and National Minorities
For the most part, education policies represent an integral part of the linguistic policies 
and imply the right of the representatives of ethnic and national minorities to study in 
their native language. In the same context, the questionnaire lists the right to establish 
educational institutions in the minority languages, particularly with the assistance of the 
historical homelands. The analysis performed in this subchapter refers to the answer 
provided for questions Q 32 b, c, d, e; questions Q 33–37 a., and question Q 41 a. b..
■ The educational policies do not generate large disagreements. Both the respondents 
of the majority and the minority groups „agreed“ or „somewhat agreed“ that the 
state should guarantee the opportunity to pursue an education in Russian/Ukrai-
nian/Gagauz/Bulgarian languages for the children and teenagers of Russian/Ukrai-
nian/Gagauz/Bulgarian backgrounds. 
■ In the case of Ukrainians, Gagauz, and Bulgarians, the number of those who „totally 
agree“ that Moldova should create conditions for education in Russian is larger than 
the number of those who „totally agree“ that the state should create conditions for 
education in the language of their own ethnic group. For example, 50 percent of 
Ukrainians „totally agree“ that the state should guarantee the education in Russian, 
and only 46 percent „totally agree“ that the state should guarantee education in 
Ukrainian. Among the Bulgarian respondents, 52 percent „totally agree“ that the 
state should guarantee the education in Russian, and only 43 percent „totally agree“ 
that the state should guarantee education in Bulgarian. 
■ The majority and minority groups also unanimously accept the support of the 
educa tion by the historical homelands. Generally, the number of unconditional 
agreements is larger, in case of their own historical homeland, than the historical 
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homelands of other groups. For example, 70 percent of Russian respondents „totally 
agree“ that Russia should support students of Russian background studying in 
Moldova, and the number of those who support unconditionally the similar actions 
of Ukraine, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania is smaller (62, 53, 53, and 55). The 
Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian ethnic groups usually support Russia’s actions 
for sustaining the education in Russian language as much as they support their 
own historical homeland. For example, 55 percent of the Ukrainian respondents 
support unconditionally the actions of Russia in supporting the education for 
children of Russian background, 56 percent support Ukraine’s actions, 48 percent 
support Turkey and 49 percent support Bulgaria. 
■ Mutual learning of languages. The purpose of question 41 a. and b. is to test the 
respondents’ knowledge of the official language. The respondents were asked if 
they agree with the following statements: „Moldovan children should learn the mino-
rity languages in schools“ (41 a) and „children of other ethnic backgrounds should 
learn Moldovan/Romanian in schools“ (41b). Although the question was formula-
ted for a different purpose, we will attribute it this motivation. It seems that the 
questions are mutually compensating, and suggest a necessary and natural situation: 
mutual learning of languages. I.e. children of other ethnic backgrounds study 
Moldovan/Romanian in schools while Moldovan children study the minority 
languages. This situation can be also regarded as a sign of mutual respect and 
successful integration with the multicultural and multiethnic Moldova. What are 
the respondents’ opinions regarding this possible idyllic picture of interethnic rela-
tions? In the case of the ethnic majority, most of the respondents agreed that the 
children of other minorities should learn Moldovan/Romanian, and do not quite 
agree that the Moldovan children should learn the minority languages: at least the 
number of those who agree equals the number of those who disagree. 
In the case of Russians, Ukrainians and Bulgarians, the number of those who think 
that all Moldovan children should learn the minority languages is 20 percent lower than 
the number of those who agree that Moldovan should be studied by the children of other 
ethnic backgrounds (an average of 70 and 90 percent). However, the answer „agree“ is 
predominant. In the case of the Gagauz, the answers are similar for both options: learning 
of Moldovan/Romanian by the minority children and learning of the minority languages 
by the Moldovans (76 percent). 
The answers to this question do not correspond with the answers to a similar ques-
tion – Q64 k, l, m – which asks the respondents’ opinions regarding the compulsoriness 
to know the language of an ethnic group that represents majority in a particular district/
area, and which is mostly disagreed by the respondents. Probably the explanation of the 
disconcordance is reflected in the age. It is possible that the respondents believe that it is 
normal that all children of the majority group learn the languages of the minority groups, 
but it seems to them rather unreasonable that all residents (i.e. adults like them) to learn 
and speak the language of a minority group. 
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Respondents’ Perception of Cultural Rights Provided by Moldova
The cultural rights referred to in the questionnaires include the freedom of assembly 
based on ethnic principles, conditions for the preservation and development of cultural 
heritage, and specific traditions, access to and the use of mass media. These aspects are 
covered in questions Q24, Q32 m, Q33 -37 c, and Q41. As we noted in the analysis of the 
answers to question Q32 about the role of the state in the integration of minorities, cultural 
rights represent the most „innocent“ aspect of policies for the integration of minorities. 
This does not mean that the other aspects would be more „blameworthy“, they just gene-
rate more controversies and disagreements. 
■ All respondents agree that the cultural events with the participation of different 
ethnic groups living in Moldova should be organized. However, up to now, only at 
most 30 percent of the respondents have participated in such events/festivals, and 
approximately 70 percent of the respondents have never taken part in such activities. 
It is probably the only question with equal number of responses (percent), regardless 
of the ethnic background (Q24).
■ The freedom of association by ethnic principles is accepted/recognized by all 
respon dents, regardless of ethnicity (Q41e). The respondents accept both Moldova’s 
actions to support the ethnocultural organizations, and the actions of historical 
homelands (Q33-Q37c). 
■ The access to mass media of the representatives of ethnic groups is perceived by 
the survey under two aspects – coverage of activities organized by people of diffe-
rent ethnic backgrounds in Moldovan media and the broadcast of programs in 
diffe rent minority languages on Teleradio Moldova (national broadcaster). No 
group of respondents manifested reservations regarding these measures. 
We could say that the promotion of conditions facilitating the preservation, develop-
ment of cultural heritage and traditions is a unanimously accepted measure. Respondents 
perceive these measures as separate from other measures designed to protect the mino-
rities. These actions tend to be understood in the „folk“ way. Similarly, the freedom of 
assembly, association, and expression tend to be cleansed by the civic dimension, and are 
not conceived as an integrative measure but rather as a routine action. 
Respondent’s Perception of State Policies of Non-Discrimination 
and Promotion of Equality
Among the results pursued by the policies for the protection, and integration of 
ethnic and national minorities are non-discrimination, promotion of effective equality 
regardless of ethnicity, and equal participation of minorities in economic, cultural and 
social life of Moldova. Four of the questions included in the questionnaires (Q31, Q38, 
and Q40) regard the perception of these effects by the respondents. The answers are 
highly contrasting with the almost wonderful image created by the answers to the questions 
from previous sub-chapters. 
Question 31 asks the respondents to build a hierarchy of the ethnic groups based on 
three criteria: „the richest“, the „most politically influential“, and the „most respected“. 
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Although the answers are invariable, it is interesting, however, to see how the hierarchy 
is built by each ethnic group and where each ethnic group places itself in this hierarchy. 
■ 60 percent of Moldovans consider that Russians are the richest, 39 percent (first 
choice) and 21 percent (second choice), followed by their own group. Russians 
receive 57 percent of answers for „the most politically influential), 32 percent (first 
choice) and 25 percent (second choice), followed by Moldovans, who receive 50 
percent, 33 percent (first choice) and 17 percent (second choice). On the other 
hand, Moldovans consider themselves the most respected group, 37 percent (first 
choice) and 13 percent (second choice), followed by Russians, 19 percent (first 
choice) and 25 percent (second choice). The other four ethnic groups receive the 
maximum of 6 percent for each of these three categories. 
■ The Russian respondents place the Moldovans and Russians on the first two places. 
Russians think of themselves as being on top, although they place Moldovans several 
percent higher everywhere, thus, the Moldovans are on the top of the hierarchy in all 
three categories. Fifty percent of Russians (37% and 13%) consider that Moldovans 
are the richest, and 42 percent (15% and 27%) consider that Russians are the 
richest. 57 percent of Russians (49% and 8%) affirm that Moldovans are the most 
politically influential group, while according to 49 percent (10% and 39%) Russians 
have the most political influence. Regarding the respect, opinions are rather equally 
divided, 50 percent (41% and 9%) consider that Moldovans are the most respected 
and 48 percent (15% and 33%) state that Russians are the most respected. We can 
notice that Russians feel that they are relatively lacking political influence, but not 
wealth and respect. The respondents of Russian background grant the three ethnic 
groups an insignificant number of points at all three mentioned categories. 
■ The Ukrainians also consider that the most politically influential, the wealthiest 
and the most respected are Moldovans and Russians. Moldovans would be „the 
wealthiest“ in the opinion of 35 percent of Ukrainians (24% and 9%), Russians – in 
the opinion of 37 percent (22% and 15%). Moldovans gather most of the answers 
for being the „most politically influential“ – 40 percent (31% and 9%) and Russians 
hold this position in the opinion of 33% of the respondents (13% and 20%). On the 
other side, Russians and Moldovans hold an equal position regarding the respect 
they enjoy – 31 percent (26%, 5%, 11% and 20%). The other three groups – Ukrai-
nians, Gagauz, Bulgarians - are rich, influential and respected only in the opinion 
of 1-3% of respondents. 
■ We must note that in the case of Gagauz respondents, only 50 percent chose to rank 
the groups based on the proposed criteria, the other half of respondents opted for 
„don’t know/No answer“ option. Those who answered the question placed Moldovans 
and Russians on key positions: The richest: Moldovans 36 percent (26% and 10%), 
Russians 30% (15% and 15%); the most influential: Moldovans 35 percent (28% 
and 7%), Russians 35 percent (15% and 20%); the most respected: Moldovans 31 
percent (19% and 12%), and Russians 25% (13% and 12%). However, we notice a 
novelty here: 18 percent of Gagauz respondents (10% and 8%) consider that the 
Gagauz are the most respected. 
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■ The answers of the respondents who identified themselves as Bulgarians are also 
rather varied here, as in the case of the Gagauz, the number of „Don’t know/No 
answer“ option is rather high. For example, „the richest“ would be the Moldovans 
in the opinion of 43 percent, Russians – among 29 percent, while 38 percent opted 
for „Don’t know/No answer“ option. Moldovans get the highest scores for all these 
criteria. Thus, 55 percent consider Moldovans as the most influential, Russians 
having only 34 percent of the options (9% and 25%). In addition, Moldovans are 
the most respected according to 45 percent (34% and 11%), and Russians only in 
the opinion of 30 percent (15% and 15%) of respondents. Also, 14 percent give the 
political influence to Gagauz (1% and 13%), and 18 percent (6 and 12%) attribute 
the highest respect to their own group, i.e. to the Bulgarian ethnic group. 
These answers prove a rather discriminatory hierarchy. The two ethnic groups, the 
majority and the minority, are perceived as having privileged positions to what regards 
the well-being, political influence and respect. These perceptions tend to become more 
objective due to the fact that not only the other groups perceive them as such, but also 
the groups consider themselves as being privileged. Consequently, we can assert the exis-
tence of economic and social hierarchies, which do not represent indicators of equality and 
nondiscrimination on ethnic background. The logical question is whether this situation 
is an effect of the legal framework or has a different nature. In order to clarify this aspect, 
we will not leave the methodology of the present study. We will try to see if the answers 
of the respondents to other questions shed light on this actual inequality. 
The question Q38 from the questionnaire asks the respondents to assess the Moldovan 
laws regarding minority rights. We must mention that it does not say if the respondents 
ever had an opportunity to learn these laws or solely assessed the actual situation as 
being the consequence of application of minority-related laws. Unlike the question Q31 
analyzed above, where we can say there was a „picture of major differences“, here one 
returns to the situation characteristic for most of the questions included in the survey form: 
„the minor differences“ in answers. Thus, most respondents (average of 60%), regardless 
of their ethnic background, answered that all ethnic minorities have „sufficient rights“. 
The number of answers included in the category „too many rights“ or „not enough rights“ 
is relatively low, therefore, their significance drops. 
From the perspective of „minor differences“, we can say that each minority ethnic 
group considers itself as misjudged, i.e. believes that it does not have enough rights. For 
example, 20 percent of Russians believe that they do not have enough rights, 16 percent 
of Ukrainians, and 15 percent of Gagauz think their own groups are misjudged and 22 
percent of Bulgarians believe that they are the most misjudged. Moldovans, as the majority, 
are not included in the structure of the question, and 10 percent of them consider that 
the most misjudged are the Romanians living in Moldova. 
Similarly, from the perspective of minor differences, one can notice that each group 
points to another group as having too many rights. According to Moldovans (22%), this 
group would be Russians, and in the opinion of 13 percent of Russian, the Romanians 
have too many rights. Ukrainians (6%) think that both Russians and Romanians have 
too many rights. Gagauz consider that Russians are privileged, while Bulgarians think 
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same of the Gagauz. However, we must ask ourselves how relevant these indices are when 
over 60 percent of respondents, regardless of the ethnicity, believe that all ethnic groups 
enjoy sufficient rights. 
The perspective of minor differences of variation in the answers to the question regar-
ding the minority legislation is not compatible with the perspective of major differences 
in the answers to the question Q31, where the ethnic groups of Moldovans and Russians 
outrun clearly the other groups as being „the richest“, „the most influential“, and the 
„most respected“. Consequently, one can say that this discriminatory hierarchy is not the 
effect of legislation but has a different nature. The most plausible supposition is that the 
sources of inequality are rather historical than legal. 
Questions Q39-Q40 from the survey forms ask the opinion of respondents about the 
importance of nationality in employment and successful business. An average of 60 
percent of respondents, regardless the background of the groups, both who answer the 
questions, and who are being evaluated, choose the option „sufficient chances/oppor-
tunities“. The rest of the answers lead again to the situation of „minor differences“, where 
the following typical answers are outlined: 1. Each ethnic group considers that it has the 
fewest chances/opportunities. 2. In the structure of questions were included both the 
Moldovans as majority ethnic group, and the Romanian group, as a separate minority 
group. The respondents belonging to the Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian groups 
believe that most of the chances/opportunities in employment and successful business 
have the Moldovans – an average of 20 percent – followed by Romanians, which also are 
considered advantaged. 3. From the perspective of minor differences, we must remark 
that Moldovans believe that Russians have too many chances/opportunities, and that Ro-
ma nians have the fewest opportunities, followed by Bulgarians, Gagauz and Ukrainians. 
Does this grouping of answers of the four minority ethnic groups’ representatives 
reflect an objective and truthful situation? What would be the cause of such a grouping 
of answers, especially on the second typical answer: Do Moldovans and Romanians have 
too many opportunities? The survey forms do not ask for clarifications of this aspect, 
however, we can suppose that what gives this impression to the ethnic minorities is the 
need to know the official language, even though this condition is diminished by the 
existence of a language for interethnic communication. 
Respondents’ Perception of Freedom of Ethnic Groups in Moldova 
to Establish Cross-Border Contacts
In this subchapter, we will focus on the perception of the respondents regarding the 
freedom of ethnic groups from Moldova to establish international and cross-border 
contacts, which primarily implies the freedom to have relationships with the historical 
homelands and hold the citizenship of other countries. 
The research of these perceptions offers important indices about the success of integra-
tion of ethnic and national minorities with the state, because the loyalty and excessive 
orientation of minorities towards their historical homelands is considered a weak indi-
cator of their integration with the country where they reside. 
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For the purposes of this subchapter, we will refer to the questions that ask the opi-
nions of the respondents about being a citizen of Moldova, about the actions of historical 
homelands, and about the external orientation and future of Moldova – D11, Q13, Q52, 
Q53, Q55, Q33-37.
a. Citizenship
■ Most respondents, regardless of ethnic background, declare that they have only 
one citizenship: Moldovans – 98 %, Russians – 97%, Ukrainians – 98%, Gagauz – 
99%, and Bulgarians – 96%. Only one or two percent choose „I don’t know/don’t 
answer“, which allows us to say that these would hold more citizenships, with the 
exception of those 1-2 percent whose situation is unqualified. 
■ Question Q13 offers the respondents a list of attributes and asks them to specify 
the ones they identify with. Among these are ethnic affiliations (Moldovan, Roma-
nian, Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, and Bulgarian), resident of this locality, citizen 
of Moldovan, CIS resident, European, East-European. All groups give priority to 
ethnic identity, i.e. affiliation to an ethnic group followed by the Moldovan citizen-
ship. 70 percent of Moldovan/Romanian respondents choose ethnic identity followed 
by the citizenship. Only 15 percent of Moldovans/Romanians – or representatives 
of majority ethnic group – consider themselves first of all Moldovan citizens. Among 
Russians, 46 percent consider themselves Russians, followed by 31 percent who 
consider themselves citizens of Moldova. 59 percent of Ukrainians consider them-
selves Ukrainians and only 20 percent consider themselves, first of all, citizens of 
Moldova. 66 percent of Gagauz also give priority to their ethnic identity followed 
by 17 percent who put citizenship on the first place. 62 percent of Bulgarians think 
that they are first of all Bulgarians, and only 18 percent identify themselves, first of 
all, as Moldovan citizens. As we can see, the difference between the number of 
those who give priority to their ethnic group, and the number of those who identify 
themselves with the Moldovan citizenship is rather big. Only in the case of Russians, 
this difference is smaller. Russians have the largest number of people who identify 
themselves, first of all, as Moldovan citizens. It is obvious that ethnic identity based 
on affective relations is stronger then the citizenship, which is based on rational 
principles of respecting rights and liberties, and assuming citizen responsibilities. 
b. Relations with historic homelands
■ Predominance of ethnic identification could be considered an indicator of a rela-
tion ship with historic homelands, loyalty towards historic homelands in the detriment 
of loyalty towards the Moldovan state. There is no clear evidence of a relationship 
between ethnic identification and loyalty towards countries of origin/historic home-
lands. The answers to question Q14 – Q19 confirm that the relationship is optional. 
The first most important things mentioned in all the cases, when answering the 
question „What are the three most important things to be considered Moldovan/
Russian/Ukrainian/Gagauz/Bulgarian/Romanian?“ were: to have parents of relevant 
background, to speak the language, to respect the traditions of that particular 
group, to feel part of that group. The fact of living in Moldova/Russia/Ukraine/
TAU GagauzYeri/Romania was considered secondary/minor. 
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■ However, living in Moldova and feeling part of an ethnic group seems to be more 
likely if the historic homelands have their contribution to this. Questions referring 
to the Russian/Ukrainian/Turkish/Bulgarian/Romanian actions on the territory of 
Moldova showed that all the respondents consider that these actions are very 
necessary. For example, Q33-Q37 refer to a series of actions of historic homelands 
(Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania), including: 
• Supporting students and pupils of the respective ethnicity who study in Moldova;
• Supporting the businesses belonging to persons of the respective ethnicity;
• Supporting the cultural organizations of the respective ethnicity from Moldova;
• Developing the identity of the respective ethnic group in Moldova. 
Most of the answers reflect the options „totally agree“ and „rather agree“. The most 
unconditioned agreements are represented by the historic homeland of the respondent 
group, i.e. 70 percent Russians „totally agree“ with Russia’s actions in Moldova, and only 
60 percent „totally agree“ with the actions undertaken by Ukraine. 
c. External orientation
■ The answers to question Q52, which refer to the external orientation of the country, 
suggest that the ethnic groups seem to have a stronger connection with a certain 
space – the CIS, than with a certain country that can be considered historical home-
land. The vast majority of Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian respondents 
declared that the external orientation of Moldovan should be „maintenance of CIS 
presence“. Thus, 41 percent of Russians think that Moldova should remain within 
CIS, 38 percent believe that Moldova should join the EU, and 6% plead for 
neutrality. 49 percent of Ukrainians believe that Moldova should remain within 
CIS, 21 percent plead for EU and 3 percent advocate neutrality. 24 percent do not 
know what is the best external orientation for Moldova. According to 48 percent of 
Gagauz, Moldova should „remain within CIS“ and only 18 percent are in favor of 
EU integration, while 8 are neutral and 19% do not know what the answer is. 36 
percent of Bulgarians plead for CIS, 36 percent for the EU, 19 percent do not know, 
and 7% plead for neutra lity. As we can see, in the case of Bulgarian group there is 
an equality, or an (almost) equal division of the opinions of those who opt for EU 
and those who advocate for CIS. 
In the case of the majority group, 62 percent believe that Moldova should join the 
EU, and only 14 percent state that the country should stay within CIS, while 7% believe 
that Moldova should not be in any of these structures. 
The majority and the Russian ethnic groups, unlike other ethnic groups, express a 
certain concern regarding a possible failure of Moldova as a state (Q53): 43 and 44 
percent accordingly. The majority group has most of the fears: 30 percent of respondents 
are concerned about an armed conflict, although the majority (57%) does not have this 
fear. Those who fear believe that this conflict will happen likely between Moldova and 
the Transnistrian Region (82%) or between Moldova and Russia (9%). 
The number of Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian respondents who are concerned 
about the failure of the state does not exceed 25% within each group. More reduced is the 
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possibility for an armed conflict - only 10-15% express such a fear, and those who do 
express this fear indicate Transnistria and Romania as aggressors. 
Perception of Survey Participants vs. Perception 
of Delphi Study Participants 
The organization of the nationwide Ethnobarometer survey was preceded by a 
research among experts (opinion leaders, representatives of civil society and mass media) 
using the Delphi method, in order to identify the basic categories and indicators for the 
survey. Given this situation, we do not think it is relevant to analyze the perceptions of 
the experts separately because we do not have two separate researches but rather a 
research composed of two phases. 
Are the results of the survey different from the perceptions of the experts? Considering 
that the perceptions of the experts have set the framework and, probably, the limits for the 
expressed opinions of the survey participants, what can we say about the perceptions of 
these two groups of respondents? The aspects that can be mentioned in this context refer to 
the similarities and differences in the answers of the two groups of research participants. 
Similarities 
■ Identification of a privileged ethnic group. Both groups of respondents have identi-
fied the existence of a privileged ethnic group: the Russian ethnic group. According 
to the answers from the survey form, Russians would be at the same level with the 
ethnic majority in the categories of the richest, most politically influential and most 
respected. The participants to the Delphi study also state the reasons that lead to 
the privileged status of the Russian ethnic group: the status during soviet times, 
preservation of economic positions, etc. 
■ The minorities believe that the ethnic majority has more advantages, firstly because 
of the number and secondly because the language of the majority is the official 
language of Moldova. In their opinion, at the beginning of 1990s this situation 
facilitated the replacement of other ethnic groups from administration and state 
apparatus with Moldovans. 
■ The participants in the national survey prove a lack of knowledge of the Ukrainian, 
Gagauz and Bulgarian minorities. These three groups had most of the „don’t know/
no answer“ choices for many questions, especially for those asking to describe and 
choose features for this group. In addition, some Delphi study participants consider 
that the Gagauz and Bulgarians are the most disadvantaged group because they 
live in a very poor rural area. 
■ Both categories of respondents manifested a suspicion regarding the assistance 
offered by the neighboring countries to the relevant ethnic groups (setting up 
universities, radio stations, TV stations, newspapers, etc.) The biggest suspicions 
among minorities are raised by the Romanian assistance to Moldovans and Turkish 
ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 107
assistance to Gagauz. For the ethnic majority, suspicious are the activities of the 
Russian minority financed by Russia. 
■ The foreign policy options are also similar in both researches. Moldovans plead for 
a pro-European orientation while the ethnic minorities favor a foreign policy 
oriented towards the CIS. 
■ The legislation related to national minorities is considered by both groups of 
respon dents as being sufficiently advanced and compliant with the international 
legislation. From the legislation perspective, all citizens of Moldova have sufficient 
rights, chances and opportunities. 
■ After an integral reading of both the results of the national survey and the results of 
the Delphi study, we can notice a outranking of the interethnic issues by the econo-
mic issues, which, according to the respondents, are more stringent and pressing. 
Differences
■ Read and analyzed from the perspective of the dilemma of the state’s role in 
resolution of interethnic problems in Moldova, the results of the Ethnobarometer 
survey show a picture which can be called „picture of minor differences“. Generally, 
most answers (over 50%) are grouped in one of the options (agreement or disagree-
ment). Most respondents have the same perceptions regarding the interethnic rela-
tions referred to in the questions. Only after finding this consensus, the researcher 
can analyze the small differences in the attitudes and opinions. In the Delphi study 
there is a more trenchant and numerically equal differentiation between the two 
types of attitudes of the experts/opinion leaders. For example those who look with 
suspicion at Gagauz Yeri and those who believe that the Gagauz autonomy was a 
good solution; those who believe that the relationship between ethnic groups are 
cordial and those who say that these relationships do not exist at all, etc. 
■ The experts/opinion leaders formulate clearly the link between the interethnic prob-
lems and the problems of emergence of the Moldovan nation-state. For example, the 
link between the integration of minorities and the identity-related confusion of the 
majority ethnic group (Moldovans or Romanians? Romanian or Moldovan lan-
guage?). Such a link is not visible in the answers of the survey participants for whom 
the identity of the majority ethnic group does not seem to be a problem. Neverthe-
less, this aspect was not explicitly or implicitly formulated, especially that Romanians 
were included as a separate ethnic group, even separate from the majority group. 
Conclusions
In the present study, we referred to the theoretic framework of the liberal multi-
culturalism and pluralism since this is the most relevant approach of the ethnocultural 
diversity existent in the political theory. This approach is capable to offer the functional 
tools for the understanding and analysis of the relationship between the state and ethnic/
national minorities from different geographical contexts. From the perspective of the 
liberal multiculturalism and pluralism, the settlement of the interethnic problems is not 
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a separate function, added to the state, but the very process through which the state is 
founded and exists. Certainly, this process is rather complex and maybe challenging 
because it implies at the same time the protection of ethnocultural diversity and integra-
tion of ethnic and national minorities. 
Although in this study the ethnonational issues from Moldova were conceived and 
systematized from the above-mentioned theoretical perspective, the success and the 
extent of the settlement of these problems is not evaluated mainly from a theoretical 
perspective. The extent of resolution of interethnic issues is provided by the perception 
of the respondents who participated in the research of the actions of the state meant to 
solve these issues. Of course, the respondents’ perceptions are commited to an evaluation 
from the above-mentioned theoretical and normative perspective: for example, we cannot 
avoid the question if a certain perception of the respondents involved in the study is 
determined by the adherence to the rational principles of the rule of law or by the affective 
affiliation to an ethnic group. Often, in the analysis of the perceptions carried out in 
Chapter III of the study, these two levels of assessment overlap. Moreover, the other 
aspects of the relationship between Moldova and ethnonational minorities will be identi-
fied in the materials provided by the empirical research and maybe analyzed in a different 
work. For example, analyzing the results of the research, we can ask ourselves how 
Moldova can protect the ethnocultural diversity without crystallizing and worsening the 
differences or how Moldova can support the ethnic diversity without leading towards 
the articulation of political options based on ethnic background. 
However, in a „final“ perspective, which inevitably combines the opinions of respon-
dents and the normative perspective, we can say the following about the actions under-
taken by Moldova in order to solve the interethnic issues: 
■ The respondents perceive the existence of a privileged ethnic group – the Russian 
ethnic minority. The privilege has two sources: historical – inheritance of the privi-
le ged status from the soviet times – and legal: existence in the Moldovan legislation 
of provisions about Russian language as a language for interethnic communication. 
Unlike the participants of the Delphi study, the survey forms do not reflect any 
feel ing of injustice regarding this privilege. The privilege is simply visible and is 
not necessarily perceived as an injustice, especially that more respondents agree 
that the „historical homeland“, Russia, should support the Russian minority living 
in Moldova, even larger than the number of those who agree unconditionally that 
their own historical homelands (Ukraine, Bulgaria, Turkey) should support their 
own ethnic group. 
■ We notice a mutual ignorance among the Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian ethnic 
groups, primarily because of the large number of „don’t know/no answer“ choices to 
the questions that directly relate to these groups. The ignorance could be explained 
partially by their inclusion by the majority in the notion of „Russian-speaking popu-
lation“, and even the representatives themselves affiliate with this group. However, 
survey forms do not ask the respondents to choose to identify with the „Russian 
speaking population“ or an ethnic group. 
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■ The experience of territorial autonomy TAU Gagauz Yeri does not generate diffe-
rent attitudes and perceptions for the members of this particular group. The Gagauz 
respondents do not offer perceptions differently from other ethnic minorities who 
did not benefit from this experience, i.e. they do not have different attitudes or 
perceptions regarding their historical homelands, external orientation of Moldova, 
linguistic policies, etc. There is no directly plausible explanation of this phenomenon: 
We can suppose either that this right does not generate specific experiences, or 
that the legal provisions are not fully applied. 
■ According to respondents’ answers, there is a linguistic confusion in Moldova. The 
confusion exists both at the level of perceptions – the massive option for two 
official languages- and at the legislative level: existence of an official language and a 
language for interethnic communication. These confusions generate other con fu-
sions – who should speak the language and which language; and suspicions – some 
know a certain language but avoid speaking it. 
■ The atmosphere from the picture outlined by the results of the survey is rather 
cordial: minorities seem tolerant and open, fact that does not concord with the 
attitudes expressed by the leaders of the ethnic organizations in different political 
events from Moldova. Often, what the majority considers as a benefit, it is seen as 
a threat by the minorities and vice versa. „Today when there is hope for a solution 
of the most painful problems of our society, the forces that want to obstruct this 
process became active again“. „All principles of tolerance were violated. […] Civil 
society that we are all building is being threatened“, „the flag of the European 
Union cannot wave over those who defy the principles of European democracy“. 
(Excerpts from the letter of the Coordinating Council of Ethnocultural Organiza-
tions within the Department of Interethnic Relations of the Moldovan Government 
addressed to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Higher Commis-
sioner of the OSCE for Minority Issues during the anticommunist protests from 
January-April 2002 in Chisinau. 
■ The existence of the phenomenon „motherland“ is rather pronounced in both the 
survey results and the results of Delphi study. This phenomenon is not so spread 
in the Western European countries, and is not approached in a special way in the 
political theories of liberal pluralism or multiculturalism. It is a challenge for these 
theories to assimilate this phenomenon, and recommend an adequate political 
framework for the situation when minorities claim rights and freedoms in one 
state, but are rather loyal to their historical homelands or country of their origin. 
Both the survey and the Delphi study results include multiple references to the 
actions of the historical homelands in Moldova. Even though these indices are not 
direct proofs that there is a lack of loyalty of minorities and „collaboration“ with 
their „homeland“, these are not indices of successful integration of the ethnic 
minorities with Moldova. 
The listed conclusions are less positive and rather show trends in the solution of the 
issues of ethnic minorities and their integration in Moldova. Among more positive 
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aspects that would show effective measures undertaken by the state in this direction we 
can mention: legislation compliant with the international standards, linguistic legislation, 
tolerance and cordiality visible in the results of the survey, etc. However, these positive 
aspects are more problematic than the negative aspects because, as shown in the results 
of the research, the actual situation is not always determined by the legislation compliant 
to the standards. 
Recommendations
It is natural to make recommendations for the possible actions of the state for a more 
efficient resolution of interethnic problems depending on the conclusions. In addition, 
in accordance with the standards for such study, the recommendations should be of two 
types: recommendations for public policies and recommendations for the improvement 
of the relevant legislation. Both types of recommendations are quite difficult in this case, 
if not impossible, because the researchers risk losing their neutrality and be accused of 
impartiality. For example, the attempt to think of a solution for the improvement of the 
situation made both by the experts and respondents, and namely the existence of a 
privileged group, as a cause the Russian, will immediately lead to grave accusations for 
the authors of these recommendations, even though these will be made from a human 
rights perspective, and starting from the premises of liberal political theory. Similarly, 
the proposals that would refer to the reduction of linguistic confusion, outlined in the 
analysis of the survey forms, the number of official languages, who should speak these 
languages, and the elimination of the suspicion such as „some know the language but 
refuse speaking it“, would generate the same accusations of being biased. 
Another challenge in the attempt to make recommendations is the fact that the real 
interethnic situation is not always an effect of the legal framework, but has other historical 
and sociological explanations. Let us take for example the existence of the „real bilin-
gualism“ assured by the status of Russian as a language for interethnic communication, 
as provided in the Law of the Republic of Moldova about the functioning of languages. 
This original status granted to the language of an ethnic minority creates the impression 
that the sphere of interethnic communication should be separated from the sphere of 
official language, as if the ethnic groups communicate differently, in different places or 
about other things than those necessary to be communicated in the official language. 
Also, from the logical perspective, this status multiplies the injustices and disadvantages 
for the members of other ethnic groups. If it was proved that the idea of an official 
language is absolutely necessary for the existence and functioning of a state, (because 
only in this way the state can standardize the educational system and economy, and can 
assure the equality of opportunities, as well as the mobility in the economic, but also 
cultural and social spheres) then the existence of two languages means that some ethnic 
groups are disadvantaged twice. The first time - because they have to invest efforts and 
time to learn the official language, and the second time - because they have to invest the 
same type of resources in order to learn the language of interethnic communication. 
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Thus, the Ukrainian, Gagauz and Bulgarian ethnic groups from Moldova are disadvan-
taged, because in order to participate in the social life they have to learn two tools (i.e. 
two languages that are not their native), unlike the majority and the Russian ethnic 
groups, who need to learn only one additional tool. However, if for the elimination of 
these disadvantages one would recommend to cancel the status of Russian as a language 
for interethnic communication, this fact, even though correct from the perspective of 
the liberal political theory and from the logical perspective, would provoke a possible 
massive protest of the „disadvantaged“ minorities. The explanation of the protest is 
historical – the compulsoriness of knowledge of Russian in the Soviet times, fact that 
lead to the situation that the adult population did not perceive the knowledge of the 
language for interethnic communication as an additional effort or as a disadvantage. 
However, if this status of language of communication is not eliminated in the following 
years, the new generation will feel disadvantaged. 
The compulsoriness of knowledge of two languages by all citizens of Moldova doubles 
the efforts of the state to guarantee the knowledge of two languages for their use in the 
public sphere. The expenses from the public money are also doubled. The historical argu-
ment that everybody knows the language of interethnic communications is not appro-
priate because the natural speakers of Russian will be replaced biologically by others who 
are not natural speakers. For this, the state will have to spend considerable resources to 
assure all citizens with a double instrument used in the public space, although by its 
nature the public space must be as reasonable, functional and accessible as possible. (Of 
course, for their private sphere, individuals can learn as many languages as they want 
from the esthetic, euphonic, personal reasons). However, if the new generations are 
also „natural“ speakers of the language of interethnic communication, then the liberal 
political theory can no longer be a theoretical framework for the analysis, and under-
standing the emergence of Moldova as a state and of the ways Moldova guarantees 
ethnocultural justice. 
As we can see, the researchers of interethnic problems in Moldova face considerable 
challenges when they have to formulate recommendations for public policies, and legis-
lative initiatives to improve a certain aspect. To what regards the example of linguistic 
confusion mentioned above, we cannot recommend adding a new clause to the existent 
legal framework on national and ethnic minorities. On the contrary, from the perspective 
of the liberal political theory, we can argue the elimination of some clauses and impro-
vement of the functionality of this framework. However, this is a less ordinary and even 
a risky recommendation. 
CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
IN MOLDOVA 
(Vitalie Catana)
The results of the Delphi study show that the problems related to citizenship and 
identity in Moldova are determined by several factors, and require a complex approach. 
First, these problems occur because the space between Prut and Nistru rivers has never 
experienced a real national or territorial autonomy. Second, there is an addition of ingre-
dients specific for a territory, which has been extensively under the occupation of an 
empire. These ingredients are materialized in the effects of denationalization and coloni-
zation policies, encouragement of migration, etc. applied for the destruction of identity 
of the population living in this area. 
With independence and beginning of consolidation of Moldova’s statehood, all these 
aspects revealed the challenges an entity can meet, when confronted with the necessity 
to build the institutions required for an efficient administration. 
Given the fact that the Moldovan statehood is a new and original creation, there was 
a need to explain the use of the state formation approach, and to obtain citizens’ loyalty 
and support. In Moldova, the challenges became visible both in the behavior of public 
authorities, and in the reaction of Moldovan elites and citizens. Since there is an absence 
of a traditional governance and administration, the authorities were placed before the 
need in order to form citizens’ loyalty towards the created entity. 
In the accomplishment of this approach, public authorities and elites had to choose 
between two options that can be defined as identity and citizenship. Without exception, 
governments that followed have preferred the identity concept as a tool for the formation 
of the relationships between the state and citizens. The institution of citizenship was 
almost totally ignored, and has functioned only when it became inevitable, in situations 
when the citizenship becomes necessary in order to organize activities such as exercising 
the right to vote, public employment, issuance of identification documents, etc. The insti-
tu tion of citizenship was not invoked too often in its full meaning and rapports. 
Identity Model in Moldova
Depending on the case, the definition of individuals and communities’ identity takes 
place in its relationship with other individuals and communities. When the „clash“ with 
others occurs, individuals either live the experience of confirming their own identity, if 
this identity has been already formed, or live the sentiment of discovering that they are 
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different, if the identity has not been yet formed. At that moment, the individuals begin 
to acknowledge the elements that make them different. Consequently, the identity is not 
only an abstract and susceptible concept applied to communities, but also a category 
made of elements perceived by the individuals in their relationship with the society. This 
means that the identity has two dimensions. One of them defines the community as a 
sum of individuals, and the other defines the community in relation with the individual. 
The relationship between the concept of identity and the individual contains, in its turn, 
two aspects. On one hand, they regard the objective criteria, which are applicable in the 
definition of community, serving the individuals as reference points in the approach of 
self-determination, and, on the other hand, the subjective criterion, which implies the 
attitude of individuals towards their own identity. 
In societies with formed identity, the identity issue is relatively simple. The individual 
has nothing else to do but adopt an identity from the available options. In the case of 
newly emerged countries that have not experienced in the past a period of formation, 
like Moldova, the problem of state and citizens’ identity represent ones of the major issues 
in the consolidation of state and its institutions. It seems that most citizens of Moldova 
can be included in the second assumption, regarding the level of emancipation, i.e. of 
discovering that they are different from other people, and have not reached the level of 
definition of their own identity. In its turn, the state identity is generally determined by 
the sum of citizens and communities’ identities. In the societies where the communities 
have different identities, there is a competition in the determination and affirmation of 
state identity. It is also the case of Moldova, where such debates focused on the issues 
regarding the identity of the largest community and the identity of the state, the issue of 
official language, and the name of the official language of Moldova. 
In Moldova, the application of an identity model began with the identification of the 
majority community and its mobilization in the effort of society building. One resorted 
to the notion of Moldovan people, which generated negative reactions and which failed 
because of the undefined content. This notion generated confusions because the term 
Moldovan people has a dual meaning. It defines the largest community, which is delimited 
from the territorial perspective by this term, and defines the totality of citizens of Moldova, 
because the name of the country derives from the name of the largest community. The 
confusion generates problems related to the appropriation of identity, determined by the 
citizenship and by the ethnic background. For example, Russians define their identity in 
opposition with the term Moldovan people, even though they are included in it as citizens 
of Moldova. 
The conclusions of the study reveal a confused perception of the respondents from a 
different perspective. The chapter on national identity shows that „the opinions regarding 
the principles of defining national identity can be divided in two large categories: (1) 
those who conceive this national identity only in the framework of a common history, a 
common memory and common people:
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 „It is a conscience of affiliation to a certain community where the members have 
something in common: cultural and historic background, common memory, common 
aspirations, and plans for the future“, F1.
 „It is what makes you identify with a nation, feel part of the nation. Generally, the 
nation is defined by meeting a set of criteria and attributes: language, culture, race, 
traditions, etc. and by understanding the affiliation or loyalty to these attributes“, M5 
 „The national identity is the defining element of a person belonging to a certain ethnic 
group. It is a notion that consolidates an ethnic group and gives it the aspect of nation. 
It is a community of people speaking the same language, having the same traditions, 
customs, deriving from the same blood and having a common history“, M6.
Moreover (2), individualists who consider that self-identification is an issue related 
to the freedom of individuals to join a group or the values they believe in:
 „I define it as an individual option. Even though for a long time it has been declared 
that the national identity is taken for granted, that you are born with it and that you 
cannot deny it, I believe that it is an individual option. The individuals can leave, can 
learn a different language, or, even as in our case, can stay, can speak the same lan-
guage, but consider themselves Romanians or Moldovans. Therefore, it is an individual 
option, it is a political option, and it is a socially formed option. There is nothing in-
born here, there is nothing for granted, there is nothing. It is something minor that an 
individual can choose, give up, or ignore“, F10. 
 „This moment of self-identification represents something very personal. How do you 
perceive yourself? By culture, by your way of thinking… In my opinion, in this case it 
is not even about being a local. Another thing is that there should not be a forced, 
impo sed identification. There is such a notion – „assimilation“. Assimilation repre-
sents the possibility of the representative of a nation to change the ethnic background, 
while in another ethnic environment. This is exactly the issue of mixed marriages. 
Now, we do not have nationality specified in our passports, however it existed before. 
At that time, people deriving from mixed marriages, a Moldovan and a Ukrainian 
parent for example, had to determine who they were: Moldovans or Ukrainians. You 
could not choose „Moldo-Ukrainian“, you had to determine your identity, but it 
was voluntary. The voluntary assimilation occurs everywhere, and, generally does 
not generate rejec tion, as it is the case of forced assimilation. I believe that the issue 
of self-identification is rather serious for us, especially in relation with the title 
nation, and can be proble matic for other ethnic groups. Maybe it is just a personal 
problem“, M7. 
In fact, the two options derive from the elements of identity, which are not contra-
dictory, but complementary, and which are found together in the definition of identity. 
Thus, the spoken language, common history and culture, represent objective elements of 
the definition of community, and the individual has the right to adopt or reject the 
particular identity, which is the subjective element of identity. 
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Thus, Recommendation no. 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe dated February 1, 1993, shows in article 1 the elements applicable when defi-
ning the national minorities: a. they live on the territory of a state and are its citizens; b. 
they maintain long-term, strong and permanent connections with that state; c. they 
display distinct ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic features; d. they are sufficiently 
representative even though they are less numerous than the rest of the population, or 
population of a certain region of that state; e. they are driven by the desire to preserve 
their common identity, including culture, traditions, religion and language. Items a., b., 
c., and d. estab lish the objective elements of identity and item e. refers to the subjective 
element. 
The inconsistency of attitudes represents nothing more than the reflection of the 
terminological and conceptual confusion of the Moldovan society regarding the identity. 
They also represent the reflection of the two ideological perspectives regarding appropria-
tion of identity, made up of those who perceive the independence as a national revival 
and democratization, and those who comprehend the independence as an opportunity 
for the emergence of a new nation. 
Risks of Application the Identity Model
It seems that choosing an identity, pretended to be ethnic, as a reference in the con-
solidation of the country, represented a replacement for the institution of citizenship, 
which had the purpose to set pressure on citizens, exempting the public authorities of 
the duties that appear in their relationship with the citizens and state. Thus, the application 
of identity model requires an effort on behalf of the citizen to adopt the identity, and the 
state becomes a referee, while the citizenship-based relationship between the individual 
and state is defined through mutual rights and duties. The role of the state, generally, is 
to guarantee respect of human rights, functionality of democratic institutions in provi-
ding better governance, efficient public administration, and equitable justice. The fragi-
lity of state institutions has determined the option, which excludes their confrontation 
with the discomfort related to undertaking responsibilities. In other words, the public 
authorities wanted to obtain the loyalty of citizens, while avoiding honoring their own 
duties and eventual risks in their relationship with citizens. 
However, the option for the implementation of a contested identity, as a reference 
for the formation of the relationships between the state and citizens, also implies 
certain risks. 
Identity Model Generates Competition
Firstly, the identity issue in Moldova currently represents an object of competition, 
whose finality is both the positions of the communities and the position of individuals 
in the political, social, economic, and cultural systems. In other words, the identity issue 
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is included in the logic of competition for the quality of the dominant group among 
communities from Moldova. The survey results show that both Russians and Moldovans 
characterize the existing relationships between the two communities as being worse than 
15 years ago. In the study, the attitude of Moldovans towards Russians is formulated in 
the following way: „Russians are viewed by many of the Moldovan participants as the 
ethnic group which had had in the past the advantage of power in the detriment of the other 
ethnic groups, and which had not given up the idea of maintaining this advantage: they are 
arrogant and continue to behave as foreigners without even trying to adapt to the local 
values, culture, and traditions“. The study also shows that both Moldovans and Russians 
view one another in dominant positions to what regards the economic and political 
power in Moldova. This perception represents the reflection of a struggle for primacy, 
and serves as a motivation and justification of the attitude towards the opposite com-
munity. Thus, the Russians, as viewed by Moldovans, „dominate the country from the 
economic perspective, they represent a frustrated community that lost the privileges of the 
Soviet times, realizing that now, they are just a minority in an independent country. They 
have the mentality of the „besieged“. They are aggressive and consider that the best way of 
defense is offence“ (annex 2). 
In their turn, Russians accuse the fact that Moldovans represent an overwhelming 
majority, and claim models that would preserve the existent relationships. Their percep-
tion regarding Moldovans is included in this understanding of relationships. The study 
mentions that „the positive features assigned to Moldovans represent, unlike the ones assig-
ned to Russians or Ukrainians, rather defensive qualities – inaction rather than dynamic 
features.“ Thus, „the positive representation of Moldovans describes them as joyful, hos-
pitable people, good singers and good dancers. On the other hand they are kind, peaceful, 
patient, sympathetic, respectful, decent, hardworking, and openhearted.“ It is worth insis-
ting on these findings, because they are not just listed, but also cultivated through the 
models promoted by the Moldovan elites. 
The qualities implying mobility and action are different for Moldovans. We find that 
„the negative representation related to Moldovans characterizes them as less educated, less 
urbanized, unstable (inconsistent, coward, undecided, flexible), easier to deceive compared 
to other groups, sometimes humble. They are disoriented and do not know with whom or 
with what to identify. Are not competitive when they have to compete with other ethnic 
groups, the other groups are faster.“ 
In the case of Romanians, they are assigned features that prove the intention to see 
them eliminated from the competition. They „want to expel the Russian speaking popula-
tion from the country, they want unification with Romania at any price“ and, in the percep-
tion of some respondents, „are liars, extremists, fascists, they prosecuted Gypsies during 
the World War II, they were worse than the Nazis“. We can easily notice that these features 
assigned to Romanians are nothing but clichés extensively cultivated in Moldova. 
In conclusion, we can assert that the application of identity model generates compe-
tition between communities, which can ultimately constitute a source of conflict. 
ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 117
Identity Model Leads to the Establishment of 
Consociational Models
There is another risk: the use of identity model leads to emergence of consociational 
models, i.e. organization of the society through division. Generally, consociational models 
are the models with conditions for the mobilization of communities and formation of 
conflict attitudes. The study shows that the preferences of communities are different in 
almost all areas. We can also notice in the study, that the attitudes of communities towards 
each other are formed based on clichés rather than daily experiences. The mutually 
assigned features refer to the characteristics that form the image of community and not 
individuals. 
The conclusions univocally confirm the existence of new consociational relationships 
among the communities from Moldova. To quote from the study, „What we can say from 
the first glance at the resulted information is the fact that different ethnic groups barely 
communicate amongst each other. The problems and aspects related to an ethnic group are 
less visible for the other group“. In addition, „the ethnic groups from Moldova are largely 
structured in enclaves, having rather few common values, few exchanges and little commu-
nication among them. The perception of a divided society exists among all respondents. 
Thus, „in the opinion of some participants, there are no ethnic conflicts in Moldova; howe-
ver there is very little communication among them, the Moldovans, and other minorities 
from Moldova, living in practically different worlds.“ Meanwhile, „another opinion adopts 
the idea of inexistence of relationships among ethnic groups. There is neither conflict nor 
consensus between the minorities and the Moldovan majority because each ethnic group 
lives in a completely different world.“ 
This perception is supported by the distribution of answers. The respondents’ options 
cor respond almost totally to their affiliation with the ethnic communities from Moldova. 
Firstly, the different ideological positions expressed by the participants overlapped 
with the ethnic cleavage: „on one side, the Moldovans (NR+D), and on the other side, the 
respondents belonging to ethnic minorities (NN). The positioning in one of these two 
perspectives will have consequences on the entire discussion, determining the options of the 
respondents regarding politics, history, economy, etc. Even though the expressed options do 
not totally match the two ideological models mentioned below, the differences in the opinions 
of the respondents are large enough to determine their positioning on one side or the other. 
The participants’ opinions are largely situated between these two extremes, having more 
nuances, being more complex and sometimes less consistent than the ones outlined here. 
However, the opinions contrast to the extent of their inclusion on one ideological position or 
another. The two different ideological opinions have affected greatly all answers for the rest 
of the discussed topics.“
The existence of this division is reflected also through the different attitudes regarding 
„the domestic and foreign policy issues (orientation towards the EU, CIS, or Romania)“, 
which „can place the ethnic groups on conflicting positions“ (see also annex 1).
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This division is visible also in the perception towards the economic situation of the 
country: „the issues related to the national economy, visible only from the NR+D perspective, 
are: lack of competition on the market or failure of market economy, the difficulties, often 
insurmountable, of the private businesses (this issue is sometimes perceived from the NN 
perspective!), lack of investments, scandals related to the state interference with the economy, 
as well as corruption. 
The economic issues perceived only from NN perspective are: economic stabilization, 
creation of a socially-oriented market economy, economic growth.“
The political options of community representatives also correspond to the typology 
of consociational relationships. The study finds that „there are political issues that are 
visible only from one of the positions. Thus, the winning of Ilaşcu’s case at the European 
Court for Human Rights, negotiation of an action plan for European integration, the union 
of rightist forces in a single political party - Democratic Moldova Bloc, corruption extended 
at all administrative levels, violation of certain democratic freedoms, especially the freedom 
of press during the communist governance, are issues viewed more from the perspective 
of NR+D.“ It is the position of a category that wants to change the present political 
situation. 
„On the other hand, according to the second perspective, NN, in the last 5 years Moldova 
experienced a stabilization of economy, politics, and the governmental policies were oriented 
towards ordinary people, state services rendered to the citizens improved.“ This is an atti-
tude showing that the members of Russian minority feel more comfortable in the present 
system because they can mobilize more economic, political, and cultural resources. It is 
confirmed, that those who are content with their position, tend to show the positive 
events: „Other political issues viewed as important by the participants (only from NN per-
spec tive) were the inauguration of the Stefan cel Mare (The Great) monument, renovation of 
Capriana Monastery, elaboration by the government of strategies for social, youth, tourism 
development, the wine festival organized with the involvement of the President.“ 
Identity Model Leads to Discriminatory Standards
The approach of loyalty formation through the implementation of Moldovan identity 
implies the use of wrong premises, and leads consequently to the situation when the state 
applies different standards to its citizens, and requires different levels of loyalty from 
them. Thus, the people defining themselves as Romanians are accused of disloyalty 
because they refuse to adopt an identity promoted by the officials, and decline to consider 
themselves Moldovans from the ethnic point of view. Meanwhile, it is considered natural 
when the Moldovan citizens of Russian background manifest a higher loyalty towards 
their homeland. Thus, citizens with equal rights and duties are required different levels 
of loyalty. 
The results of the study show that this situation is perceived by most of the respon-
dents. Let us quote a representative reaction of one of the respondents: „To be Romanian 
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and live in Moldova means to wait until the President comes up with another anti-Romanian 
initiative so that you can then react accordingly“, M12.
One the other hand, as the results show, when asked as Moldovans, from the perspec-
tive of their affiliation with the Moldovan citizenship, the Russians invoke the ethnic 
identity in order to refuse to answer. The Moldovan respondents perceive the situation. 
Some accept it, motivating that Russians belong to a distinct culture and civilization, in 
fact to an abstract entity because they perceive it as separate from the Russian state, and 
others reject it, accusing the Russians of being oriented towards a foreign state. 
Consequently, an aspect of identity model in the case of Moldova is the use of 
different standards to citizens of the country. Thus, when the state requests the loyalty of 
Moldovans, the representatives of minorities believe it is not the case to react because 
they represent different ethnic groups. This is the consequence of the confusion between 
the contents of the term Moldovan people as a notion defining both a community of 
people and the citizenship of a person. As a rule, the representatives of national minorities 
interpret the term in the most favorable meaning, i.e. in the sense that makes them feel 
less obliged or get special rights, depending on the situation. 
Another face of the application of different standards to the same category of persons, 
defined through the content of citizenship, represents the attitude of the authorities, 
which shows the intention to use discriminatory means of coercion to determine the 
adop tion of identity by the representatives of the majority community. In this way, the 
state is incompliant with the provisions of international norms, which stipulate that the 
adoption of identity represents a person’s right to individual option. 
Therefore, the source of discrimination appears from misunderstanding the need for 
definition of identity of the Republic of Moldova as a state, need for appropriation of this 
identity by the citizens of the country, and its relationship with the right of individuals to 
define their own ethnic identity. 
Identity Model Requires an Effort 
for Adopting Identity 
A risk for Moldovan statehood is determined by the evolution of identity in the case 
of the majority community. The present largest community is at the beginning of the 
process of identity formation and definition. The attempt to impose an identity, which 
by content is poor in values, plus the existence of fragile public institutions, contains the 
risk of an identity crisis with unpredictable consequences, which can occur when bearers 
of the dominant identity acknowledge the inferiority of their identity. Since the adoption 
of identity is closely connected with the level of mobility of a person, this thing will 
happen eventually, with the increase of mobility of Moldovan citizens. In this sense, the 
study shows that „most of the Moldovan respondents believe that being a citizen of 
Moldova implies an unconsolidated ethnic identity, obedience, extreme poverty and 
ultima tely emigration.“ Not by accident, according to the conclusions of the study, the 
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Moldovans, although representing the largest community, have a behavior characteristic 
to minorities. Possibly, when related to the members of their own community, Moldo-
vans can react negatively to the invitation regarding the adoption of state-implemented 
identity. 
One of the conclusions of the study shows that there are several assumptions about 
the evolution of that particular identity. According to this conclusion „Romanians are 
perceived by Moldovans rather as examples worth following, since they are more civi li-
zed, preserve better their traditions, culture and language, and define clearly their group 
identity.“ According to the survey, the Moldovans treated Romanians with more trust 
than the rest of communities, and the social distance between „Moldovans“ and Roma-
nians“ was the lowest. It is also important that Romanians are perceived as being more 
attached to the European principles and values, and speak correct Romanian (annex 2). 
The negative features assigned to Romanians are reflections of clichés and stereotypes, 
and not the result of the experiences of respondents. Thus, „Romanians want unification 
with Romania, at any price, they want to get rid of the Russian-speaking population, 
the slogan „baggage – railway station – Russia“ is in their opinion very actual, they want 
unification. On the other hand, Romanians are Gypsies, poor, liars, extremists, fascists, 
incon sistent, undecided, flexible, and coward. Although more and more people prefer 
to recognize their national affiliation (especially the younger generation), they still have 
the problem of self-identification. They are trickier than Moldovans, there are differences 
between Romanians from Romania and those living in Moldova – the latter are pathetic in 
their attempt to prove their identity. Romanians are also hesitant, flexible, intelligent, ener-
getic, arrogant, radical, frustrated, people who yell and then think of the consequences of 
their words. However, they move faster and are on the right track, they represent the local 
population“ (Annex 2). 
The growth of mobility, living and education standards, and opportunities for move-
ment and communication, can determine another direction of evolution of identity that 
can be easily predicted. 
The way the minorities formulate their positions shows that they are interested in 
this evolution, even though it would seem that the issues related to the identity of the 
majority population is an internal matter of its members. The leaders of ethnic minori-
ties, particularly Russian and Gagauz, foreign political leaders, etc. participate actively in 
the debates and the identity model, which will be pursued by the majority community 
from Moldova, became an object of competition. Often the minorities, through public 
declarations of certain political leaders (e.g. Valentin Krilov, Briceni TV, 13.10.2005), 
have opted for formalization of an identity through a referendum, in contrast with the 
attitude of those who consider themselves Romanians, and with a part of Moldovans 
who opt for the right of individual option regarding their own identity. In the opinion of 
referendum supporters, an eventual formalization of the identity of the majority, by using 
the term Moldovan people would stop the growth of the number of those who declare 
themselves Romanians. 
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A superficial analysis shows that imposing the identity of Moldovan people, isolated 
from the civilization, shaped by the Romanian language, which is in opposition to it, is a 
handicap for those who adopt this identity because in the competition of civilizations, an 
eventual Moldovan civilization would be inferior to a more elevated civilization, such as 
the Russian. The representatives of minorities desire this situation since it allows them to 
maintain with less effort the dominant positions they held in the Soviet period, and is 
the expression of an image of reality in which these people feel more comfortable. They 
want this position materialized. 
The cultural superiority of Russians is noted and accepted by other communities: 
„The Russians are considered honest, hearty, always ready to sacrifice for their friends and 
at the same time merciless with the enemies. They belong to a large culture (unlike other 
ethnic groups from the country), to a large and respectable people, and are aware of this 
fact. They brought their culture, freedom, and development to Moldova“. 
The attitude of minorities is felt by Moldovans and is noted in the study through the 
following statement: „many of the negative features that describe Russians represent fea-
tures related to aggressiveness and domination (occupants, colonists, arrogant, quarrelsome, 
dominating, suffering from the „big brother“ syndrome, imperialists, etc.)“ In this context, 
Ukrainians are also „represented negatively“ since they are the „younger brother of this big 
brother“ and are people who get what they want regardless of the means and consequences. 
In conclusions of the study we notice that according to the representatives of mino-
rities „in the case of Romanians and Gypsies, the negative features are more visible 
compared to the positive features, or that „in the negative representation, Moldovans are 
considered inferior to Romanians, Russians and Ukrainians, being a rather rural, back-
ward,  and less educated population“. The logics of competition explains why although the 
„Romanians, Russians, Bulgarians and Jews are viewed as educated, intellectual, and pro-
fessional people“ (i.e. people recognize essential qualities for the definition of identity) 
compared to Moldovans who received worse features. We see an attitude of rejection 
towards the Romanians who „are perceived by the minorities more as foreigners and more 
dangerous, and more intolerant than Moldovans“. 
The results of the survey confirm that the representatives of Russian community prefer 
to compete with Moldovans considering them inferior in education, qualities, and skills. 
At the same time, the descriptions attributed to Romanians show that the attitude of Rus-
sian community towards them is based not on individual qualities, but on affec tive per-
cep tion, which is determined by a hypothetical danger maintained through these clichés. 
It is obvious that Moldovans’ option for the identity defined by the term „Romanian“ 
is regarded as a discomfort, because it matters in the confrontation for domination 
among communities. 
Identity Model Implies an Ideological Component
Another important risk is determined by the existence of an ideological component 
related to the notion of Moldovan people, because this notion was created in the Soviet 
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period. Ideology implies a conflicting relation and contributes to the maintenance of 
conflicting relationships in the society. In a different context, it is expected that with the 
disappearance of the effects of the soviet period, the debates regarding the identity issue 
will have a different content. 
The reasons for this division are the disturbed relationships formed in the soviet 
period. The main misbalance in the relationships between communities from Moldova 
is caused by the fact that the soviet regime created a category, which was qualified by the 
minority doctrine as „minority class“. In the soviet politics, this „minority class“ included 
not only the representatives of the Russian ethnic group, and had the role to assimilate 
nations and create a soviet identity. This „minority class“ represented the standard for 
those who hoped to achieve what we call „success in life“- career, material wellbeing, 
social status etc. The prestige of belonging to the „minority class“ was supported by mul-
tiple privileges. With the implementation of democratic reforms and market economy, 
the state annulled the privileges and imposed the principle of free competition, which 
consequently created „victims“ among the previously privileged people. 
The former „privileged“ category did not hesitate to speculate about the ethnic clea-
vage and sensibilities of the national minorities from Moldova, in order to preserve their 
privileged positions. Here is a revealing and symptomatic quote from the Russian-lan-
guage newspaper Vremea (Time), which is representative for the Russian community 
from Moldova: „More important for the Russian-speakers is the problem of their „elimi-
nation“ not only from the government bodies, but also from the job market. Since the 
economic activity is carried out in the official language, large masses of Russian-speaking 
specialists left their jobs. Since then, you can often see intellectual women selling potatoes on 
the markets, reading, for example, the magazine „Novyi Mir“ (The New World). The cate-
gory called „minority class“ believes that physical work, especially farming, must repre-
sent the prerogative of Moldovans, while leadership and elevated intellectual activities 
must be accomplished exclusively by the privileged category. This prejudice is based on 
the wrong idea that in Moldova, the ethnic communities have been specialized traditio-
nally in certain skills; therefore the Russian speaking minority interprets the emancipation 
of Romanian speakers as a deviation from the normal situation. 
 According to the results of the study, the features assigned to Moldovans sustain this 
approach. Thus, „the Moldovans are hardworking, diligent, joyful, hospitable, good singers 
and dancers, sympathetic, funny, have a good sense of humor, speak a broken Romanian, 
do not have serious education, definitely are not intellectual and if they are, then only the 
first generation. They are one of a kind. Moldovans are good only for farming, they are 
craving for everything that comes, especially, from east and less from what comes from west, 
they criticize themselves, do not have an ethnic or territorial identity, they are backward, 
peasants, Romanians from historical Moldova or Odessa region. They can be blonde, thrifty, 
calm, but they do not have a good education and are ill bred. On the other hand, Moldovans 
are inconsistent, indecisive, flexible, coward but also respectful, decent, hardworking, but 
poor. They do not calculate their efforts, they are troublemakers, illiterate, and they do not 
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keep their promises. They are sometimes tragically pathetic, lazy, generous, puzzled, patient, 
obedient, docile, „blockhead“, silly, easy to deceive, confused, do not know what to identify 
with, unorganized, are not united, distraught, friendly, humble, coward, people on whose 
back one can get rich, subservient, envious.
We notice that these qualities are not only the reflection of reality perception, but also 
a desideratum some of the respondents want to achieve. From this perspective, Moldovan 
respondents formulate their reaction asserting that being a Russian in Moldova means, 
„to continue to behave like a nation that dominates in this country“. 
The conclusions of the study show that „Moldovans perceive Russians as being different 
and having a separate status compared to other ethnic groups.“ Russians are viewed by 
many Moldovan participants as the ethnic group, which had in the past the advantage of 
power in the detriment of the other ethic groups, and which has not yet given up the idea of 
m aintaining this advantage.“ 
In these circumstances, the ethnic cleavage generally overlaps with the ideological 
cleavage, fact ascertained in the research through the following statement „the opinions 
regarding almost all discussed subjects lie on a continuum that has at its extreme two 
completely different ideological positions.“ The results outline two major trends. The first 
trend considers that democratization generated the conditions for national revival. The-
re fore, according to the study „The first perspective (independence as national revival + 
democratization – NR+D) represents a position that regards the 1991 independence in a 
double perspective: as a moment of national revival and return to Romanian spirit, on the 
one hand, the beginning of democratization of the political regime. In the first perspective, 
the return to Latin script, declaration of Romanian as official language, symbolic recovery 
of the relationship between the two banks of Prut River, are natural things related to the 
newly created historical reality. In the second stance, free elections, multiparty system, crea-
tion of the Parliament, institutional reforms, accession of Moldova to the main international 
institutions, such as the United Nations, Council of Europe, OSCE, orientation of foreign 
policy towards the European Union are the main gains that contributed to the democrati-
zation of the political regime. The outbreak of the Transnistrian war is viewed as Russia’s 
attempt to maintain its influence in the region. The settlement of this conflict cannot take 
into consideration the idea of federalization of the unitary state.“
The second trend believes that democratization led to the loss social and economic 
privileged positions, as well as the position of their ethnic community. That is why these 
people are reluctant regarding the national aspirations of the first trend, as well as 
regarding the democratic values. „The second perspective (independence as opportunity 
for emergence of a new nation – NN) is situated at the other end, and represents a position 
defining the independence as a moment of emergence for a new nation: Moldovans represent 
a nation with a separate identity and history, which initially implied multiethnic mixture 
(Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Gagauz, etc. For this reason, there is a need 
for at least two official languages – Moldovan and Russian (language spoken by everyone). 
The newly created democratic institutions have not proven their advantages. The multiparty 
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system and political anxieties related to the struggle for power of different political parties 
did not contribute to the achievement of good and unitary governance; lead to the division 
and impoverishment of society, weakening of state authority, launching of unfounded 
conflicting slogans during elections with the purpose of obtaining political capital etc. At the 
same time, Moldova did not do too much in order to affirm itself as a partner having an 
important word to say in the context of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The 
Transnistrian war broke out because of the Romanianization policy adopted by Chisinau 
at the beginning of 1990s, and misunderstandings regarding the use of official languages. 
Federalization of Moldova is regarded as a possible way to solve the conflict.“
Identity Model Serves as Basis for Wrong Premises 
in the Development of State Policies
The logical construction, resulting from the application of identity model formed 
the basis for the development of state policies by public authorities. In foreign policy, for 
example, the neighboring state, Romania, was regarded in many instances as hostile to 
Moldova’s interests. It was invoked that as the dangers for Moldovan citizens’ identity 
come from Romania, this country represents a danger for the Moldovan statehood. It was 
obvious, and the subsequent evolutions proved that it was a wrong conclusion, because 
the premises were wrong. The change of priorities, imposed by the imperatives of the 
reality, showed that the dangers for Moldovan national security come from other regions 
and not from Romania. 
The identity model can be found at the origin of the perception described in the 
research: „Some participants view with suspicion the assistance provided by the neighboring 
countries to the relevant ethnic groups (setting up universities, radio and television stations, 
newspapers, etc. financed by Russian for the Russian minority, or by Ukraine for the 
Ukrainian minority, etc. ) The biggest suspicions are raised by the Romanian assistance to 
Moldovans and Turkish assistance to Gagauz“. 
Citizenship
As we showed, in their relationship with citizens, Moldovan authorities understood 
that they should stress the efforts for creating the loyalty towards the newly created 
entity. The conclusions formulated in the research regarding the relationships between 
state and citizens represent an evaluation basis of loyalty level. Therefore, the most 
adequate approach, while analyzing the conclusions of the research, is to evaluate the 
loyalty of Moldovan citizens. The definition of citizenship helps us in this sense, because 
it provides us with the content of the relationships that need to exist between the state 
and its citizens. 
The manuals of constitutional law define citizenship as the quality of individual that 
expresses the permanent social-economic, political and legal relations between the 
ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 125
individual and the state, proving its affiliation to the state and offering the individual the 
opportunity to be the holder of all rights and duties stipulated in the Constitution, and 
state laws.
From this statement results that citizenship implies legal and political relations 
between the state and citizens, which are translated into mutual rights and duties. In this 
sense, it is adequate to recall the provisions of articles 55 and 56 from Moldovan Consti-
tution, which refer to the „rights and duties“ and „loyalty towards the country“. Article 55, 
paragraph (1) stipulates that „every citizen has duties towards the state and society, deri-
ving directly from the guaranteed rights and freedoms“ and paragraph (2) stipulates that 
„respect for legal rights and interests, dignity of other citizens is mandatory“. Article 56, 
paragraph (1) stipulates that „loyalty towards the country is sacred“ and paragraph (2) 
provides that „citizens entrusted with public functions, as well as the military, are under 
the responsibility to fulfill faithfully their duties and, in given situations, shall also take 
the oath as requested by law“. 
Affiliation of persons with an entity does not result from the quality of citizen as 
such. This quality represents only the premise for the relationship between individuals 
and the state. At the same time, loyalty is not an abstract notion that could be imposed 
by a propagandistic demarche or by law. 
Formation of loyalty and appropriation of identity is closely related to the attitude of 
individuals towards state institutions, their community environment, life quality, and 
hope for the future. The environment where individuals perform their daily activities 
by connecting to a system of relations with people around them, determines the analysis 
of one’s own identity and identity of people forming the community. Thus, loyalty and 
approp riation of identity have an important component, given by the evaluation of com-
munity members and the relationships with them. The membership and relationships 
defined by education level, posture, and behavior determine the attitude, and the extent 
to which individuals appropriate the identity of their community. 
Therefore, the state that wants to form the loyalty of its citizens has to apply at least 
the diligence test, because the individuals’ attitude is also shaped by one’s own experiences 
in relation with state institutions. 
The state duties revealed by the respondents’ answers and interesting for us are the 
following: to guarantee human rights and efficient functioning of democratic institutions, 
good governance, efficient public administration and fair justice, standards that offer a 
decent life and an adequate community environment. 
The perceptions expressed by the respondents, concerning the listed areas crystallize 
the elements based on which we can estimate the degree of loyalty of Moldovan citizens. 
Moldovans’ Representations of State 
and Perception of Citizenship
From the very beginning, we notice two major trends regarding the general attitude 
of Moldovan citizens towards their state. The first category is represented by the national-
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optimists, and includes most of the participants who declare that they are „proud of the 
country where they were born and live, calling it their homeland and associating it with 
the most beautiful metaphors and epithets“. These participants say, „(Moldova) reminds 
me of a leaf; or it reminds me of Italy. Look at it and you will notice how much it resembles 
the Italian „boot“. Only Corsica and Sicily are missing“, M7; „When I was in school, it 
was associated with a grape“, M17; „I am proud to be a citizen of Moldova“. In the Soviet 
Union, I served in the army in the Far East, and when I was asked about my country, and 
when I told them that I was from Moldova, they were surprised to learn that there were 
Bulgarians living in Moldova. When I was asked about Moldova, I was answering them 
that Moldova is a flourishing country with many orchards, vineyards, grain fields and 
everything you wish“, M21; „Its people, its land, its traditions. When we say ‘Moldova’ we 
suddenly see vineyards and blooming orchards, a good wine, vegetables, fruits and hardwor-
king people. This is the meaning of Moldova for us“, M24. 
We notice that this category formulates its attitude towards Moldovan state, referring 
to the elements that form an entity, which we can identify with the notion of Motherland. 
The notion of Motherland and concept of state define, however, distinct entities. Terms 
as „vineyards“, „orchards“, „hardworking people“, can be associated with the Motherland, 
but have nothing to do with the state. Consequently, even though this attitude represents 
a form of loyalty, it is not conclusive because the notion of Motherland can be also 
identified in the absence of state, without the individual facing challenges in manifesting 
its feelings. 
The attitude reveals the capability of Moldovan citizens to define the content of their 
relationships with the state. 
Thus, those who form the „unionist perspective“, i.e. „people who consider that the 
present country is a part of a larger political entity“ and that Moldova is nothing else 
than „The second Romanian state“ (M6), will not contest the attitude of the first category, 
but they show a clear attitude towards the Moldovan state. 
The „skeptics“ category includes „people who assume that Moldova hangs over an 
abyss because of poverty, economic decline, as well as political inconsistency. This abyss 
opens in front of a weak state, with a territory fragmented by Transnistrian conflict, with 
an extremely short and fretful history and an uncertain identity“. They use the follo-
wing qualifiers: „Poor country“, M4; „Poverty“, M9; „Country where I live. A poor country 
which has not yet determined itself where to go – towards east or west“, M11; „Moldova is 
sooner a territory than a country, because it does not control a part of its territory (Trans-
nistria)“, M3;
The „skeptics“ understand more clearly the meaning of state than the national-opti-
mists do, but they also define the state only through the prism of phenomena they per-
ceive directly. 
It can be concluded that most of the Moldovans do not have a clear representation of 
what state means and, consequently, they are not capable to make an assessment based 
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on which they could form their attitude towards the state. Thus, it is difficult to evaluate 
the loyalty level of Moldovans towards the state from this perspective because there is no 
representation of the object of loyalty. 
The confusion appears when we learn the answers showing the way Moldovans per-
ceive themselves as Moldovan citizens. We see that „most of the Moldovan respondents“, 
i.e. the majority that includes those from the first category of national optimists, „consider 
that being a citizen of Moldova implies an unconsolidated ethnic identity, obedience, extreme 
poverty and ultimately emigration“.
The survey shows that Moldovans have a more adequate representation of citizenship 
when explaining what this quality implies: „Probably it means to be a person subject to the 
arbitrary influence of the state, almost uncontrolled acts of the state authorities; it means to 
exercise with great risks your civic and constitutional rights. It means to be unable to live a 
decent life from the incomes generated by local businesses. but only from the income gene-
rated by foreign enterprises, businesses and non-commercial institutions. Despite this, to be 
a happy person, probably helps Moldovans to keep away from depression“, M12;
The fact that Moldovans do not have the representation of what is called state and 
the way they define affiliation to Moldovan citizenship reflects the defensive position in 
relations with the state. All the invoked elements represent only phenomena learned from 
one’s own experience. 
There are two different approaches concerning the institutions. Thus, the percep-
tions regarding justice and human rights are formulated based on the appreciation, 
according to which Moldovan citizenship means, „exercising with high risks your civic 
and constitutional rights“. The way justice works is very important, because it is the only 
branch of power that people have access to, by formulating requests, and materializing 
relations in perceptible effects for citizens. Consequently, the way these requests are ful-
filled forms the people’s perception concerning attitude of the state towards its citizens. 
Public administration is appreciated through the statement that being a citizen „pro-
bably means to be a person subject to the arbitrary influence of the state, almost uncontrolled 
acts of the state authorities“.
The political environment is also seen in grey colors, the citizens’ political rights 
being violated: „once we also experienced perestroika: multiparty system. Now we arrived 
at where we started, the majority of the population pleads for one party. We do not have a 
truly independent newspaper. Human rights and freedoms are limited“, F1. „Exercise of 
citizens’ rights and liberties was restricted, for example, freedom of expression, and there 
were abuses against the opposition, the ruling party tried to split certain organizations, 
media, trade unions etc.“,“, M9. „The system is unstable from the political point of view. In 
2000, for example, Moldova became parliamentary republic de jure, but de facto, it is a 
presidential republic: Presently the President controls the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches“, M3.
The quality of governance is evaluated through expressions concerning the perfor-
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mance of central administration: „A poor country which has not yet determined itself 
where to go – towards east or west“, M11; „Moldova is sooner a territory than a country 
because it does not control a part of its territory (Transnistria)“, M3. The prerogative of 
governance is to establish the „direction“ and „perspectives“, and the lack of horizons is 
the failure of governance. The opinion expressed by respondents does not leave space for 
interpretation: „Social problems come first: there is no work, jobs and funds, and the results 
are: poverty, disorientation, because there is no clear way of Government activities“, M28. 
Government is also responsible that „Statistics show economic stability but the situation is 
deplorable: lack of competition, high prices, low salaries, unemployment, and massive emi-
gra tion. (…) Current issues: corruption at all levels, lack of competition, of market economy, 
impossibility to initiate a business, lack of processing infrastructure in agriculture, deficien-
cies in education and social assistance“,“, F1.
The NN category brings „reproaches to former governments for the undertaken reforms 
(„thoughtless“ privatization, administrative decentralization etc.)“, and NR+D category 
brings „reproaches to the present governance for the tendency to centralize and limit the 
democratic freedoms“. 
The positive evaluation of governance comes from NN category and regards the fields 
that actually are not conclusive. when describing the quality of life. The Government is 
praised for the „political and economic stability, orientation of state policies towards common 
people, improvement of services for citizens, elaboration of strategies for social, youth, and 
tourism development, stabilization of national currency, payment of salaries and pensions 
without delays“. 
Reference to life standards in the society represents an important element in the indi-
vi dual’s values and influences the process of identity adoption. Thus, the Moldovan citi-
zenship means, „to strive. to survive in a village by farming, in a town by practicing retail 
business, or to create an ideal to leave the country and find a job abroad“. It also means 
to „think how to leave the country sooner to earn a living in Italy, Portugal or any other 
country. I do understand the people who leave the country because they feel humans. Many 
of them feel humans, I don’t know why. Even though they work hard, they are paid for that 
and feel useful. Here they don’t feel that“. F10
Massive labor migration, usually illegal, is perceived by respondents as one of the 
most important events and, as a rule, is associated with patriotism, i.e. with the citizens’ 
loyalty level. 
The attitude towards the group members determines the level of identity adopted by 
an individual. It is based on values that show the level of civilization, education, posture, 
and behavior of community members, etc. The attitude regarding the community envi-
ronment and members is appreciated by the statement: to be a Moldovan „ means to have 
little opportunities for existence, it means to seek to leave the country and look for a job 
abroad, to speak a broken language and to be unclear about your identity“. M5; We only 
have to assess to what extent individuals will want to identify themselves with a „country 
of miserable people, without future, who cannot clearly articulate what they want“, M12.
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Minorities’ Representations of the State 
and Perception of Citizenship
State representation of a category of persons belonging to ethnic minorities is similar 
to that shown by the national-optimist Moldovans. Thus, „some representatives belonging 
to national minorities believe that they belong to a beautiful country where they are pleased 
to live; they believe in their future“. It is similar to formulating an attitude without under-
standing the definition of state. and elements they have to use in the evaluation of perfor-
mance of state authorities. Like the case of Moldovans, it is a representation, which is 
available when the entity referred to would not constitute a state, a representation refer-
ring to geographic features of Moldova. Moldovans’ perception about the way Russian 
minority relates to the Moldovan state is illustrated in the following statement: „(Russians) 
are different and their situation is different. Maybe the climate here is much more favorable. 
Compared to Siberia, this is a beautiful and rich region“, F1. 
The attitude of a category of minorities is eloquent for the situation from Moldova: 
As shown in one of the conclusions, „other representatives belonging to national minorities 
avoided to answer this question“. The refusal to formulate an answer could also mean the 
denial of Moldovan statehood by some minority groups. It seems that this is the attitude 
that generates the lack of trust between majority and minority groups, and represents the 
source of existing rivalry among the main communities. 
Therefore, many Moldovan participants view Russians as „colonists, the ethnic group 
which had in the past the advantage of power in the detriment of other ethic groups, and 
which has not yet given up the idea of maintaining this advantage. They are arrogant and 
continue to behave as foreigners, without trying to adapt to the local values, culture, and 
traditions. They are drunkards, greedy, unpredictable, brought the Russian communism 
and imperialism“. 
It seems that the minority groups have a clearly shaped representation regarding the 
citizenship, the research showing that they „consider regardless of their ethnic background, 
they are all citizens of one country“. They synthesize their vision on affiliation in the follo-
wing way: „I like very much the popular idea in America – there are no nations, there are 
only Americans. Regardless if you are Russian or Ukrainian, you have to serve the country 
you live in, you have to love it and do something for it.“, M14.
This way of defining one’s position appears rather in the situations when the minority 
groups wish to reduce Moldovans’ numeric domination from the ethnic perspective. In 
other situations, minority representatives always invoke the ethnic identity, when they 
are asked to identify themselves. In this context, the case of the organization Spiritual 
Council of Muslims from Moldova is eloquent. Its leader was invoking in court the autho-
rity of Kazan Mufti (Russia) in supporting registration of the organization. In other words, 
the religious identity is the one that legitimizes in its vision the request for registration, 
and not the citizenship of Moldova. 
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The unconditional granting of Moldovan citizenship to all people residing on the 
territory of Moldova at the moment of declaration of independence, exonerated them 
from the effort to understand the meaning of citizenship. They dissociate from the issue 
of identification as a citizen: „It is difficult for me to give an answer to this question. I think 
Moldovans should answer this question“, M26
The answers of some Moldovans show that they consider this situation an error. The 
Moldovans assert that Russians „continue to behave as foreigners or as conquerors“. Thus, 
the attitude of minority groups is noted by the majority group and their reaction is 
formulated through the conclusion that Russians „should learn our culture and traditions, 
integrate and become true citizens“, F1. 
The research shows that Gagauz community from Moldova formulated two attitudes. 
The former outlines the fact that the Gagauz perceive Moldova as their homeland and 
are accepted: „They have settled here a long time ago and I think they view Moldova as 
their motherland, have the possibility to develop themselves from the ethnic, social and cul-
tu ral perspective“, F1; „Moldova is the motherland for the Gagauz living here“, F25; „For 
Gagauz I think this is great. The Gagauz practically live only in Moldova and they have 
managed to get autonomy. They enjoy many rights. They have opportunities for develop-
ment“. F8 There is an element in the evaluation of the Gagauz, which differentiates them 
from Russian minority, i.e. they are not formed from emigrants and are mostly seen as a 
local population. This element legitimates the right of Gagauz to have „many rights“ and 
„to develop“. The aversion is probably eliminated due to the fact that Gagauz minority do 
not present a threat to the minority in the social, economic and political competition, as 
in the case of Russians. The qualifiers attributed to Gagauz by Moldovans show that the 
latter describe them as people who do not have the potential for serious competition. 
Moreover, they live isolated on the territory defined through Gagauz autonomy, and are 
appreciated more than the Russians for the fact that they identify with the territory where 
they live. 
The second attitude is determined by the risks of pronounced identity and isolation 
of Gagauz compared to the other communities. The Gagauz minority is treated with 
mistrust because of the help and support it receives from Turkey. Respondents belonging 
to other groups assert that being Gagauz means „to identify more and more with Turkey, 
to wait for its help and investments, and to listen to the advice and suggestions from outside, 
remaining, at the same time, a separate group“, M5. They accuse the Gagauz of lack of 
loyalty towards Moldovan state and point out the reason of this: „In the last years, more 
and more Gagauz and Bulgarians leave, and establish in Turkey and Bulgaria, accordingly, 
because of Moldova’s social economic problems. They are allured by the higher living stan-
dards and common cultural affinities, especially that there are certain tempting offers from 
Turkey, scholarships, etc.
 This exodus of Gagauz demonstrates us that they are not too attached to Moldova. The 
feeling of affiliation to Moldova is not so developed because they, however, succeeded in 
forming the political formation of Gagauz-Yeri and I believe that they perceive themselves 
ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 131
rather as citizens of this autonomous political unit within Moldova“, M6. 
The way other ethnic groups, besides those mentioned, perceive themselves as Moldo-
van citizens, is not different from that of national-optimist Moldovans. These individuals 
„believe in the future of this country and think that they live in a beautiful country, they 
enjoy living here, and all must be citizens of this country“. Their attitude is generalized in 
the following statement: „I believe that we should be proud of belonging to this people 
because we live in such a wonderful country, we have the chance to admire all that and live 
a decent life“, M7; „It is a pride. Especially that I have a job here. What else can make me 
happy?“ M15. This category considers less important how the state structure will look, 
more important is their individual comfort determined by the level of wellbeing. The 
moti vation for this attitude is explained by the fact that these individuals are not involved 
in the competition for the configuration of Moldovan state. 
Issues of Identity of Moldovan State
The issue of Moldovan state configuration is also one of the issues related to the 
compe tition among the main communities from Moldova and, consequently, an element 
of identity appropriation. In other words, if the state takes the shape desired by the 
commu nity, its member will become loyal to the state or, otherwise, they will refuse to 
recognize the state, creating a parallel space where they feel comfortable. The minority 
participants’ refusal to express their attitude towards Moldovan state is explained by this 
way of under standing things. The answer to the survey questions regarding some issues 
confirms this approach. 
Attitudes Regarding Political Configuration 
of the State
The results outline two major trends defined through the elements presented in the 
study based on two attitudes. „First perspective (independence as national revival + demo-
cratization - NR+D) represents a position that views the 1991 independence from a double 
perspective: as a moment of national revival and return to Romanian spirit, on the one 
hand, and as a beginning of democratization of political regime, on the other hand. In the 
first perspective, return to Latin alphabet, and declaration of Romanian as official language, 
symbolic recovery of relations between the two banks of Prut River are natural things con-
cerning the newly created historical reality. In the second perspective, free elections, multi-
party system, creation of the Parliament, institutional reforms, accession of Moldova to the 
main international institutions, such as the United Nations, Council of Europe, OSCE, orien-
tation of foreign policy towards the European Union are the main gains that contributed to 
the democratization of political regime. The breakout of the Transnistrian war is reviewed 
as Russia’s attempt to maintain its influence in the region. The settlement of this conflict 
cannot take into consideration the idea of federalization of the unitary state.“
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The first trend includes those who wish to see a Moldovan state characterized by the 
following features: a) a democratic state; b) free elections and multiparty system; c) foreign 
policy oriented towards West excluding Russian influence; d) unitary state; e) national 
values based on identity defined by the term „Romanian“ and Romanian language as 
official language; g) Transnistrian conflict is caused by Russia. 
These elements constitute a subject for debate among communities and influence 
the loyalty to the Moldovan state. 
The attitude towards democracy is explained by the facts that with the implemen-
tation of democratic institutions, the Moldovans’ return to their national values. and 
elimination of a discriminatory situation was possible. Naturally, the Russians’ reaction 
towards democratic institutions is determined by the fact that they lost the privileged 
situa tion, and see Moldovans’ emancipation as a threat for their dominant position, 
invoking the threat for their own identity as a pretext. 
The attitude towards free elections and political parties is determined by the nature 
of relations the latter form, relations where the Russian identity, despite its reduced nu-
meric ratio, is not found. The proof is the 2005 elections, after which the segment of 
population oriented towards Russia does not have representatives who could promote 
their political options. The expressed opinions show that the Russian minority prefers a 
political system that would guarantee the possibility to determine the agenda of Moldo-
van policy. This is a consociational system (through division) and can be materialized 
through the federalization of Moldova. This explains the attitude towards the Transnistrian 
conflict and the solutions to it. 
The Transnistrian issue is one of the conflicting topics of the study: „Even though many 
respondents consider that the conflict is rather political than ethnic, the issue can oppose the 
positions of Moldovan ethnics to those of Russians/Russians speaking communities. The 
former would be more inclined to the return to the unitary state and would agree with the 
politics of Chisinau, the latter would side with the separatist regime from Tiraspol. From the 
perspective of Russian ethnics/Russian speaking communities, the Moldovans could be accu-
sed of intolerance - regarding the official language or guaranteeing autonomy to Transnistrian 
territory, a reason for Transnistria’s separation from Moldova.“ 
The attitude towards the Transnistrian issue is relevant from the perspective of iden-
tity and policy towards Russian Federation. To quote from the study: „The issue related to 
the configuration of the Moldovan state is closely linked to the other two conflicting issues: 
war in Transnistria and national identity. The opinions of Moldovan ethnics could contra-
dict those of Russian ethnics. or those of other Russian speaking ethnic groups. The Moldovan 
ethnics could be on the side of the present formula regarding state organization, while the 
Russian-speaking ethnics could be on the side of a federal state. Moreover, the minority 
groups could be afraid of the majority’s intentions to unite Moldova with Romania in the 
future, while the majority group could be afraid that federalization could lead to the growth 
of Russian Federation influence in Moldova. and very strong Russian control over some 
states of the federation, even to the disintegration of the Moldovan state“.
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The foreign policy orientation is also determined by the communities’ representations 
of the state. The study shows the options differently. Thus, „the Moldovans might favor 
a pro-European orientation, while the ethnic minorities would aspire for a foreign policy 
orien ted towards the CIS states“. One should note, „There is an assumption that the Russian 
ethnics support Russia’s policy regardless of the issue. If Moscow and Chisinau would ever be 
on divergent positions, the Russian ethnics would automatically disagree with Moldovans. 
The assumption is justified if we consider the fact that the tendency is maintained also in 
more specialized issues, such as the federalization of Moldova proposed by Kozak plan. 
Two attitudes emerge from here: „on the one hand, those who think that this plan was a 
good option for Moldova, as long as it would solve the Transnistrian conflict; on the other 
hand, those who consider that this plan would threaten the Moldovan unitary state, maybe 
even its independence“. 
The Moldovans perceive this „assumption“ and find its explanation in the following 
fact: „for Russians it is a real problem because they do not to identify with this state, because 
it was recently formed and it is normal not to identify with a state that never existed“ (M2), 
and being a Russian ethnic in Moldova means „to promote your interests hoping that 
Russia’s policies would determine Moldova to adopt an Eurasian policy“ (M12). Thus, the 
assumption seems to be confirmed, especially that we notice that only the issues that are 
not related to competition among communities are considered non-conflicting. To quote 
from the study: „The themes identified by the participants as having potential to produce 
a general consensus among people living in Moldova, could be those that propose social and 
economic goals of general interest: concentration of all groups on the economic development, 
help in case of natural disasters, consolidation of the Moldovan state“.
Considerations Regarding the Identity of Moldova 
from Ethnocultural Perspective
Debates regarding national identity, language issue, affiliation, and history etc. referred 
in the study, are not related only to the identity of communities and configuration of the 
Moldovan state, but also the nature of identity of Moldovan citizens as a sum of indivi-
duals. The conclusions of the study show that „the Moldovans could be dissatisfied by 
the following situation: fear of political identification with Romania and conflicts that 
this situation could generate“. Another problem is that they „are refused“ or they „refuse 
to assume a Romanian cultural identity“ and „this artifice leads to an internal disequilibrium 
of the ethnic group and to extreme fragility of Moldovan identity“. „On the other hand, 
ethnic minorities influence this way the self-relation of the majority group. The adoption of 
Romanian identity by Moldovans could make them feel excluded as ethnic group, but also 
as citizens of the same state. How long can they declare themselves Moldovans of Russian, 
Ukrainian, Bulgarian ethnic background? („We are all Moldovans“), how will they call them-
selves if Moldovans become Romanians overnight? Moreover, there would always be a fear 
that once they become Romanians, the Moldovans would also like to unite with Romania“. 
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From the above-mentioned statements, we can conclude, „in both cases (minorities, ma jo-
rity) there are identification barriers that are difficult to overcome. Both situations (of ma-
jo rity and of minorities) contribute to the stability of the created vicious circle.“
The attitude of minorities represents the result of confusion related to the definition 
of identity in Moldova. One of the answers through which the minority representatives 
express their attitude towards Moldovans, as a community, shows that they represent „the 
majority population or the title nation, their name has a geographic connotation and is 
not an ethnonym.“ The „Moldovans“, as a concept, represent „a nation with a separate 
identity and history which implied initially a multiethnic mixture (Moldovans, Russians, 
Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Gagauz, etc.)“. This definition of Moldovans does not exclude 
those who consider themselves Romanians from the ethnic point of view. It results that 
when the minorities deny the Moldovans, as community members, the possibility to con-
si der themselves Romanians, they admit the possibility of violation of identity right. 
In reality, the confusion appears from the „mixture“ of the two traditional concepts 
concerning nation definition in the case of Moldova. According to one of the concepts, 
nation is defined based on the ethnic community of individuals (German Volk, theory 
attributed to Herder). Thus, according to this theory, the German nation also includes 
the Germans living outside the borders of Germany. The second concept defines the 
nation through the affiliation to a political community also called „civic nation“, French 
nation being considered a representative model. Affiliation to a nation is determined by 
citizenship and the black natives from Africa, for example, can be also called French. 
In Moldova, the term defining a territorial community called „Moldovan people“ 
was applied to identify the totality of citizens of the country, as well as in defining the 
community of ethnic majority. 
The distortions appear when the Moldovans who claim their Romanian identity in 
the ethnic sense are reproached, that they refuse this way the quality of Moldovan in 
political sense. In other words, the quality of Romanian ethnic is contested and treated 
in opposition to the Moldovan citizenship. 
Another problem caused by the confusion in defining the concept of nation is the 
refusal of minorities to define themselves as Moldovan citizens and to assume the content 
of this quality.
The challenge related to the definition of minorities in the case the Moldovans be-
come Romanians overnight is false, because the name of the state will most likely not 
change and they will continue to be Moldovans according to the political definition of 
the term. In reality, the fears are connected to the eventual unification of Moldova with 
Romania, if the identity changes. This fear is based on political orders and the problem 
of self-identification is a cover or a pretext, depending on the case. 
The speculations, including the idea to make Russian a second official language and 
to promote the notion of „Russian speaking population“, are part of a larger effort concer-
ning the determination of the character of the Moldovan state from the ethnocultural 
perspective. Moldova is a young state whose identity has not been well shaped yet. The 
respondents share the same perception: „the new Moldovan state is perceived as young, 
ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 135
unconsolidated, lacking a well-shaped national identity, which experienced instability of the 
strategic foreign policy option, exposed to the threats of institutional erosion or the dissolu-
tion of state authority.“ 
The fact that Moldova has an ethic majority of 78 percent, will determine the future 
state identity based on the identity of this majority. As the survey shows, not all people, 
at least those who define the Moldovan nation as a multiethnic mixture, agree with this 
situation. The ethnic minorities cannot have an impact in shaping the identity of Moldova, 
because their ratio when related to the majority is insignificant. The situation would be 
different if a consociational model is instituted through federalization is recognized. The 
efforts of a 22 percent minority group would be more efficient and the weight of claims 
directed against the 78 percent majority would be higher. 
Based on the logical construction, developed on the basis of these speculative notions, 
some try to define Moldova as a multicultural or multinational state. The quantitative 
criterion is always invoked in supporting this desideratum, different figures are used, and 
the notion of „Russian speaking population“ has the purpose to serve as an argument. 
This approach avoids a rigorous qualitative analysis, and one should remember that the 
international norms exclude the quantitative criterion. given the multitude of situations 
and their complexities in each case. The international documents stipulate only the ele-
ments that oblige to perform the analyses, only by applying qualitative criteria. 
Such analysis was performed by W. Kymlicka, whose demarche to specify the term 
of multiculturalism was determined by the need to avoid „terminological confusions“ 
based frequently on „political interests“. The words „terminological confusion“ and „poli-
tical interest“ used in the same context sound familiar if we take into consideration the 
conclusions of the study and that is why we should follow the arguments of Kymlicka. 
We will quote a passage: „A state can be considered multicultural if its citizens belong 
to more nations (in the case of multinational state) or are immigrants who came from 
other countries (situation when the state is considered multiethnic). This represents an 
important component of personal identity, public life, and political identity from that 
particular country“. In this context, culture is an „attribute“ of a nation or of a people 
that represents „an intergenerational community, more or less complete from the insti-
tutional point of view, occupying a certain territory in a traditional way (which is consi-
dered native land) and being characterized by its own language and common history“. 
The native land is the place where the community is formed, not the birthplace of people 
who form the community. According to this concept, Moldova is not a multinational but 
a multiethnic state, and this fact draws different consequences where the claims for de-
claring Russian the official language, and the recognition of the term „Russian speaking 
population“ is ungrounded. 
MOLDOVAN LEGISLATION ON NATIONAL ISSUES 
AND INTERETHNIC RELATIONS 
Vitalie Catană
Perceptions Regarding the Legislation in the Field 
of National Issues and Interethnic Relations
A general overview of Moldovan legislation on national issues and interethnic rela-
tions shows that it corresponds to the international standards, with the remark that some 
observations and clarifications are needed in the case of the Law, regarding the Concept 
of National Policy. 
The quality of legislation is tested in most cases by analyzing the quality of the rela-
tion ship between the majority and minority communities. The respondents’ perception 
determined by the study is adequate: „Most participants believe that Moldova had a 
balanced policy towards national minorities, adjusting its legislation to the requirements of 
international bodies and managing to avoid excesses“.
Obviously, this perception is partly due to the knowledge of the standards and content 
of this legislation, but also because many people assess the interethnic relations outside 
the legal provisions, analyzing it by referring the legislation to specific situations or poli-
tical activities. We find from the study that „if from the legislative point of view the situation 
can be considered satisfactory, there are aspects that make certain ethnic groups advantaged 
compared to others. The opinions about this are divided“. 
The finding gives us a clue about the source of the confusions regarding interethnic 
relations. Thus, the following aspects cause the distortion in the perception concerning 
respect for ethnic minorities’ rights in Moldova: 
a) Some minority participants perceive the numeric advantage as a fact, which produces 
unacceptable effects, displaying a negative attitude: „There are opinions according 
to which Moldovans are advantaged due to their number (they represent the majo-
rity) and the fact that the official language is their native language. This situation 
facilitated, in the beginning of 1990s, the replacement of other ethnic groups from 
administration and state structures with Moldovans“. 
The mentioned perception is in unison with the assumptions accepted in the doctri-
ne, according to which the numeric superiority represents an advantage that leads to the 
natural expulsion of minorities and, consequently, balanced measures are needed in this 
situation. However, the measures claimed by the ethnic minorities in Moldova are in con-
tra diction with the international standards. According to public declarations, the ethnic 
minorities claim consociational mechanisms for guaranteeing certain positions, such as 
shares in administration, official status to the Russian language, recognition of a certain 
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category called „Russian speaking population“, etc. Minorities claim protection through 
regulation of collective rights, invoking frequently that the threshold for granting special 
rights for minorities established by international standards, is 20 percent. 
We have to mention, that in accordance with the relevant provisions of the interna-
tional law, the balance measures represent an exception, and are adopted after the evalua-
tion of the need for their enforcement, and after setting exact limits of these measures. 
At the same time, the measures are addressed to individuals, i.e. the subjects of rights are 
the individuals and not the communities, since collective rights are not recognized. 
b) For some participants, the distortions represent reflection of competition and 
rejec tion of domination of another community. The study finds that „according to 
another set of opinions, the Moldovans are disadvantaged compared to other ethnic 
groups, even though they represent the majority. This is possible due to the advantages 
of the Russian speaking ethnic groups, especially the Russians and Ukrainians, at the 
beginning of 1990s. These minorities lived mainly in urban areas, compared to the 
Moldovans who were rather a rural population, they were more educated and had 
representatives in central economic and political positions. If, politically, the situation 
was in favor of Moldovans by introducing the use of Moldovan language in adminis-
tration and organizing free elections, then, economically, Russian minority, next to 
Ukrainian one, dominate the country. Moreover, if Moldovan became the language 
of politics and administration, then Russian is the language of economy“. 
Competition is a field of interethnic relations where even speculations find their place. 
An example is V. Klimenco, one of the political leaders of Russian community, who once 
declared that there are only 5 Russian libraries in Moldova, which is not enough in relation 
to the percentage of minorities (35 percent), this figure including Russians and other ethnic 
communities. In reality, 80 percent of the books from Moldovan libraries are in Russian. 
The perception of legislation in the light of social imbalances generates the tendency 
to solve them by legal means, and this is how certain opinions on the imperfection of 
legislation appear. This attitude refers, especially, to small ethnic minorities: „There are also 
opinions that perceive Gagauz, Bulgarians, and Romanians as disadvantaged minorities. 
This happens because Gagauz and Bulgarians are minorities that live mostly in rural areas, 
very poor regions from the south of Moldova. Gypsies represent an ethnic group that adheres 
with difficulty to the social norms and values of the majority, and little things have been 
done for their integration. 
This approach becomes significant especially when some participants appreciate the 
relations by comparing the northern area of Moldova, which is considered more developed, 
to the southern region, which is considered backward. Thus, „Some participants assert 
that the things in this field were left at the formal level of „content-empty“ legislation, and no 
follow-up policies were implemented to stimulate interethnic communication or collaboration, 
to reduce the gaps between north and south (areas with different ethnic configuration), or 
to establish common goals for the majority and ethnic minorities.“
It is obvious that there are gaps in Moldovan legislation regarding interethnic rela-
tions, this fact implying an examination and elaboration of exact recommendations for 
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eliminating the deficiencies. As we find in the study, „In none of the situations where parti-
cipants indicated the advantage of an ethnic group over the other, were offered examples of 
policies oriented towards improvement of these situations“.
At the same time „Many participants consider that the autonomy given to Gagauz was 
a good solution, and that the representatives of this minority now perceive Moldova as their 
motherland.“ 
c) Ignorance of regulations and international standards regarding the protection of 
minorities represents a source of confusions. Thus, political leaders of the Russian 
community assert that integration of Moldova with the Euro-Atlantic structures 
will lead to the violation of minority rights. These leaders confuse, whether deli-
berately, or because of ignorance, the failure to fulfill the political desideratum 
subject to the rigors of political democracy, with the violation of a minority right. 
It is necessary to mention that in Moldova, there are no legal precedents of violation 
of the rights of people belonging to ethnic minorities. It is also interesting that not 
a single claim has been filed in court on this matter. 
The state has its role in the preservation of this situation because it ignored the rela-
tion ship with the citizens, based on citizenship institution, and left outside the debate on 
legal norms that establish the relationships between the nationals, including those regar-
ding the rights of people belonging to ethnic minorities. 
The perception of the role of state institutions is described in the work in the way the 
participants view the contribution of the governmental structures. „On one side, there are 
those who believe that these structures are useful and contribute to the improvement of inter-
ethnic relations, the most frequently listed activity of these is the organization of multi ethnic 
cultural events and festivals; on the other side, there are people believing that these struc tu-
res are totally inefficient, and their activity does not manage to solve the actual problems. 
The survey participants understand perfectly that the artistic and cultural activities 
are not sufficient to build an adequate interethnic climate: „All these [institutions] are 
formal, and exist only to create the impression –exhibits, folk festivals, etc. However, nobody 
cares about the problems of the ethnic groups that go much beyond these cultural dimensions. 
The leaders of these organizations are always the same. They participate at different cultural 
manifestations, but don’t do anything real“, M27.
Considerations Regarding the Terms Used in 
Moldovan Legislation
Even though the Moldovan legal framework is adequate, especially because it does 
not have to address special situations such as policies defined as Affirmative action, i.e. 
policies and measures for positive discrimination, in some normative acts, we find 
adequate solutions for conflicts. 
Such a law is the controversial Concept of National State Policy adopted by the Parlia-
ment. The problems emerged by the launch and adoption of this Concept add to the list 
ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 139
of problems emerged from the debates regarding the terms „state language“ or „official 
language, „second mother tongue“, „language of interethnic communication“ and the 
prob lems related to the status of the Russian language in Moldova. These debates were 
normally placed in the context of the rights of people belonging to ethnic minorities and 
in the case of the Concept, the one that invoked the need for guaranteeing interethnic 
peace. During the debates on this issue, one invoked precise figures, which would crystallize 
certain definitions and would establish the base for certain special rights for the ethnic 
minorities. For example, by stating that if a minority represents 20 percent of the total 
population, it has to benefit from special rights, or if the majority represents less than 
two thirds of the population of the state, the state would be considered multinational as 
opposed to mononational, with the relevant consequences. The conclusions formulated, 
based on these figures, do not have any support in the international documents, are inven-
ted and find their answer in the content of the Resolution of the UN General Assembly 
no. 217 C(III) from 10.12.1948. This is in the „Declaration on the fate of minorities“, 
which states the following: „it is difficult to adopt a uniform solution of this complex and 
delicate question which has special aspects in each State in which it arises“. There have 
been no changes to the mentioned approach since then. 
Term „Language of Interethnic Communication“
In the Concept, the Russian language is called „the language of interethnic communi-
cation“, i.e. a different language than the official one. In the survey, this issue is reflected 
under the aspect of introduction of mandatory Russian language classes in the Romanian 
language schools. Two options were expressed regarding this issue: „according to the advo-
cates of this measure, the history of Moldovans is totally different from the history of Roma-
nians, and must be studied separately; Russian is necessary for Moldovans so that they can 
communicate with the representatives of other ethnic groups, the bilingualism being a national 
pride. According to those opposing this measure, the new history course is a political phony and 
has no connections with the historical truth. Russian is not more important than other lan-
guages of international circulation as long as Moldovan continues to be the official language.“ 
We have to show that the communication language represents an element of the right 
of individuals to identity, and the right to choose the communication language. The inter-
na tional provisions and state practices do not recognize the notion of „language of inter-
ethnic communication“. The states can impose the mandatory knowledge of the official 
language in order to facilitate the communication with its citizens, and in order to have 
an efficient administration. However, imposing the language of a national minority as 
the language of interethnic communication is discriminatory for both the people belon-
ging to the majority and the people belonging to other ethnic minorities, because they are 
subject to an unequal and inferior treatment. Article 20 of the Framework Convention, 
regarding the protection of national minorities provides that the protection of the rights 
of people belonging to national minorities should be realized in compliance with the 
respect for the rights of other people. 
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A „communication language“ does not have a meaning: If a language does not meet 
the requirement that would allow it to claim the status of official language, for the same 
reasons it cannot be imposed as a language of interethnic communication. Moreover, the 
reasons for which a language is declared official determines the acceptance of this lan-
guage as a language of communication between the ethnic groups. 
The draft of the Concept contained a provision, which luckily was excluded in the 
final version, which attempted to accredit the idea that the term „official language“ and 
„state language“ have different meanings, and define different concepts. In reality, there are 
no differences between these notions, and the legislative practices of the states confirm 
this fact. The Constitution of Spain, article 3, stipulates, „Castilian is the official language 
of Spain“. In fact, the term „official language“ is used more frequently than the term „state 
language“ used in the Constitution of Moldova. Therefore, the establishment of Russian 
as official language would equal the declaration of a second state language in Moldova. 
More important is the fact that the Concept included some unconstitutional provi-
sions. The provision regarding the penalties and dissolution of political parties and nongo-
vernmental organizations, whose activities do not comply with the Concept, violates the 
rights of people to identity and its public manifestation, as well as the right of people to 
opinion, the freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. These stipulations can end 
up with a case in the European Court for Human Rights, based on complaints against the 
Republic of Moldova filed by its citizens. 
Concept of Official Language
„More important for the Russian-speakers is the issue of their „elimination“, not only 
from the government bodies, but also from the job market. Since the economic activity has 
been carried out in the state language, large masses of Russian-speaking specialists left their 
jobs. Since then, you can often see intellectual women selling potatoes on the market reading, 
for example, the magazine „Novyi Mir“ (The New World).“ 
From this quotation, and implicitly from the results of the survey, we can notice that 
the state language is an institution that can cause social effects, and at the same time can be 
an instrument for the protection of ethnic minorities. It is true that the state language can 
be an institution with significant social effects, but not in the sense described in the quota-
tion, but in the sense that it can contribute to social integration policies recommended by 
the international regulations. The state language is not an instrument for the protection 
of ethnic minorities; therefore, it is useful to show the real nature of this institution. 
In 1789-1790, when French was becoming the official language in France, one thought 
that this approach had the purpose of „transforming the language into an important and 
mandatory mark of affiliation to a nation, as a sign of a genuine civism“. The goal of this 
action was to impose a more evolved, unique and standardized language in the „service 
of the nation-state“ and its institutions. Language had to become an element for the integra-
tion with the political body and an element of social success. In 1793, French became 
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mandatory and unique language in primary education. The standardized language con-
tri buted essentially to the public education system and „educating the people is to make 
it appreciate the good work of the government“, as stated in an official document dating 
from 1861. 
The international provisions developed in the second half of the twentieth century 
show a special preoccupation for the linguistic rights of the people belonging to national 
minorities, in the sense of elimination of discriminatory policies promoted against them. 
Meanwhile, these norms encourage the integration policies of the states, and the know-
ledge of the state languages by the persons belonging to national minorities, as element 
of integration. As long as the integration policy is not transformed into a „policy of lin-
guistic terrorism and grammatical hegemony“, and is accomplished with the respect of 
human rights, the advantages of knowing the official language by the national minorities 
are incontestable. The learning of the official language represents the premise of the social 
unity and a factor of „social cohesion and integration“. This is the interpretation of the 
provisions of the framework Convention, for the protection of the national minorities. 
Article 14(3) of the Framework Convention stipulates that the possibility of learning the 
minority language or receive an education in this language cannot „affect the learning of 
the official language or education in this language“. According to the text from item 66 of 
the commentary on the Framework convention, „…the obligations of the parties regar-
ding the use of minority languages do not affect in any way the status of the official 
language(s) of the country“. 
Even though it has lost some of the initial meanings, the institution of official language 
kept the most important meaning, and therefore the international documents allow the 
states to institute official languages and impose the mandatory knowledge of these. 
The official language continues to be the language of public authorities, the language 
in which the state exercises its authority. This fact is determined by the need to organize 
an efficient administration of public affairs by the state authorities, communication in 
this sense having a major role. The mandatory character of the official language is not 
discrimination, because it does not oblige the people to communicate among them in 
this language. Moreover, as long as a person is not interested in the public affairs, it is 
fine not to know the official language or know the language superficially. 
However, the lack of knowledge of state language, as reflected in the survey, generates 
division of the large ethnic communities, but also of the small ones, as the Gagauz mino-
rity. Most participants mention that the ethnic groups from Moldova barely communicate 
amongst them. The finding is backed by the opinion expressed by one of the respondents: 
„People from Moldova live in parallel worlds. For example, a Russian radio station always 
broadcasts the weather forecast for Moscow, but I am not interested in that. If I want to hear 
the weather forecast for Bucharest, I tune my radio to ProFM or KissFM, because I studied 
in Bucharest for 4 years. Probably there are people who studied in Moscow. Therefore, 
we have parallel worlds that do not intersect linguistically; they do not interconnect at all. 
Probably this exists in other countries but our case is more tragic“. F10 (see annex 2)
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The Issue of Russian Language Status in Moldova
The survey results show that there are two options regarding the state language. The 
first option is that „the return to the Latin script and declaration of Romanian as the state 
language are normal things related to the newly created historical reality. The second option 
includes the idea that Moldovans are „a nation with a separate identity and history, which 
initially implied multiethnic mixture (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Ga-
gauz, etc.) For this reason, there is a need for at least two official languages – Moldovan and 
Russian (language spoken by everyone). 
The insistently promoted idea of declaring Russian as the second state language in 
Moldova raises the issue of the foundation for this status. The advocates of granting offi-
cial status to Russian brought in support of their approach the most important argument 
that: „Many countries of the world (Finland, Belgium, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Spain, 
Israel, Canada, India, etc.) have two or more official languages. Why should we be different? 
We want to join the European Union. There is no reason to prove that the second official 
language in Moldova should be Russian (and not French)“, („Vremea“ newspaper).
There are not that many countries in the example, considering that there are more 
than 200 countries in the world, and that Spain has one official language (Castilian) and 
not two. (Article 3, Constitution of Spain). India introduced recently a moratorium on 
the use of English in order to protect the local identity. 
The official language is the language of the country, the language used by the state to 
exercise its authority. This fact is determined by the need to organize an efficient admi-
nistration of public affairs by the state authorities, communication in this sense having a 
major role. Granting the official status to a language does not guarantee the protection of 
the linguistic rights of the people, including individuals belonging to ethnic minorities. 
The international documents draw a clear line between the issue of protecting and exerci-
sing linguistic rights of minorities, and the language used to exercise the state authority, 
i.e. the official language. There is no concept, and there has never existed a concept based 
on which one could grant the status of official language to language spoken by a minority 
in order to protect and preserve the identity of that particular ethnic group. 
According to the Framework Convention on the protection of minority rights, article 
14(3), the opportunity to learn the minority language and receive an education in this 
language cannot „affect the learning of the official language or the teaching in this lan-
guage“. Paragraph 66 of the commentary on the Framework convention provides that, 
„…the duties of the parties regarding the use of minority languages should not affect in 
any way the status of the official language(s) of the country“. 
The official languages are not granted the status of official based on a priori rules, 
which would take into consideration the quantitative or qualitative criteria, but are the 
result of lengthy and complex evolutions. The mononational or multinational character 
of a state does not influence the number of state languages, and never the sole element 
that an ethnic minority is present in a state has constituted the basis for giving the official 
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status to the language spoken by this minority. Most unitary states and very many federal 
states have one official language, even though they have important minority groups. It is 
considered that it is optimal for a state to have just one official language. On one hand, it 
is because the state can exercise more efficiently its authority (less expenses, employees, 
time management and logistical efforts, etc.), and on the other hand, the social integration 
policies of these states have a higher and wider support. Because of historical evolutions 
of the states, most of them have one official language. However, there are states with two 
or more official languages. Generally, these states are divided in two groups. One group is 
represented by states like Switzerland, Canada, where two or more official languages were 
established by its component entities, the subjects of the federation, as equal parties of 
the state. From this perspective, the official languages are meant to describe the character 
of the state: federal or unitary. Therefore, as a rule, two or more official languages exist 
in federal states. Each entity of the federal state tries to impose its language as official 
language, as an element defining its identity. The same thing happened in the case of 
Swit zer land. Official languages were established by the Cantons as equal parties of the 
Swiss federal state. The direct consequence is that if the status of official language is with-
drawn for any of these languages, this fact could be interpreted as denunciation of the act 
of constitution of the federal state, and could serve as a reason for withdrawal from the 
federation. Not accidentally, the states demonstrating a certain sensibility regarding the 
issue of their national or territorial unity have one official language. Moldova can be inclu-
ded in the list of the unitary states preoccupied with preserving this unity, like France, 
Spain, for example. However, it is difficult to find similarities between Moldova and 
Swit zerland or Belgium. 
Another group of countries with two or more official languages is represented by the 
former colonial states, which experienced the „lingua franca“, or the language with the 
purpose of bringing civilization to these countries, providing its citizens with an access 
to the values of modern civilization. Russians did not have such a purpose in Moldova. 
The local population between Prut and Nistru River has always known, and experienced 
the advanced values and institutions, that are specific for the historical stages, experienced 
through its own language or the languages from this family, especially through French. 
The Russian language had the purpose of eliminating the use, and replacing the lan guage 
spoken by the Romanians from Bessarabia. It was used as a propaganda tool for the impe-
rial communist authorities, or as L. R. Higonnet said, „linguistic terrorism“, against the 
Romanian language. 
Regarding granting the status of official language, we have to remember the following: 
if the official language is the language used by the state and public authorities, any aspect 
related to this issue represents a subject of public interest and must be subject to public 
debates. There is no doubt that a decision to grant official status to a language should be 
the result of a consensus expressed explicitly. If this consensus does not exist, then a 
basic principle of democracy should be applied, the one that establishes the majority rule 
in the adoption of decisions of general interest. 
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In this context, we have to mention that the claim for granting Russian the official 
status, formulated by some people of Gagauz background, based on the rights of people 
belonging to national minorities is not legitimate. One of the defining elements of the 
national minorities is stipulated in article 1(e) of the PACE 1201. The recommendation is 
that these are „motivated by the preoccupation for preservation of their common identity, 
inclu ding culture, traditions, religion or their language“. Russian is not an element of the 
Gagauz identity, therefore, preoccupation for granting official status to Russian. and the 
right for the use of Russian by the Gagauz does not have a legitimate foundation, and the 
state is not obliged to offer guarantees in this sense. Obviously, the Gagauz can speak any 
language they want, including Russian, but they cannot force other people to speak the 
language they want. 
Term „Russian Speaking Population“
The term „Russian-speaking population“ is frequently used concerning a pretended 
category that would include all individuals who are not native Romanian speakers. 
Through this act, one pursues to give content to a category created with the obvious inten-
tion of creating a distinct entity, which would legitimize the claims of those who speculate 
with this notion. This is one of the reasons why the Moldovans assert, according to the 
survey, that Russians do not want to give up their dominant position, and that the rights 
of several ethnic minorities are violated. 
The notion „Russian-speaking population“ defines all persons who know and speak 
Russian. These can be Moldovans, French, Germans, Latvians, etc. It does not describe 
an entity that could form the object of legal regulations, and cannot constitute support 
for the eventual special rights of persons that are part of it, such as the right to identity. 
As it is mentioned in item 43 of Commentary regarding the Framework Convention, 
referring to the report on the meeting at experts’ level in Geneva, „not every ethnic, cultu-
ral, linguistic or religious difference leads necessarily to the creation of a national mino-
rity“. Moreover, the fact that people affiliated to different nationalities speak Russian 
cannot constitute the basis of a distinct ethnicity. 
In order for a community to be defined as a distinct minority entity, it should corres-
pond to the following conditions: (1) the characteristics of persons who are affiliated to it 
should correspond to the objective criteria contained in the definitions of national mino-
rities from international documents, and (2) these persons should declare explicitly their 
affiliation to the minority. 
First, according to the Regulations 1134 and 1202 of PACE, a minority should be well 
defined. The linguistic criterion is not the only one that should be applied. An English 
language speaker is Anglophone, but not necessarily British. It is necessary not to have 
other relevant elements, which would exclude the individuals from the respective mino-
rity, and would affiliate them to other minorities. The relevant element that excludes an 
individual from the category called „Russian speaking population“ is affiliation to another 
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national minority, for example the Jewish one, which corresponds to the criteria listed in 
the definition of national minorities. Common native language, culture, religion, history, 
and conscience of affiliation are the priority criteria compared to the criterion of speaking 
Russian language. 
Secondly, affiliation to a minority is an act and free option of an individual. The 
accep tance and the use of an inappropriate notion, such as „Russian speaking popula-
tion“, would violate article 20 of framework Convention, which stipulates that „during 
the exercise of the rights and freedoms deriving from the principles of the present Frame-
work Convention, any person belonging to a national minority will respect the national 
legislation and the rights of others, especially people belonging to the majority or other 
national minorities“. The main right of the people belonging to national minorities is the 
right to identity. The term „Russian-speaking population“ used to refer to the people that 
are not of Russian ethnic background is discriminatory, and violates the right to identity 
of the ethnic minorities. 
Aside from the fact that under these aspects the concept of national policy does not 
correspond to the doctrine requirements, and is in contradiction with the provisions of 
international law, the concept is also deficient from the perspective of the potential prac-
tical effects. 
Analyzing democracies in many countries, A. Lijphart concluded that the level of 
social division in most countries varies depending on the number and the size of ethnic 
groups. „For example, a country with two ethnic groups representing 90 and 10 percent 
accordingly, is less devised than a country with two equally sized ethnic groups. Applying 
this formula to the Moldovan case, we will find that the level of social division is higher 
if we consider a ratio of 78 to 22 percent between communities than in the case of a ratio 
of 78, 9, and 8 percent accordingly. Therefore, the risk of emergence of conflicts in the 
first case is higher. 
In conclusion, the adoption of the national policy concept corroborated with the 
promotion of the idea of granting official status to Russian language by mobilizing, and 
consolidating a pretended Russian-speaking community of 22 percent is contrary to the 
goal declared in the concept, which is establishment of a lasting interethnic peace in 
Moldova. In fact, before the adoption of the concept there was no interethnic conflict 
requiring an intervention of the kind described above. The existence of the debates does 
not mean the existence of a severe conflict, and the best solution would be the absence 
of a concept as opposed to the existence of an inadequate concept. Time has proven the 
uselessness of the Concept because it was totally ignored, and did not generate either 
positive or negative effects. 
In this context, it is adequate to quote the remark from the study regarding the per-
cep tion of interethnic relations in Moldova according to which „most of the respondents 
believe that these relationships are not tense, moreover, they are considered even cordial.“ 
In their opinions, each ethnic group taken separately is tolerant, respects and understands 
the position of the other ethnic groups with whom they share the territory“. 
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Recommendations
1. „The democratic societies have integrated through common citizenship, which, until 
now, was national (the author uses the term referring to the state). The solidarity 
among people emerges because they form a „community of citizens“. Otherwise, in 
the name of what and how would they be ready to undertake the eventual personal 
risks in order to defend it? The defense, more than citizenship, is not necessarily 
national, however, the will to defend and consolidate the collective values should 
exist at the national or European level. Throughout history, the political entities 
that have not managed to consolidate their own values and have not mobilized 
themselves for their defense, had tragic destinies even with the arms in their hands 
(Dominique Schnapper, Christian Bachelier în „Ce este cetăţenia?“, Editura Poli-
rom, Iaşi, 2001). 
The authorities of Moldova are to shape their relationships with the citizens based 
on the institute of citizenship, and not by imposing an identity. When there are no ge-
nuine values deriving from a tradition of statehood, the citizens of Moldova can extract 
their motivations from the resources offered only by the „solidarity of citizens’ com-
munities“. 
The creation of an adequate relationship between the state and its citizens forms an 
attitude called in the doctrine „constitutional patriotism“ which, in its turn, underlies the 
loyalty and the national identity in its civic definition. As shown, it is a difficult approach, 
but it is the only one for Moldova, that can guarantee a sustainable social consolidation. 
2. The state must withdraw from the debate regarding the identity in Moldova. If the 
state promotes an identity, it is put in the position to answer to the requirements 
legitimated by the identities of its citizens. The evaluation of the legitimacy of the 
claims based on identity is impossible, because there have not been developed any 
standards in this sense, and it is difficult to guarantee the equality of the ethnic 
communities. In order to eliminate the risks of application of discriminatory stan-
dards, the state must answer only the claims referring to the guaranteeing of the 
human rights, which are subsequently related by the citizenship of the person. 
In this context, the idea of a referendum regarding the identity of Moldovans is in 
contradiction with the provisions of the international provisions, which stipulate that any 
person has the right to choose freely his or her identity, and the right to identity also im-
plies the freedom to give up on this identity. The international regulations establish that 
the rights of ethnic communities relate to the rights of individuals and not collec ti vities. 
The legal recognition of the ethnic features ultimately violates the individual freedom, 
and meanwhile formalizes the consociational models of social organization, which eli-
minates integration and bears the risks of generating ethnic conflicts. 
3. It is necessary to reduce the role of parties and political leaders in the problem of 
interethnic relations. The ideological component determines the political actors 
to feel obligated to involve in the debates on identity-related issues. The survey 
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shows that these problems are perceived as being rather a political privilege than 
regulations of the legal provisions. According to the study, „Groups or people 
perceived as having the influence (mostly negative) upon the interethnic relations in 
Moldova are almost exclusively political figures or parties“. 
The outlined perception is that the sources for interethnic conflicts can originate not 
only from within the ethnic communities, but also from outside of these communities, 
more precisely from the political realm. Even the initiatives to grant the official status to 
the Russian language, and its introduction as a mandatory subject in schools did not 
cause clashes between communities. The protests were directed strictly towards the ones 
who came up with these initiatives, and the debates reached high levels of tensions espe-
cially between parties and political figures. 
The Transnistrian conflict is also considered a political and not an interethnic con-
flict. According to the study, „many participants believe that the Transnistrian conflict is 
not of interethnic nature but sooner a political one“. 
4. The state should avoid the models favoring competition between communities. 
The survey results show that in Moldova one can talk about a competition between 
communities with a latent confrontation existing among them. A conflict, however, 
can become imminent only due to political interferences and speculations of the 
stakeholders, as it is happening in the case of the Transnistrian region. The closed 
character of the communication process correlated with the dispersion of the ethnic 
minorities throughout Moldova creates a special situation. It is determined by the 
fact that the ethnic minorities are not concentrated on certain territories, and this 
reduces the capacities for the mobilization, which would increase the threat of 
conflicts and chances for their emergence. This situation allows us to anticipate 
that the distribution of minorities in enclaves will not last for long, and will stop 
as soon as a communication is established. This assumption seems more realistic 
especially after announcing the results of the 2005 National Census, which reflects 
that there has been an increase in the numeric ratio between majority and minority 
from 65%/35% to 78%/22%. It is expected that the reduction of the number of 
minorities from 35 down to 22 percent will determine the reduction of the capa-
cities for the mobilization against the majority community. Because the closed 
character of the communication process was largely due to the lack of intentions 
of the ethnic minorities from Moldova to adapt, it is expected that with the reduc-
tion of their number, their efforts for integration will increase. 
The issue of definition of national identity, with all its characteristic elements (lan-
guage, history, state configuration, options for foreign policies) stays open and is a prob-
lem that will continue to generate controversies in the future, in the opinion of the survey 
participants. 
5. The new Moldovan state is perceived as „young, unconsolidated, lacking a well-
sha ped national identity, which experienced the instability of the strategic foreign 
policy option, exposed to the threats of institutional erosion or the dissolution of 
state authority.“ 
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The perception about the state institution influences the affiliation with an entity. 
Therefore, the state is obliged at least to show the intention to undertake measures for the 
improvement of the quality of governance, life standards of its citizens and improvement 
of the community environment as factors that form the important elements of identity. 
The state has the obligation to formulate the social standards, and assure the conditions 
for their achievement. The state also has the direct obligation to guarantee the efficiency of 
the public administration (both central and local), the efficiency of justice and protection 
for human rights. 
The survey shows the deficiencies that are perceived by the respondents as being 
important, and which can ultimately become a threat for the Moldovan statehood. One 
can see that the democratic institutions are fragile, and the good governance is vitiated 
by the corruption. The level of corruption in justice is also very high, and the citizens 
face serious challenges in defending their rights. 
The most important events perceived by survey participants are massive labor migra-
tion of labor, usually illegal, and the extreme poverty of the ordinary people. 
The citizens do not want a necessarily rapid resolution of the economic and social 
problems, but rather a horizon, which would offer them a hope for the future. In the long 
run, the lack of hope for a better future can determine the option of the citizens for 
alternatives which can be already found in the picture of identities in Moldova, and are 
confirmed by the results of the study: the option for the affiliation specifically with the 
Romanian and Russian communities from Moldova. 
6. The survey results show that the identity of the minorities excludes the loyalty towards 
the Republic of Moldova. Even today, some people show loyalty to a state other than 
the citizenship they hold or the state where they live. „For Russians it is a problem 
because they do not identify themselves with this country because it is a young 
state, and it’s normal not to identify yourself with a country that never existed“, M2; 
The approach of building a new political entity, such as the Republic of Moldova, is 
overlapping with the creation of a new identity, and consequently, the efforts of the autho-
rities of forming a loyalty based on the new and undefined identity only lead to tensions 
between communities. A state with cultural identity conflicts must separate the ethnic 
identity from the political identity, and the political identity can only be build through 
citizenship. 
The unconditional granting of Moldovan citizenship to all people residing on the terri-
tory of Moldova at the moment of declaration of independence, regarded by many partici-
pants as a mistake, eliminated the need to adopt the content of the quality of citizen. There-
fore, the state has to explain the content of the relationship between state and citizens, and 
must explain that the political loyalty is not contradictory to the ethnic loyalty of the citizens. 
The Moldovan authorities do not have another solution because the „reflection regar-
ding the inevitable evolution of the forms and content of citizenship is a fundamental 
finding. We do not have a better idea to make the people, who by definition are different 
and unequal, live together by respecting the dignity as the fundamental value of a democ-
ratic society. The citizenship is based, in fact, on the idea that living aside all differences 
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and inequalities, everybody is equal as dignity, and must be treated equally from the 
legal and political perspective. The specific individuals have historical references, diffe-
rent reli gious beliefs, are unequal from the economic and social points of view. The trans-
cendence of the particularities of any kind through the idea of citizenship is today the 
only basis for the political organization capable to determine the people to live together 
by respecting each other’s dignity. The discussion regarding the specific forms for the 
organization of this principle in the society is the most passionate and the most justified. 
Maybe because the regimes based on citizenship have managed to resist victoriously the 
two projects of the 20th century, whose purpose was to destroy them, Nazism and Commu-
nism, and because the freedom and the desire to be equal respond to a natural aspi ra-
tion, innate to all people. (Dominique Schnapper, Christian Bachelier în „Ce este cetăţe-
nia?“, Editura Polirom, Iaşi, 2001).
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POLITICAL LIFE, ECONOMIC REALITY AND SOCIETY 
IN THE PERCEPTION OF ETHNIC COMMUNITIES FROM 
MOLDOVA
Mihail Guzun
Threats of Ethic Tensions for Human Development
The satisfaction of the claims regarding recognition and equality of different ethnic, 
religious and linguistic groups, as mentioned in a study regarding the identity policy in 
the world – 2004 Human Development Report, developed at the request of the United 
Nations Development Program, represents one of the major problems affecting interna-
tio nal stability and human development in the 21st century. Presently, there are over 5,000 
ethnic groups living in those approximately 200 countries existing in the world. In two 
of out of three countries, the report says, there is at least one significant ethnic or religious 
group representing more than 10 percent of the population. One seventh of the world’s 
population, approximately 900 millions, is facing some form of discrimination due to their 
ethnic identity, race or religion (1). 
In the practice of many countries and multicultural communities we will find different 
strategic approaches to the issues of national policy, cultural freedom, national identity – 
from bilingual education and plans of affirmative action to different new systems of pro-
portional representation and federalism. The right of all individuals to preserve ethnic, 
linguistic and religious identity is promoted and the protection of these identities is the 
only sustainable approach in different societies. We witness a challenge caused by the 
economic globalization and its success can become questionable if the cultural freedoms 
are not protected and respected. 
The protection of minorities has become a true ideology generating relevant social 
movements. New concepts and assumptions have been launched which can be easily 
noticed in the specialized works. These include:
– Special status (minorities in relation with majority); 
– Specific treatment (protection of minorities in relation with the majority); 
– Normative derogations in favor of the disfavored groups; 
– Positive discrimination, practiced with legitimate appearances (in education, pro-
fessional training, etc) 
The policy regarding ethnic minorities enjoys a significant approach. In Finland, 
Ireland and Canada, the linguistic duality is officially recognized. Spain has four official 
languages. The cultural and linguistic rights are mutually recognized in Germany and 
Denmark. The are even derogations from the effective legislation in the favor of minori-
ties, especially „small minorities“. In fact, the party of Danish minority from Germany 
usually does not acquire 5% of the votes during elections; nevertheless it is represented 
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in the German parliament. In Romania, due to the positive discrimination, each of those 
11 ethnic minorities have at least one parliamentarian representative in the legislative 
forum of the country, although neither of them gain sufficient votes to be represented in 
the parliament. Many countries have an impressive number of official languages. South 
Africa recognizes 11 official languages, India – 15 languages out of the 1652 languages 
registered and used in this country; Senegal admits 6 international languages, Nigeria 
recognizes three out of 400 registered languages, etc. (2).
The ethnic „tremors“ have generated in different regions of the Earth phenomena 
that questioned what was considered not long ago solved for good. We are witnessing 
processes that occur in multiple regions of the old continent, one of them being the 
ethnic unrests in France at the end of 2005, which overturn many of the theoretical con-
structions and recommendations formulated in many agreements and findings of presti-
gious international forums. The spectacular growth of the shares of ethnic minorities in 
relation with the title nations registered in the last decades of 20th century in most of deve-
loped countries (3), appearance of real opportunities after the fall of the Iron Curtain for 
many ethnic communities from the ex-soviet countries, generated multiple axiological 
transfigurations in the realm of the national phenomenon. Not all countries were capable 
to react quickly and adequately to the occurred transformations, though. Moreover, each 
country faced certain problems whose solutions greatly depended upon the will and 
capa bilities of these countries. We will refer to a conclusive example in this respect. At 
the beginning of June 2005, during an international forum in Plovdiv (Bulgaria), it was 
ascertained that the ethnic Bulgarians risk becoming a minority in their own country by 
2050. By this year, Turkish and Roma will count 3.5 million, while the number of ethnic 
Bulgarians will decrease to 6 million (4). This situation is generated by the demographic 
crisis but can determine multiple problems whose solution cannot be postponed. 
Evi dently, no matter how significant the involvement of international institutions in the 
set tle ment of potential conflicts is, the mobilization and use of internal resources will 
play a decisive role. 
The danger of ethnic tensions, the threat of exclusion exists and generates a political 
activism built on the mobilization of ethnic, religious, and cultural resources. Almost all 
ex-soviet countries, countries of the former socialist bloc and others, have sources of 
tension of interethnic relations generating, in their turn, conflicts between states. These 
conflicts are manifested by diplomatic tensions (Poland/Belarus), economic blackmail 
(Russia/Moldova), direct military conflicts (Azerbaijan/Armenia), and smoldering con-
flicts (Uzbekistan/Kyrgyzstan), etc.
The route marked by the new challenges from the realm of national phenomenon did 
not bypass Moldova. The young state confronted with problems of this kind immediately 
after the proclamation of independence, because the promotion of democratic principles 
inevi tably opened for the „excluded groups“ from the former soviet empire more political 
space and more forms for manifesting protest against the historical injustices promoted 
tacitly until that moment. Transition from one form of social-political organization to 
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another, the escape from the „ideological“ chains of totalitarianism stimulated the process 
of national policy reconstruction, emphasizing an essential aspect for the Moldovan 
popu la tion, that of previously repressed and distorted national identity. The re-proble-
matization of national phenomenon was accompanied by multiple conflicts and misunder-
standings and turned into a „national issue“. During many years, it constituted one of the 
main objectives of scientific approaches but also one of the favorite themes of political 
discourse in Moldova. The political debates on national issue, particularly national 
identity, incited to the maximum the public opinion and became a permanent subject of 
multiple public manifestations but also a favorite topic for the mass media. This issue 
was included in the agenda of parties and social-political organizations, this fact placing 
those involved in discussions concerning the national phenomenon on antagonist posi-
tions. After many years of controversial and provocative discussions, the implementation 
of national policy acquires in 2003 the status of law, the national policy being declared 
priority in the Government and public authorities’ activity (5). Nevertheless, we should 
notice that the mentioned document has not managed to temper the opponent spirits in 
understanding the ways of building the interethnic relations. Some politicians continue, 
like before, to accuse their opponents of conservatism, communist and totalitarian nos-
talgias, others blame the undemocratic attitudes, human rights violations, nationalistic 
and hegemonic tendencies. 
Obviously, the status of „ex-soviet country“ left its marks on the fate of young 
Moldovan state that had neither democratic culture nor political experience in solving 
correctly the problems of national, cultural, linguistic and religious minorities inherited 
from the past. At the confluence of 1980s – 1990s, two large threats existed that could 
affect the evolution of interethnic relations. On one hand, the coexistent ethnic minorities 
could have been disadvantaged as there was the urge for recreating the national identity 
of majority ethnic group. On the other hand, the complexity of the problem of national 
minorities in Moldova, as well as in the entire ex-soviet space, resides in the fact that the 
revival of the national identity of the Moldovan/Romanian majority, coincided in time 
with the revival of the national identity of minorities, with the exception of Russians. 
Hence, the multitude of real challenges, especially artificial, linked to the desire of some 
people or unwillingness of others that Moldovan/Romanian majority regain the con-
science of its genuine identity (6). 
Ethnic Groups in Moldova – Between Past 
in Present Tense and Present 
in Future Tense
The answers to the questions included in the survey „Ethnobarometer in Moldova“, 
the data of the Delphi study whose purpose was to identify the perception of politics and 
policies promoted in Moldova in the field of interethnic relations and their manifestation 
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in practice, attitude towards the evolution and situation from the economic and social 
sector, pointed out that those who represent today the „multicultural and multilingual 
people of Moldova“, as stipulated in the Concept of Moldovan National Policy, adopted by 
Moldovan Parliament in December 2003, are still at the crossroad of two hopes-realities, 
both generated by the act of constitution of Moldova as a sovereign and independent 
state. One is marked by national revival, the natural recovery of national identity, beginning 
of democratization of the political system. One of the possible arguments for this kind of 
attitude can be found in the answers of Delphi study respondents (the advocates of this 
perspective can be called supporters of the „second Romanian state“), who justified their 
option by returning to Latin script, declaration of Romanian as official language, estab-
lishment of relations between the two banks of Prut river based on common values and 
traditions, affirmation of multiparty system and pluralism of opinions, accession of 
Moldova to the main international institutions and orientation of the country towards 
western democratic values. The second option is related to obtaining a real opportunity 
for building a distinct Moldovan nation, therefore the attempts to democratize the political 
sphere in general and political structures in particular, generated rather a larger insecurity. 
From the information gathered in Delphi study, this attitude is based on the fact that the 
Moldovans have a specific history and identity and, given the multiethnic nature of Mol-
dovan people, it is necessary to institute at least two official languages – Moldovan and 
Russian, and the institutional transformations from the power sector and the efforts to 
base the political life on the platform of multiparty system and pluralism of opinion dimi-
nished the activities of governmental structures regarding the consolidation of society on 
the idea of statehood, affirmation and stability of Moldova within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. The conflict between the two banks of Nistru River was appreciated 
as a consequence of „Romanianization“ policy promoted at the beginning of 1990s, and 
the federalization of Moldova as one of the possible solutions for the Transnistrian 
conflict. 
We can conclude that in the face of current challenges, a considerable part of the 
society still remains marked by the nostalgia for the past. The answers to the second 
question of the survey form, where respondents were asked to assess the situation of the 
current interethnic relations compared to 15 years ago, offer us sufficient reasons to assert 
that fixation on the past memories is noticed among all interviewed ethnic communities, 
especially in the case of the representatives of ethnic minorities (see figure 1). According 
to 31 percent of Gagauz, 30 percent of Russians, 29 percent of Bulgarians and 24 percent 
of Ukrainians, the relations with the Moldovans were „much better“ or „somewhat better“ 
before the independence. 
In our opinion, the nostalgia for the past does not necessarily mean that those people 
who still share it hope for a possible revival of what was once called Soviet Union. It 
reveals rather a reaction to the events that followed after the emergence on the world 
map of a new state – Moldova. 
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Figure 1. Relations between the Moldovans and other ethnic groups in present and 15 years ago
The perception of political and economic events groups the participants of the Delphi 
study in too large categories. Those who consider that the declaration of independence 
after the collapse of Soviet Union gave an impulse to the emergence of a „second Roma-
nian state“, emphasize the „success of Ilascu case at the ECHR“, „negotiation of the EU-
Moldova action plan“, „restriction of democratic freedoms“, „lack of competition on the 
market/failure of market economy“, „massive state interference with the economy“. The 
active supporters of „new nation building“ mentioned the „orientation of state policies 
towards ordinary people“, „political and economic stability“, „elaboration of social, youth 
and tourism development strategies“, „economic stabilization“, „creation of socially-oriented 
market economy“, „economic growth“. 
The assessment of the social events, places all around the two major issues for the 
society: „massive migration of labor force, often illegal“, and „extreme poverty of ordinary 
people“.
On the top of the list of Moldova’s problems, considered crucial by the respondents 
of the Ethnobarometer, four were nominated by the representatives of all ethnic groups. 
These are: low salaries, unemployment, corruption and health condition (see table 1).
The representatives of all ethnic groups manifest joint concern towards the events 
related to the proximate existence. In addition, 70 percent of Russians and Ukrainians, 
68 percent of Bulgarians, 54 percent of Moldovans and 63 percent of Gagauz believe that 
„the wellbeing of each individual depends especially on the state“. Thus, the hope in 
solving the problems of the Moldovan society is related to a more efficient support of 
state structures, which should manifest itself through the „control over the prices of 
basic goods“, „creation of jobs for all citizens“, „introduction of harsher punishments in 
order to reduce the crime level“. The „relations with Transnistria“ is what detaches the 
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Moldovans from the ethnic minorities, since they consider these relations more impor-
tant for the country’s fate. 
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1. Unemployment 2 1-2 2 2 1
2. Terrorism/violence/guerilla wars 14 13 14-15-16 11 14-15
3. Low salaries 1 1-2 1 1 2
4. Violation of human rights 10-11-12 9-10 10 8-9 7-8
5. Housing issue 10-11-12 11-12 6 12-13 11-12
6. Health condition 4 3-4 4-5 3 4-5
7. Environmental issues 10-11-12 5-6 7 6-7 7-8
8. Corruption 6 3-4 4-5 3 4-5
9. Crime level/insecurity 7 8 8 4 10
10. Drug trafficking 8-9 11-12 12 12 11
11. Armed conflicts 15-16 15 14-15-16 15-16-17 17
12. Ethnic conflicts/tensions 17 16-17 14-15-16 15-16-17 13-13
13. Lack of rule of law 13 14 13 10 6
14. Lack of press freedom 15-16 16-17 17 15-16-17 12-13
15. Drug abuse 8-9 7 11 13-14 15-16
16. Trafficking in women 5 5-6 4-5 8-9 4-5
17. Relations with Transnistria 3 9-10 9 6-7 9
Table 1. The hierarchical position of Moldova’s problems, considered crucial
The Communist Party enjoyed the highest credibility at the moment of this survey, 
proved by the answers to the question „If Parliamentary elections were to take place this 
Sunday“. The readiness to vote for this Party was expressed by 54 percent of Ukrainians, 
46 percent of Russians, 41 percent of Bulgarians, 37 percent of Gagauz and 30 percent of 
Moldovans. We learned that most of the Communist Party supporters represent represen-
tatives of ethnic minorities, the Moldovans demonstrating more reluctant towards this 
party. The Communist Party greatly outruns the second political formation, „Moldova 
Democrata Electoral Bloc“, for which only 7 percent of Bulgarians, 5 percent of Russians 
and Gagauz and 2 percent of Ukrainians were ready to vote. The Moldovans’ votes for 
the second party were equally divided: 10 percent for Moldova Democrata Electoral Bloc 
and 10 percent for the Christian-Democratic Party (PPCD). 
Moreover, the majority ethnic group is in opposition to the national minorities in 
the assessment of the country’s geostrategic direction. The majority of Moldovans, as 
seen in table 2, conceive Moldova integrated with European Union, while most of the 
representatives of Gagauz, Ukrainian and Russian minorities are oriented towards the 
Commonwealth of independent States.
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Ethnic group Integrate with the European Union Remain within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
Moldovans 62% 14%
Russians 38% 41%
Ukrainians 21% 48%
Gagauz 18% 48%
Bulgarians 36% 35%
Table 2. Orientation of the country: Europe of CIS?
Media Communication in the Opinions of 
Ethnobarometer Respondents
Even though the „lack of press freedom“ is not, according to the opinion of Ethno-
barometer respondents, of major importance (see table 1), the Gagauz seemed to be the 
most concerned by the „lack of press freedom“, 53 percent of them considering it a severe 
problem. The less affected were the Ukrainians, only 37 percent of them considering that 
the role of media institutions in the realization of national policy is major and cannot be 
ignored. Media represents a perfect instrument capable to favor other ways of existence 
and thinking, other spiritual and cultural universes, thus assuring a better understanding 
and collaboration among the coexistent ethnic communities. The most active in favor of 
the above-mentioned purpose were the representatives of the Russian ethnic group, 91 
percent of which „totally agreed“ or „somewhat agreed“, while the Moldovans were the 
most reluctant in this perspective. Only 41 percent of the respondents expressed uncon-
ditional agreement regarding the broadcast of radio and TV programs about the life of 
the ethnic groups. The Moldovans were again the most reserved about radio and TV 
programs in the languages of ethnic minorities (table 5). 
Ethnic group Crucial Severe Not too serious
Gagauz 15% 53% 15%
Russians 11% 50% 26%
Moldovans 14% 43% 26%
Bulgarians 21% 38% 27%
Ukrainians 7% 37% 34%
Table 3. Problems Moldova: Lack of press freedom
It is confusing that a considerable part of the Gagauz ethnics (16–17 percent) and 
Bulgarians (17 percent) express their total or partial disagreement regarding radio and TV 
of programs about life of minorities, as well as programs in the languages of minorities. 
We suppose that this is actually a reaction to the present quality of the programs about 
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ethnic minorities. We also wonder: to what extent the message delivered through these 
programs is conceived as an opening or a window to the cultural world of the relevant 
ethnic community? Namely, are they an expression of spiritual enrichment or, on the 
contrary, they represent nothing but a pretext for withdrawal in the inner world, a threat 
factor?!
Ethnic group Totally Agree
Somewhat 
agree Disagree
Totally 
disagree
Don’t Know/
No answer
Moldovans 41% 37% 10% 3% 8%
Russians 67% 24% 4% 1% 4%
Ukrainians 61% 30% 3% 0% 6%
Gagauz 50% 26% 12% 5% 7%
Bulgarians 60% 22% 13% 4% 2%
Table 4. Agreement/disagreement regarding radio or TV programs about the life of minorities 
from Moldova
All media institutions from the country have the mission to promote values and 
objectives that are common the whole society, emphasizing, evidently, the ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic and religious specifics of all ethnic communities. The motto „through diversity 
towards unity“ would be the most appropriate in the precise and brief formulation of 
this mission. Although we are different, we represent one people, and although we are 
one people, we are all different. Obviously, we do not attempt to diminish the importance 
of the knowledge of oneself, which is a dominant tendency in the pages of many publica-
tions of ethnic minorities, but the press can be concerned not only about the differences 
but also the similarities, which gets into an area of convergence with the provisions of 
article 10 of the Moldovan Constitution: (1) The national unity of the Republic of Mol-
dova constitutes the foundation of the State. The Republic of Moldova is the common 
and indivisible motherland of all its citizens. 
Ethnic group Totally Agree
Somewhat 
agree Disagree
Totally 
disagree
Don’t Know/
No answer
Moldovans 34% 31% 16% 9% 9%
Russians 65% 23% 7% 1% 3%
Ukrainians 60% 29% 4% 0% 6%
Gagauz 53% 25% 12% 4% 6%
Bulgarians 58% 23% 13% 4% 1%
Table 5. Agreement/disagreement about the programs of the National Television in the languages 
of minorities (Russian, Ukrainian, Gagauz, and Bulgarian)
Following the articles focusing on national issues published by the Moldovan press, 
we can easily convince ourselves that many fragments of these articles „betray“ some 
symptoms of a situation that upsets the society and determines media to adopt a position. 
It is exactly the case to remember Eminescu’s words that „it is not the origin that makes 
ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 159
a people strong, but its work, done with the hands or with the minds“ and „one does not 
become a national writer by repeating the words homeland, freedom, glory, nation in 
every written work, on the other hand, one can never even mention these words and, 
still, be a national writer“ (7).
In discussing interethnic relations, including the issue of national minorities, our 
press shows the presence of certain unproductive tendencies, such as the lack of consis-
tency and obvious discrepancy, the exaggerated amplitude of perspectives in the media’s 
approach and treatment of the national phenomenon. This situation is largely fueled by 
the obvious or veiled bias of the media in favor of certain parties and sociopolitical move-
ments, in other words, by the excessively politicized media sector, often determining the 
content of the newspaper articles and promoting the ignorance of the scientific truth. 
The very complexity of the national phenomenon demands a lot of judgment, correct 
attitude and, last but not least, tolerance on behalf of those preoccupied with the evolution 
of the national policy and its consequences in Moldova. In the message of UN Secretary 
General, Kofi Annan, on the occasion of the International Day of Tolerance (16 Novem-
ber, 2002) was mentioned that tolerance is an active and positive commitment of 
human diversity and, therefore, is a fundamental principle of democracy in our 
multiethnic and multicultural societies (8). 
Central to all tolerance promotion efforts is the dialogue between individuals, cul-
tures and civilizations. Without a continuous and efficient dialogue, the social cohesion 
is threatened. 
Moldova – a State of National Minorities?
A subject of many polemics, called absurd by the author of a newspaper article, is the 
question: Who are we: Moldovans or Romanians? Perhaps the results of Ethnobarometer 
disappointed some individuals and encouraged the other: 95 percent of representatives 
of the majority identify themselves as Moldovans and only 5 percent consider themselves 
Romanians. The importance of this problem lies, in our opinion, not only in the name of 
the ethnonym (Romanian or Moldovan) used in the self-identification of the repre-
sentatives of the majority group, but also in the fact that the declared identity (Moldovan) 
is placed in opposition with the objective identity (Romanian) and vice versa, and those 
who declare themselves Romanians/Moldovans have a feeling of personal threat. However, 
more severe is the fact that this situation is not only tolerated but also stimulated, directly 
or indirectly, by the official state authorities. We refer to the incapacity of the public 
authorities from Moldova to approach objectively and constructively the national issues. 
This incapacity or the lack of will to know the truth has its own motivations. Our goal 
was not to list all these motivations, we will limit ourselves only to one aspect, which 
generated and continues to fuel the disagreements from this area, namely the ignorance 
of scientific truth, the lack of a solid conceptual basis that would serve as reference 
points, or solutions for the multiple problems related to the improvement of interethnic 
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relations. These things are discussed for many years without coming to any agreement, 
one argues about issues that represent axiomatic truths in the world of advanced demo-
cracies. Here I refer to the correct name of the majority ethnic group and the official 
language of the country. The ignorance of scientific truth leads to regrettable confusions. 
Thus, the Concept of National Policy of Moldova includes the following passage: „Mol-
dovans, the founding nationality of the state, together with the representatives of other 
ethnic groups, Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, Jews, Romanians (?), Byelorus-
sians, Gypsies (Roma), Poles and others, constitute the Moldovan people, Moldova being 
their common motherland.“ In our vision, namely this „official“ understanding and 
interpretation of certain fundamental notions by the public structures, which is different 
from the one found in the recommendations of the scientific community, explains the 
cause of many controversial answers to the questions from the Ethnobarometer survey, 
including those from Delphi study.
What are the other ethnic groups besides the majority group? Ethnic group? Ethnic 
minority or national minority? Different terms, in fact referring to the same group of 
individuals, were put into use at the level of state structures (Parliament, Government), 
as well as at the level of doctrinary discussions. The clearance of the Constitutional draft, 
signed by 52 scientists of the Moldovan Science Academy, published in the newspaper 
„Moldova Suverana“ on June 2, 1993, stipulated that there were no national minorities 
in Moldova but ethnic groups, characterizing them as „a group which separates from the 
main historical entity and emigrates and settles on the ethnic and historical territory of 
another people.“ The Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, Jews were identified as 
ethnic groups who in different historical periods and under different circumstances, 
detached from the main ethnic realm, establishing on the Romanian territory between 
Prut and Nistru rivers.
If at the crossroads of 1980s and 1990s and in the first years of independence the 
notions national group or ethnic group were used more frequently, then gradually priority 
was given to the term ethnic minority. For example, if in the decision of the Government 
of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic „Regarding the basic functions, structure and 
Regulation of The State Department for National Issues of MASSR“ from April 25, 1991, 
we can find notions like non-local population, national communities, national groups, in 
the Decision of Moldovan Government „Regarding the adoption of Regulations and 
Structure of the Department for National Relations“ from July 27, 1994, we see terms like 
ethnocultural formations and ethnic minorities (9). However, it is worth mentioning that even 
today, judging from the normative acts and documents, there is no clear image regar ding 
the terms used for ethnic communities in the subdivisions of public authorities. It is the 
case to point out that in the circles of researchers preoccupied with the national issues, 
the terms ethnic minorities and national minority are not used as absolute syno nyms. It 
is considered that most ethnic groups are a consequence of global migration (like the 
Armenians from Romania and Turks from Germany), while the national communities 
are a consequence of border changes and not emigration or immigration processes. 
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The distinction between national minorities and ethnic minorities is also made by 
some researchers depending on the existence or inexistence of a state where the members 
of the relevant ethnicity form the majority. However, we believe that the authorities 
should start with the idea that, from the point of view of protection of specific rights, the 
international legislation does not make a distinction between the two categories, thus an 
eventual difference should not exist in the national legislation. In fact, this could also 
serve as a starting point in solving the issues of national minorities. Thus, according to the 
Law on citizenship, adopted in 1991 (article 2), citizens of Moldova are the persons who 
were permanently residing on the territory of Moldova at the moment of proclamation 
of the sovereignty. The adoption of the „zero variant“ in this case allowed solving without 
problems the issue of citizen affiliation of the representatives of national minorities who 
were residing in the country. 
In January 1945, the United Nations Subcommittee responsible for the protection of 
minorities declared that a definition of the term „minority“ should rely on the following 
basis:
a) the term „minority“ includes non-dominant groups of a population which possess 
and wish to preserve their ethnic, religious and linguistic traditions;
b) these minorities should include a sufficient number of individuals in order to be 
able to develop their characteristics;
c) the members of these minorities should prove their loyalty towards the state they 
belong to.
Article 1 of the Law of the Republic of Moldova „regarding the rights of persons 
belonging to national minorities and the legal status of their organizations“, stipulates 
that „persons belonging to national minorities are considered the individuals who are 
residing on the territory of Moldova, are Moldovan citizens, have ethnic, cultural, lin-
guistic and religious particularities that distinguish them from the majority of the 
population - the Moldovans - and consider themselves of a different ethnic background“. 
After a closer examination, in the „Moldovan version“ the notion of national minority 
has a slightly different nuance and meaning from the one mentioned in the plan of 
activity of the United Nations Subcommittee. 
National Idea as Factor of Social Consolidation
A solution that could lead to the stabilization of interethnic relations is the develop-
ment of a national idea, meaning a totality of ideals and social, political and spiritual 
values that would contribute to the consolidation of the society, would confer stability to 
its development and aspirations in achieving its specific goals. As noted by Anthony D. 
Smith, „in liberal and democratic states, the goal of a system of mass national education 
was not that much to homogenize the population, but more to unify it around some 
common values, symbols, myths and memories allowing the minorities to preserve their 
symbols, memories, myths and values and trying to adapt or include them within a larger 
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public culture and its national mythology. The increasingly stronger claims of these 
ethnic and religious minorities and rejection of cultural suppression in liberal societies 
did not lead to the abandonment of national loyalty or civic education. Instead, the most 
economically advanced societies attempted to promote, tacitly or openly, multiple ethno-
religious cultures through the mass education system, using the ideal of „multicultura-
lism“ and the resulted cultural diversity in order to increase the quality of a more synthetic 
„national identity““ (10). It would seem that there is nothing simpler than finding this 
edifying idea, which would contribute through its attractiveness and vitality to the conso-
lidation and mobilization of the Moldovan „multicultural“ and „multilingual“ society in 
achieving a common objective. 
Presently, the state authorities promote insistently two ideas that, actually, have the 
same target: the idea of affiliation to the Moldovan people and the idea of Moldovan 
statehood. The „Concept of National Policy of the Republic of Moldova“ stipulates that 
one of the tasks of the national policy „in the political and legal sectors“ is „the affirmation 
of a system of national values based on the awareness of citizens of our country that 
they are belong to the Moldovan people“. And in the letter addressed to the writer Ion 
Druta by the President of Moldova, and published in the newspaper „Moldova Suverana“ 
from January 22, 2002, we find the following lines: „… After many years of distress and 
large social unrest, we came to the conclusion that it is impossible to accomplish some-
thing positive if the population does not engage fully in materializing the IDEA of NA-
TIONAL INTEGRATION. Despite the fact that the Moldovan intelligentsia is divided 
and that some of its representatives contribute to the destabilization of the situation in 
the country, disseminating discord among its citizens, I think...that the time has come 
for us to have a creed. In my opinion, this belief could be an INTEGRATION IDEA for 
our entire NATION, namely the idea of building the Modern Moldovan State“.
There were also other recommendations formulated based on the integration idea. 
For example, Veaceslav Untila, one of the former leaders of „Moldova Democrata“ Elec-
toral Bloc, believes that before uniting in the name of prosperity of Moldova, before 
taking a common cause around the slogan „The Supreme Law – the wellbeing of people“, 
it would be good to start with „what is more important, what constitutes the first point 
in all the lists of priorities – decrease the crime level, fight with the organized crime, 
because if before the supreme goal of the organized crime was to gain enormous profits, 
nowadays it tends to absorb the political... and executive power“ (10).
It is not the diversity of opinions on this issue that is discouraging, but rather the lack 
of signs that would give us the hope that sometimes this national idea will be formulated 
and accepted by most of sociopolitical formations from the country. This state of inse-
curity is still fueled by the behavior of the representatives of political elite from Chisinau, 
by the lack of ideas that would confirm the capacity to listen to each other, to have a 
constructive dialogue, and not only for promoting certain narrow group interests. This 
insecurity will continue to persist, once 32 percent of the representatives of the majority 
ethnic group consider that they are „residents of this locality“ and only a little more than 
half of the respondents – 57 percent – consider themselves Moldovan citizens. Accor-
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dingly, the Russians consider themselves: residents – 36 percents and Moldovan citizens 
-68 percent; the Ukrainians: residents – 42 percent, Moldovan citizens - 64 percent; the 
Gagauz: residents –43 percent, Moldovan citizens – 46 percent; Bulgarians: residents –34 
percent, Moldovan citizens – 55 percent.
It would seem that the integration of Moldova with European Union could be consi-
dered a national idea, as the idea of creating an „European identity“ next to the existing 
strong national identities is actively supported on the old continent. However, the results 
of the Ethnobarometer show that the feeling of being European has not yet developed in 
the conscience of Moldovans: only 6 percent of them consider themselves Europeans (10 
percent for Bulgarians, 7 percent for Russians, 6 percent for Gagauz and only 3 percent 
for Ukrainians), despite the fact that 62 percent of Moldovans support the idea of Euro-
pean integration. The prospect of European integration is even less likely according to 
the representatives of national minorities. In favor of this integration are 38 percent of 
Russians, 36 percent of Bulgarians, 21 percent of Ukrainians and only 18 percent of the 
Gagauz.
Obviously, the perspective of creating a „European identity“ is more distant in time, 
as this kind of identity can be thought only as a result of extensive social and political 
practices.
Presently, the ideal solution for Moldova in the creation of national idea would be to 
start from assuming the same fate, thus the political potential and the national sentiment 
would be incommensurable. The inspiration should come from the economic and social 
segment, since the most severe and crucial problems of Moldova, as identified by the res-
pondents of all surveyed ethnic groups, were unemployment (48 percent Moldovans and 
53 percent Ukrainians), low salaries (49 percent Bulgarians and 53 percent Moldo vans, 
Gagauz, Ukrainians) and corruption (25 percent Ukrainians and 37 percent Moldovans). 
National Identity in the Context of Harmonization of 
Interethnic Relations
A condition that could contribute to the harmonization of interethnic relations and 
establishment of a climate that is beneficial for the development of all ethnic minorities 
could be, in our opinion, the creation of a free space and opening of equal opportunities 
for all ethnic communities to form and promote the national identity of each national 
group. The national identity should become an instrument for preservation and cultiva-
tion of national conscience not only for the majority group but also for minorities. If we 
accept the idea formulated by Anthony D. Smith that national identity can be understood 
as a result of interaction between ethnic and political components, then when we refer 
to the national identity, we should consider equally both aspects: (I) ethnocultural and 
(II) political. Both components, although forming an entity, are in antagonist relations, 
which can be qualified as ... constitutional. Article 1, title I from the Moldovan Constitution 
stipulates that „Moldova is a sovereign and independent, unitary and indivisible state“. 
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And article 10 stipulates that „(1) The unity of the people of the Republic of Moldova 
constitutes the foundation of the state. 
The Republic of Moldova is the common and indivisible motherland of all its citizens.
(2) The state recognizes and guarantees all its citizens the right to preserve, develop 
and express their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity.
In our opinion, the concept of national identity has two dimensions: emotional and 
rational. Thus, both emotional and rational attitudes are manifested in the relationship 
with the „attributes of national identity“. We must admit that nowadays the national 
identity is marked by a new reality, is developing in a new sociopolitical and economic 
environment, even if the efforts to maintain and preserve the ethnic components are 
actively manifested and this tendency cannot be accused. The ordinary citizens should 
make considerable efforts to evade from their own ethno-cultural sphere into the sphere 
of interests of the society as a whole, especially in a society made of an ethnic and cultural 
mixture, like Moldova. In this process, the decisive role is to be played by the official 
authorities, constitutional imperative and legislation. The smaller the distance between 
the emotional and rational elements, and the more harmonious the correlation between 
these two components, the bigger the chances to hope for a sustainable development of 
the society and to have a greater clarity of Moldova’s integration perspective with the 
European community.
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SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS 
AND SELFCONSCIOUSNESS OF ETHNIC 
GROUPS FROM MOLDOVA
Vasile Cantarji
„There is a belief in our country that democracy means only election 
campaigns and eventual alternation to power of rival political forces; 
but democracy is actually all that happens in the long years between 
national and local elections, set of norms, procedures and institutions 
that promote the values and principles of the theory of democracy“. 
Giovanni Sartori
Nowadays the „governance of multiethnic society“ is one of the most important 
issues in Moldova and requires the diagnosis of interethnic interactions, prevention and 
identification of latent forms of interethnic tensions. 
The preliminary results of the October 2004 census reflect the essential changes that 
took place in our society in the last 15 years. 
According to the data of both censuses, Moldovans represent the majority: in 1989 
the share of Moldovans was 69.9 percent of the total population, and in 2004, based on 
the preliminary data, Moldovans represent 76.1 percent, registering a 6.2 percent growth 
(the census did not include the districts from the left bank of Nistru River). 
The Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz, Bulgarians and Romanians are the other nationa-
lities that represent an important share in Moldovan society and register 23.9 percent of 
the total population according to the preliminary data of the 2004 census. It is worth 
mentioning that in 1989, the share of these nationalities was 30.1 percent, which is 6.2 
percent higher than in 2004. Among these, Ukrainian and Russian ethnics come second 
and third in the total number of country’s population. 
At the same time, the decrease of the share of Ukrainians and Russians by 2.9 and 4.0 
percent, accordingly, was influenced by the migration that took place between these 
censuses. 
The share of Gagauz experienced a 0.3 percent growth in the last 15 years, represen-
ting 4.4 percent of the total population, due to the relatively high birth rate compared to 
the average birth rate registered in the country. 
The number of people identifying themselves as Romanians also increased, and 
comprises 70,275 people, which is 2.1 percent of the total population. It is necessary to 
mention that in 1989 the share of Romanians was 0.1 percent or 2,477 people. 
At the same time, the share of Bulgarians experienced a 0.1 percent decrease. „Other 
nationalities“ registered a 1.5 percent decrease, compared to the data of the 1989 census. 
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The changes registered in the last census are mostly due to the migration of labor 
force, migration influxes caused by the collapse of USSR and, especially, by the exchanges 
of population between the banks of Nistru River. Nevertheless, Moldova remains a multi-
ethnic state that requires a specific character of its domestic, as well as foreign policies, 
more than in other historical moments, after the proclamation of independence, and this 
conclusion is imposed, especially, by the pro-European orientation, declared recently as 
priority of Moldovan foreign policy. 
In the present work, we will try to carry out a complex analysis of sociologic aspects 
of the self-consciousness of ethnic groups, relating it to another subjective aspect of eth-
nicity, such as the subjective perception of Moldovan citizenship. 
As basic empiric indicators that characterize the ethnic conscience under the aspect 
of ethnic interaction, we will use: 
– ethnic self-identification, which includes the attitude towards the one’s ethnic affi-
liation, awareness of ethno-consolidating and ethno-differential features, national 
feelings of the representatives of the main ethnic groups from Moldova and their 
level of expression;
– relation between self- and hetero-stereotype, ethnic attitudes, the importance and 
the level of development of structural ethnocultural components, cultural assimi-
lation level of the dominant ethnic group;
– forms of manifestation of the ethnic consciousness, and their level of influence of the 
character of interethnic relations, evaluation of the level of interethnic intensity.
Reflection of the citizenship perception will be achieved through the prism of new 
approaches of democratic theory and, especially Will Kymlicka’s liberal theory on mino-
rity rights (theory of multicultural citizenship). For that purpose, we will use the indica-
tors from the survey form that reflect the basic points of Kymlicka’s theory, regarding the 
studied aspect, namely: 
– perception of loyalty towards the state;
– collective rights:
a)  specific rights of representation; 
b) multiethnic rights;
c) rights for autonomy; 
– citizenship as source of political identity.
In addition, we will also look at other indicators that will help us understand the 
inter ethnic relations in Moldova in general. 
The empiric analysis will be carried out based on the results of the Ethnobarometer 
survey realized by the Institute of Marketing and Surveys (IMAS), at the request of the 
Institute for Public Policy (IPP), in December 2004-January 2005 on ethnic samples that 
included 822 Moldovans/Romanians, 431 Bulgarians, 472 Gagauz, 412 Russians and 413 
Ukrainians.
Do we have democracy? One thing is sure, we exist at the moment in the context of 
a young democracy or even live in a period when the basic elements of a democracy are 
taking shape with difficulty, and will leave their mark on the most deep subjective points 
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of social conscience after long periods, which is as important for democracy as freedom, 
market economy, human rights, etc. The democracy relies not only on the civilian’s vir-
tual involvement in the governing process, but also on the real participation, and this is 
possible only in conditions of a profound awareness of norms and freedoms offered by 
democracy. We know how important the ethnic factor is for every state, regardless of how 
much the state has advanced in promoting democracy. Our purpose is not to list the stra-
tegies and ways of approaching interethnic relations of different states; neither will we 
try to offer evaluative statistics regarding the success of these strategies and experiences. 
We propose to reflect one of the basic elements of ethnicity, which is self-consciousness 
of the ethnic groups from Moldova, through the prism of new scientific approaches in 
the democratic theory regarding ethnicity.
One of the last events of significant importance in the theory of democracy is Kym-
licka’s liberal theory on minority rights (the theory of multicultural citizenship), which 
reflects the weaknesses of liberalism as a system of ideas, because of which he cannot 
propose articulated solutions for minority issues. 
 Young democracies face „double standards“ in the minority issue; more exactly, they 
deal with normative prescriptions regarding ethnocultural equity, prescriptions which 
the consolidated democracies did not have to consider at the moment of completion of 
their own national constructions.110 
Kymlicka’s Theory on Multicultural Citizenship111
The liberal theory on minority rights (the theory of multicultural citizenship) deve-
loped by Will Kymlicka sets forth a possible solution regarding the management of conse-
quences of ethnocultural diversity thorough the prism of normative political philosophy. 
The author asserts that in managing the ethnocultural conflicts, the states from all over 
the world tend to subordinate justice and equity to the imperative of internal stability. 
More than that, there is no consensus among the important international actors concer-
ning the way of reaching solutions for ethnocultural conflicts without producing desta-
bilization. On one hand, this causes double standards in approaching ethnocultural conf-
licts; on the other hand, it leads to violence on behalf of minorities craving for attention. 
By emphasizing these two consequences, Kymlicka ascertains the failure of political 
scien ces, and concludes that the used concepts should be reconsidered.112 
Two of the concepts mentioned by the author are relevant for the issues discussed 
here: ethnocultural neutrality in a rule of law and collective rights. 
According to Kymlicka, when used abusively, the concept of ethnocultural neutrality 
in a rule of law describes the situation when the ethnicity issue is no longer relevant (the 
so-called beneficial neglect) in conditions of a rule of law based on liberal democracy. 
110  Levente Salat, Multiculturalismul liberal, Polirom:Iaşi, 2001, pp.328-333
111  Th is section is based exclusively on the subchapter „Teoria cetăţeniei multiculturale a lui Kymlicka“ from the article 
of Alexandru F. Voicu „Percepţia subiectivă a calităţii de cetăţean român“, Barometrul relaţiilor etnice 1994 – 2002, Cluj, 
2005, pp. 41-54.
112  Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Th eory of Minotity Rights, Oxford University Press, 1995. A Libe-
ral Th eory of Minotity Rights, Oxford University Press, 1995
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From the perspective of this approach, the situations when minorities claim official re-
cog nition and rights, are similar to the „19th century nationalism“. Kymlicka argues that 
the theory of beneficial neglect is a myth, as long as most modern states are national and 
have official languages. Obviously disadvantaged by this reality, the minorities have three 
alternatives for action: assimilation, self-isolation or claiming legal right of building moder-
nity similarly to the majority (implying autonomy). Kymlicka concludes that presenting 
the wish for autonomy as „19th century nationalism“ is not persuasive. In the same context, 
the author defines the concept of societal culture as being that part of culture, which is 
institutionalized, which is found in the public space and which forms the basis of modernity. 
The other important concept described by the author of multicultural citizenship theory 
is the term collective rights, which began to be used excessively in politics. Kymlicka 
shows that, in the case of any collective right, there are two components which should 
balance each other: On one hand, a component of internal protection of community 
(against the members’ dissidence), and on the other hand, a component of external pro tec-
tion against the decisions of the majority (according to one’s own interests). The author 
identifies three types of institutional solutions for the protection of ethnocultural com-
munities: specific rights of representation (positive discrimination), multiethnic rights (pro-
tection of those rights that cannot be supported in the conditions of market economy, 
like in the case of cultural rights) applicable, for example, to immigrants; and different 
forms of autonomy. Kymlicka draws our attention to the fact that the refusal to accept the 
legitimacy of collective rights indicates a conceptual confusion; he also shows that the 
institutionalization of collective rights should not imply violation of individual rights. 
Kymlicka’s theory can be synthesized in two fundamental theses and two auxiliary 
(adjacent) theses. 
The first fundamental thesis postulates the existence of a permanent connection 
between individual freedom and cultural affiliation. Individuals can be free only if they 
have options; this brings up the need for existence of a social context, which is nothing 
else but the societal culture, as defined above. Thus, in order to protect the individual, one 
has to protect the individual’s right to context.
The second fundamental thesis asserts that we should admit the moral equality of cul-
tural communities. The immediate conclusion is that the predominantly liberal discourse 
cannot be always used in argumentation; the solutions to the issues of ethnocultural diver-
sity can be achieved only by dialogue, and they differ from one case to another.
The first adjacent thesis treats the issue of intolerant communities. 
There are anti-liberal communities, but the arbitrary interference of the majority, 
even animated by liberal goals, is in essence anti-liberal (of course, the extreme situations, 
grave and repeated violations of human rights are excluded113).
 Even if the institutionalized protection of the social context can have certain anti-
liberal consequences, one cannot give up the principles based on some limited cases. The 
113  Kymlicka makes a distinction between the situation when the internal restrictions are based on the large consensus of 
community members (who have the possibility to leave the community if they wish) and the case when the community is 
ruled by an unpopular dictator, without having the possibility to leave the community (see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural 
Citizenship, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 170, in L. Salat, op. cit., p. 198).
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author insists that there are liberal ways of disseminating liberal principles: persuasion, 
for example.
Finally, the second adjacent thesis approaches the issue of social solidarity, threatened 
by the differentiated (multicultural) citizenship, which results from granting three types 
of collective rights described above. Kymlicka admits that a normative solution to this 
problem simply does not exist within liberal multiculturalism. Nevertheless, he confines 
the issue to autonomy, showing that the other two cases (specific rights and multiethnic 
rights) follow the increase of chances for integration, and reaffirms that the refusal to 
acknowledge the right to context is less likely to have positive consequences in consoli-
dation at the global scale.
Ethnic Consciousness and Perception of Moldovan Citizenship 
In the conditions of a multiethnic region, the tendencies to develop ethnic conscious-
ness can include preservation of its specific character, consolidation of the ethnic group 
as autonomous system, as well as unification of this ethnic group with other ethnic for-
mations. Thus, self-identification is an empirical indicator, which characterizes ethnic 
consciousness, and particularly, the tendencies of processes determining the evolution 
of ethnic configuration. In this case, we should admit several nuances that require a spe-
cial attention on behalf of the researcher and, at the same time, create more obstacles in 
investigation. The main problem is the nature of factors that determine self-identification. 
Often, the results of a statistical record cannot satisfy our claims because of some objec-
tive factors, which determine individuals to declare things that are contrary to their 
opinions. As an eloquent example is the problems related to Roma identification who, 
despite being a marginalized group because of the discrimination they were subject to, 
during the soviet period, maintain the tendency of „hiding“ their real identity. Therefore, 
scientists consider that censuses cannot offer eloquent information about this group. 
Fortunately, there are no strong factors that could distort the reflection of reality in the 
subjective perceptions, and attitudes of respondents, concerning the ethnic groups des-
cribed in the study, maybe except the case of Moldovan-Romanian dilemma. 
In the Ethnobarometer, the group affiliation was established based on the respondents’ 
statements to the question, „Which of the following statements describe best your identity? 
I mainly consider myself…“ (See annex 1). The highest score to the option „Representative 
of the declared nationality“ was registered among Moldovan/Romanian respondents, this 
percentage being higher in the case of Gagauz and Bulgarians and lowest in the case of 
Russians. 
Instead, Russian respondents mainly chose the option „citizen of Moldova“. Also high 
is the score for „resident of this locality“. This shows a strong identification based on 
citizen ship or state identity, this option registering the lowest score (compared to other 
natio nalities) among Moldovans, being rather significant and ranging from 15 percent 
in case of Moldovans to 31 percent in case of Russians. The legal identification with the 
European space is practically missing, despite the clamorous political declarations about 
the reorientation of Moldova’s foreign policy. 
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Therefore, we found that besides the strong identification based on the ethnic group, 
we see state identification – a crucial moment, as it outlines at least two important things 
that underlie state consolidation:
– first, it was observed and proved many times that during the times of social unrests 
and crises, when the political regulators, in fact ideological and economic, of inter-
group and interethnic relations dissolve and lose value, while the new ones form 
very slowly, the subjective regulators – ethnic, religious, etc. – come first. Usually, 
the process, when the importance of the ethnic factor grows, takes place and accom-
panies the moments of cardinal changes in the social, economic and political life, 
and in this case, it means that the reality has not returned to its normal situation 
yet. The population has not found yet the ideological factor that would serve as a 
warrant of stability and is based, respectively, on what is more stable in time, i.e. on 
the ethnic factor; 
– the second idea refers exactly to this „ideological background“ or, in other words, 
to what represents a consolation idea, which was invoked many times as being ne-
cessary for the consolidation of the population, and the state on their way to de-
mocra tization. The fact that the population identifies itself mainly based on ethnic 
background and less on citizenship, talks about the citizens’ lack of trust in the 
Moldovan state. For almost 15 years from the declaration of independence and 
emer gence of the Moldovan state, the population still does not view this structure 
as a warrant of stability and prosperity. This fact explains the lack of trust in state 
institutions reflected in all studies carried out until now. „What should be the direc-
tion of our country in the future?“ is one of the questions included in the Barometer 
of Public Opinion. The options are presented in the following table:
May 
2004
April 
2003
November 
2002
April 
2002
January 
2001
Should remain within the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS) 30% 29% 38% 41% 43%
Should integrate with the European 
Union 47% 42% 38% 40% 51%
Be independent of any alliance/
union 2% 4% 4% 4% 2%
Don’t Know/No answer 21% 16% 20% 15% 4%
We see that a very small segment of people think that our country should remain 
independent; most respondents think that the state will not be capable to develop inde-
pendently. We well try not to comment on these results since the situation is obvious.
The next aspect inspired from Kymlicka’s theory seems to contradict with the pre-
vious statements made by the author, and namely the measure of loyalty towards the 
state reflected in the distributions of options to the question „To what extent do you agree 
that people should support their country even if things are not quite easy“? (Q11a) We can 
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notice a pronounced loyalty regardless of the ethnic background. In all cases, the sum of 
answers „totally agree“ and „rather agree“ registers a share of over 85 percent. The highest 
share is registered among Russian and Ukrainian respondents (96.1 and 96.3 percent, 
accor dingly), the lowest share among Bulgarians (86.8 percent), while the share of Mol-
dovan/Romanian respondents represents 94.3 percent. It would be very useful to com-
pare the relevant shares with the ones registered in Romania, where they constituted 94.1 
percent among Romanians, 90.5 percent among Hungarians and 95.2 percent among 
Roma114. This comparison imposes at least the assumption that the causal chain of loyalty 
does not include things that would show that Moldova differs from Romania. For example, 
if the living standards in Romania are higher than in Moldova, this is not reflected in a 
subjective phenomenon such as loyalty towards the state. 
Moldovans/
Romanians Ukrainians Russians Gagauz Bulgarians
Totally Agree 80.4 74.8 85.4 70.3 60.3
Somewhat agree 13.9 21.5 10.7 19.5 26.5
Disagree 2.6 1.0 1.2 4.4 10.0
Totally disagree 1.1 0.5 0.5 1.1 1.9
Don’t Know/No answer 2.1 2.2 2.2 4.7 1.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 1. People should support their country even if things are not quite easy
The distribution of answers in table 2 offers a certain reflection over the approached 
aspect. In the Barometer of Public Opinion in Moldova from April 2003, respondents 
were asked, „In an eventual war, would you be ready to fight for your country?“. Of course, 
in the case of this distribution we should open some parentheses. First, the distribution 
for the ethnic minorities in this case is based on very few answers, because the sample 
was not divided by ethnic criteria. In order to show the similarities and differences 
between these questions, it is necessary to specify that the difference between the concrete 
cha racter of these questions (the difference in attitudes towards the object and the 
concrete situation) leaves a mark. In addition, one should take into account that the 
military ser vice implies certain restrictions based on gender, age, health condition and 
other social-demographic characteristics. For these reasons, we will accept only a general 
comparison. 
The fact, that from the total number of adult population 60.4 percent declared their 
readiness to fight for the country, proves a rather high level of patriotism, as the rest of 
the respondents represent the elderly, women, and the disabled, and only a small number 
represents capable people who did not accept this situation. 
The Gagauz and Bulgarians, compared to the other ethnic groups, registered again 
the lowest shares of affirmative answers. The Moldovans registered the highest share. 
114  BAROMETRUL RELAŢIILOR ETNICE 1994-2002: O perspectivă asupra climatului interetnic din România. Cluj, 2002
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Yes 64.1 56.0 56.0 53.0 41.2 33.3 60.4
No 27.2 36.0 31.0 30.8 39.2 52.4 29.1
Don’t know 7.2 4.0 7.1 12.8 15.7 14.3 8.3
No answer 1.5 4.0 6.0 3.4 3.9 .0 2.2
Base (number of respondents). 846 25 84 117 51 21 1155
Table 2. Would you fight for your country in case of a war?
What would be the explanation to the fact that the population, being quite loyal to 
the state, gives priority to the ethnic factor when it comes to self-identification, ignoring 
citizenship and affiliation to the state they are loyal to? The answer is determined by the 
nature of factors, and constitutes a real background. If in the case of self-identification 
people approach factors such as socio-economic, political stability and strength of the 
state, then in case of loyalty the answers are based on the psychological features of the 
population. The Moldovan people are famous for its hospitality, kindness etc, they are 
considered rather collectivist than individualist115. Moldovans help everyone who is in 
need, in this case even the state. 
The way people perceive their ethnic affiliation is important when characterizing the 
ethnic consciousness. The data from table in annex 2 confirm the fact that the sacral 
perception of affiliation predominates: we notice that, regardless of the nationality, the 
respondents offer the highest scores to parents’ nationality, when determining the ethnic 
affiliation of an individual. In addition, the language spoken in the family was noted, 
respect of the traditions, considering that the native language is indeed the language of 
this nationality. It is interesting to notice that the feeling of affiliation to the ethnic group 
registered a large share among the respondents of all nationalities. 
At the same time, there are significant discrepancies in the share of each factor depen-
ding on the nationality of respondents. The share of „parents’ nationality“ factor is higher 
among Bulgarians, Gagauz and Moldovans/Romanians, and less significant in the case of 
Russians and Ukrainians. The spoken language is more significant for Moldovan/Roma-
nian and Bulgarian respondents, and least significant, compared to the rest of the nationa-
lities, for Ukrainians. The share of customs and traditions is important, regardless of res-
pon dents’ nationality. Significant differences were registered regarding the statement „to 
honor the national flag of the state of the relevant nationality“. The statement was supported 
by 19 percent of Russians, 9 percent of Moldovans/Romanians, 13 percent of Bulgarians, 
6 percent of Ukrainians and 0 percent of Gagauz, a fact explained through different attitu-
des of each of these groups towards their historical homeland. The Gagauz are the only 
ethnic group that lives preponderantly in Moldova and does not have a nation-state. 
115  See: Hofstede Geert „Managementul structurilor multiculturale“, London, 1996
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The data from this table (see annex 2) determine us to talk about another important 
moment in the analysis of ethnic consciousness, namely about some features of identity 
ethno-consolidation, i.e. about the most important elements that approach representa-
tives of one ethnic group to another. As dominant criteria, in the identification of the 
par ticipants, were mentioned the language spoken in the family (48 percent among 
Moldovans and 29 percent among Russians), respect for traditions of the ethnic group 
(36 percent among Moldovans, 36 percent among Bulgarians and 29 percent among Rus-
sians), and the culture of the relevant nationality (32 percent among Moldovans and 25 
percent among Gagauz and Ukrainians). Such a criterion as native language signifi cantly 
varies from one nationality to another, thus this option was mentioned by 40 per cent of 
Ukrainians, 33 percent of Bulgarians, 31 percent of Gagauz, 21 percent of Moldovans/
Romanians and only 14 percent of Russians. 
According to the research results, we can conclude that an important role in the for ma-
tion and preservation of ethnic identity is played by ethnocultural elements. It is neces-
sary to mention the importance of connections between ethnic and linguistic processes, 
because language is the most obvious factor in the formation and functioning of ethnic 
consciousness, bearing a formation character since this common language makes commu-
nication in the social space possible. Especially in Moldova, the language issue bears a 
specific character and generates many political and social tensions. In the conditions of a 
multiethnic environment, the usage of a common language does not imply that different 
groups of people belong to one ethnic group. Language should be regarded as an impor-
tant element based on which more complicated structures, belonging to different cultural 
aspects, are formed. On one hand, being an obvious external indicator that differentiates 
the ethnic entity from other entities, a kind of solidarity symbol, language implies the 
unity of ethnic and cultural community and influences the character of interethnic rela-
tions; on the other hand, it is, to some extent, an indicator of the assimilation processes 
occurring in the region. 
Generally, we can notice a relationship between the size of the ethnic group and the 
number of languages, native as well as spoken, practiced in this group. We notice that the 
smaller the group, the larger the number of the languages spoken within it. However, the 
statement based only on the size of the group will not be comprehensive. The languages 
practiced in particular and the assimilation processes in general, depend on many factors, 
but if we refer only to the objective factors, then besides the size of the group, a significant 
influence has the specific nature of distribution of an ethnic group in the territory, popu-
lation area (whether concentrated or extended), co-habitation of different groups on the 
same territory, as well as other factors. 
Concerning the languages practiced within each ethnic group (see annex3), the lowest 
disparity between native language and language spoken in the family exists only in the 
case of Moldovans/Romanians and Russians, where there are almost no differences in 
the share of the language declared native and the language spoken in the family. There is 
a large disparity among the rest of the ethnic groups: among Ukrainians, where 82 percent 
of respondents declared Ukrainian the native language and only 66 percent speak Ukrai-
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nian at home, while 25 percent declared Russian the native language and 43 percent speak 
it at home. 97 percent of Gagauz respondents declared Gagauz language their native and 
only 83 percent speak it in the family. The largest fluctuation, as in the case of Ukrainians 
and Bulgarians, is registered for Russian language, which was declared native by 14 per-
cent and spoken at home by 44 percent of respondents. 92 percent of Bulgarian respon-
dents mentioned Bulgarian as native and only 71 percent speak it at home, while Russian 
was declared native by 22 percent and 47 percent speak it in the family. 
The perception of national language as an important element of ethnic integration 
on one hand, and the use of a different language, in this case Russian, or both, reflect a 
difference between the real behavior and the projective behavior in this sphere, because 
the bilingualism is a necessary prerequisite in adapting to the conditions of a multiethnic 
environment. Obviously, there have been several debates on the question, which emerges 
from this situation. Theoretically, there can be two extremes in this sense: adoption of 
the language of majority, namely the official language, action that releases the assimilation 
processes or, on the other hand, the seclusion and use of the one’s own language in the 
communication realm (impossible to realize in a pure form). The paradox of this situation 
has its roots in the period between 1812 and 1991, denoting the fact that the linguistic 
indicator of the ethnic processes still proves a pro-Russian tendency. From the perspective 
of objectives of the analysis, language, or more exactly the position of minority languages, 
would be part of collective rights.
Concerning the specific rights of representation, no direct adequate indicators 
could be found in the results of surveys available for the author, but the answers to the 
question regarding the Moldovan laws on minority rights could offer us a general reflec-
tion. We believe that this indicator presents a specific interest because it reflects directly 
the „ethnic“ legislation of Moldova. 
The highest score is registered for the statement enough rights, but from the perspec-
tive of the specific goal of this analysis and because this share is homogeneous enough 
(in the range of 60-70 percent), we will present only the shares of the statements too 
many rights and not enough rights in a comparative analysis of ethnic groups. Among 
Moldovan/Romanian respondents, the highest share for the statement too many rights 
was registered with regards to the Russian ethnic group (21.7 percent). Concerning the 
rest of the ethnic groups, the size of this share in the answers of Moldovan respondents 
is in direct relationship with the size of each ethnic group. 
In the case of ethnic minorities, the main tendencies are:
- the Romanians and Russians are considered the most advantaged from this per-
spective; they register the highest shares in the answers of minority groups for the 
option too many rights. 
- the fact that the Gagauz ethnics represent the only group that has territorial-ad-
ministrative autonomy is not reflected in the opinion of other ethnic groups, the 
shares for the answer too many rights referring to Gagauz group being very modest; 
there is a different situation in the case of Bulgarian respondents, among Bulgarians 
this share being the highest; 
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- the highest score for the option not enough rights is registered among Russian res-
pon dents who act as advocates of minority rights, and the lowest shares are regis-
tered among Moldovan respondents. 
Moldovans/
Romanians Ukrainians Russians Gagauz Bulgarians
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Russians have… 21.7% 4.0% 5.8% 10.7% 4.6% 20.1% 9.1% 6.6% 8.8% 14.2%
Ukrainians have… 11.2% 6.3% 1.5% 16.2% 2.7% 18.9% 3.2% 9.1% 3.5% 16.9%
Gagauz have… 9.6% 6.8% 2.2% 10.2% 3.2% 19.2% 5.7% 14.6% 9.7% 13.2%
Bulgarians have… 7.2% 6.0% 1.7% 11.1% 1.9% 19.7% 3.4% 9.3% 2.1% 22.3%
Romanians have… 5.8% 9.9% 6.3% 7.0% 12.6% 10.0% 5.7% 3.4% 9.3% 8.1%
 Table 3. What is your opinion about the Law on the rights of minorities in Moldova?
Concerning the multiethnic rights, we will analyze the answers to the questions 
regarding the duty of Moldovan state to support the development of different aspects of 
identity of ethnic minorities (see table 4). The share of minority respondents who agreed 
that the Moldovan state should guarantee their children the opportunity to pursue education 
in the language of their minority, support the cultural organization of the ethnic groups and 
help develop the identity of ethnic minorities, in all cases was higher than 70 percent. The 
differences between the answers provided by Moldovans and minority groups are visible. 
This difference is relatively smaller concerning the support of cultural organizations 
of the ethnic groups, a little higher (approximately 30 percent) in the case of education 
in minorities’ language and very high in the case of a subjective aspect, such as assistance in 
developing the identity of ethnic minorities (differences between 40-50 percent). We find 
a higher level of tolerance of the majority group towards some institutionalized forms of 
multiethnic rights, such as the language of education and cultural organizations, than in 
the case of identity, i.e. the basic element in the conservation of evolution of interethnic 
relations. The majority ethnic group seems to „favor“ the Russians and little less the Ukrai-
nians, in comparison with the Gagauz and Bulgarian groups. In the case of education in 
minority language and identity issue, the share of affirmative answers, offered by the 
Moldovan/Romanian respondents, is the highest compared to the rest of the minority 
groups, and second, in case of Ukrainians. We find again that Russian ethnics are the most 
consistent advocates of multiethnic rights. They support mostly the idea of education in 
the language of minorities, and development of the identities of these minorities. If we 
compare the shares in their case, and in the case of other ethnic groups, there is a paradox 
when the statement refers to this group: the ethnic Russians agree more with the statement, 
„the state should guarantee the opportunity to pursue an education in Ukrainian for the 
Ukrainian children and teenagers“ than ethnic Ukrainians (89.6 percent for Russians and 
85.5 for Ukrainians). Compared to Gagauz, this ratio is 82.8 percent to 76.9, compared 
to the Bulgarian respondents 84.7 percent to 77.0 percent. 
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Do what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
Do you think that Moldova should…?
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guarantee education in Russian for Russian children and 
teenagers 57.4 91.7 86.2 80.5 78.9
guarantee education in Ukrainian for Ukrainian children 
and teenagers 53.2 89.6 85.5 81.8 76.3
guarantee education in Gagauz for Gagauz children and 
teenagers 48.7 82.8 77.7 76.9 70.3
guarantee education in Bulgarian for Bulgarian children 
and teenagers 49.5 84.7 77.7 80.5 77.0
support the cultural organizations of different ethnic groups 
in Moldova 65.6 86.2 80.6 74.4 79.4
help develop the identity of the Russian ethnic group 35.2 88.3 81.1 80.9 79.1
help develop the identity of the Ukrainian ethnic group 33.3 85.4 80.1 73.5 76.6
help develop the identity of the Gagauz ethnic group 32.6 78.2 74.1 82.0 75.4
help develop the identity of the Bulgarian ethnic group 33.0 77.7 71.9 75.0 79.1
Table 4. The numbers represent the share of „totally agree“ and „somewhat agree“ answers. 
Regarding autonomy, we have only one finding. We find that among Moldovans/
Romanians, those who totally agree or somewhat agree with the statement that „Moldova 
should grant a larger autonomy to districts where an ethnic group represents majority“ 
represent less than one third of the options, and a little more are those who totally 
disagree with this statement. The distributions are inversed in case of minority ethnic 
groups. In all cases, the sum of totally and rather agree answers represents over half of the 
options, and only in the case of Bulgarians 47.1 percent. It is worth mentioning that this 
sum is somewhat larger among the Russian and Gagauz respondents, respectively among 
them the lowest is the share of totally disagree answers, as compared to the Bulgarian and 
Ukrainian ethnics. The confusion resides in the fact that the Gagauz is the only ethnic 
group from Moldova enjoying territorial-administrative autonomy, based on ethnic 
confi guration of the area where they reside, and the Russians are somewhat advantaged 
from the perspective of their rights compared to other minority groups, both in the 
opinion of Moldovans and minority groups (see table 3). Moreover, even among the 
Russian respondents, the share of those declaring that Russians have too many rights is 
higher than regarding the rights of other minority ethnic groups (besides Romanians) 
(see same table). 
The ethnic consciousness, both at the individual and group level, is based on the opi-
nions about one’s own people (ethnic group), which definitely are related to the characte-
ristic features of other ethnic communities that determine the formation of attitudes and 
stereotypes of behavior in the realm of interethnic interactions. Namely, the ethnic fee-
lings, sometimes partly understood, form the basis for the ethnic complementarities and 
represent a very important indicator of ethnic consciousness. 
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Moldovans/
Romanians Ukrainians Russians Gagauz Bulgarians
Totally Agree 10.9 26.2 33.3 29.0 21.8
Somewhat agree 16.7 27.6 26.2 29.7 25.3
Disagree 24.6 14.3 12.6 19.9 21.8
Totally disagree 29.0 12.1 10.9 4.2 17.9
Don’t Know/No answer 18.9 19.9 17.0 17.2 13.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 5. The state should grant a larger autonomy to districts where an ethnic group represents 
majority.
The Ethnobarometer results show certain contradictions regarding the attitude towards 
one’s own ethnic affiliation, especially in case of Moldovans (see annex 4). Although the 
share of totally agree and somewhat agree answers to the statement the fact that I am 
Moldovan/Romanian makes me proud is 82 percent, which is one of the highest share 
compared to other groups, 58 percent of them mentioned that the affiliation with this 
group makes them feel ashamed, which is incomparable with the statements of respon-
dents belonging to other ethnic groups. 
Stereotypes also represent an important component of ethnic consciousness: the na-
ture of interethnic relations, interaction or conflict and confrontation, depends on the 
balance between self and hetero stereotypes. 
We can notice that ethnic Moldovans noted best the features of Russians, for the rest 
we conclude that the lower the group, the less visible its stereotypes, fact confirmed by 
the analysis of non-answers (see annexes 5, 6). Thus, the Moldovans assign all minorities 
negative features such as selfishness and aggressiveness. 
The index of quality of social contacts (see table below), calculated based on the ans-
wers using the Bogardus social distance scale, presents a special interest. The Bogardus 
scale includes seven categories, each of them representing a certain level of social distan-
ce. The subject is asked to express the acceptance or rejection of a person from the dis-
tance group at different levels of distance (marriage, friendship, neighbor, employee, citi-
zen, visitor and total rejection). The index of quality of social contacts is a sum of points 
attributed to each position depending on the distance (acceptance as part of the family 
equals 7 points, the rejection of the person equals 1 point). Thus, the 0-index means 
rejection of all positions and 28 – acceptance of all positions. 
The scale used in the Ethnobarometer has only five positions (part of the family, 
friend, neighbor, resident of the same locality, resident of Moldova), and does not include 
a visibly negative position, such as total rejection from the country. In this case, a zero 
index means rejection of all positions, highest closeness, and index 5 implies full accep-
tance of all positions, respectively total openness. The average values of the indicator for 
each respondent sample are presented in the table below. 
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Social contact quality index *
Moldovans
/Romanians Russians Ukrainians Gagauz Bulgarians
Moldovans 14.26 13.91 13.13 13.21
Russians 11.17 13.99 13.06 13.03
Ukrainians 10.63 14.05 12.76 12.70
Gagauz 9.11 11.86 10.11 11.51
Bulgarians 9.75 12.18 10.01 12.68
Romanians 12.47 11.79 9.89 11.19 10.75
Table 1a.
* The respondents’ nationality is mentioned in the upper row; the ethnic groups for which the 
index is calculated are mentioned in the left column. 
From the table data, we can notice a rather high general level of openness, in none of 
the cases the index is below 9, which means general acceptance up to the friendship 
level. If we perform a comparative analysis, we can say that Moldovans have the highest 
level of openness towards Romanians (12/47), Russians (11/17), Ukrainians (10/63), and 
are somewhat less open towards Bulgarians and Gagauz. If we refer to stereotypes (see 
annexes 15, 16), Moldovan respondents had the highest number of non-answers for these 
ethnic groups. Among other ethnic groups, Moldovans and Russians are more privileged, 
and Romanians is the least accepted group among ethnic minorities from the country. 
Romanians are the least accepted by the Ukrainian ethnics from Moldova in comparison 
with other ethnic groups. The studies of the Kiev International Institute for Sociology 
(KIIS) from Ukraine ascertain the same thing, and establish „an extremely high level of 
intolerance towards Romanians at the national level in Ukraine, overrun only by Roma 
and the black population“.116 We should comment on the indicator calculated in relation 
to Romanian ethnics, which makes us be more attentive and reserved in our statements 
and assumptions regarding this issue. The probability that Ukrainian respondents did 
not refer to the Romanian ethnics from Moldova but from Romania is very high. 
In order to have a better image of reality, we will use the social distance index (SDI), 
calculated based on the same scale. If the indicator of the quality of social contacts pre-
sents an amount of the shares offered to each position, the social distance index represents 
a simple total of rejections of the relevant positions, so, the lower the value of SDI (less 
possibilities for contact were refused), the more reduced the social distance towards 
member of the respective group. In this case, the zero value of the indicator signifies an 
extremely reduced distance and acceptance of all positions, while a value equal to five 
signifies rejection of all positions (included on the scale) and the highest social distance, 
accordingly. 
116  Dan Dungaciu. Materials of the National Conference „Republic of Moldova in a new regional security context», Chisi-
nau, 11–12 May, 2005. 
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Social distance index
Moldovans Russians Ukrainians Gagauz Bulgarians Romanians
Moldovans 0.17 0.24 0.42 0.42
Russians 1.05 0.23 0.44 0.48 2.09
Ukrainians 1.23 0.23 0.51 0.57 1.91
Gagauz 1.71 0.84 1.34 0.88 2.27
Bulgarians 1.52 0.75 1.36 0.55 1.89
Romanians 0.73 0.87 1.39 0.97 1.16
Table 2a.
The value of the social distance index with a value below one signifies highest open-
ness and, namely, acceptance up to the level of family member. Generally, SDI is rather 
reduced and presents a general acceptance between acceptance at the friendship level 
and acceptance as a family member, regardless of the interviewed ethnic group and the 
ethnic group towards which the attitude was expressed. In case of Romanian ethnics, we 
have two cases when the value of SDI is between 2 and 3, i.e. the Russians and Gagauz 
are accepted by them only up to the level of neighbors. The calculated index shows that 
Moldovan ethnics are more closed in comparison with other ethnic groups. They accept 
Romanian ethnics, and only in a relatively small percentage, as family members, the other 
ethnic groups being accepted up to the friendship level in different shares. Russian ethnics 
manifest the highest level of openness. They accept all ethnic groups, in different pro-
portions, up to the family level, SDI ranging from 0.17 for Moldovans to 0.87 for Roma-
nians. It is necessary to note that, although all minority groups included in the sample 
are Russian speaking from the perspective of interethnic communication, Russian ethnics 
manifest the highest level of openness towards Moldovans (the lowest value of SDI in the 
sample being 0.17), and are less opened towards the Gagauz and Romanians. 
 Citizenship as a source of political identity. In order to reflect this aspect, we will 
use the frequency of distributions of answers regarding the statements I prefer to be a ci-
tizen of Moldova than a citizen of any other country and there are many things I should be 
ashamed of because I am a citizen of Moldova.
In the case of minority groups, half of the respondents agreed more or less with the 
statements, but none of the groups reached the share of 60 percent (see table 6). It is 
remarkable that in the given case Russian ethnics register again the highest percentage 
(the combined shares of the options totally and rather agree is 59.9 percent). This number 
is not significantly higher in case of Moldovan/Romanian respondents, as the latter 
registered a share of 66.8 percent. For comparison, according to the results of the 2002 
Barometer of Interethnic Relations in Romania, this number reached 85 percent among 
Romanian ethnics. 
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Moldovans/
Romanians Ukrainians Russians Gagauz Bulgarians
The sum of distributions for 
totally agree and rather agree 66.8 55.4 59.9 52.1 51.3
Totally Agree 38.8 25.4 28.6 22.7 26.2
Somewhat agree 28.0 30.0 31.3 29.4 25.1
Disagree 15.5 23.5 18.7 25.4 30.4
Totally disagree 8.3 5.6 9.2 11.7 12.3
Don’t Know/No answer 9.5 15.5 12.1 10.8 6.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 6. I prefer to be a citizen of Moldova than a citizen of any other country
Citizenship is embarrassing for almost one third of Moldovan ethnics (28.5 percent); 
in the case of minority groups this percentage does not differ too much, Ukrainians regis-
tering the lowest (22.5) and Russians the highest percentage (34.2 percent) (see table 7). 
This obvious aspect depends on many things, first on the general satisfaction of the po-
pulation with the political, economic and social situation in the country. The existence 
of alternative citizenship options would be another factor. An eloquent example regarding 
the second factor would be the fact that in Romania (Barometer of Interethnic Relations 
1994-2002, Romania) the lowest share of the affirmative answers to this statement was 
registered by Roma ethnics, who do not have an alternative citizenship (19.4 percent com-
pared to 22.6 percent in case of Romanians and 42.3 percent in case of Hungarians). 
Moldovans/
Romanians Ukrainians Russians Gagauz Bulgarians
The sum of distributions for 
totally agree and rather agree 28.5 22.5 34.2 28.6 29.0
Totally Agree 7.3 7.5 13.1 9.7 9.3
Somewhat agree 21.2 15.0 21.1 18.9 19.7
Disagree 29.7 35.4 28.6 33.9 29.7
Totally disagree 29.7 24.5 24.3 27.1 34.1
Don’t Know/No answer 12.2 17.7 12.9 10.4 7.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 7. There are many things I should be ashamed of because I am a citizen of Moldova
* * *
This was an attempt to investigate the subjective perception of citizenship through 
the prism of elements of ethnic consciousness. Obviously, in decision-making and in the 
implementation of solutions in the spirit of liberal theory of minority rights, a deeper 
and more complex scientific investigation is necessary. The complex approach of this 
kind of subjective aspects results in more profound interdisciplinary implications, which 
is impossible to accomplish only by one researcher in a limited timeframe; nevertheless, 
we consider that we reflected the main aspects in this sense. 
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The first and main conclusion is that the Moldovan society is still facing a crisis of 
values, caused by the sudden transition from communist ideology to a democratic system. 
This event is revealed by the process of self-identification, regardless of ethnic background, 
the identification based on ethnic factor and much less on citizenship comes first, this 
situation being specific to transition and crisis periods that accompany a young and 
uncon solidated state. 
Regardless of the ethnicity, the level of citizens’ loyalty is rather high. It is worth men-
tioning that the highest shares in this respect do not belong to the majority group, but to 
Russian and Ukrainian ethnics, though the differences are not significant if we take into 
consideration the margins of error. The fact that the same shares are registered in Ro-
mania means at least two things: probably this aspect has nothing to do with a specific 
area and does not depend on economic development, the level of democracy and other 
things that distinguish Moldova from Romania at this moment. 
To what concerns multiethnic rights, among ethnic minorities the shares of those 
who consider that minorities in Moldova do not have given enough rights are rather 
high. Generally, there is a polarization of opinions regarding minority rights, among majo-
rity group, and ethnics who declared themselves Romanians and minority groups. It is 
natural that respondents from the majority group are more reserved about granting spe-
cific additional rights to minorities comparing to those belonging to minority groups. In 
addition, universal is the idea that Russian ethnics are more favored in comparison with 
the rest of ethnic groups, and that they manifest to a greater extent, in comparison with 
other minority groups, dispositions in favor of specific additional rights for all minorities, 
except Romanians. 
Another conclusion is that granting autonomy to ethnic groups does not solve the 
problems and does not favor this group, according to the population and even in the eyes 
of other minority groups. This conclusion is possible due to the observation that the auto-
nomy granted to the Gagauz does not offer this group any advantages related to minority 
rights. 
Moldovans are rather reserved about granting multiethnic rights to minorities. Appro-
xi mately half of them do not agree with the idea that the state has to provide students of 
ethnic minorities the right to education in their native language, and about two thirds 
express their disagreement about state duty to help the development of minority groups’ 
identity. 
Another finding is the so-called paradox that Russian ethnics express more support 
for granting multiethnic rights to other minority groups than these groups themselves. 
On the other hand, the minority ethnic groups express more support for education in 
Russian language than for education in their own native languages offered to their own 
group. However, the second situation is explained first through the position, more pre-
cisely the usage, of Russian language and other minority languages on the territory of the 
country. 
The Moldovan/Romanian ethnics do not welcome the idea of granting autonomy to 
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the districts where an ethnic group is dominant, while this idea is supported by less than 
two thirds of respondents belonging to ethnic minorities. 
Of course, Kymlicka’s theory does not limit its applicability only to the investigation 
of subjective perception of citizenship; it is also valid in case of other specific decisions.
Finally, we will make a little digression from the researched issue in order to reflect 
some moments that we consider important, namely, a more favorable position of the 
Russian ethnic group in the opinion of other ethnic groups, and the more prominent 
attitude of the Russian ethnics in favor of granting more rights to minority groups.
In this context, we wonder if it is correct to explain this phenomenon only from the 
ethnic perspective, or say that Russians favor additional specific rights only because they 
belong to the Russian ethnic group and because of the situation of this ethnic group in 
Moldova and in the ex-soviet space from the historical and geopolitical perspectives. We 
do not think so. The existence of other factors, maybe as important, it can be observed if 
we analyze the distribution of respondents by education level and by residence area. Let 
us refer only to one of the aspects that generate differences in the perception and opinion 
of citizens from rural and urban areas: fluctuation of information. We see, from the table 
below, that all ethnic groups except Russians are preponderantly residents of rural areas, 
while 84 percent of Russians live in cities.
Moldovans/Romanians Russians Ukrainians Gagauz
Urban 36.6 83.7 45.0 32.4
Rural 63.4 16.3 55.0 67.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Residence area
Based on this, it would be appropriate to present some correlations from the Barometer 
of Public Opinion (February 2005) on media coverage by residence areas (see annex 7). 
First, it is worth mentioning that the access to information in rural areas is very limited. 
There are only three television channels with national coverage (TVM, ORT and TVR). 
Only one of these channels (ORT) is broadcast in Russian, and the individuals who do 
not know the official language mainly watch this channel, moreover, the broadcast time 
of ORT Moldova is limited. 5.3 percent of urban and 13.1 percent of rural population do 
not have a TV. Only 94.3 percent of people from urban areas and 87 percent of people 
from rural areas watch TV daily or several times a week. To what concerns radio audience, 
the percentage represents 77.5 for urban areas and 76.9 for rural area, while the situation 
of printed media is more critical: 11.1 percent of the respondents living in cities mentioned 
that they read newspapers once a month or less, while 12.2 percent had not read news-
papers in the last 3 months. Second, in rural areas, 28.4 percent of the respondents had 
not read newspapers in the last 3 months and 12.2 percent read newspapers once a month 
or less. Thus, there are village/city differences regarding the access to information. 
Another question could be the „quality“ of information, i.e. how often and what 
exactly a person watches/listens/reads during the day. It is obvious that life in rural areas 
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is characterized by an abnormal working day, which is reflected on the duration of media 
reception. Referring to what exactly a person watches/listens/reads, it would be logic to 
admit the existence of a positive correlation between education of an individual and the 
types of received information. The higher the education level, more types of programs 
the individual is interested. In this case, we suggest looking at the distribution by edu-
cation level of respondents belonging to different ethnic groups (see table below). Gene-
rally, we can say that Russian respondents have a higher level of education. They register 
the lowest scores in the case of lack of education, incomplete general education and ge-
neral education, and the highest shares in the case of college and university education.
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No education 6.6 1.5 4.6 7.6 3.9
Incomplete secondary education 25.1 12.9 25.9 24.6 16.7
Secondary school 21.5 18.7 24.0 33.1 27.6
Vocational school 17.3 21.8 22.0 20.3 25.3
High school 3.0 1.5 .2 1.1 1.4
Post high school education (college) 11.4 10.9 8.7 3.8 6.0
Incomplete higher education 2.9 5.3 1.5 3.2 3.5
Complete higher education 11.3 20.9 10.2 5.5 13.5
Master’s degree, PhD .5 1.5 .5 .2 .2
Don’t know 1.0 .5 .6 .5
No answer .4 4.1 1.9 1.4
Education level
We noticed that the population from urban areas is already more advantaged regar-
ding the access to information, education, differences in living standards in urban and 
rural areas. This would be one of the causes that explain why Russians are perceived as 
the richest, most influential etc.: not only because they were advantaged during the soviet 
times, but also probably because most of them live in the cities. 
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ANNEX 1
Which of the following statements describe 
best your identity:
I consider myself first of all… Multiple 
choice!
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Representative of the declared nationality 77% 59% 46% 66% 62%
Resident of this locality 6% 16% 14% 14% 14%
Citizen of Moldova 15% 20% 31% 17% 18%
CIS Resident 0% 4% 5% 2% 4%
European 1% 1% 2% 0% ,7%
Eastern European 0% 0% 1%
Don’t Know/No answer 0% 1% 2% 1% ,9%
ANNEX 2
In your opinion, what are the most 
important three things for a person 
to be considered representative 
of the declared nationality? 
Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices! M
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Have parents of this nationality 51% 48% 46% 56% 59%
Speak the language of this nationality 
in the family 48% 29% 38% 38% 46%
Follow the customs and traditions of this 
nationality 36% 29% 31% 33% 36%
Feel part of this nationality 30% 37% 42% 31% 38%
Feel the culture of this nationality as his/her 
own culture 32% 25% 29% 25% 31%
Honor the national flag of the state of this 
nationality 9% 6% 19% 0% 13%
Live in the state of this nationality 26% 12% 34% 32% 10%
Be a native speaker of the language of this 
nationality 21% 40% 14% 31% 33%
To have the citizenship of the state of this 
nationality 21% 13% 18% 16% 12%
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ANNEX 3
Moldovans/
Romanians Ukrainians Russians Gagauz Bulgarians
Language:
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Moldovan 86% 85% 4% 8% 6% 12% - 1% 6% 13%
Romanian 17% 17% 1% 4% 3% 6% - 1% 1% 1%
Russian 2% 7% 25% 43% 94% 93% 14% 44% 22% 47%
Ukrainian - 1% 82% 66% 3% 4 % - - 1% 2%
Gagauz - - - - - 1% 97% 83% 2% 8%
Bulgarian - - - - - - 1% - 92% 71%
Other - - - - - - - - - -
Don’t know/No answer - - - - - - - - - 1%
ANNEX 4
To what extent do you agree with 
the following statements: the fact
that I am the representative of the 
declared nationality…*
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a. makes me proud 82% 72% 79% 83% 85%
b. makes my life easier 41% 23% 35% 39% 42%
c. makes me feel ashamed 58% 4% 6% 13% 15%
d. makes my life harder 11% 9% 12% 12% 15%
* The distribution represents the sum of the answers for totally agree and rather agree
186 ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
ANNEX 5
Positive qualities attributed 
by Moldovan respondents 
to different ethnic groups
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Decent 14% 9% 8% 2% 3%
Kind-hearted 13% 4% 6% 2% 1%
Hearty 9% 3% 4% 1% 2%
Independent 4% 12% 6% 3% 1%
Civilized 2% 6% 2% 1% 2%
Educated 3% 5% 3% 2% 1%
Resourceful 3% 9% 5% 3% 2%
Joyful 7% 7% 8% 2% 2%
Clean 1% 2% 1% 1% 1%
Religious 5% 3% 3% 3% 3%
United 1% 7% 5% 4% 4%
Honest 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Modest 1% 1% 2% 1% 1%
Hardworking 26% 1% 3% 3% 3%
Intelligent 0% 1% 1% 0% 0%
Hospitable 8% 4% 3% 2% 2%
None 1% 6% 6% 9% 7%
Don’t know/No answer 3% 20% 35% 61% 63%
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ANNEX 6
Negative qualities, attributed by 
Moldovan respondents to 
different ethnic groups
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Selfish 10% 9% 8% 3% 3%
Aggressive 4% 20% 8% 6% 3%
Apathetic/cold 6% 5% 4% 1% 2%
Obedient 16% 1% 2% 2% 3%
Backward 3% 1% 2% 3% 2%
Uneducated 4% 3% 2% 1% 1%
Negligent 5% 2% 2% 1% 2%
Sad 4% 2% 2% 1% 1%
Dirty 1% 3% 2% 2% 2%
Superstitious 2% 2% 2% 1% 2%
Divided 4% 1% 2% 1% 1%
Thieves 4% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Vainglorious 1% 3% 2% 1% 1%
Lazy 1% 6% 2% 2% 1%
Stupid 1% 0% 0% 1% 0%
Hostile 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
None 13% 7% 10% 7% 7%
Don’t know/No answer 21% 33% 48% 65% 68%
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ANNEX 7
How often do you…
Residence
Urban area Rural area
read newspapers
Daily (6-7 days a week) 20.3% 10.7%
A few times a week 33.9% 25.0%
A few times a month 19.6% 19.1%
Once a month or less 11.1% 12.2%
None in the last 3 months 12.4% 28.4%
Don’t know 1.5% 1.8%
No answer 1.3% 3.0%
listen to the radio
Daily (6-7 days a week) 56.6% 62.1%
A few times a week 20.9% 14.8%
A few times a month 4.7% 4.4%
Once a month or less 2.0% 2.5%
Never in the last 3 months 10.8% 11.5%
Don’t know .9% 1.4%
No answer 4.1% 3.3%
watch TV
Daily (6-7 days a week) 86.9% 80.6%
A few times a week 7.4% 6.4%
A few times a month 1.6% 1.6%
Once a month or more seldom .4% 1.0%
Never in the last 3 months 2.5% 7.8%
Don’t know .1% .3%
No answer 1.0% 2.3%
Do you have a TV at home?
Yes 94.0% 86.6%
No 5.3% 13.1%
No answer 0.7% 0.2%
STEREOTYPES AND INTERETHNIC IMAGES
Natalia Cojocaru
The study of ethnic phenomenon and ethnic relations offer the possibility of knowing 
the effective dynamics, which guide the intergroup trends, as well as a richer and more 
accentuated understanding of social conflicts. Even if stereotypes were treated separately 
from the problems of intergroup relations, they represent one of the factors capable of 
deteriorating or improving the relations between various social groups. Further studies 
reveal the fact that images and stereotypes, created by group members about each other, 
result from the type of reports, developed by the groups themselves. The judgment errors 
that occur because of stereotyping „others“ could release xenophobic and discriminative 
attitudes towards other ethnic groups. Therefore, by having the knowledge of stereotypes, 
developed by individuals or groups in interaction with others, is necessary, moreover 
because of the fact that these will determine the positions and influences, usually 
negatively, as well as the behavior and intergroup relations
There have been many studies on national stereotypes at the level of common 
conscience, especially after the Second World War (50-60s), and then it was brought 
back during the post communist period. 117 The majority of these studies have been 
developed through UNESCO program 118, by reflecting a better mutual understanding 
and a reduction of negative stereotypes. A series of experimental studies have proved 
that the work groups, that initially were having a negative perception about each other, 
were getting closer together and were succeeding on psychological barriers, being 
engaged in the realization of „supraordinated“ projects.119 The activities completed 
collectively determine the formation of a favorable perception regarding the neighboring 
group, and the reports of collaboration concluded between the members, engaged in the 
group effort, are necessary to finish successfully the „supraordinated“ project120.
117  I. Radu, Social Psychology, Cluj-Napoca, Ed. EXE SRL, 1994.
118  Th e researches were realized under the auspices of UNESCO - O. Klineberg (1950) has studied the images that nations 
have about each other, with the purpose of studying the false representations or the gaps, for the mutual knowledge and 
understanding. W. Buchanam and H. Cantril (1953) have researched on samples from nine countries ( Austria, Great 
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, Norway and USA) the way diff erent nations „see themselves“ on the base of a 
check-list, which includes factors such as: diligent, intelligent, spirit, pragmatic, arrogant, generous, ruthless, shy, coura-
geous, capable of self-controlling, ironic, progressive, pacifi st. H. C. Dujker and N. Frida (1960) chose, as their fi eld of 
study, the national characteristic and stereotypes, and C. Guillaumin (1974) – interethnic attitudes refl ected in the mass 
media messages from the francophone countries (apud I. Radu, Social Psychology, Cluj-Napoca, EXE SRL, 1994). 
119  I. Radu, op.cit.
120  It is shown as evidence that the percent of sociometric elections at the end of the experiment is non – discriminatory in 
the context of those two groups involved, although the separation aff ects negatively the perceptive and emotional sphere 
of relations between the groups, apud I. Radu op.cit.
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Stereotypes do not constitute rigid structures, but modify themselves under the 
influence of certain social events. In certain historical periods, there exists bewilderment 
about traditional stereotypes: some stereotypes could disappear and new characteristics 
would come into sight regarding certain groups. The collapse of Soviet Union and the 
formation of new states made possible for similar processes to occur. 
Our goal, through out this study, was to determine and to evaluate social representa-
tions (images and stereotypes) of various ethnic groups from Republic of Moldova. We 
tried to reflect the way some members from different ethnic groups represent their 
group (autostereotype), the characteristics attributed to other ethnic co – habiting groups 
(hetero stereotype), and based on this, the type of reports that are developed by a variety 
of ethnic groups. The study begins with a psychosocial analysis of the concept of ste-
reotypes and relations between intergroups, by presenting definitions, dimensions and 
traditional ex pla nations of the phenomenon, further continuing with the presentation of 
„ethnic por traits“, and concluded with the discussion on some strategies for demolishing 
negative stereotypes. 
What are the stereotypes?
Stereotypes represent omnipresent elements of every day life, expressing the preferred 
themes of many studies in the field of social psychology. A definition widely used in the 
psychosocial literature treats stereotypes as an assembly of opinions and faiths regarding 
the personality characteristics and behaviors of a social group. Thus, stereotypes could be 
opinions, as well as beliefs.121 The difference is useful, because the opinions are flexible to 
the new information, and as a result could be changed easier, however the beliefs interfere 
as „solid representations“ that determine the individual’s behavior. Stereotypes function 
as „mechanisms of information reduction“, which facilitate the rational economy, event 
called „cognitive egoism“.122 Generally, stereotypes have a bad reputation, justified by 
their „participation“ in the formation of prejudices and discriminative attitudes.123
The term’s origin 
The term „stereotype“ is a mix of two Greek words: stereos (fixed, solid) and typos 
(character). The original meaning had technique significance to it and it meant multi-
plication of a typographic form through casting a copy in metal.124 Taken over by the 
liberal sciences in the 30’s, the word stereotype undertook the meaning of “that corpus 
of beliefs shared regarding the personality and behavior characteristics, specific to one 
121  А. А. Налчаджян, Этнопсихология, СПб, Питер, 2004, p.197.
122  P. Iluţ, Iluzia localismului şi localizarea iluziei. Polirom, Iaşi, 2000.
123  V. Yzerbut şi G. Schadron, Cunoaşterea şi judecarea socială. Polirom, Iaşi, 2002, p.163.
Usually stereotype are confused with prejudices or are used as synonyms in the common language, the diff erence though is 
referring to the following “ the prejudice is a negative attitude regarding each member of a group motivated just by its 
belonging to the group, but the stereotype is a cognitive stereotype of this attitude, while discrimination is referring to the beha-
vior determined by negative attitudes. “ (D. Capozza, C. Volpato, Relaţii intergrupuri: perspective clasice şi contemporane, 
în R. Y. Bourhis şi J.-F. Leyens (coord.). Stereotipuri, discriminare şi relaţii intergrupuri. Iaşi: Editura Polirom, p.12).
124  S. Chelcea, Personalitate şi societate în tranziţie. Studii de psihologie socialã, Bucureşti, Editura „Societatea Ştiinţă şi 
Tehnică“, 1994, p. 242.
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group“.125 The „Invention“ of this term belongs to Walter Lippmann (1922), who attributed 
the psychosocial meaning to it, in relation to the rigidity of our concepts about social 
groups.126 The author considers that humans do not react directly to the spurs of the world, 
but instead to the images in their mind. „The right environment is very important, very 
complex, and very changeable for the direct knowledge. We are not equipped in order to 
endorse this subtlety, a variety of permutations and combinations. In order to travel the 
world one needs a map“.127 These „super simplified images in our mind“, as Lippmann 
expressed himself, let us filter the objective reality, the awareness of the „other“, by pre su-
ming social judgment and perception of the other, these processes support the need for 
the individual to remain in a predictable and controlled world in order to adapt his/her 
beha vior, and in order to act. We do not see before we define, as the author notes, but we 
de fine before we see.128 Even if the etymological meaning of the word comes from the 
Greek stereos, which in translation means solid, fixed, and suggests the stillness nature of 
images on certain social groups, the psychological researches accentuate more on the 
flexibility, than on rigidity of faiths and expectations regarding a population relatively 
homogeneous.129
How are stereotypes formed and what are they used for?
Lippmann underlined in Public Opinion that even if stereotypes are schematic and 
inexact, they are still inevitable: neglecting stereotypes means in fact impoverishment of 
human life. Later on, Gordon Allport (1954), in his book The Nature of Prejudice, brings 
back the discussion on the study of stereotypes, mentioning that the categorization process 
has the mission to simplify a complex environment, so stereotypes constitute a derivative 
of this necessary operation. 
The mechanism of comparing with „others“ (other ethnic groups) is based on the forma-
tion of ethnic heterostereotype. There have been identified three comparison situations: 
interethnic comparison of equality, interethnic comparison of superiority and interethnic 
comparison of inferiority.130 The ethnic stereotypes are considered more objective in the 
first comparison state, meaning that when an ethnic group is comparing with another 
one at an equal position vis-à-vis the status and accomplishments. In the other two cases, 
stereotypes are either preponderantly negative, or positive. These comparison situations 
reveal the following types of relations:
• Positive perception of the in-group and positive perception of the out-group;
• Negative perception of the in-group and negative perception of the out-group;
125  V. Yzerbyt şi G. Chadron, Stereotipuri şi judecată socială, în R. Y. Bourhis şi J.-F. Leyens (coord.). Stereoti puri, discrim-
inare şi relaţii intergrupuri. Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 1997, p.98.
126  Th e American journalist and political analyst W.Cippmann (1889-1974) have introduced for the fi rst time in his book 
Public Opinion, published in 1922, the term stereotype, borrowed from publisher’s vocabulary, were stereotype means a 
metal form used for clishe’e.
127  Quoted by: J.-Ph. Leyens, V. Yzerbyt şi G. Schadron, 1996, p. 22 în S. Chelcea et al., Cercetări psihologice con crete 
pri vind reprezentarea socială a identităţii naţionale a românilor, 1998, p. 264.
128  V. Yzerbut şi G. Schadron, Cunoaşterea şi judecarea socială. Polirom, Iaşi, 2002, p.99.
129  S. Chelcea, Reprezentarea socială a identităţii naţionale a românilor, Sociologie Românească, 1994, 2-3, 194 –196.
130  А. А. Налчаджян, Этнопсихология, СПб, Питер, 2004, pp. 223–224.
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• Negative perception of the in-group and positive perception of the out-group;
• Positive perception of the in-group and negative perception of the out-group.131
Stereotypes are released by various contextual situations, based on them, they have 
different specific functions. Tajfel (1981) distinguishes three social stereotype functions: 
social cause explication, social justification and social differentiation. The first is concerned 
with the attempt to understand social events or unsocial through the identification of one 
group, perceived as being responsible (the tendency of attributing a sort of responsibility 
to the group of emigrants for the economical crises, and the development of a negative 
stereotype in this way). Social justification represents an act of developing a specific ste-
reotype for one group in order to justify the actions designed by it (for example, the case 
of negative stereotypes produced by colonial powers regarding the nations that exploit 
them). Nevertheless, social differentiation refers to the stability of social positive identity 
through the emphasis and clarification on differences between groups, in order to estab-
lish a distinction in the favor of the belonging group.132
Have stereotypes a grain of truth?
Sometimes, stereotypes could contain some truth, but more often, 
it is just an incident. 
(O. Klineberg)
The classic approaches on stereotypes have emphasized, in particular, the errors of 
perception and of social trial challenged by these images. Afterwards, the concern of 
accuracy has replaced the classical concept of false stereotypes.
When the issue of erroneous or true character of stereotypes is being discussed, the 
notion of stereotype accuracy then is being used, referred to the estimation of correspon-
dences between the stereotype features attributed to one social group, and those real 
ones, which they already possess.133 In the psychosocial literature there are many studies, 
that try to demonstrate the empirical accuracy or inaccuracy of stereotypes. The research 
on autostereotype and heterostereotype of Greeks and Americans (Triandis and Vassiliou, 
1967), and of Japanese and Americans (Abate and Berrien, 1967) points out their rela ti-
vely accurate character, although the data presented by McCaulez, Langavelu and Rozzin 
(1988) refutes this fact.134 
O. Klineberg has worked out a series of researches on the question if the stereotype 
is untrue or at least contains a grain of truth. The author’s answer is a positive one – not 
all the stereotypes are false, they could be more or less close to truth. The study realized 
by Ch. Judd and B. Park (1993) reveals the fact that stereotypes for in-groups are more 
accurate than those for out-groups, the latter ones, in the author’s opinion, being the 
expression of generalizations and super-generalizations.135
131  А. Налчаджян, op.cit., p.223.
132  Apud V. Yzerbut şi G. Schadron, Cunoaşterea şi judecarea socială. Polirom, Iaşi, 2002, p.37.
133  E. Stănculescu, Acurateţea stereotipului, în S. Chelcea şi P. Iluţ (coord.), Enciclopedie de psihosociologie, Editura 
Economică, Bucureşti, 2003, pp.19-20.
134  Ibidem.
135  Ibidem.
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Three types of inaccuracy are known:
• The inaccuracy of stereotype information, which refers to the tendencies of sub-esti-
mating or supra-estimating the real attributes of the group;
• The inaccuracy of valence, the tendency of perceiving the group is more or less 
positive than in the reality;
• Inaccuracy of dispersion, the perception of the group is more or less heterogeneous 
than in the reality.
Th e Interaction with „the other“ – intergroup relations 
The groups’ encouragement constitutes the fertile soil where 
nationalism blossoms. 
 (T. Todorov)
More psycho-socialists point out the fact that the members of one in-group136 tend 
to favor the belonging group, and produce stereotypes and discriminations against the 
members of an out-group. Each group fights for a social positive identity. Social positive 
identity is seen as a source of self-respect. Groups have the necessity of a self-high respect; 
however, members develop various strategies to cope with the lack of respect. 
In the case of stereotype activation, the information is influenced by a series of inter-
group effects, such are: in-group favoritism; the familiarity effect, prototypical, auto-
referen tial effect, the double treatment and the automatic vigilance.137 The in-group 
favoritism is translated through judgments or behaviors in favor of the belonging group, 
the familiarity effect indicates the tendency to evaluate positively the known stimulus; 
the prototypical resorts on a model (composed or unique) as a typical exponent of the 
same group; the auto-referential effect points out a more accentuated easiness, through 
which we process the information about ourselves, comparing to other categories of 
information; and at last the double treatment information indicates the tendency to 
activate strategies of various categories, in function of their belonging. 
Beginning from 1953, Avigdor has demonstrated that the image that one group is 
developing about the „other“ depends on the contact type existent between those two 
groups. Thus, the author points out the following: 
• The stereotype is generally detrimental if the relations between those two groups 
are in conflict, and favorable if they are friendly or have a cooperative character;
• The stereotype contains the most apt characteristics in order to induce behaviors 
that contribute either to the conflict digest or to the improving of relations between 
those two groups.138
William G. Simmer (1906) said that the hostility regarding the out-group is pro-
portional to the cohesion intensity in an in-group139, but Ilut (2004) believes that even 
136  Referensies to in-group are made in term of us (afi liation group), and to out-group in terms of others (other groups).
137  L. Iacob, Etnopsihologie şi imagologie. Sinteze şi cercetări, Iaşi, Polirom, 2003, p.186, 201. 
138  Apud W. Doise et al. Psihologie socială experimentală, Iaşi, Polirom, 1999/1978.
139  P. Iluţ, Valori, atitudini şi comportamente sociale. Teme actuale de psihosociologie, Polirom, Iaşi, 2004. 
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if it does not take the form of hostility, the pride of „ourselves“, accompanied often 
by an implicit or expressive disregard of „others“, is visible beginning with family 
groups (…)
As far as ethnicities and nations go, ethnocentrism phenomenon is significant in this 
sense.140 Psychosocial research developed by Henri Tajfel (1969, 1971), through the model 
of minimalist intergroup situations, has demonstrated, experimentally, that only the simple 
dividing of subjects in two groups generates discrimination and favoritism of the in-group. 
Tajfel (1981) claims that the simple categorization, induced experimentally between „us“ 
and „them“, promotes favoritism between the members of the in-group and depreciation 
of those in out-group. This relation has been illustrated experimentally by another study 
as well. For example, in order to decipher the degree of similarity that exists, perceived by 
members of the in-group, and the degree of threatening to the evaluation of members in 
out-group, has resorted on the questioning of more than hundreds Russian students regar-
ding three out-groups (Moldavians, Ukrainians, and Georgians), asking them to evaluate 
features such as: hostility, friendship, intelligence, greed, how much they look alike, and the 
degree of threat to Russia. The authors established that as threat becomes less important 
and similarities larger, then the descriptions are more favorable – in case of Moldavians 
and Ukrainians – and as perception of threatening is increasing and the degree of simi-
larity is decreasing – the case of Georgians – then the descriptions are less favorable.141
Interethnic Perceptions
The goal of the current analysis is to delimit stereotypes that outline the ethnic 
portrait of various ethnicities in the Republic of Moldova, as well as the emphasis on the 
differences and similarities that exist between the autostereotype, and the representations 
of other ethnic groups regarding the analyzed group, and at last, the discussion on the 
common images between autostereotype and another’s perception.
Starting with the theoretical principles and the conclusions of some empirical studies 
described earlier, our expectations are similar to the principles described by the authors, 
found in the results of the Ethno-barometer. Thus, the classical effect, due to perception, 
such as: in-group favoritism and depreciation of out-group, the homogenous out-group and 
heterogeneous in-group, the types of interethnic comparisons will be discussed with regards 
to stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes of the analyzed ethnic groups. 
How did the subjects proceed? From a list142 of 32 bipolar attributes (16 positive and 
16 negative), the subjects were required to choose three positive features and three nega-
140  P. Iluţ, op.cit., pp. 195-196.
141  E. Henderson-King, D. Henderson-King, N. Zhermer, S. Posokhova, V. Chicher, In-group favoritism and perceived 
similarity: A look at Russians perceptions in the post soviet era, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 1997, apud 
P. Ilut, Valori, atitudini şi comportamente sociale. Teme actuale de psihosociologie, Polirom, Iaşi, 2004, p. 201.
142  honest – selfi sh, kind – aggressive, hearty – indiff erent/cold, independent – obedient, civilized – backward, educated 
– uneducated, resourceful –procrastinators, joyful – sad, clean – dirty, religious – superstitious, united – disunited, loyal 
– thieves, modest – vainglorious, diligent – lazy, intelligent – stupid, hospitable – hostile.
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tive ones that could describe best the Moldavians, Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz, Bulga-
rians, and the Romanians from the Republic of Moldova. The proposed attributes are 
referred to the intellectual sphere (civilized, intelligent, stupid and so on), the interpersonal 
relation sphere (honest, kind, aggressive, hostile and so on), the way one is at work (diligent, 
lazy), the in-group cohesion (united, disunited) and so on. The questioned ones could 
also choose from the following: none, I don’t know/no answer. 
The fist result is that generally, the autostereotype is positive; the subjects choose in 
order to describe their own group with more positive attributes, the classic phenomenon, 
named in-group favoritism. The Moldavians’ ethnic portrait, and possibly the Russians’ 
one are distinguished through tendencies clearly delimited and trenchant. The Gagauz 
operate with the least negative descriptions for the portrayal of the „other“, however Bul-
ga rians and Ukrainians, generally, use a large palette of attributes. The Russian autoste-
reotype, comparing to other attributes, mentions intelligence, the level of education, and 
politeness, attributes that are not often seen in the hetero-stereotype of Russian for other 
ethnic group, but neither in other autostereotypes. 
Ethnic stereotypes: are these truly stereotypes? What surprised us even from the 
begin ning were the proportions relatively high registered for the answers I do not know/ 
no answer, when the subjects had to select negative attributes for the description of other 
ethnic groups, and of the belonging group, such would be the case of Ukrainians and 
Gagauz. In our opinion, this fact is due to either the lack of information regarding certain 
ethnic groups, and thus, a perception about these groups is not formed, or is due to the 
type of a defense mechanism, expressed through the avoidance of pronouncing about 
that group, even making the „other“ – taboo. 
Table 1. Answers (in percent) I don’t know / no answer
Moldovians Ucranians Russians Gagauz Bulgarians Romanians
SP SN SP SN SP SN SP SN SP SN SP SN
M/R 5% 27% 38% 52% 24% 40% 62% 67% 64% 70% 38% 55%
U 17% 68% 24% 81% 31% 70% 73% 97% 79% 95% 77% 86%
R 16% 34% 17% 39% 17% 39% 52% 55% 53% 59% 48% 49%
G 26% 47% 34% 53% 28% 50% 22% 55% 37% 54% 59% 66%
B 12% 28% 23% 37% 15% 31% 21% 34% 12% 35% 41% 46%
PS – positive stereotype, NS – negative stereotype; M/R – Moldavians (Romanians)), U – Ukrainians, 
R – Russians, G – Gagauz, B – Bulgarians.
Analyzing Table 1, we observed that only in the case of Bulgarians, concerning about 
its own group, and also other ethnic groups, the proportion of these answers is 50% smaller. 
In the Moldavian (Romanian), Russian, and Ukrainian heterostereotype, comparing to 
the Gagauz, and Bulgarian one, there are recorded proportions with more than 50%, 
much higher, even in the Ukrainian case. We could consider that this could happen due 
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to the lack of information regarding these ethnic groups, the lack of a geographic proximity, 
but clearly that this is not valid in the Ukrainian case, for which 81 % are attributed to 
the negative autostereotype. 
The Ukrainian case could be explained by a high in-group favoritism, which clarifies 
the lack of desire in expressing in negative terms about the belonging group. 
Our interrogation, regarding the existence of some stereotypes, is precisely referred 
to the absence of some obvious tendencies in stereotyping, being doubled by the high 
proportions of answers I do not know/ no answer. In the case of Moldavians and Russians 
we can discuss about some clear tendencies of stereotyping, in all the other cases the 
perception is very different, without identifying some tendencies. Further, we will analyze 
what are the different ethnic groups’ portraits, by presenting the qualities and defects 
that appear in autostereotype and heterostereotype. 
About Moldavians (Romanians)143
a) „Diligent, but less welcoming…“ If we take in consideration the characteristics that 
have a higher frequency among the identified attributes in the ethnic autostereotype 
of the Moldovan/Romanians, then hospitality and diligence clearly resulted to be 
the psycho-moral features, which are most indicated by subjects. Thus, Moldavians/
Romanians are considered diligent (57%), welcoming (41%), and less joyful (28%), 
kind (27%) and honest (22%), being characterized the same by Ukrainians, Rus-
sians, Gagauz and Bulgarians. 
In table 2, the degree of the reflections of these attributes is represented through the 
voices of alteration in heterostereotypes. 
Generally, according to the attributed stereotypes, we could deduct that other eth-
nic groups have a positive attitude towards Moldavians. There are registered even more 
mentions on feature, such as honesty to Ukrainians, Russians and Gagauz with corres-
pon dingly 34%, 25% and 24% comparing to the one identified in the Molda vian/Roma-
nian autostereotype (22%). Moldavians are considered kind by 27% Moldavians/Roma-
nians, 40% Ukrainians, 42% Russians 29% Bulgarians, who assign this feature to them. 
143  „According to the results from Ethnobarometer 2004, it is pointed out (still) the presence in the collective imagina-
tion of these two perceptive categories – Moldavians and Romanians. Th e author of the present study shares his opinion 
according to which the population with a Romanian ethnic represents the majority group in R. of Moldova. However, 
for the present analysis, the diff erence between Moldavians and Romanians could be done at the level of perceptive cat-
egories, and not the ethnic one. We base on theoretical principles described by H. Taifel (1981), who underlined the idea 
that if the members of one group consider that they are diff erent from others, this is enough and suffi  cient for them to 
„exist“, even if these perceptive diff erences are not based on the objective level. Th us, even if the small amount of those 
who declared themselves Romanians, the Moldavians (Romanians) data regarding other ethnic groups will be presented 
separately from the heterostereotype of other ethnic groups, regarding Moldavians and Romanians. Nevertheless, we 
cannot expect to a greater amount of those who declare themselves Romanians, aft er so many years of developing a diff er-
ent type of identifi cation. We try though to progress, but the hypothesis that „Moldavians do not want to be Moldavians 
anymore“ (we could depict a sentiment of frustration, according to the negative autostereotype), but, they are not even 
(at the perceptive level, not ethnic one) Romanians. Th is sinuous process of de-categorizing is a long lasting process. In 
addition, according to the functions of social events (and of offi  cial politically ones) is going to be produces the „passing“ 
to one or another category. Even though the group who declares itself Romanian is a minority, we can conclude that there 
exist rudimentary forms of stereotypical organizations of other groups concerning this group. A perceptive category and 
a representation related to this category in development!
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Table 2. Positive stereotype. How are Moldavians perceived by…?
Moldavians/
Romanians Ukrainians Russians Gagauz Bulgarians
Honest 22%* 34%* 25%* 24%* 17%*
Kind 27% 40% 42% 29% 27%
Hearty 23% 20% 27% 23% 24%
Educated 13% 11% -** 17% 13%
Joyful 28% 29% 29% 19% 30%
Diligent 57% 56% 43% 20% 29%
Hospitable 41% 11% - -** -**
None 1% 1% 0% 1% 0%
Don’t know/ no answer 5% 17% 16% 24% 12%
*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice 
**less than 10 percent
The frequency of these positive stereotypes among the attributed features by other 
ethnic groups, and their presence in the Moldavian/Romanian stereotype lead us to the 
conclusion that these would represent the main characteristics of the Moldavian „ethnic 
portrait“. Moldavians remained as „dilligent“ as they were before, but what has happened 
with the expression „hospitality“? In the soviet period, hospitality was considered, beside 
diligence and joyfulness, to represent specific features of Moldavians. Nowadays it seems 
that this fact does not hold truth anymore. While 41 percent of Moldavians/Romanians 
consider that this is a specific characteristic of Moldavians, and just 11% Ukrainians, 9% 
Russians, 8% Bulgarians and 5% Gagauz share this opinion. 
The advocates of the functionalist theory maintain the idea that stereotypes depend 
on the evolution of the relations between the intergroups. 
The bewilderment of the interethnic perception is realized according to certain 
conflicts or social events that have a major impact. Hence, the researches done by Katz 
and Braly (1933), and Gilbert (1951), with the theme of American stereotype regarding 
different nations show that the Second World War had a huge impact on the American’s 
stereotype, vis-à-vis Germans and Japanese.144 If Japanese were seen in 1933 as being 
intelligent, diligent, and progressive, then in 1951 they are perceived as being perfidious 
and malicious. The same type of bewilderment could be found in relation with Germans. 
Almost two decades later the stereotypes of these nations regained same aspect as before 
the conflict.145
Basing on the conclusions of these studies, could we consider that the traditional 
stereotype of Moldavians has been modified after 1989? Which were really the causes 
that have bewildered the traditional stereotype of the Moldavians? Why Moldavians 
became less „hospitable“ in the perception of others, according to the high percent for 
this feature in the autostereotype?
144  D. Katz, K. W. Braly, Racial stereotypes in one hundred college students apud V. Yzerbut şi G. Schadron, Cunoaşterea 
şi judecarea celuilalt, Polirom, Iaşi, 2002, pp. 27-28.
145  M. Karlins, T. L. Coff man, Walters, On the fi nding of social stereotypes: Studies in three generations of col lege students 
apud V. Yzerbut şi G. Schadron, Cunoaşterea şi judecarea celuilalt. Polirom, Iaşi, 2002, p. 28. 
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b) „Obedient, but also aggressive…“ After almost 15 years of independence, the 
majority ethnic group from Republic of Moldova is dealing with a severe identity 
crisis. Among Moldavian (Romanians) respondents, 95% declare themselves Mol-
davians and only 5% Romanians.146
The identity crisis is reflected at the level of stereotyping as well. It was mentioned 
before that the groups tend to a positive identity, and the pride of „us“ is associated with 
a strong cohesion in-group. Regarding the negative autostereotype of Moldavians (Roma-
nians), we can establish the presence of some features that lead to the lack of the cohesion 
and solidarity in-group. However, Moldavians (Romanians) perceive „others“ as united! 
The attribution of the characteristic disunited for your own group, and the idealized 
projection of the opposite – united – for the others, in our opinion, demonstrate a strong 
sentiment of frustration. 
Thus, in the negative autostereotype (table 3), among the defects assigned to Molda-
vians/ Romanians with a higher frequency can be mentioned: obedient (30%), disunited 
(19%) and procrastinators (18%). They are considered to be procrastinators and obedient 
by others as well, however with a lesser frequency. Among Ukrainians and Gagauz’ 
respondents, a higher amount of mentions don’t know/ no answer (with respectively 68% 
and 47%) is registered. Even if Moldavians/Romanians are considered to be disunited, 
they are considered to be likewise by Ukrainians and Bulgarians with 11% and 15 % res-
pectively. All the ethnic groups consider them backward: 11% Moldavians/Romanians, 
11% Ukrainians, 16% Russians, 12% Gagauz and 17% Bulgarians. Russians consider Mol-
da vians equally aggressive (18%), but obedient (18%). Moldavian obedience is classic, and 
is recognized by other groups as well in autostereotype, but why then aggressive? Were 
they perceived similarly in the soviet period as well? Were Moldavians as aggressive 
by the time the Soviet Union collapsed, event, which produced changes at the level of 
perception and intergroups relations, in the opinion of N. Enciu.147 The author considers 
that the event provoked an absolute psychological shock for Russians, being the equiva-
lent to the loss of the status of a soviet citizen and the acceptance of a new status, 
unordinary, the one of being the citizen of a new independent state and of a national 
minority. Because we do not have at our disposal the empirical data, that could support 
or refute these affirmations, we could just presume that the events after 1989 have influ-
enced somewhat the classical perception, or either Moldavians remained as aggressive as 
before, or even more aggressive. 
Those two defects that do not register significant frequencies in the autostereotype 
of Moldavians, but are mentioned by others are superstitious and uneducated. 
In the autostereotype of each ethnic group, we can find positive features as well as 
negative ones. Most of the times, the amount of those positive is greater, the negative 
ones are present, but at times, during the existence of the group their number can become 
146  We consider that this percentage would be higher, if in the questionnaire could be incuded also some variables like: 
Romanian from Republic of Moldova, Moldavian Romanian or Bessarabian Romanian.
147  N. Enciu, Populaţia titulară a Republicii Moldova faţă cu minorităţile naţionale, în Arena Politicii, anul II, nr.4 (6), 
ianuarie, 1998. 
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larger. Nalceadgean considers that the presence of a great amount of negative features in 
autostereotype becomes as a protection mechanism, present in situations when:
• The ethnic group applies negative stereotypes for devaluing its own group and are 
used when more members of this group are not satisfied of the belonging to this 
group or are marked by an inferiority complex;
• The members of an ethnic group are very self - critics regarding the position of the 
belonging group and present a strong desire for self - perfectionism. 
It seems obvious the frustration sentiment experienced by the members of the group, 
regarding the belonging group, through the clear opposition of „us disunited and them 
united“.
Table 3. Negative stereotypes. How are Moldavians perceived by…
Moldavians/
Romanians Ukrainians Russians Gagauz Bulgarians
Aggressive 10%* 13%* 18%* -** 12%*
Obedient 30% 22% 18% 10%* 19%
Procrastinators 18% 12% 11% 10% 11%
Selfish 14% 12% 12% - 11%
Disunited 19% 11% -** - 15%
Backward 11% 11% 16% 12% 17%
Superstitious -** 22% 10% 11 12%
Uneducated - 14% 14% 11% 18%
None 14% 14% 15% 7% 7%
Don’t know/ no answer 27% 68% 34% 47% 28%
*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice 
**less than 10 percent
c) A new perceptive category or about Romanians 
„This kind of Moldavians“. Even if there exist some similarities between „the old“ 
portrait of Moldavians and the features mentioned by other ethnic groups for Romanians, 
such as: honest and joyful, the differences are significant. Moldavians/Romanians 
assigned most of the qualities – effect caused by the in-group favoritism. However, we 
could observe that precisely the qualities that have not been attributed to Moldavians, 
are assigned to Romanians. Could this be a category of some sort of active minority 
described by S. Moscovici?148 
Romanians are seen as being educated, independent and civilized (table 4). Thus, it is 
registered a high percent of answers don’t know/no answer among Ukrainians and Gagauz, 
which is caused, in our opinion, by uncertainties and ambivalent attitude regarding this 
148  Th e notion of active minority as decribed by S. Moscovici does not represent only the reduced number of persons, but 
the behaviorist style, the action. S. Moscovici considers the behaviorist styles of active minorities to be characterized by: 
investment (spending of money, energy, time in order to achieve the goals), autonomy (independence of thoughts and 
attitudes), consistency (the organization of information), rigidity (the majority reaction regarding minorities), equity 
(the minority preoccupation for stabilizing equitable relations with the majority). In order to infl uence the majority, the 
active minorities want their actions to be visible and recognized as a mark of originality, without being progressive or 
reactionary, active minorities militate for social changes. apud S. Chelcea, Un secol de psihosociologie, Iaşi, Polirom, 
2002, pp. 143 -144. 
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perceptive category. As a prove could serve the fact that Romanians’ representation is 
still in progress, without being sufficiently structures in the collective mentality.
Table 4. Positive stereotype. How are Romanians perceived by…
Moldavians/
Romanians Ukrainians Russians Gagauz Bulgarians
Honest 12%* -** 14%** -** -**
Educated 14% 19%* -* - -
Joyful 10% 15% - - 15%*
Religious 16% 18% 11% 16%
Intelligent 16% 14% - - -
United 14% - - - 11%
Independent 12% 12% 12% - 12%
Civilized 21% 27% 21% 14%* 16%
None 4% 4% 4% 1% 3%
Don’t know/ no answer 38% 77% 48% 59% 41%
*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice 
**less than 10 percent
In the negative hetero-stereotype (table 5) there have been registered high proportions 
of answers don’t know/ no answer, higher than in the Ukrainian case. Comparing to Mol-
davians, who are seen as the symbol of diligence, Romanians are considered lazy by Ukrai-
nians and Moldavians/Romanians, and aggressive by Russians and Ukrainians. However, 
Ukrainians still cannot differentiate the feature obedient among Moldavians and Roma-
nians, with 22% and 17% respectively. Moldavians (Romanians) consider them vainglo-
rious, but Ukrainians and Bulgarians – indifferent/cold. It seems that precisely these attri-
butes, which appear in the hetero-image of ethnic groups regarding Moldavians, are 
registered through the opposite side of them in hetero-image about Romanians. 
Table 5. Negative stereotype. How are Romanians perceived by…
Moldavians/
Romanians Ukrainians Russians Gagauz Bulgarians
Vaniglorious 13%* 12%* -** -** -**
Lazy 12% 18% 10%* - -
Aggresive -** 12% 15% - -
Indifferent/cold - 19% 12% - 12%*
Subordinated - 17% - - -
Procrastinators - 14% - - 10%
Selfish - 17% 10% - 10%
Uneducated - 11% - - 12%
None 14% 10% 10% 5% 6%
Don’t know/ no answer 55% 86% 49% 66% 46%
*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice 
**less than 10 percent
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These „different kind of Moldavians“ who are perceived to be more educated, intel-
ligent and civilized, but aggressive as well could be perceived as a threat for „the other“149, 
and can be used as a source for competitive or conflict relations.150
About Ukrainians
a) „Kind and joyful…“. With a higher frequency, we can identify 12 qualities and 7 
defects in the autostereotype of Ukrainians. They are referring to features such 
are: diligent, honest and kind, that could characterize them best, and respectively, 
we find out that approximately the same proportion regarding these qualities of 
the representation of other ethnic groups about Ukrainians, and slighter than in 
the case of Moldavians/Romanians. In table 6 the proportion of the chosen attri-
butes in hetero-stereotypes of others regarding Ukrainians is represented. 
Table 6. Positive stereotypes. How are Ukrainians perceived by…
Ukrainians Moldavians/Romanians Russians Gagauz Bulgarians
Honest 27%* 12%* 10%* 15%* 12%*
Kind 26% 10% 26% 19% 21%
Hearty 23% 10% 22% 18% 19%
Educated 10% -** 10% 14% 12%
Resourceful 10% 12% 18% 10% 11%
Joyful 24% 19% 27% 20% 23%
Diligent 50% 16% 19% 13% 15%
United -** 14% -** -** 13%
Religious 13% - 11% 15% 12%
None 0% 7% 0% 0% 1%
Don’t know/ no answer 24% 38% 30% 34% 23%
*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice 
**less than 10 percent
149  One of the survey’s questions is referring to the perception of threat: Th inking about Moldavians, Romanians, Ukrain-
ians, Gagauz, Russians, Bulgarians from the Republic of Moldova, do you consider possible that they could become a 
threat for the nation, for the belonging ethnic group, for you or your family? An assemblage glance points out a relatively 
small percent for the answer choices: very much, and much, exception being the Moldavian (Romanian) group, for whom 
the perception of threat from other ethnic groups is relatively higher. Regarding Romanians from R. of Moldova, the highest 
percent is registered among Russian respondents. As comparison serves the fact that: just 3 % of Russians consider that 
Moldavians present a threat, and then 9% perceive Romanians being a threat for the nation, and 9% – for Russians. Roma-
nians are perceived as being a possible threat for the nation for 6% of Ukrainians and 7% of Bulgarians.
150  We are trying to evolve the idea that even if there would exist some interethnic tensions (even if we don’t consider 
that it could become and interethnic confl ict in R. of Moldova according to the results from the Ethnobarometer ), the 
reference to the minority ethnic groups is not done by majority rule ( tensions between majorities and minorities in the 
classical sense of approach, but we ascertain that it is more of a minority-minority rapport, taking in consideration that 
the rapport is created or might be created between Romanians ( minorities by quantity, and not quality), comparing to 
Moldavians who represent the majority by quantity, not by quality. 
Since this is the fi rst Ethnobarometer organized in Republic of Moldova there is no possibility of comparing, so we estab-
lish that we can discuss it as of a situation case, and this is the reason why we keep uncertainties and we can develop more 
ideas that conclusions, hoping that we could use them during the realization of more in-depth studies, and comparing the 
earlier results with the future ones. 
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Even if Ukrainians are considered diligent by 50% from them, the proportion among 
respondents from other ethnic groups is smaller. In slighter proportions, Ukrainians 
men tion the following features: educated, honest and hospitable, as well as specific attri-
butes for them. 
b) „Selfish and superstitious…“. Regarding the negative autostereotype, Ukrainians 
mentions among choices obedient, procrastinators, selfish and superstitious. Others 
also mention these features concerning this ethnic group; however, only Bulgarians 
(table 7) see Ukrainians as obedient. 
Table 7. Negative stereotype. How are Ukrainians perceived by…
Ukrainians Moldavians/Romanians Russians Gagauz Bulgarians
Aggressive -** 14%* 11%* -** 10%*
Indifferent/cold - 11% 10% - 13%
Obedient 14%* -** -** - 11%
Uneducated - - - - 12%
Procrastinators 16% - 11% 10%* 15%
Selfish 11% 12% 16% - 12%
Vainglorious - - - - 13%
Disunited 11% - - - 11%
Superstitious 20% - 10% - 11%
Backward 10% - - - -
Sad 14% - - - -
None 19% 11% 15% 6% 7%
Don’t know/ no answer 81% 52% 45% 53% 37%
Even if aggressiveness and indifference are not mentioned as characteristics, 
Moldavians/Romanians, Russians and Bulgarians see them this way. 
About Russians
a) Reminiscences of „older brother“: „We are like them, but more civilized“. 
In the autostereotype of Russians, nine qualities and seven defects are predominant. 
In the description of its own group, Russians use same attributes mentioned at first by 
respondents of other ethnic groups as well: honest, kind, hearty. The content differences 
between self-image and hetero-image are not registered. Same qualities are found in the 
mentions of other ethnic groups about Russians, and having almost same percent value 
(table 8). However just 26% Russians consider themselves honest, and just 13% Moldavians 
(Romanians) and 14% Bulgarians consider Russians honest, a smaller percent than in the 
Gagauz and Ukrainian case, with 21%. Moldavians (Romanians) consider Russians kind 
and hearty in a much smaller proportion than percent value for these attributes, in the 
case of other ethnic groups, where the proportion is much higher (Table 8). Even if 15% 
Russians consider themselves diligent, we cannot find a consensus in other stereotype as 
well, with the exception of Bulgarians, 10% of which perceive them to be diligent. Howe-
ver, if 10% Russians consider themselves united, 25% Moldavians and 20% Ukrainians 
perceive them united as well.
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Table 8. Positive Stereotype. How are Russians perceived by…
Russians Moldavians/Romanians Bulgarians Gagauz Ukrainians
Honest 26%* 13% 14% 21% 21%
Kind 22% -** 28% 25% 17%
Hearty 26% - 23% 17% 28%
Independent 18% 24% 17% 12% 19%
Civilized 17% 12% 16% 15% 14%
Educated 18% 11% 16% 15% 12%
Resourceful 14% 26% 16% 11% 20%
Joyful 21% 24% 25% 27% 27%
Diligent 15% - 10% - -
Intelligent 12% - 12% - 11%
United 10% 25% 11% - 20%
None 0% 7% 0% 0% 0%
Don’t know/no answer 17% 24% 15% 28% 31%
*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice 
**less than 10 percent
We can observe some common tendencies in stereotyping Russians regarding the 
following attributes: independent, civilized and joyful. Nevertheless, what was left from 
the mentality of „older brother“? Russians consider themselves civilized (17%) and 
educated (18%), considered same by Ukrainians (16%) and Gagauz (15%), and less by 
Moldavians (Romanians). These qualities do not appear on the first positions, in neither 
autostereotype (position 5, 6), nor heterostereotype. (5, 6, 7).
b) „Aggressive and lazy“. Common tendencies regarding Russians’ image is estab-
lished as indifferent, lazy and selfish. In the negative autostereotype, Russians men-
tion specific attributes of in-group: aggressive (17%), and in a smaller proportion: 
indifferent, lazy etc. Regarding aggressiveness, one percent relatively high is estab-
lished in the heterostereotypes of Moldavians/Romanians and Ukrainians, with 
respectively 31% and 20%. 
Table 9. Negative stereotype. How are Russians perceived by…
Russians Moldavians/Romanians Bulgarians Gagauz Ukrainians
Aggressive 17%* 31%* 13%* -** 20%*
Indifferent 13% 14% 14% 12%* 16%
Obedient 13% -** 12% - -**
Uneducated 11% 13% 12% 11% -
Procrastinators 12% - 15% - 27%
Lazy 13% 17% 16% 10% 17%
Selfish 10% 17% 14% 12% 13%
Vainglorious -** 14% 11% - 10%
None 17% 8% 7% 8% 17%
Don’t know/no answer 39% 40% 31% 50% 70%
*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice 
**less than 10 percent
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This conclusion seems to confirm the fact that the representations about „the other“ 
are caused by intergroup’s relations. The linguistic and national problems at the end of 
the 80’s have modified the nature of the relations between Russians and Moldavians/
Romanians from the Republic of Moldova. The east side of the republic, inhabited by 
mostly of Russian speaking population, has declared itself a cvasiindependent, justifying 
especially the decision of adoption a linguistic legislation, which was considered by them 
unjust, even if Russian has been declared as the interethnic language of communication. 
The aggravation of intergroups relations has blocked some reforms, moreover, it has de-
ve loped a sentiment of guilt among the majority population for the failure of some eco-
nomic reforms. No matter how banal would sound the idea of this association „Romanian 
language, history… – economic failure“ – it persists on the collective mentality level, acti-
vated when social problems are discussed at the level of common sense. 
The Gagauz – under the sign of marginalization
a) Who are the Gagauz? Gagauz people are continuing to be ignorant and margi-
nalized. Being named after Charles King „a nation forgotten by world and God“, Gagauz 
people represent with certainty the group least known, and the one that the subjects have 
less to discuss on. Bulgarians present the only exception, because of their geographical 
location, in the south part of the Republic of Moldova, region inhabited compactly by 
Gagauz people, had more common experiences with the members of this ethnic group, 
and the frequency of intergroups contacts generating a higher level of mutual familiarity. 
Incontestably, stereotypes are created by social interactions and respectively, intergroups 
interactions are influenced by stereotypes. Comparing the choice proportion of don’t 
know/no answer for each analyzed group regarding Gagauz, we can observe the high fre-
quency of the choices, either positive or negative (table 1). 
In the table below, the data (percents) are illustrated, obtained through the measures 
of mentions indicated by Gagauz and other ethnic groups regarding Gagauz. In the auto-
stereotype of Gagauz, we can observe a great number of positive attributes and practically 
the lack of a significant percent regarding the groups’ defects. Some of the specific qua-
lities of the Gagauz are  diligent (32%), honest (27%), kind (24%), hearty (21%), educated 
(18%) etc. Comparing to the self-imaged of other ethnic groups and the attributed 
heterostereotype we have established a relative similarity, very few from the self-dis-
tributed qualities of Gagauz have reflected in the heterostereotype of other groups about 
them. 
For example, just 10 % Russians and 11% Bulgarians perceive Gagauz as being honest, 
but for this quality, Gagauz had just 27% choices. Generally, Gagauz are not seen as kind 
as well, considered likewise by just 11% Bulgarians. A relative consensus exists regarding 
the quality of Gagauz as being resourceful, 8% Moldavians, 15% Ukrainians, 11% Russians 
and 17% Bulgarians considering them similarly. Gagauz are also perceived diligent and 
religious. Even if they are not considered united, 9% Moldavians/Romanians, 15% 
Ukrainians, 12% Russians and 26% Bulgarians consider them likewise. 
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Table10. Positive Stereotype. How are Gagauz perceived by…
Gagauz Moldavians/Romanians Ukrainians Russians Bulgarians
Honest 27%* -** -** 10%* 11%*
Kind 24% - - -** 11%
Hearty 21% - 15%* 10% 15%
Educated 18% - 11% - -**
Resourceful 10% 8%* 15% 11% 17%
Joyful 17% - 16% - 11%
Diligent 32% 8% 16% 12% 31%
Religious 13% - 19% 11% 17%
Loyal 12% - 16% - 11%
United - 9% 15% 12% 26%
Independent - - 17% - 14%
None 0% 10% 4% 3% 1%
Don’t know/no answer 22% 62% 73% 52% 21%
*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice 
**less than 10 percent
Regarding the negative heterostereotype, Bulgarians have again offered more infor ma-
tion. The table below represents the defects identified by them and other ethnic groups. 
Table 11. Negative stereotype. How are Gagauz perceived by…
Gagauz Moldavians/Romanians Ukrainians Russians Bulgarians
Selfish 10%* -** - 13% 13%
Aggressive - 11% 21% 13% 26%
Indifferent/cold - - 15% - 13%
Procrastinators - - 14% - 12%
Backward - - 12% - 10%
Uneducated - - 17% - 13%
None 12% 7% 11% 11% 7%
Don’t know/no answer 55% 67% 97% 55% 34%
*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice 
**less than 10 percent
Moldavians and Russians had the least amount of positive feedback, and Ukrainians 
probably do not even know the existence of Gagauz population in Moldova, since their 
proportion of answers don’t know/ no answer is high. Moldavians/Romanians (11%), Ukrai-
nians (21%), Russians (13%) and Bulgarians (26%) see them as being aggressive, however 
Gagauz do not see themselves likewise. Some of the negative attributes mentioned are 
indifferent, procrastinators and backward. 
The conclusions of some studies151 show the low level of communicative abilities of 
Gagauz populations, regarding other ethnic groups, deficiency in expressing opinions, 
151  Кауненко, Ирина; Гашпер, Лучия. (2002). Поиски путей формирования толерантности у молодёжи – основа 
построения гражданского общества Молдовы. În Sympozia Professorum. Seria Psihologie şi Ştiinţe ale Educaţiei. 
Chişinău: ULIM, pp. 100 – 101; N. Cojocaru, S. Suhan, Realităţi psihosociale în Găgăuzia, studiu realizat cu suportul 
fi nanciar al IPP Chişinău, 2003.
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perception of isolation comparing to „others“ and Chisinau („they know very few things 
about us“), as well as the lack of social mobility ( the tendency of living and studying in 
the native places). These would be the conclusions that we could express when analyzing 
the representation on Gagauz. 
About Bulgarians 
Bulgarians, as well as Gagauz are not really known by other ethnic groups (table1). If 
in the case of Gagauz, Bulgarians had more things to say, the image on Bulgarians is 
mainly build by Gagauz. The majority of attributes in the autostereotype of other ethnic 
groups are present in the autostereotype of Bulgarians as well (table 12). Therefore, 
Bulgarians consider themselves diligent (41%), kind (25%), hearty (17%) and educated 
(17%). The image of Moldavians/Romanians about Bulgarians is very fragmented. There 
are no attributed qualities that are registered by Moldavians for this ethnic group to be 
greater than 10%. This could be explained by the fact that there exist some stereotype 
structures regarding Bulgarians, and respectively, the opinions expressed are the result 
of a direct knowledge, that changes the traditionalism and the other one is perceived by 
in function of the context, the experience in this case being the one to structure the con-
tent of the stereotype. In the Russian stereotype about Bulgarians, 5 qualities are empha-
sized with a bigger proportion, less then Ukrainians’ mentions. However, the Gagauz tell 
us the most about this ethnic group. The Gagauz have a favorable attitude regarding the 
Bulgarians, their mentions being relatively similar to the one mentioned by the Bulgarians 
in the autostereotype. 
Table 12. Positive stereotype. How are Bulgarians perceived by…
Bulgarians Moldavians/Romanians Ukrainians Russians Gagauz
Honest 21%* -** -** -** 12%*
Kind 25% - 12%* 13%* 17%
Hearty 17% - 11% 10% 14%
Educated 17% - 11% - 12%
Resourceful 14% - 13% - 10%
Joyful 15% - 14% - 14%
Diligent 41% 9%* 17% 16% 20%
Religious 10% - 15% 10% 12%
United 11% 9% 18% 12% 11%
Loyal 14% - 12% - 11%
Independent - - 17% - 10%
None 0% 8% 3% 3% 1%
Don’t know/no answer 12% 64% 79% 53% 37%
*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice 
**less than 10 percent
In the case of the negative stereotype, we are referring to the Gagauz stereotype. Bul-
ga rians consider themselves obedient and disunited, and Gagauz perceive them as indif-
ferent and selfish.
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Table 13. Negative Stereotype. How are Bulgarians perceived by…
Bulgarians Moldavians/Romanians Ukrainians Russians Gagauz
Indifferent/cold 12%* -** 12%* -** 11%*
Obedient 17% - 12% - -**
Procrastinators 11% - 21% - -
Selfish 10% - -** - 12%
Disunited 18% - 14% - -
Backward 11% - 10% - -
Superstitious 11% - 14% - -
Vainglorious 11% - 17% - -
None 10% 8% 10% 11% 7%
Don’t know/no answer 35% 70% 95% 59% 54%
*percent representing the sum of the mentions from the first and second choice 
**less than 10 percent
The image of „the other“
Further, we will try to delimitate certain tendencies in stereotyping „the other“, and 
so, we will outline the type of relating to others. Moldavians (Romanians) perceive „the 
others“ as being joyful, united in the positive side, and aggressive in the negative one 
(Figure 1). 
In the Russians’ heteroimages we can distinguish many common features (figure 2). 
So, Russians’ image about others is resumed to the following: kind and diligent at the 
positive side, and aggressive, obedient, backward, selfish at the negative side, comparing 
to the creation of a frame of equality with Romanians. 
DP – Differentiated perception 
Figure 1. How Moldavians (Romanians) perceive others as…
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DP – Differentiated perception 
Figure 2. How Russians perceive others as…
Figure 3. How Ukrainians perceive others as…
Ukrainians’ image regarding others is differentiated (figure 3). There are no 
tendencies registered. Romanians are civilized and educated, but lazy, the opposite from 
Moldavians and same as obedient Moldavians. 
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DP – Differentiated perception 
Figure 5. How Gagauz perceive others as…
There are no differences remarked in the hetero-images of Bulgarians (figure 4) 
regarding Russians and Ukrainians („sort of Russians“). Common tendencies are joyful 
and kind, for Ukrainians, Russians and Moldavians, and Gagauz are united and aggressive. 
Image of „others“ in the Gagauz perceptions are: everyone is kind, Russians and Ukrai-
nians are joyful, Bulgarians and Moldavians are diligent, and Romanians and Russians 
being considered civilized (Figure 5).
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Similarities and autostereotypes
R. A. Levine and D. T. Campbell (1972) have discovered the existence of a universal 
stereotype in the in the perception mode of ingroups and outgroups in conflict situations 
and of nations with a memory full of tragic events based on outgroups.152 The authors 
have developed a study in the period of cold war in countries with pro-American views, 
pointing out then the individual’s tendency of attributing qualities to its own ethnic 
group, and respectively, the defects of the group with which it has conflict relations.153 
We have realized the presence of common features mentioned by each ethnic group in 
the autostereotype. Five qualities, respectively honest, kind, hearty154, joyful and diligent 
are the features that appear in relatively similar proportions to other groups, exception 
being the diligent ones, who appear in different proportions in the self-perceptions of 
subjects. In the table below, the data is presented:
Moldavians/
Romanians Ukrainians Russians Gagauz Bulgarians 
Honest 22% 27% 26% 27% 21%
Kind 27% 26% 31% 22% 25%
Hearty 23% 23% 26% 21% 17%
Joyful 28% 24% 21% 17% 15%
Diligent 57% 50% 15% 31% 41%
Table 14. Common autostereotype
These are actual qualities that emphasize the tolerance character and openness to-
wards the other, being present in the auto-stereotype, as well as in hetero-stereotype. The 
value of accuracy of these autostereotype has to be considered as well. The individual’s 
behavior in society in a concrete situation could be different of what individuals believe 
about each other, even if some studies point out the „weight“ of stereotypes. We cannot 
know if the perceived qualities are also intrinsic characteristics of the group or represent 
just the desire of presenting the members of the group, as being tolerant, honest, and 
open towards „the other“. A modern tendency in the study of an ethnic stereotype is the 
discussion about the measurement of general ethnic stereotypes and of contextual ethnic 
stereotypes. The ethnic context stereotypes are referring to the members’ behavior of an 
152  R. A. Levine şi D. T. Campbell, 1972, p. 183, cit. de Chelcea et al. Cercetări psihologice concrete privind re prezentarea 
socială a identităţii naţionale a românilor, 1998, p. 270. 
153  Th e autostereotype which is found in the self image of all the nations, contains affi  rmation such as: we are proud, we 
have self respect and we respect our traditions; we are loyal, honest and we trust one another; but we are induced by error 
of the ruthless strangers , we are courageous and we were always like this; we defend our rights and properties, we do not 
accept to be humiliated; we are peaceful and amiable; we do not hate, but our worse enemies; we are moral and spiritually 
clean. And respectively, the group heterostereotype with which the respondents are in confl ict contain negative character-
istics (the negative sign regarding the outgroup represents the positive part in autostereotype): they cannot see but their 
interests, they are exclusive, if they could they would lie to us, do not have the sense of honor, do not respect the moral 
code regarding the relations with us; they are aggressive and expansionists, they want to progress on our behalf; they are 
hostile and they hate us, they are immoral and dirty spiritually. 
154  In the same time we presume that for the fi rst three, such as honest, kind and hearty, could interfere the eff ect of order, 
these being on the fi rst positions on the list presented by the subjects. (See annexes 1-5)
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ethnic group in a specific role situations: as a marital partner, as a neighbor, as a friend, 
however the general ethnic stereotypes are referring to the attributed characteristics of 
the ethnic group, indifferent to the concrete situation in which this is manifesting. A 
series of psychological researches point out the importance, that the ethnic contextual 
stereotypes studies have, and referring to the „situation person“, it offers more information 
regarding the effective behavior comparing to the general stereotypes.155
Interethnic perceptions. Conclusions
• The taboo of „the other“. Having the relatively high proportion of answers don’t 
know/ no answer, we emphasize the lack of perceptive organizations, caused by 
either the lack of information regarding certain ethnic groups, or by a certain type 
of defending mechanism, manifested through the avoidance of pronouncing about 
the group, even the taboo „of the other“.
• The lack of clear tendencies of stereotyping: we can discuss on some clear tenden-
cies in stereotyping more in the case of Moldavians and Russians, and in all other 
cases perception is very differentiated, without having identified some tendencies. 
• A common autostereotype: we have found the presence of a common autostereo-
type to each ethnic group, respectively, honest, kind, hearty, joyful and diligent are 
features that appear in relatively similar proportions to all of the groups. 
• Moldavians are not as hospitable: they are perceived as being as diligent, but what 
happened with the proverb of „hospitability“? While 41% of respondents Molda-
vians/Romanians consider that this is a specific attribute of Moldavians, just 11% 
Ukrainians, 9% Russians, 8% Bulgarians and 5% Gagauz consider them likewise.
• This kind of Moldavians: Romanians are seen educated, independent and civilized, 
but the representation about Romanians is still in the development, without being 
sufficient structured in the collective mentality.
• A sentiment of frustration: In the negative autostereotype of Moldavians (Roma-
nians), we find the presence of some attributes that send to the lack of cohesion 
and solidarity in the ingroup, but Moldavians (Romanians) perceive „others“ uni-
ted! The attribution of the characteristic disunited of its own group and the idealized 
reflection of the opposite – „they are united“ – for others; we consider the essence 
of a strong sentiment of frustration. 
• What has left from the mentality of „the older brother“? Russians consider them-
selves civilized (17%) and educated (18%), being generally considered the same by 
Ukrainians (16%) and Gagauz (15%) and less than Moldavians (Romanians). 
These qualities do not appear on the first positions, neither in the autostereotype 
(position 5, 6), nor in the heterostereotype (5, 6, 7). 
• There does not exist a representation about the Gagauz and the Bulgarians: the 
Gagauz and Bulgarians are ignored and marginalized, the subjects had less to tell 
about them. The Bulgarians’ image is build mostly by Gagauz and the reverse. 
155  S.Chelcea, Reprezentarea socială a identităţii naţionale a românilor, Sociologie Românească, 1994, 2-3, 194-196.
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They and us – mirror images: where do we end 
and where does the alteration begin? 
If each ethnic group is creating stereotypes about themselves, and about others, by 
how much the ingroup stereotyping is reflecting in the outgroup one?156 We tried to repre-
sent the qualities and the defects of each ethnic group, according to the autostereotype 
in order to surprise which of these are attributed to others, correspondingly what is com-
mon and what is different in the autoperception. Thus, the attributed qualities and de-
fects have been selected for the belonging group, as well as for the first and second choice, 
which had a percent of over 10. Afterwards there have been analyzed the qualities and 
defects, that appear in the autostereotype, and respectively, the ones that are attributed 
to other ethnic groups. Starting from the perception effect of the dissimilarity „they are 
different from us“, we have applied this procedure because we considered that the pro-
portion of some qualities or defects from the autostereotype in heterostereotype, repre-
sents a factor of a perceptive similitude that contribute to the closeness or marginalization 
of some groups regarding others, as well as an indicator of social integration.
Moldavians (Romanians) about Them and about Others 
The Other one like us. The autostereotype of Moldavians/Romanians is referred to 
the following attributes: diligent (57%), hospitable (41%), obedient (30%), joyful (28%), 
kind(27%), hearty (23%), honest (22%), disunited (19%), religious (18%), procrastinators 
(18%), indifferent (15%), selfish (14%), educated (13%), thieves (13%), resourceful (12%), 
backward (11%), sad (11%), aggressive (10%). The autostereotype of Moldavians/Roma-
nians is referring to the following attributes: the closest to this autostereotype proved to 
be the heterostereotype for the Ukrainians – 10 common characteristics, from which 6 
qualities and 4 defects: diligent (16%), hospitable (11%), joyful (19%), kind (10%), hearty 
(10%), honest (12%), indifferent (11%), selfish (12%), resourceful (12%) and aggressive 
(14%) are the attributes identified in the heterostereotype of Moldavians/Romanians 
regarding Ukrainians. In the Heterostereotype for Russians we have delimited 7 common 
features – 4 qualities and 3 defects: joyful (24%), honest (13%), indifferent (14%), educated 
(11%), hospitable (11%), selfish (17%), resourceful (26%) and aggressive (31%). The least 
common attributes are emphasized in the heterostereotype for the Gagauz and Bulga-
rians. Otherwise, in the case of the heterostereotype regarding Bulgarians and Gagauz, is 
remarked the relatively high proportion of choices such as don’t know/ no answer (more 
than 60%). Thus, in a smaller common proportion for Moldavians and Gagauz, according 
to the heterostereotype, are the attributes: diligent (8%), resourceful (8%) and aggressive 
(11%), for Bulgarians it is mentioned just diligent (9%).
The other different from us – „They are all united, we are disunited“. Generally, Mol-
davians/Romanians do not consider them as independent, quality attributed to Russians 
and Ukrainians, and not even united, characteristic met on a higher proportion in hetero-
stereotype for each of the ethnic mentioned groups. 
156  А. А. Налчаджян, Этнопсихология, СПб, Питер, 2004, p. 236.
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Ukrainians about themselves and others
The other like us. In the autostereotype of Ukrainians, we identify with a higher fre-
quency 18 attributes, from which 12 are positive – an accentuated ingroup favoritism. 
Ukrainians perceive themselves: honest (27%), diligent (50%), kind (26%), joyful (24%), 
hearty (23%), superstitious (20%), united (20%), procrastinators (16%), hospitable (14%), 
obedient (14%), sad (14%), loyal (13%), religious (13%), disunited (11%), selfish (11%), 
intelligent (11%), educated (10%), resourceful (10%), backward (10%). They utilize a large 
palette of attributes for the description of the „other“. According to the number of com-
mon attributes, we could mention that the closest one could be Moldavians, because 
Ukrainians identify 15 similar features with the ones in autostereotype. However if we 
analyze the proportion of qualities, we find out the presence of a favoritism of the group, 
regarding other Slavic, Russian and Bulgarian groups. Hence, according to the positive 
heterostereotype, closest ones are Russians (10 qualities) and Bulgarians (10 qualities). 
Ukrainians consider Russians and Bulgarians to be joyful, hearty, united, resourceful, hos-
pitable etc. Analyzing the negative autostereotype and heterostereotype, we are pointing 
out seven common defects for Moldavians (superstitious, procrastinators, obedient, disu ni-
ted, backward sad and selfish), five defects for Bulgarians (superstitious, procrastinators, 
obedient, disunited and backward), three for Russians (superstitious, procrastinators and 
selfish) and two for the Gagauz (procrastinators and backward). 
The other different from us – another does not really exist. Analyzing autostereotype 
and heterostereotype of Ukrainians regarding other ethnic groups, we conclude that Ukrai-
nians utilize approximately same positive attribution, negative for the description of the 
ingroup and of the other ethnic groups, exception being Russians, who are perceived to 
be lazy and Gagauz, Bulgarians and Moldavians who are considered uneducated. 
Russians about them and others
The other one like us. A higher proportion has been identified in the autostereotype 
of Russians regarding 17% of presented attributes, 10 qualities and 7 defects. Russians 
consider themselves to be honest (26%), hearty (26%), joyful (21%), kind (32%), indepen-
dent (18%), educated (18%), civilized (17%), diligent (15%), resourceful (14%), intelligent 
(12%), aggressive (17%), indi fferent (13%), obedient (13%), lazy (13%), procrastinators (12%), 
united (10%), selfish (10%) and uneducated(11%). Among the qualities there are mentio-
ned, a series of attributes, such as civilized157, intelligent, that are not attributed to other 
ethnic groups. Could these be the reminiscences of the mentality of an „older brother“, 
who is civilized and superior to others? The closest ones to the autostereotype of Russians 
are the Ukrainians, in their heterostereotype we have identifies 12 common attributes, 
eight qualities– honest (10%), kind (26%), hearty (22%), diligent (19%), resourceful (18%), 
joyful (27%) etc., and four defects – aggressive (11%), selfish (16%), procrastinators (11%) 
and indifferent (10%). Afterwards, in the heterostereotype of Moldavians have been iden-
tifies 11 common attributes indicated by Russians and in the autostereotype – 5 qualities: 
157  Exception being Romanians.
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honest (25%), kind (42%), hearty (26%), joyful (29%) and diligent (43%), and 6 defects: 
selfish (12%), aggressive (18%), uneducated and others.
To the Gagauz and the Romanians there have been attributed seven common quali-
ties to each, among the ones attributed by Russians to Russians. In the heterostereotype 
of Gagauz we identify six qualities, present in the heterostereotype of Moldavians and 
Ukrainians, such as honest (10%), hearty (10%), resourceful (11%), diligent (12%) etc., 
even so we learn that the proportion is much lower comparing to their frequencies from 
the heterostereotype from the mentioned groups. Generally, it is observed that a higher 
proportion of non-answers, regarding the Gagauz, with 53% for the positive attributes 
and 55% for the negative ones. Among the three qualities attributed to the Romanians, 
such as honest (14%), independent (12%) and civilized (21%), the last one is mentioned 
just in the heterostereotype of Romanians, without being mentioned in a significant pro-
portion in the heterostereotype of other ethnic groups. 
The Other one different from us – „we are intelligent, and they are religious“. Rus-
sians perceive themselves as intelligent, quality that is not attributes to others, as we 
mentioned above. They consider others as being backward (Moldavians), superstitious 
(Moldavians, Ukrainians), united (Gagauz and Bulgarians) and religious (Moldavians, 
Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians and Romanians). 
Gagauz about themselves and about the others
The other one like us. 
As we mentioned previously, the Gagauz avoid formulating some opinions about the 
habits characteristic to its own group, and to other ethnic categories, especially about 
defects. Diligent (32%), honest (27%), kind (24%), hearty (21%), educated (18%), joyful 
(17%), religious (13%), loyal (12%), resourceful (10%) and selfish (10%) are the attributes 
that register higher frequencies among choices. All the mentioned qualities are found 
approximately with the same amount in heterostereotypes. 
The other one different from us. If there are no huge differences regarding the posi-
tive stereotypes, then the negative heterostereotype are more emphasized. Thus, Russians 
are indifferent and lazy, Bulgarians – indifferent and selfish, and Moldavians – backward 
and uneducated. 
Bulgarians about themselves and about the others.
The other one like us. Bulgarians and Ukrainians utilize a larger palette of attributes 
for the description of their own group, as well as other ethnic groups discussed in the 
present study. Generally, the percent obtained for the mentioned qualities is relatively 
small; there is no amount of attributes as in the case of the autostereotype of Moldavians 
and Russians. We ask ourselves if this perceptive complexity is caused by the experience, 
that changes the traditional stereotypes, or, the opposite, is caused by the ambiguity 
deter mined by the lack of an organization at the level of mentality of some stereotypes. 
Bulgarians see themselves as: diligent (41%), kind (25%), honest (21%), hearty (17%), disu-
nited (18%), educated (17%), obedient (17%), joyful (15%), loyal (14%), resourceful(14%), 
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modest (13%), indifferent (12%), united (11%), procrastinators (11%), religious (10%), sel-
fish (10%), backward (11%), sad (11%), superstitious (11%), vainglorious (11%) and unedu-
cated(10%). It is also remarked a high level of resemblance regarding the autostereotype 
and heterostereotypes. Approximately same numbers of mentions for qualities and defects 
is found in the image of Bulgarians about them and others. 
The other one different from us – is the other one more civilized? The only attribute 
that is reflected in the relatively small proportion of the image about themselves (just 
6%), but it is mentioned in the stereotype about others is civilized. Bulgarians consider 
civilized Romanians (16%), Russians (16%), Moldavians (11%), Ukrainians (9%) and 
the Gagauz (10%). 
Us and them – mirror images: conclusions
We synthesize the following aspects from what has been resumed previously in the study:
• According to the autostereotype and heterostereotype, and the number of common 
attributes, „closer“ to Moldavians/Romanians proved to be Ukrainians and Rus-
sians, and „further away“ – Bulgarians and Gagauz;
• Generally, Moldavians/Romanians do not consider themselves independent, the attri-
buted quality to Russians and Ukrainians, and not even united, characteristic more 
often found in a higher proportion in heterostereotype for other ethnic groups; 
• For Ukrainians, the closest ones seem to be Moldavians, however if we analyze the 
proportion of qualities, we learn the presence of a group favoritism regarding other 
Slavic, Russians and Bulgarian groups;
• We find out that Ukrainians utilize approximately same positive attributes, but ne-
gative as well, in order to describe its ingroup, and other ethnic groups; with the 
exception that Russians are perceived as lazy, but Gagauz, Bulgarians and Molda-
vians – uneducated;
• The closest ones to the Russians’ autostereotype are Ukrainians, then Moldavians; 
we can observe a high proportion of non-answers regarding the Gagauz, and Mol-
da vians are considered civilized, which is not a significant attribute in the hetero-
stereotype of other ethnic groups; 
• Russians perceive them as being intelligent, quality that is not attributed in a signi-
ficant proportion; they consider others as backward (Moldavians), superstitious 
(Mol davians, Ukrainians), united (Gagauz and Bulgarians) and religious (Molda-
vians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians and Romanians);
• The qualities mentioned by the Gagauz are found with approximately same pro-
portion in the heterostereotypes, however the negative heterostereotypes are more 
emphasized: Russians are indifferent and lazy, Bulgarians indifferent and selfish, 
and Moldavians backward and uneducated;
• Bulgarians, as well as Ukrainians, utilize a large palette of attributes for the descrip-
tion of its own group, as well as of other ethnic groups, but the percent is relatively 
small, there does not exist a weight of some attributes such as the case of Moldavian 
and Russians autostereotype; we presume that this is caused by either the experience, 
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that changes the traditional stereotypes, or the lack of a stereotypic organization at 
the rational level;
• An attribute that can be found in a relatively small proportion in the Bulgarian 
stereotype about Bulgarians (just 6%), but it is mentioned in the stereotype about 
others is civilized (Romanians 16%, Russians 16%, Moldavians 11%, Ukrainians 
9% and Gagauz 10%). 
The Contact Hypothesis 
If you obligate people to build a tower together you will then change them in 
brothers, but if you want, people to hate each other just throw them a hand of seeds
 (A. de S.Exupery)
If the experimental researches show that among groups it is very easy to install 
attitudes and negative representations, the question then arises if it can change as easy. 
In 1954, the Court Supreme of USA decides that the school systems that have discrimina-
tion between black students and white students violate a series of articles from the Ameri-
can constitution. At the base of this thinking was the idea that the segregation between 
whites and ethnic minorities diminishes their chances of success and perpetuates preju-
dices and intolerance. Gordon W. Allport publishes the book The Nature of Prejudice, in 
which he makes an analysis of intergroup stereotypes and points out diverse recommen-
dations to eliminate it. The assembly of these recommendations is known as the contact 
hypothesis, according to which the intergroups contact eliminates or reduce the prejudi-
ces and hostilities between the groups. The contact hypothesis postulates the idea that 
stereotypes are erroneous and thus, if stereotypes are the result of the lack of correct and 
sufficient information, and/or of the presence of some misleading information regarding 
the group, the solution consists in offering contact occasions and to misplace so the inexact 
perceptions158. Even though Allport emphasizes the simple fact that groups are getting in 
contact it is not sufficient to reintegrate the harmony; contrary, the simple gatherings, 
without positive interdependency, represent for the hostile groups as many occasions to 
meet its rivals. 
The simple contact is not a panacea
The contact has the anti-discriminatory efficiency if it is oriented towards meeting 
some common objectives, it has to be systematic and long-lasting, the superficial mee-
tings that do not reduce the negative attitudes, the contacts among the unequal groups as 
prestige and social power do not really succeed in diminishing negative stereotype, the 
intergroup relations have to be encouraged and supported by the official authorities. An 
experiment realized with student groups (Kţoeva, 1986) had the purpose to research the 
type of modification of a negative ethno-stereotype in the conditions of a common group 
activity, having multinational component to it, with participants from four ethnic com-
158  V. Yzerbut şi G. Schadron, Cunoaşterea şi judecarea celuilalt, Iaşi, Polirom, 2002.
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mu nities. The research was based on the description of the belonging group, and of other 
ethnic groups at the beginning of the practice period, and at its end ( after 2 months). It 
has been found that a change of attributed from the „other“ portrait to the positive pole, 
at the end of the period in place of ambivalence or a unfavorable features in the image 
about „the other“ from the beginning of the period. The author’s conclusion was that this 
is caused by the common activity, a progressive knowledge and close relationships159. 
T. F. Pettigrew (1997) has learned, by surveying 4000 European citizens, that the reduc-
tion of negative stereotype regarding other cultural groups is correlated not only with the 
number of outgroups friends of the respondent, but also with the experience that others 
from its own group have same friendships. This study demonstrated the contact hypo-
thesis, proving that not only direct contact with the members from other groups contri-
bute to the reduction of negative stereotypes, but also the fact that we know that in our 
group there are people who have positive relations with them. Although the conclusion 
of close relationships (friendships, successful marriages) between the members of diffe-
rent groups cannot contribute all the time to the reduction of stereotypes, the justification 
mechanism of these exceptional causes can lead to their conservation160.
The model of ingroup identity proposed by Gaerner and other (1993) represents a 
continuation of the contact hypothesis, betting on the re-categorization mechanism, at 
the re-drawing of the borders between „us“ and „them“.161
Cooperation and integration. Recommendations
The main conclusion from this study is the sentiment of marginalization and isolation 
felt by Gagauz and Bulgarians. All the discussion with ethnic component to it after 1989 
have been referred to Moldavians (Romanians) and Russians. There have been discussion 
about Gagauz at the beginning of the 90’s, and after 1994 there were discussion on their 
voting pattern. We know less about Bulgarians. It happens that everybody „knows“ Mol-
davians (Romanians) and Russians, and so they know the evident tendencies in their 
stereo typing. Regarding Bulgarians and Gagauz there is no image, neither positive, not 
negative. Thus, it is imposing the assurance of adequate condition for he cultural deve-
lopment of the population belonging to these ethnic minorities, as well as for leaning 
Romanian and the realization of some activities (common projects) of integration, that 
would diminish the sentiment of marginalization and contribute to the consolidation of 
the perception of a citizen with equal rights. 
The need of „us“ – supraordinated
 Even if some differences are attested in stereotyping, there still exits some common 
tendencies that express through the attribution of common qualities: kind, honest, hearty, 
diligent. Therefore, we can conclude that a type of common perception of co -living 
ethnicities could exist, with some reminiscences from „the older brother“ in the case of 
159  I. Radu, Psihologie socială. Cluj-Napoca, EXE SRL, 1994.
160  P. Iluţ, Valori, atitudini şi comportamente sociale. Teme actuale de psihosociologie, Polirom, Iaşi, 2004.
161  Ibidem.
218 ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Russians. Even is this perception is common, the rapport is made in ethnic sense: we 
Russians, we Ukrainians…etc. we are kind, honest, hearty and we miss this „we Molda-
vians…“, in the sense of the inhabitants of R. of Moldova, the citizens of this state. We 
still consider that the presence of this common attributes constitute a premise for the 
out line of us supraordinated. The common projects have to be oriented toward the deve-
lopment of the belonging sentiment of us supraordinated. 
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ETHNIC/NATIONAL162* 
IDENTITY AND SELFIDENTIFICATION OF ETHNIC 
GROUPS IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Loretta Handrabura
Under the pressure of the geopolitical changes that have shaken the world and, im-
plicitly, the Republic of Moldova within the last decades, identity discourse makes its 
presence felt more and more obviously. Identity is being rethought versus alterity, but also 
with regard to ethnicity, nationality, and citizenship, in order to make a clear distinction 
between the concepts and to exclude any risk of unfounded interpretation and unjustified 
conflict at such levels as the interpersonal, ethnic-group, or national one.
In our case, that of a borderline zone with a „specific“ historical destiny, this topic is alter-
natively heavily or lightly stressed, depending on the historical period when the iden tity of 
the prevalent ethnic group is discussed. Today the issue is still spoken of in academic circles, 
in the media, at scholarly events – symposia, congresses, conferences, seminars – yet it is 
carefully disguised, if mentioned at all, during political and diplomatic events of any scale.
It has to be said that a significant segment of population, particularly the inhabitants 
of rural areas, do not show interest for this issue. According to them, it is insignificant, 
compared to other issues, as economic or social ones (e.g., unemployment, very low 
living standards, migration etc.), which become more and more acutely felt every year, 
although the government reports an improvement of living in the last five years. A part 
of the young people – especially those who had been caught by the wave of national 
renaissance and those whose schooling took place mostly after 1989 – together with that 
active segment of our society that is keen to manifest a national civic conscience are 
ready to admit that we, the native population of Moldova, have not yet surpassed the 
„crisis of identity“ we had been facing for centuries. The tension generated by the crisis 
is due to the „rupture“ of values consecutive to the shifting from an autocratic system of 
communist type to a democratic one. Since 2001 the latter became quite an oxymoronic 
mixture of communism and democracy that made us known in the world.
If we subscribe to the hypothesis163 according to which every balanced period of time 
– one of continuous growth and clear rules, of stable politics and legitimate institutions 
– is complemented by a set of categories shared by the majority and contains a strongly 
interiorised symbolic system of designation and classification, we realise that the breaking 
of this balance is an important and specific dimension of the crisis.164 The reversal of 
162 * Etymologically, ethnic is the same as national: yet the latter will also continue to have the meanings bestowed upon it 
by political and social ideologies.
163  Cf. Claude Dubar, Criza identităţilor. Interpretarea unei mutaţii (Chişinău: Ştiinţa, 2003), p. 15-16.
164  „Identity becomes an object of interest and analysis there only where it ceases to be understood on its own, where 
common sense is no more pre-given and where actors do not succeed any longer in agreeing over the signifi cance of the 
situation and over the roles they are supposed to play.“ (Michaël PoLLack, L’expérience concentrationnaire. Essai sur le 
maintien de l’identité sociale. Paris: A.-M. Métailié, 1990, p. 10).
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norms, models, and terminology brings about a destabilisation of references, names, and 
former systems of symbols: this very destabilisation, confusion, uncertainty are clearly 
demonstrated by some answers of the Ethno-Barometer’s respondents.
Accordingly, the „self-searching“ of the quantitative ethnic majority continues to 
elec trify discussions and ignite the spirits.165 It is noticeable at both the interpersonal and 
inter-group level, being alimented and strategically and ideologically sustained by the 
national (Moldavian, that is) policy of the communist government since 2001, although 
after the national elections of March 6 2005 the voices denying the linguistic and ethnic 
identity of the ethnic majority with the Romanian people have apparently quieted down 
for well-known reasons, as a consequence of the declared option for the European vector 
and, obviously, of the change of optics in the relationship with the Ukrainian and Ro-
manian neighbours, the latter having been accused several years ago in the European 
Parliament by the former Minister of Justice Ion Morei of „meddling into the internal 
affairs of the Republic of Moldova“.
Even 15 years after declaring its independence, Moldova remains one of the few 
Eastern-European countries where the politic elite and the cultural elite do not agree 
upon the foundations of national culture. „Only in Moldova“, as Charles King justly ob-
ser ves in a study of the relationship between national identity, nation building, political 
tradition and cultural tendency, „there is still a clear distinction between strong groups 
whose members have divergent opinions concerning the fundamental problem of the 
meaning of belonging to an ethnic group that also gave its name to the country.“166
Following the stated situation, our reference objectives for this study are:
■ Analysing the identity construction (self-identification) and the plurality of the ethnic 
image of the „Moldavian“ majority
■ Researching the self- and hetero-representation of the five ethnic groups involved in the 
Ethno-Barometer questionnaire (Moldavians/Romanians, Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauzes 
and Bulgarians) as elements of ethnic identity.
I. The ethnic/national identity of the prevalent 
population of the Republic of Moldova
1.1 The building of the „Moldavian“ identity – a sinusoidal 
political artifice
The ethnic gaps of the past and of nowadays, seen in the native population of the 
Republic of Moldova, may and must be explained only through the objective prism of 
history and of the events that were circumscribed to the problem of identity. We believe 
that a brief retrospective is required in this case, even if it might risk becoming superfluous 
sometimes, given the number of literature concerning the theory of Moldavian identity. 
165  Th e generally promoted idea is that „identity is like a tooth: it only becomes a problem when it hurts“ (see Vintilă 
Mihăiescu, Foreword to the Romanian edition, in John Rex, Rasă şi etnie (Bucureşti: Du Style, 1998), p. 16). For us, the 
prevalent ethnic group of the Moldova situated between the Prut and the Dniestr, this controversial problem has been a 
sort of „Achilles’ heel“ since 1812.
166  Charles King, Moldovenii, România, Rusia şi politica culturală (Chişinău: Arc, 2002), p. 231.
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It will also contain some personal accents. This digression will also allow us to understand 
both the confusion and the ethno-identification option of the Moldavians/Romanians 
involved in the study.
As historiography shows, the problem of identity exists for nearly two centuries, with 
a certain specific emphasis, given Russia’s 1812 annexation of the Moldova between Prut 
and Dniestr and the prolongation of this statute until the fall of the Soviet regime.
The persistence of this topic until nowadays both on the political agenda and on the 
scientific and cultural one is determined, first of all, by the political factor, represented by 
Communists and pro-Russian formations, supported from outside of the country. They 
track their pro-Moldavian position from the well-known Soviet ideology, which has 
been methodically promoted and inoculated by all possible means before 1988, in order 
to hinder the clear affirmation of Romanity and Romanism on this territory.
We speak, of course, of the five decades of Soviet occupation that had favoured the 
consolidation of a Moldovenist theory. The intellectual precursors of this fabrication – 
A. Lazarev, N. Mohov, I. Grosu, Afteniuc, V. Stati, V. Senic etc. – have set the foundations 
of „Moldovenism“, through which an attempt is made to a „scholarly“ justification of a 
centuries-long existence of a „Moldavian state“ and „Moldavian language“. The central 
idea of this theory is that Moldavians are not Romanians, and that Romanians are of an 
anti-Moldavian disposition. In order to secure the continuous evolution of the „Moldavian 
state“, speculations were made between 1995 and 2002-2003 about the fact that the separa-
tion of the Moldavians living on the left bank of the Prut from the Romanians inhabiting 
the right bank was beneficial, particularly since the „Moldavian nation“ had strong (esp. 
economic) ties with CIS nations.167 
Between 1988 and 1991 a series of events occurred that were circumscribed to the 
troublesome itinerary of the indigenous inhabitants of the RSSM, which were then called 
„Moldavians“, towards their identification with the Romanians as a nation. We refer to the 
return to Romanian language and Latin-based alphabet (August 31 1989); the adopting of 
the Romanian tricolour flag with the heraldic symbol of Moldova (the head of a bour, a native 
bison-like species) and of the Romanian anthem Deşteaptă-te, române („Awake, O Roma-
nian“); the change of the country’s name from RSSM to Republic of Moldova (May 23 
1991); the proclamation of national sovereignty (June 23 1990) and independence (August 
27 1991); the law of citizenship, adopted in June 1991, one of the most generous of its kind 
in Eastern Europe, giving the right to Moldavian citizenship automatically to all citizens 
living in Moldova by the date of the declaration of sovereignty (June 23 1990), regardless of 
ethnicity, language and other criteria (the law „Concerning the citizenship of the Republic 
of Moldova, June 5 1991). All these events were essential changeovers in the historical and 
political evolution of Bessarabia, and were perceived as such also by foreign authors168.
Yet the national movement at the end of the 1990s had as its initial mobile the rejec-
tion of the differentiation between Moldavians and Romanians. In the eyes of certain 
Westerners,169 the national movement has been nothing else but a mass „confession“ 
that, despite decades of Soviet propaganda, Moldavians were actually Romanians.
167  Cf. Ift ene Pop, Basarabia din nou la răscruce (Bucureşti: Demiurg, 1995), p. 11.
168  Klaus Heitman, Limbă şi politică în Republica Moldova (Chişinău: Arc, 1998), p. 130.
169  Th e New York Times, February 25th, 1990, apud Klaus Heitman, quoted above.
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Nevertheless, the issue of the „Moldavians“ national identity would keep returning 
after 1991, making itself noticeable in political discourse and in the media, and always 
present in philology and history. The „true“ ethnicity of the Moldavians, seen as de dicto, 
not de iure, has been the object of many controversies in the republic. After the declaration 
of independence the Moldavian political evolution was featured by repeated disputes 
between factions embracing radically opposite conceptions concerning „Moldovenism“.
The „crossroad“ moment, when the balance between different components of ethnic 
identity broke, occurred after the Parliament elections of February 27 1994. It was then 
that the parliamentary majority, belonging to the Agrarian party, and the deputies of the 
Interfront faction openly displayed themselves as „anti-Romanians“. Embracing Moldo-
venism as a state ideology is back into fashion again, particularly since it is „opportune 
in their tendency to remain in governing and respond to any Moscow services“.170
The development principles of a state policy concerning „the building of a Moldavian 
conscience“, „the saving of statehood, integrity and sovereignty of the state“ were backed 
by Pro-Moldova, a patriotic movement initiated by the pseudo-historian and pseudo-phi-
lologist V. State. He even hammered together a book dedicated to the new state ideology, 
called Moldovenii în istorie („The Moldavians in History“), and published it under the 
eloquent pseudonym P. P. Moldovan. One of the ideas this book promoted was that „the 
students and teachers who do not respect the Moldavians’ right to remain a nation distinct 
from the Romanians“ ought to be barred from the teaching process. 
Mircea Snegur was to pay tribute to the same ideology when promoting Moldovenist 
theses at the so-called congress Our Home — the Republic of Moldova (February the 5th, 
1994). By this discourse he demolished all his former „oeuvre“, as did I. Druţă, H. Corbu 
and other intellectuals. His arguments concerning the „viability of the centuries-long 
tradition of our statehood“ and „the legitimacy and the historical basis of our right to be 
a state, to be called the Moldavian nation“171 did puzzle a large segment of population, 
which, after years of denial, obstruction and annulment of the generic national being 
had redefined its belonging in 1989 by identifying with the Romanian nation.
The insistent underlining of the national – Romanian – identity, although natural after 
decades of official „Sovietisation“, has often inspired fear among ethnic minorities and is 
counted among the main causes of the unrest in the first years of independence. The 
ongoing debate about the definition of the „nation“ concept, taking place between the 
ethnic minorities (over a third of population) and the majority, has strong reasons.
The ethnic minorities representing other states – Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgarians, 
Armenians, Poles, Jews etc. – were worried about the fact that the affirmation of the 
national identity of the Republic of Moldova at the end of the 1980s would endanger the 
relative interethnic stability, which had „dominated“, being well directed and kept under 
control, during the URSS period, particularly through cultural policy and the protecting 
„Elder Brother“ theory. 
170  Maria Neagu, „Identitatea românilor basarabeni între speculaţii politice şi adevăr istoric“, in Unitatea naţională a 
românilor între ideal şi realitate. Materialele Dezbaterilor Naţionale, Bucureşti, 27-28 martie 2001 şi Chişinău 9-11 aprilie 
2001. Chişinău, 2001, p. 168. 
171  Cf. Marian Enache, Dorin Cimpoieşu, Misiune diplomatică în Republica Moldova 1993-1997, Iaşi: Polirom, 2000, pp. 304-311.
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The national Constitution that was promulgated in 1994 and had been modified and 
completed until October 11 2004 does not contain any mention that ethno-national 
identity is the defining feature of the state. The Constitution repeatedly employs the term 
„the people of the Republic of Moldova“, in order to avoid allusions to any connection 
between state and ethnicity.172
The legitimation of the Moldovenist theory through the Preamble and the 13th and 
118th Articles of the Constitution is another chapter that has to be taken into account in 
this game of identities. The notions of „Moldavian people“ and „Moldavian language“ 
are legitimised against historical and academic truth. To this day, they are promoted by 
the sustainers of Communists and of the political parties or unions that tend towards 
extremism, as Patria Rodina, Edinstvo, Ravnopravie, but also by other factions that made 
a political capital by tacitly accepting the concession.
Two other meaningful moments state a group’s political intention of methodically 
incul cating, through the media and through pretended academic investigation (the latter 
being fabricated on political orders), the idea of a new, „Moldavian“, nation. The first is 
the publishing in 2003 of the so-called Moldavian-Romanian Dictionary by that prolific 
exponent of Moldovenism, V. Stati. Through this book „the historical and ethno-cultural 
parameters of the national language of the Moldavian people are being reconfirmed, toge-
ther with a disclosure of the expansionist and nationalistic essence of the various re-chris-
teners and foreign falsifiers of fundamental Romanian values“173. Another is the replace-
ment in loyal schools of the Romanian History course by a course of Integrated History. 
After the 2005 elections the members of the parliamentary factions PPCD and PSL, 
known for their combating spirit and pro-Romanian option, have renounced to insist any 
longer on this vulnerable subject. They allowed themselves to be convinced by the President 
V. Voronin, whom they had sustained during the April 4 2005 elections, that there are 
issues much more stringent than history and the correct name of a language, although 
these were issues explicitly and implicitly concerning the identity of the ethnic majority. 
Therefore, as the above excursus infers, the policy proclaiming the individuality of the 
„Moldavian people“, appeared from a rationing for the justification of the old Russian po-
licy in a new conjuncture, is only meant to sustain a political ambition in an ambi guous 
situation – a situation of new perturbations in the comparatively stabilised (at the begin-
ning of the 1990s) relationship between certain elements that structure the ethno-identity 
and/or the nationality of the majority. Apparently, this situation is becoming normality. 
1.2 Discord in ethno-identity representation
Despite the steady efforts of the new „Moldavian nation“ pioneers, the identity (and, 
implicitly, nationality) confusion of the ethnical majority is usually evident in any polls 
including questions about ethnicity/nationality or cultural identity. For instance, the poll 
organised between May 3 and 9 2004 within the project Tolerance and social integration. 
Information and formation included 94 Education, Psychology and Philology students from 
172  Constituţia Republicii Moldova, Chişinău: Moldpress, 1994; Moldpress, 2004.
173  V. Stati, Dicţionar moldovenesc-românesc, Chişinău, 2003, p. 9.
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the State Pedagogical University „Ion Creangă“ of Chişinău, aged 18 to 25. 4 of the questio-
ned students identified themselves as Romanian, 89 – as Moldavian, and 1 as Ukrainian.
Within another module of the same project, Intercultural education for the under-
standing of alterity, 16 teachers from rural, district and urban schools gave to the initial 
assessment questionnaire the following answers (on May 10 2005): 
Ethnicity (nationality): Moldavian – 11, Romanian – 5 (with specifications as „Bessa-
rabian Romanian“ or „Romanian – Moldavian“)
Cultural identity: Moldavian – 2„a Romanian’s“, – 2, „Romanian“ – 4, „Romanian 
culture“ – 2; together – 8. 
„I am an intellectual formed by Romanian, Russian, and world literature“ – 1
No answer – 5 
Linguistic competence: native language Romanian – 14, Russian – 2.
What language do you prefer to communicate in? Romanian – 16, Russian – 4.
These results are by no means representative as a sample and thus cannot be taken 
for a basis. We only referred to them in order to show an example of the incertitude to be 
found in an occasional group of intellectuals concerning the correlation between ethni-
city (nationality) and cultural identity. Only for two respondents out of the eleven self-
declared Moldavians ethno-identity coincided with cultural identity. Three Moldavians 
assumed Romanian cultural values, one related himself to more than one culture, and 
five teachers (of Romanian language and literature) provided no answer.
It is also worth noticing that 14 teachers had named Romanian as their native language, 
and all 16 respondents indicated as favourite language of communication the Romanian, 
not Moldavian, idiom, although it is under the latter name that it appears in the Constitu-
tion. We believe the obtained information is important also as a psycho-social pheno-
menon – identity itself being defined as a psycho-social variable – from which it becomes 
clearly visible that the members of the ethnic majority still do not succeed to agree over 
their common identity. This situation is also evident in the results of the November 2004 
population census – how objective and credible are these is altogether another question. 
The same situation is to be found in Ethno-Barometer — the Republic of Moldova and in 
the data of the Delphi study, which was the exploring stage of the Ethno-Barometer.
In the Delphi study, where the participants were chosen from different realms of 
social life (political: central and local, mass-media, academic (university), associating 
medium), 12 of 30 declared themselves Moldavian as ethnicity, 5 as Romanians and the 
remaining respondents identified with other national groups inhabiting Moldova.
The data collected by the Ethno-Barometer will allow a pertinent and complex 
analysis of this subject. Our intention in this study is to investigate these data, correlating 
them and other bibliographic174 resources. A primary objective of this study, developed 
by IMAS between December 2004 and January 2005, was the monitoring and assessment 
174  We refer particularly to Flavius Solomon, Identitate etnică şi minorităţi în Republica Moldova. O biblio grafi e, Iaşi: 
Fundaţia Academică „A. D. Xenopol“, 2001, a useful working instrument gathering hundreds of book names concerning 
the inter-ethnic relationships in Bessarabia and the historical Transnistria; Iulian Fruntaşu, O istorie etnopolitică a Basara-
biei (1812-2002), Chişinău: Cartier, 2002, and other quoted sources.
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of the current ethnic situation in the Republic of Moldova. The ethnic situation can be seen 
from the answers to the 64 questions asked to 5 sample groups: Moldavians/Romanians 
(822), Ukrainians (413), Russians (412), Gagauzes (472), and Bulgarians (431).
The very first question (Q1) — People believe the Republic of Moldova is inhabited by 
several ethnic groups (Moldavians, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauzes, Bulgarians etc.). How 
do you perceive yourself? — reveals an obvious old issue. If the sample groups of Russians, 
Ukrainians, Gagauzes and Bulgarians show 100% identification with their ethnic groups of 
belonging, then the quantitatively larger sample group is divided thus: 95% call themselves 
Moldavian and only 5% identify as Romanians.
The percentage differences shown by the prevalent group speak for themselves of a 
reality whose exponents perceive themselves differently, notwithstanding a communion 
of nation, territory, culture, and language. In this respect, Al. Zub, the reputable historian 
from Iaşi, is right in saying that „Historical conscience is never a definite gain, and the 
nation — as we know ever since Renan — is continuously ‘plebiscited’“.175
Concerning the natural correlation between ethnic identity and native language, which 
is interdependent, the situation found is similar to the one noticed in the above-mentioned 
questionnaires. Thus, of the 95% of respondents declared as Moldavians, only 86% call 
Moldavian their native language (and only 85% admit to speaking it at home usually), 
17% named Romanian as their mother tongue, and 2% said it was Russian.
The ethno-linguistic variable derives also from the answers to Q65 and Q66, both of 
which concern state languages and what these ought to be. 77% pleaded for Moldavian 
as a state language; 25% plead for Romanian, 22% — for Russian and 1% each — for 
Ukrainian, Gagauz, and Bulgarian. The hypothesis imposing itself (and remaining open, 
like all other hypotheses) is the following. The oscillation of the group members between 
Moldavian and Romanian language is due partially to the linguistic policy in the context 
of the promoted ideology about the Moldavian people, and partially to the indirect dis-
agreement of the Moldavians that the Romanian language is different from Moldavian, 
and that, respectively, the name of the country (the Republic) ought to coincide with / to 
be found in the name of the language.
We find therefore an internal disequilibrium of the prevalent ethnic group concerning 
the issue of ethnic identity. Generally speaking, as we do not aim to construct theories, 
this state of affairs fits into a well-recognized and accepted phenomenon. Ethnic type 
identity has a cinematic character, that is — a character of change and reform through 
social relationships, since identity is shaped on the basis of certain social processes. The 
identified situation can be explained and justified (first of all based on the above historical 
digression) by the loss in time, due to the historical context, of the founding memory of 
the ethnic group, the one rewriting history, and the building of another cultural memory 
of the past, not without the help of interested political forces. Still, at least two other 
moments must be considered. We mean, of course, the different possibilities of information 
and formation of the prevalent ethnic group members, a difference that determines the 
cognition of „us“ versus „others“ and the self-knowledge of „self “ in order to learn the 
difference, but also the different use and meanings of the word Moldavian, which we 
175  Alexandru Zub, Basarabia în căutarea identităţii: excurs istoriografi c, in: Basarabia. Dilemele identităţii. Iaşi: Fundaţia 
Academică „A. D. Xenopol“, 2001, p. 20.
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must take into account when discussing the ethnic and / or linguistic component. Con-
cerning the term Moldavian, it may have several meanings and thus perceptions:
• The individuals animated by the national ideal of reintegration into one state entity 
perceive it as a blasphemy, when used with regard to Romanians living over the Prut.
• Some accept it with its regional meaning, just as Transylvanian, Wallachian etc.
• Others believe that Moldavian is naturally included into the term Romanian.
• A certain segment of population uses it to designate another ethnic and national 
category, somewhat different from Romanians.
We can notice from the third hypothesis that all these differences of attitude are 
ethnically charged and politically loaded. After all, „It is the political loading of ethnicity 
that creates the anthropological side of nationalism, the one giving birth to xenophobia, 
extremist intransigency, chauvinism etc.“176 
II. Self- and hetero-image in the construction 
of ethnic identity
2.1. Self- and hetero-identification of the ethnic groups
Generally, the identity configuration shows an intertwining of identity forms, which 
can be grouped in two categories: 1. for „oneself “, called self-image, 2. for „the other“, 
known as hetero-image. Further, we intend to study the issue of self- and hetero-identi fi-
cation of the ethnic groups of Moldavians/Romanians, Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauzes, 
and Bulgarians by means of certain ethnic and cultural marks.
Almost in all cases when an ethnic group’s identity is sought to be re-established, the 
cultural dimension becomes the starting point. Addressing cultural identity attributes 
(lan guage, religion, traditions, education, the media) is inevitable, since it is precisely 
through the cultural pattern of group life that ethnic organization become visible, gets to 
manifest its similarities and differences vs others. The members of the groups questioned 
by the Ethno-Barometer on this issue have mentioned, too, preponderantly the cultural 
dimension as an important element of ethnic identification within a larger range of 
options for Q14 — According to you, what are the three most important things for one to 
be considered a Moldavian, Ukrainian etc. — through which reference to origin, political 
symbols, and citizenship was made:
a. to have Moldavian parents
b. to speak Moldavian/Romanian at home
c. keep Moldavian customs
d. to feel Moldavian
e. to perceive Moldavian culture as his/her own
f. to perceive Romanian culture as his/her own
g. to respect the Moldavian national banner
h. to live in the Republic of Moldova 
i. to have Moldavian/Romanian as native language
j. to have Moldavian citizenship
176  Cătălin Turliuc, Etnic şi naţional în Basarabia secolului XX, in Basarabia. Dilemele identităţii. Iaşi: Fundaţia 
Academică „A. D. Xenopol“, 2001, p. 54.
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k. to be born in the Republic of Moldova
l. I don’t know/no answer provided.
The comparative analysis of the self- and hetero-image of ethnic groups during the 
study of ethnic identities has allowed us to notice the following tendencies.
I. Each ethnic group has opted for a set of identity elements/indexes, as a rule, both 
referring to „self “ and „others“. These indexes differ very little as a priority or as a model 
of founding one’s self-identity from one ethnic group to another.
Example: Moldavians have opted, for „self “ and for „others“, for a, b, c, that is — for 
blood relation, language spoken in the family, and customs. The „others“, on the other 
hand, found d (feel Moldavian) more important than c (keep Moldavian customs).
The three most important things for one to feel MOLDAVIAN
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a. To have Moldavian parents 51% 40% 45% 48% 55%
b. to speak Moldavian/Romanian at home 48% 33% 32% 35%
c. to keep Moldavian customs 36% 30%
d. to feel Moldavian 37% 29% 36%
e. to perceive Moldavian culture as his/her own
f. to perceive Romanian culture as his/her own
g. to respect the Moldavian national banner
h. to live in the Republic of Moldova
i. to have Moldavian/Romanian as native language 35%
j. to have Moldavian citizenship
k. to be born in the Republic of Moldova
l. I don’t know/no answer provided
The Moldavians. Self- and hetero-identification. 
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Romanians, too, are hetero-identified by Moldavians through a (to have Romanian 
parents), b (to speak Romanian at home), and c (to keep Romanian customs). The other 
four ethnic groups believe a, b, and h (to have Romanian as native language) to be the 
proof of ethnic belonging to the Romanian nation.
The three most important things for one to feel ROMANIAN
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a. Having Romanian parents 46% 37% 43% 48% 55%
b. Speaking Romanian at home 40% 28% 40%
c. Keeping Romanian customs 34% 32%
d. Feeling Romanian 29% 36%
e. Perceiving Romanian culture as his/her one
f. Respecting the Romanian national banner
g. Living in Romania
h. Having Romanian as native language 36% 32% 29%
i. Having Romanian citizenship
j. Being born in Romania
k. I don’t know/No answer provided
The Ukrainians, the second ethnic group of our study (and the largest Ukrainian 
minority group in all former URSS republics) believe a, h (having Ukrainian as native 
language), and d (feeling Ukrainian) important for „self “, but also for Gagauzes, Bulgarians, 
and Romanians. They insist, therefore, on the native language and feeling dimension, 
combined with a self-conscience of belonging to a distinct ethnic group, while Moldavians 
and Russians prefer a, i (keeping customs), and d. The „others“ also expect of Ukrainians, 
beside a, h, and d, also b (speaking Ukrainian at home).
The ROMANIANS. Self- and hetero-identification.
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The three most important things for one to feel UKRAINIAN
U
kr
ai
ni
an
s
M
ol
da
vi
an
s
Ru
ss
ia
ns
G
ag
au
ze
s
Bu
lg
ar
ia
ns
a. Having Ukrainian parents 48% 49% 47% 49% 53%
b. Speaking Ukrainian at home 37% 34% 31% 39%
c. Keeping Ukrainian customs 32%
d. Feeling a Ukrainian 37% 37% 38%
e. Perceiving Ukrainian culture as his/her own
f. Respecting the Ukrainian national banner
g. Living in Ukraina
h. Having Ukrainian as native language 40% 34%
i. Having Ukrainian citizenship
j. Being born in Ukraina
k. I don’t know/no answer
The Russians are the most prominent ethnic minority of Moldova, due to their 
current position the country’s public life, Moscow’s insistence on sustaining the rights of 
the neighbouring countries’ Russian-speaking communities, and the dominant statute 
of Russian culture during URSS rule. They perceive both „themselves“ and the „others“ 
through a, d, and b. for the „others“, too, a Russian can be identified by a, b, and d.
The UKRAINIANS. Self- and hetero-identification.
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The three most important things for one to feel RUSSIAN
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a. Having Russian parents 46% 51% 44% 47% 51%
b. Speaking Russian at home 38% 48% 33% 2 37%
c. Keeping Russian customs 36% 30% 27%
d. Feeling Russian 42% 36%
e. Perceiving Russian culture as his/her culture
f. Respecting the Russian national banner
g. Living in Russia
h. Having Russian as native language 33% 2
i. Having Russian citizenship 37%
j. Being born in Russia
k. I don’t know/no answer provided
The Gagauz people do not form a separate „nation“. Their ethnic and linguistic 
identity is not elucidated or unanimously accepted until this day, even by the most 
remarkable representatives of this ethnic group. Similarly to Moldavians, their ethnicity 
indicators are a, b, and c, which they also mark/suggest for Russians and Bulgarians. For 
Ukrainians and Romanians they invoke, beside a and b, h — the native language as a 
The RUSSIANS. Self- and hetero-identification.
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cultural mark; for Moldavians they also suggested d (feeling Moldavian). The latter ele-
ment is to be found also at „others“ conception about the members of the Gagauz ethnic 
group, along with the three priority criteria, which coincide.
The three most important things for one to feel GAGAUZ
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a. Having Gagauz parents 56% 48% 39% 47% 55%
b. Speaking Gagauz at home 38% 37% 33% 41%
c. Keeping Gaguz customs 33% 35%
d. Feeling a Gagauz 25% 34% 36%
e. Perceiving Gagauz culture as his/her own
f. Respecting the Gagauz national banner
g. Live in the Gagauz ATU
h. Having Gagauz as native language 32%
i. Being born in Gagauzia
j. I don’t know/no answer provided
The GAGAUZES. Self- and hetero-identification.
232 ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
For Bulgarians parentage, the linguistic component and identification with all Bulga-
rian (a, b, d) test the belonging to the Bulgarian ethnic group; the same marks were pro vi-
ded fro Ukrainians, Moldavians, Russians, and Gagauzes. Only for Romanians c (keeping 
Romanian customs) was mentioned instead of d (feeling a Romanian). In the eyes of the 
„others“, a, b, and c are the three forms of identification for Bulgarians.
The three most important things for one to feel BULGARIAN
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a. Having Bulgarian parents 59% 49% 36% 48% 49%
b. Speaking Bulgarian at home 46% 38% 34% 32%
c. Keeping Bulgarian customs 34% 33%
d. Feeling a Bulgarian at heart 38% 25% 36%
e. Perceiving Bulgarian culture as his/her own
f. Respecting the Bulgarian national banner
g. Living in Bulgaria
h. Having Bulgarian as native language 35%
i. Having Bulgarian citizenship
j. Being born in Bulgaria
k. I don’t know/no answer provided
II. To summarise, all ethnic groups in Moldova tend distinctly towards a (having … 
parents), b (speaking [the language] at home), d (feeling a [ethnicity] at heart), then h 
(having [the language] as a native language), c (keeping the [national] customs), e (per-
ceiving the [national] culture as his/her own). The named indicators concern generally 
The BULGARIANS. Self- and hetero-identification.
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1) the blood-relation conscience; 2) the family-spoken language conscience; 3) the 
common-destiny conscience for ethnic minorities, while Moldavians tend to choose for 
founding their own identity the criterion of respecting national customs.
We must specify that the coexistence of these ethnic groups continues for centuries, 
and only predominance varies. By the end of the 1980s, for instance, the prevalent ethnic 
group was first language-conscious, and then nation- and culture-conscious. During the 
Transnistria War common-destiny conscience prevailed, being expressed by the conscious 
solidifying of an ethnic segment in its wish to preserve national (territorial) unity with 
any cost and sacrifice.
Today, in time of peace, but also with an as yet unsolved conflict in the Dniestr 
region, and with a policy clearly oriented towards the individuality and affirmation of 
the new „Moldavian nation“, other consciences dominate the minds. According to Ethno-
Barometer data these are blood-relation conscience, followed by family-spoken-language 
conscience and ethnic-, or national-community conscience. The latter actually integrates 
the former two in this identity macrosistem. Therefore, as well-known authors have also 
shown in their exegeses on this topic177, everything depends on the historical circumstan-
ces through which the people of the Republic will live, and one form of conscience will 
give way to another.
What directly influences the (either negative or positive) self-projection of the indivi-
dual or of the ethnic group compared to other groups is, first of all, a lack of inter-group 
consensus. Yet a lack of out-group consensus is to be noticed, too, for instance in the case 
of the integrating elements of the Moldavians’ nationality. Usually, the referential crite-
rion of „self “ – personal identity – appears with a strongly positive projection, similar to 
that of „ours“ – collective, group identity – compared to „others“, confirming social iden-
tity theories. The self-assessments of the ethnic groups and the inter-group assessments 
from Q11, dimension b-g „The world would be better if the rest of the people were like the 
Moldavians, Ukrainians, Russians etc. of the Republic of Moldova“, appear particularly 
eloquent in this respect. 
Simply evoking one ethnic category starts the ecart through comparison as a principle 
and means of construction of self- and hetero-images. At the same time, it tends to 
activate the afferent prejudices and their specific corollary, the stereotypes.
Each ethnic group, as it can easily be seen from the following diagram, tends to set 
itself highest of all. It is a natural inclination of any ethnic group to „overestimate its 
capacities and values“178 compared to „others“. This very partiality is the source of posi-
tively deformed, ethnocentric self-images.
The Gagauz ethnic group appears to overestimate itself most of all (41%), followed by 
the Russians (36%). It is known that overestimation belongs to the anthropologic fund, 
which is common to all ethnic groups. At the same time, it is determined by particular 
historical and cultural factors, which nourish the intensity of the excessively positive 
assessment attitudes. Such are, on the one hand, the specific factors of the Gagauz ethnic 
177  We refer to the writings of V. Conta, Ion Petrovici, Nae Ionescu, Mircea Vulcănescu, Constantin Noica, Emil Cioran et 
al., concerning the Romanian space.
178  Grigore Georgiu, „Etnocentrismul şi paradoxul diversităţii culturilor“, in Societate & Cultură, nr. 4, 1991, p. 27. 
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group, the only one lacking a metropolis and tending towards self-affirmation, and, on 
the other hand, those of the Russian ethnic group, which as a nation has been favoured 
by historical circumstances in different periods and used to have (and still preserves) an 
important position in the East of Europe.
It is probably due to the privileged position of the Russians in the former URSS, and 
accordingly due to their culture, well known by the others, to the information concerning 
them, to their relationships and to the more special and intense contacts that this ethnic group 
is generally assessed best of all. In this respect, Klaus Heitmann is right in stating: „Howe-
ver doubtful stereotype building upon the global representations of one ethnic group’s about 
another may be, these stereotypes do nevertheless build upon inter-ethnic encounters and 
historical experiences resulting either from peaceful exchanges or armed conflicts.“179
The Gagauz ethnic group is the most underrated of all groups. Bulgarians make the 
only exception, living next to them in the same region and thus knowing them better. For 
this reason Bulgarians perceive and estimate the Gagauzes in a more objective manner 
than Moldavians/Romanians, Ukrainians or Russians do. These peoples only detain super-
ficial and over-simplified information about the Gagauzes, and thus have a negatively 
deformed image of them. Generally, the ethnic groups are largely enclosed in enclaves, 
as the Delphi study was ready show. Although they do not have many common values, 
there are still a few exchanges, some communication and solidarity between them.
In the process of correlating one ethnic group to another – the hetero-image gap is 
defined by alter vs ego, alter vs others — or the personal „self “ to the social group one 
belongs to, the „self “ may attribute to itself either a positive self-identity image or a negative 
one (of shame for what they have been/have done or are/do, behave among themselves 
as a community or towards „others“), which clashes with its personal value and principles. 
We believe that this phenomenon conditions the start-off, existence or lack of an ethnic 
and/or national dignity feeling. This feeling grows and is directly related to the feeling of 
national/ethnic conscience. The data gathered by the Ethno-Barometer are very sugges-
tive in this respect, too, if we analyse the picture shaping on the feeling of pride for one’s 
ethnic identity and citizenship, for example.
179  Klaus Heitmann, Imaginea românilor în spaţiul lingvistic german, 1777-1918. Studiu imagologic. Bucureşti: Univers, 
1985, p. 43.
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We can see from the above diagram that Moldavians appear to be the ethnic group 
which is most proud of what it is (66%), compared to other ethnic groups, while Ukrai-
nians appear to show the least pride in this respect (40%). This statement risks to prove 
irrelevant and even wrong if we stop here and omit a comparative analysis of the answers 
for „makes me feel ashamed“. So what do we find here?
Makes me feel 
proud
Makes me feel 
ashamed
The fact of being Moldavian/Romanian… a total 66% agree 49 % rather agree
The fact of being Ukrainian… a total 40% agree 40% totally disagree
The fact of being Russian… a total 47% agree 56% totally disagree
The fact of being Gagauz… a total 54% agree 58% totally disagree
The fact of being Bulgarian… a total 49% agree 61% totally disagree
If for ethnic minorities the correlation between „pride“ and „shame“ shows more or 
less a feeling of satisfaction for belonging to that given ethnicity, and the feeling is shared 
by most of the group members, then for Moldavians/Romanians the feeling is clearly 
oscillating between contentment, satisfaction, trust in the qualities of one’s group and 
disagreement, dissatisfaction and even shame.
In our opinion, the disbalance within the prevalent in-group, once more acknowled-
ged on the national feeling dimension, may and must be interpreted in separate studies 
through the different ways in which group members perceive and assess the past and the 
chances for future evolution, self-assess their group features and their limits as to the 
answer given to the challenges of natural and social environment.
Naturally, the self-image of ethnic groups is updated according to the groups’ res-
ponse reactions – either positive or negative – to the challenges of natural and social 
envi ronment. From this perspective the criteria of assessment for successes and failures, 
of their acknowledgement or denial appear as fundamental, and the results can lead 
either to mobilisation for the surpassing of obstacles or to an attitude of discouragement 
and immobility. Where do we stand ourselves, we, the Moldavians, at the beginning of 
the 21st century, must be our constant preoccupation and has to be found as an goal in 
any social policy discourse in order to appreciate objectively the state of things that might 
The ethnic/citizenship feeling
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contribute to our cohesion as a group, so that our self-image would cease to be continually 
„hurt“, vague, and rather negative, but would instead become a positive one.
After all, social practice proves that the ethnic groups with a positive self-image show 
much more performance than the ones with a negative self-image. Only societies with a 
positive self-image can enjoy a healthy regime of collective and individual life. Societies 
with a permanently „bombarded“ (both inside and outside) self-image will be pushed 
towards obstruction, illness and suffering. In such societies the first thing to collapse will 
be the „self-respect“180, which – let us stress it again – is still a problem for us, the ethnic 
Moldavians. It is high time to solve this problem, and it can only be done if each of us 
applies their will and effort towards it.
To resume: we believe that the feeling of pride/dignity for the quality of being a Mol-
davian/Romanian, Ukrainian or Gagauz is connected not only with the blood-relation, 
culture-communion, destiny and other consciences, but also with attachment and respon-
sibility; and it generates patriotism, too. Taken together, these are indicators of belonging, 
whether only ethnic or national as well.
The indicators of ethnic/national belonging
2.2 Successive identities
Ethnic identity is only a part of personal identity, but it tends to be more and more 
important. In ethnic and/or national context, any individual assumes several identities, 
consciously or unconsciously, asked or not. In the questionnaires we had formerly mentio-
ned, two teachers answered the question concerning ethnicity with the formulas „Roma-
180  Ilie Bădescu, Dan Dungaciu, Rada Baltasiu, Istoria sociologiei. Teorii contemporane. Bucureşti: Eminescu, 1996, p. 304.
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nian-Bessarabian“ and „Romanian-Moldavian“. Through these answers they had specified, 
along with their ethnic belonging, their regional appurtenance, in the first case, and their 
citizenship, in the second. They obviously found them relevant enough to be mentioned.
Reality proves that indeed successive identification mechanisms may co-exist, without 
coming into opposition. I, for instance, can state about myself, while in Bălţi, that I am a 
Baraboian; in Chişinău – that I am a Northener; in the Republic of Moldova – that I am a 
Chisinauian; in the region Moldova of Romania – that I am a Bessarabian; in Bucharest – 
that I am a Moldavian; in Europe – that I am a Romanian, and in Africa I can call myself 
a European.
Ethnic groups in the Republic of Moldova also assume simultaneously and suc-
cessively
• first, their ethnic identity, except for the Russians, for whom citizenship is set 
before ethnic identity;
• second, the fact of being a citizen of the Republic of Moldova;
• third, local identity, „local subject“;
• fourth, the fact of living in CSI;
• fifth, being a European;
• sixth, Russians and Gagauz also mention the fact of being an Eastern-European.
None of these identities induce traumas in their owners. Moreover, they reflect a 
„social construction“ from which we deduce a hierarchy of values which the owners adopt 
at the moment. Just one remark — the feeling of ethnic identity is more profound than 
that of citizenship, prevalent in Israel, USA, Great Britain, France etc., and this fact leaves 
enough place for economically, socially and culturally-employed speculations.
Conclusions 
At the closing of our study over the way in which an ethnic group identifies itself, is 
identified by others and assesses itself versus the others, several conclusions and recom-
mendations may be formulated:
Successive identities of the ethnic groups in the Republic of Moldova
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1. There is no interethnic conflict in the Republic of Moldova. We do notice certain 
tensions between the Moldavian/Romanian group, on one side, and the Russian 
group, on the other side (plus, to a minor degree, other Russian-speakers) on lin-
guistic matters. The nature of other tensions is attitudinally-behavioural, taking 
place at the inter-personal level, and is explained by the lack of knowledge over the 
other or by a poor, distorted, prejudices and stereotyped knowledge. Different 
information sources may be responsible for the dissemination of such erroneous 
and misleading information.
2. The identity gaps of yesterday and today of the indigenous population of the 
Republic of Moldova concerning ethnicity/nationality may and must be explained 
only through an objective vision of history, not a prefabricated one, and of the 
events that are circumscribed to the issue of identity.
3. The geographic setting, the ethnic groups kaleidoscope, the historical and political 
factor are the primary determinants of the building/shaping of a distinct, „Molda-
vian“ identity of the quantitative ethnic majority. Therefore, the policy of the „Mol-
davian“ people’s individuality has appeared from an idea of justification for the old 
Russian policy in the new conjuncture. What it does is supporting a political ambi-
tion in an ambiguous situation, which appears to become normality. And yet new 
perturbations of the intra-ethnic relationship, which had been relatively stabilised 
at the beginning of the 1990s, tend to appear between certain elements that struc-
ture ethno-identity and/or nationality.
4. The members of the prevalent ethnic group do not succeed to agree upon their 
common identity. The situation is visible from both the data of the Republic of 
Moldova Ethno-Barometer and the Delphi study data (the latter being the exploring 
stage of the Ethno-Barometer). It is to be found also in the population census data 
of 2004 – how objective and credible these are is another question.
5. The internal disbalance of the quantitatively prevalent ethnic group over the 
ethnic identity issue can be generally explained through a recognised and accep-
ted phenomenon – the cinematic (transformative, reforming through social relation-
ships, since identity is being shaped around certain social processes) character of the 
ethnic-type identity. To this we shall add several interdependent hypotheses:
A. the lost in time, due to the historical context, of the founding memory of the 
ethnic group, the one rewriting history, and the building of another cultural 
memory of the past, not without the help of interested political forces;
B. the different information and formation possibilities of the prevalent ethnic 
group members, which determines „our“ knowledge versus the „others“ and 
the self-knowledge of the „self “;
C. the use, with different ethnically and politically charged meanings, of the 
term Moldavian, which must be taken into account when discussing the 
ethnic and/or linguistic component.
• Individuals animated with the national ideal of reintegration into one state 
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entity consider it as a blasphemy when used with reference to the Romanians 
on the other bank of the Prut;
• Some accept it with a regional meaning, like Wallachian, Transylvanian etc.
• Others find it natural than Moldavian is naturally included into Romanian;
• A certain segment of population use the term to indicate another ethnic 
and national category, somewhat distinct from Romanian.
6. As a whole, the option of all ethnic groups of the Republic of Moldova concerning 
self- and hetero-identification inclines clearly towards a (having parents belonging 
to the given nation), b (speaking the given language at home), d (feeling a [name 
of the nation]), and then h (having [the given language] as native), c (keeping the 
customs of…), and e (perceiving the culture of… as one’s own). Generally, these 
indicators reflect 1) the blood-relation conscience, 2) family-spoken language 
conscience, and 3) common-destiny conscience for minority ethnic groups, while 
Moldavians tend to choose the criterion of respecting the customs for the founding 
of their identity.
7. We suggest that the disbalance of the prevalent in-group, re-acknowledged also on 
the national feeling dimension, must be interpreted in separate studies, via the diffe-
rent ways through which group members perceive and assess their past and chances 
for future evolution, self-assess their group characteristics/features and their limits 
as to the answer given to the challenges of natural and social environment.
Suggestions 
As it is known, the self-image of ethnic groups is updated according to the groups’ 
response reactions — either positive or negative — to the challenges of natural and social 
environment. From this perspective the criteria of assessment for successes and failures, 
of their acknowledgement or denial appear as fundamental, and the results can lead 
either to mobilisation for the surpassing of obstacles or to an attitude of discouragement 
and immobility. Where do we stand ourselves, we, the Moldavians, at the beginning of 
the 21st century, must be our constant preoccupation and has to be found as an goal in 
any social policy discourse in order to appreciate objectively the state of things that might 
contribute to our cohesion as a group, so that our self-image would cease to be continually 
„hurt“, vague, and rather negative, but would instead become a positive one.
Educational policy ought to centre also on the intercultural axis from the teaching 
and educating process, first of all for the understanding of alterity within the Republic of 
Moldova. The cultivation of tolerance and mutual respect between the members of coha-
bi tating ethnic groups through cognitive, attitudinal and behavioural experiences must 
become a distinct frame goal in both the curriculum and extracurricular activities.
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QUALITATIVE RESEARCH REPORT
Delphi Study
This study represents the exploratory phase of a year long research conducted in Moldova, 
with the purpose to collect the information necessary for the development of working tools for 
the Ethnobarometer research. 
Ethnobarometer is a survey performed on a representative national sample, which will give 
us the opportunity to evaluate and monitor regularly the interethnic relations in Moldova. At the 
same time, the poll results will be a useful database for subsequent researches and analyses, and 
can become topics for public debates. 
During the exploratory phase, a two-stage Delphi study was realized among 30 participants 
selected from different social sectors (political, both central and local level, mass media, academia, 
and nongovernmental sector). 
Objectives
The objectives of the Delphi study were: 
■ Identification of important items on Moldova’s public agenda; 
■ Identification of topics that have generated or generate controversies/conflicts;
■ Identification of issues likely to generate interethnic conflicts;
■ Identification of the most important positive and negative features used by respondents in 
describing the ethnic groups from Moldova; 
■ Identification of representations defining the national identity from different perspectives; 
■ Identification of perceptions and attitudes regarding Moldova’s politics and policies;
■ Identification of relevant opinion leaders and reference groups in the relationships between 
different ethnic groups from Moldova. 
Methodology
The exploratory phase used the Delphi research method. This method can be defined as a 
method of structuring the communication process so that it allows a group of individuals to confront 
a complex problem. In order to get to this structured communication, one needs:
■ A feedback of individual contributions;
■ Evaluations of group thinking;
■ Possibility of individuals to redefine their opinions;
■ Anonymity of individual responses.
The study was realized in two stages. The first phase included the conduct of in-depth interviews 
with personalities from different social sectors (political life, academia, nongovernmental sector, 
local authorities and mass media). The second phase implied the use of a self-completed survey 
form. In this second working session, the participants had the opportunity to learn the information 
collected from the entire group, to redefine and complete their positions, and to comment on the 
research report. 
The final report was compiled from the information collected through 30 in-depth interviews 
and 20181 survey forms completed by the participants of the first stage. The participants had the 
opportunity to consult in advance the research report of the first stage. 
181  Th e 20 participants of the second phase were the participants of the fi rst phase that were contacted and accepted to 
participate in this working session. 
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The information collected in the qualitative research should be used for orientation 
purposes only since it could not be extrapolated at the national level! Some conclusions can 
measure inadequately (too extensively, or too intensively) the identified issues, because of the 
distortions that appeared due to the number of participants!
Participant group structure 
Declared 
ethnic 
background
Area of activity Interview location
Language 
of the 
interview
F11 Moldovan Political Science Dept. Chisinau Romanian
M2 Moldovan Political Science Dept. Chisinau Romanian
M3 Moldovan History Dept. Chisinau Romanian
M4 Romanian History Dept. Cahul Romanian
M5 Moldovan Institute of Philosophy, Social Sciences and Law Chisinau Romanian
M6 Romanian Academy of Sciences Chisinau Romanian
M7 Russian Parliament Chisinau Russian
F8 Moldovan UNICEF Chisinau Romanian
M9 Romanian NGO Chisinau Romanian
F10 Moldovan Mass Media Chisinau Romanian
M11 Romanian Mass Media Chisinau Romanian
M12 Romanian NGO Chisinau Romanian
M13 Moldovan NGO Chisinau Romanian
M14 Ukrainian Business Balti Russian
M15 Roma Business Soroca Romanian
M16 Moldovan Business Chisinau Romanian
M17 Romanian Business Cahul Romanian
M18 Moldovan Parliament Chisinau Romanian
M19 Ukrainian Local authorities Cahul Romanian
M20 Moldovan Local authorities Balti Romanian
M21 Bulgarian Local authorities Taraclia Russian
M22 Bulgarian Local authorities Taraclia Russian
M23 Roma Roma leader Soroca Romanian
M24 Ukrainian Mass Media Chisinau Russian
F25 Gagauz Mass Media Gagauz region Russian
M26 Gagauz Mass Media Gagauz region Russian
M27 Armenian Mass Media Chisinau Russian
M28 Moldovan Parliament Chisinau Romanian
M29 Moldovan Business Hincesti Russian
M30 Russian NGO Chisinau Russian
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Major conclusions
■ The research studied three central issues: Perception of politics/perception of Moldovan 
poli tics and policies, items on Moldova’s public agenda/controversial issues, and interethnic 
relations. These issues are discussed in details in the next chapters.
Perceptions on politics/relation to politics and policies from Moldova
■ The answers to the questions that referred to the first two issues in the first stage can be 
divided in two large categories, based on two different ideological and normative perspec-
tives. The adoption of one of these two perspectives will have consequences on the entire 
discussion, determining the participants’ options regarding politics, history, economy, etc. 
Even if the expressed opinions do not fully fit the two ideological models described below, 
since they vary from case to case, the differences in the participants’ opinions are large 
enough to determine their placement on one side or the other. 
■ The first perspective (independence as national revival + democratization –NR+D)
This is a position referring to the 1991 Independence, which is perceived in a double perspec-
tive: as a moment of national revival and return to the Romanian spirit on one side, and as the 
beginning of democratization of the political regime, on the other side. From the first perspective, 
the return to Latin script, declaration of Romanian as official language, symbolic restoration of 
the links between the two banks of Prut River are natural things related to the newly created histo-
rical reality and redefinition of national identity. From the second perspective, the free elections, 
multiparty system, creation of the Parliament, institutional reforms, accession of Moldova to the 
main international structures (UN, Council of Europe, OSCE, external orientation towards the EU) 
are victories that contributed to the democratization of the political regime. The outbreak of the 
Transnistrian war is viewed as Russia’s attempt to maintain its influence in the region. The reso-
lution of this conflict cannot take into consideration the idea of federalization of the unitary state. 
■ The second perspective (independence as an opportunity for the emergence of a new 
nation – NN)
At the other extreme, a different position defines the moment of independence as a moment, 
signaling the emergence of a new nation – the Moldovans, nation with a distinct history and iden-
tity, which initially implied a multiethnic mixture (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, 
Gagauz, etc). 
Therefore at least two official languages are needed – Moldovan and Russian (language spo-
ken by everyone). 
From this second perspective, the newly created democratic institutions have not proven their 
advantages. The multiparty system and the political unrests related to the struggle for power of diffe-
rent political formations have hindered the accomplishment of a good governance, have consequently 
lead to division and impoverishment of the society, weakening the state authority, laun ching slogans 
without real support during electoral campaigns in order to gain political capital. On the other 
hand, Moldova did little to affirm itself as a partner with an important word to say within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. The Transnistrian war occurred because of the „Romaniani-
zation“ policy of Chisinau at the beginning of the 1990s, and misunderstandings rela ted to the use of 
official languages. The federalization of Moldova is regarded as a possible solution of the conflict. 
■ In many instances, the participants belonging to different ethnic groups placed themselves 
on different ideological positions: Moldovans (NR+D) on one side, and national minorities 
(NN) on the other side. 
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■ The participants of the second stage viewed with suspicion the opinions formulated by the 
advocates of the opposing perspective. In most situations, the reaction was to close the 
communication process, either by denying the legitimacy of the opposing perspective, by 
attacking the correctness of the study, by reducing to the minimum or neutralizing their 
own comments in the second stage. Most of the participants limited themselves to criticizing 
the opposite position or to emphasizing their own position. 
National identity
■ Most of the participants are proud of the country where they were born and where they 
live, calling it their motherland and associating it with the most beautiful metaphors and 
epithets. 
■ Some participants view the country as part of a larger political entity (Romania or Russian 
Federation). 
■ Other participants believe that Moldova is about to collapse due to poverty, economic decline, 
as well as political inconsistency. This abyss is getting wider in front of a weak country with 
a territory fragmented by the Transnistrian conflict, with an uncertain identity and with an 
extremely short and tumultuous history. 
■ The opinions regarding the definition of national identity can be divided in two large 
categories. Some participants conceive the idea of national identity only within a common 
history, a common memory, and one nation. Other (individualists) believe that the way of 
self-identification is an issue related to the freedom of the individuals to join a group or the 
values they believe in. 
Policy towards minorities
■ Most participants believe that Moldova led a balanced policy towards national minorities, 
adjusting its legislation to the requirements of international bodies and managing to avoid 
excesses.
■ Some participants find that in this field, the things remained at the formal level of „con-
tent-empty“ legislation and that the state has not implemented any policies that would sti-
mu late the interethnic communication and collaboration, would reduce the development 
gaps between the North and the South (regions with different ethnic configurations) or set 
common goals for the majority and minorities. 
Public agenda
■ We have grouped the relevant topics listed by participants in three large categories: politics, 
economy, and society (see also annex 1, page 25). 
■ Among the issues related to the politics of the past years, considered by the participants as 
important, we can note some events related to the emergence of the new state: declaration of 
independence in the context of the collapse of the Soviet Union, adoption of the Constitution 
and the Transnistrian war. The more recent events mentioned by the participants are: the 
victory of the Communist Party in the 2001 elections, federalization plan of Moldova pro-
posed by Moscow, introduction of the integrated history and Russian language classes in 
schools, granting rights to national minorities, development of the poverty reduction stra-
tegy by the Government with the clearance of the international bodies. These issues are 
perceived differently, depending on the perspective adopted by the participants. 
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■ Some political issues can only be seen from one position. Thus, the victory of the Ilascu 
case at the European Court for Human Rights, negotiation of the action plan for European 
integration, consolidation of the right wing forces in one political formation - Moldova 
Democrata Bloc, corruption extended at all administrative levels, violation of democratic 
freedoms, particularly the freedom of mass media, during the communist rule are issues 
identified mostly from the NR+D perspective. On the other hand, from the other perspec-
tive (NN), in the last years Moldova witnessed a political and economic stabilization, the 
governmental policies were oriented towards ordinary people, the services rendered to the 
citizens were improved. 
■ Other political issues considered important by the participants (only NN perspective) were 
the installation of Stefan cel Mare (The Great) monument, renovation of Capriana Monastery, 
elaboration by the Government of a strategy for social, youth and tourism development, 
organization of the wine festival with the involvement of the President of the country. 
■ The issues identified by the participants as important for economy – noted from both 
perspectives, but again differently – are the stabilization of the national currency, elimination 
of arrears in the payment of salaries and pensions, the absence of the infrastructure for 
processing of agricultural products in the context of a predominantly agrarian economy. 
■ The issues related to the national economy noted only from the NR+D perspective are: lack 
of competition on the market or failure of market economy, challenges, often insuperable, 
for private businesses (issue sometimes perceived from the NN perspective!), lack of invest-
ments, scandals related to the state interference with the economy, corruption. 
■ The economic issues perceived only from NN perspective are: achievement of economic 
stability, creation of a socially-oriented market economy, achievement of economic growth. 
■ Concerning society, most of the participants believe that the most important challenge for 
Moldova at this moment is the extreme poverty and massive migration (often illegal) of 
labor force. 
■ In the second phase of the study, the participants completed the public agenda or confirmed 
some issues contained in this agenda. 
Controversial issues
■ The topics with the highest conflict potential noted during the first phase of the research 
by the participants were: the Transnistrian situation and the ways for solving the conflict, 
the issue of state configuration - unitary or federal, the issue of strategic orientation of 
Moldova’s foreign policy: towards the EU or CIS, issues related to the national identity 
(Romanians or Moldovans?, official language, the dangers of Romanianization), the threat 
of disintegration of Moldova – by unification with Romania, by disintegration with the 
federalization, or due to pressures on behalf of the Russian Federation. 
■ This set of issues with high conflict potential, generally identified by the participants, 
overlaps perfectly in the first stage with the set of issues identified by the participants 
as likely to generate interethnic conflicts!
■ In the second phase of the study, many participants considered the conflict potential of all 
these topics, with the exception of the Transnistrian issue, as being more reduced, compared 
to the estimations of the first phase. However, many of the NR+D participants have oriented 
themselves towards the issues related to the politics and economy from the public agenda 
that positioned them in contrast with the other ideological perspective, considering the 
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latter as having the highest conflict potential. Other participants considered that there are 
no debate topics with a high conflict potential, and some have reconfirmed the issues iden-
tified during the first phase. 
Interethnic relations
■ Regarding the topic of interethnic relations in Moldova, the general opinions concentrate 
around two main ideas. In the opinion of some participants, in Moldova there has never 
existed and there is no potential for an interethnic conflict (except the 1992 crisis, which 
was successfully solved by granting autonomy to the Gagauz region). The relationship 
between different ethnic groups residing in Moldova is peaceful, cordial, and based on 
mutual understanding. 
■ According to other participants, there are no interethnic conflicts in Moldova, however, 
the ethnic groups barely communicate. The Moldovans and different ethnic minorities 
from the country practically live in different worlds. 
■ In the second phase of the study, the participants confirmed one of these two ideas.
■ Many participants believe that the Transnistrian conflict is not ethnic, but political. 
Positive and negative features, stereotypes and common values
■ Each of the discussed ethnic groups (Moldovans, Romanians, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, 
Bulgarians, Jews, and Roma) was described by positive as well as negative features. In the 
case of Romanians and Gypsies, the negative features visibly outnumber the positive ones. 
■ Many of the positive features applied to Moldovans actually represent more defensive 
qualities – inaction (kind, peaceful, respectful, obedient, etc) than dynamic qualities, such 
as the ones attributed to Russians or Ukrainians (resourceful, prompt, helpful, strong, 
belonging to great cultures, etc.). In the negative representation, Moldovans are viewed as 
inferior to Romanians, Russians or Ukrainians, being considered a rather rural, backward 
and uneducated population. 
■ Romanians are perceived by Moldovans rather as examples to follow, since they are more 
civilized, preserve better their traditions, culture and language, and are well defined in their 
identity. On the other side, Romanians are perceived by minorities rather as foreigners, 
more dangerous and more intolerant than Moldovans. 
■ Many negative features used to describe Russians represent features related to aggressiveness 
and domination (occupants, colonists, grumpy, arrogant, dominators, suffering from „big 
brother“ syndrome, imperialists, etc.). 
■ The negative representation applied to Ukrainians was that of „younger brother of the big 
brother“, people who achieve their goals regardless of the means and consequences. The 
positive representation describes them as decided, joyful people who follow their traditions, 
who have beautiful songs and dances. 
■ The Bulgarians and Gagauz are the less known ethnic groups among people who do not 
belong to these ethnic groups. Many of the used identification features characterize only 
the respective ethnic group (e.g. Christian-Orthodox of Turkic origin – for Gagauz, 
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vegetable growers – for Bulgarians). Nevertheless, at times they are regarded as similar 
ethnic groups. 
■ The representation of Jews is close to the universal image: they are a very strong community 
of people that help each other, are educated, professional, and successful in business. 
However, in the negative perspective they are viewed as people who influence the economy 
and politics from the shadow, and are always ready to buy and sell if they have the 
opportunity. 
■ Gypsies represent the ethnic group with the most negative features, and the dominant 
representation is that they do not take seriously the social norms accepted by the rest of the 
people. 
■ Some of the positive features listed by the participants are common to several ethnic groups. 
Thus, the Moldovans, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians are considered hardworking and 
thrifty. If you add the Roma, what is common for them, is that all these groups are joyful, 
good singers and good dancers. The Moldovans, Russians and Ukrainians have in common 
the hospitality. Moldovans and Russians are considered the masters of the country. 
■ There are certain attributes that are absent among Moldovans but are applied to other ethnic 
groups. Except for Russians and Moldovans, the rest of the ethnic groups are considered as 
communities preserving and cultivating their traditions. Romanians, Russians, Bulgarians 
and Jews are viewed as educated people (intellectuals, professionals, etc.). Russians, Ukrai-
nians, Bulgarians and Gagauz can be called brothers, and Russians Bulgarians and Jews are 
successful in business. 
Reference groups
■ The groups and individuals are perceived influential (rather negative than positive) for the 
interethnic relations in Moldova, and represent almost exclusively personalities and poli-
tical parties. 
Relationship with the state
■ Most of Moldovan participants consider that being a citizen of Moldova goes in line with 
an undetermined identity, obedience, extreme poverty and ultimately emigration. 
■ Some participants belonging to ethnic minorities say that they live in a beautiful country; 
they are confident in Moldova’s future, and believe that they all are citizens of the same 
country, regardless of ethnic background. 
■ Other participants belonging to national minorities avoided to answer this question. 
■ Russians are viewed by most of the Moldovan participants as the ethnic group that in the 
past had the advantage of power, in the detriment of other ethnic groups, and who have not 
yet given up the idea of preserving this advantage. They are arrogant and continue to behave 
like foreigners, without even trying to adapt to the local values, culture, and language.
■ Many participants believe that the autonomy granted to Gagauz was a good solution, and 
that the representatives of this minority now perceive Moldova as their motherland. 
■ Some participants look with suspicion at the assistance provided by the neighboring coun-
tries to the relevant ethnic groups (setting up universities, radio stations, television stations, 
newspapers, etc. financed by Russia for the Russian minority, Ukraine for the Ukrainian 
minority, etc.). The greatest suspicions are raised by Romania’s assistance to Moldovans 
and Turkey’s assistance to the Gagauz ethnics.
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Work assumptions for qualitative research
1. The ethnic groups from Moldova generally live in enclaves, having few common values, 
goals and little communication among them. 
2. The issues related to domestic policy (those identified above + limitation of democratic 
rights and freedoms) or the issues related to Moldova’s foreign policy (orientation towards 
the EU, CIS or Romania) can place the ethnic groups on conflicting positions (see also 
annex 1, page 24). 
Perception on politics/relation to politics and policies in Moldova
The opinions formulated for all these topics form a range with two completely different 
ideolo gical positions at the extremes: 
■ First perspective (independence as national revival + democratization – NR+D)
This is a position referring to the moment of independence from 1991, which is perceived 
from a double perspective: as a moment of national revival and return to the Romanian spirit on 
one side, and as the beginning of democratization of the political regime, on the other side. From 
the first perspective, the return to Latin script, declaration of Romanian as official language, sym-
bolic restoration of the links between the two banks of Prut River are natural things related to the 
newly created historical reality, and redefinition of national identity. From the second perspective, 
the free elections, multiparty system, creation of the Parliament, institutional reforms, accession 
of Moldova to the main international structures (UN, Council of Europe, OSCE, the external 
orientation towards the EU) are victories that contributed to the democratization of the political 
regime. The outbreak of the Transnistrian war is viewed as Russia’s attempt to maintain its in-
fluence in the region. The resolution of this conflict cannot take into consideration the idea of 
federalization of the unitary state. 
■ The second perspective (independence as an opportunity for the emergence of a new na-
tion – NN)
At the other end, another position defines the moment of independence as a moment of the 
emergence of a new nation: the Moldovans, nation with a distinct history and identity, which ini-
tially implied multiethnic mixture (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, Gagauz, etc). 
Therefore at least two official languages are needed – Moldovan and Russian (language spoken by 
everybody). The newly created democratic institutions have not proven their advantages. The 
multiparty system and the political unrests related to the struggle for power of different political 
formations have hindered the accomplishment of a good governance, have consequently lead to 
division and impoverishment of the society, weakening the state authority, launching slogans 
without real support during electoral campaigns in order to acquire political capital. Meanwhile, 
Moldova did little to affirm itself as a partner with an important word to say within the Common-
wealth of Independent States. The Transnistrian war broke out because of the „Romanianization“ 
policy of Chisinau at the beginning of the 1990s, and misunderstandings related to the use of offi-
cial languages. The federalization of Moldova is regarded as a possible solution of the conflict. 
Observations
■ The better part extracted from participants’ opinions is situated between these two extre-
mes, having more nuances, being more complex and sometimes less consistent than the 
ones outlined here. However, the opinions contrast to the extent of their inclusion on one 
ideological position or another.
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■ The two different ideological options have largely affected all answers to other discussed 
issues. 
■ In many instances, the participants belonging to different ethnic groups positioned them-
selves on different ideological positions: Moldovans (NR+D) on one side, and national mi-
no rities (NN) on the other side. 
■ The common denominator of these two opposed positions is the appropriation of a distinct 
identity of the Moldovan state, as independent entity on the world map. 
■ At the same time, the new Moldovan state is perceived as young, unconsolidated, lacking a 
well-shaped national identity. Moldova is perceived as a state that has gone through insta-
bility in its strategic foreign policy, exposed to threats of institutional erosion or loss of 
state authority. 
Other perceptions and attitudes towards the Moldovan state
■ National -optimists: Most of the participants are proud of their country, calling it their 
motherland and associating it with the most beautiful metaphors and epithets. 
„(Moldova) reminds me of a vine leaf; or it reminds me of Italy. Look at it and you will 
notice how much it resembles the Italian „boot“. Only Corsica and Sicily are missing“, 
M7;
„When I was in school, it was associated with a grape“, M17;
„I am proud to be a citizen of Moldova. When we were part of the USSR, I served in the 
army in the Far East. When I was asked where I was from they were surprised to hear that 
there were Bulgarians living in Moldova. And when people were asking me about the life in 
Moldova, I was telling them that Moldova was a blooming region with many orchards, 
grain fields and everything you want“; M21; „Its people, its land, its traditions. When we 
say Moldova, we suddenly see vineyards and blooming orchards, a good wine, vegetable 
and fruit, hardworking people. This is Moldova’s significance for us“, M24. 
■ The unionist perspective: people that consider the country as part of a larger political entity. 
„The second Romanian state“, M6. 
■ The skeptics: people who believe that Moldova is on the edge of an abyss due to poverty, 
economic decline, as well as its political inconsistency. This abyss is getting wider in front 
of a weak country with a territory fragmented by the Transnistrian conflict, with an uncer-
tain identity, and with an extremely short and tumultuous history. 
 „Poor country“; M4; „Poverty“, M9; 
 „The country I live in. A poor country that has not yet determined its direction – East or 
West“, M11;
 „A country of miserable people, without any future, who cannot articulate clearly what 
they want“, M12; 
 „Moldova is rather a territory than a state, because it does not control a part of its territory 
(Transnistria)“, M3. 
National identity
The opinions regarding the definition of national identity can be divided in two large categories. 
■ Those who conceive the idea of national identity only within a common history, a common 
memory, and one nation: 
„It is a conscience of affiliation to a certain community where the members have something 
in common: common cultural, historical foundation, common aspirations and future“, F1;
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 „It is what makes you identify with a nation, feel part of that nation. As a rule, the nation 
is defined as something that meets a set of criteria and features: language, culture, same 
race, traditions, etc. and the understanding of the affiliation or loyalty to these values“, M5; 
 „The national identity is the defining element of a person belonging to a certain ethnic 
group. It is a notion that consolidates an ethnic group and gives it the aspect of nation. It is 
a community of people speaking the same language, sharing the same traditions, customs, 
deriving from the same blood and having a common history“, M6.
■ And individualists, who consider that self-identification is an issue related to the freedom 
of the individuals to join a group or the values they believe in:
 „I define it as an individual option. Even though it has been extensively declared that the 
national identity is taken for granted, that you are born with it and that you cannot deny 
it, I believe that it is an individual option. The individuals can leave, can learn a different 
language, or, even as in our case, can stay, can speak the same language, but consider them-
selves Romanians or Moldovans. Therefore, it is an individual option, it is a political option, 
and it is a socially formed option. There is nothing in-born here, there is nothing for granted, 
there is nothing. It becomes something insignificant when an individual can choose to give 
up or to ignore“, F10.
 „This moment of self-identification is something very personal. How do you perceive 
yourself? By culture, by your way of thinking… In my opinion, in this case it is not even 
about being a local. Another thing is that there should not be a forced, imposed identification. 
There is a notion – „assimilation“. Assimilation represents the possibility of a representative 
of a nation to change the ethnic background when in another ethnic environment. This is 
exactly the issue of mixed marriages. Now we do not have nationality specified in our 
passports, however it existed before. At that time, people deriving from mixed marriages, a 
Moldovan and a Ukrainian parent for example, had to determine who they were: Moldovans 
or Ukrainians. You could not choose „Moldo-Ukrainian“, you had to determine your iden-
tity, but it was voluntary. The voluntary assimilation happens everywhere, and generally 
does not cause rejection, as in the case of forced assimilation. I believe that the issue of self-
identification is rather serious for us, especially in relation with the title nation, and can be 
problematic for other ethnic groups. Maybe it is just a personal problem“, M7.
Perceptions on minority-related policies
Most respondents consider that Moldova had a balanced policy towards minorities, adjusting 
its legislation to the requirements of the international bodies, and managing to avoid the 
excesses. 
Some participants find that in this field, the things remained at the formal level of „content-
empty“ legislation, and that the state has not implemented any policies that would stimulate the 
interethnic communication and collaboration, that would reduce the development gaps between 
the North and the South (regions with different ethnic configurations) or set common goals for 
the majority and minorities. 
If from the legislative perspective the situation could be considered satisfactory, there are 
aspects that make certain ethnic groups more advantaged than others. The opinions on this issue 
were divided: 
■ There are opinions according to which Moldovans are advantaged due to their number 
(the fact that they represent the majority), and that the official language of the country is 
their native language. This situation facilitated, at the beginning of 1990s, the replacement 
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of other ethnic groups from administration and state institutions with Moldovans. 
■ According to another set of opinions, the Moldovans are disadvantaged compared to other 
ethnic groups, even though they represent the majority. This thing is possible due to the 
advantages the Russian speaking ethnic groups, especially the Russians and Ukrainians, 
enjoyed at the beginning of 1990s. These minorities were living mainly in urban areas, 
compared to the Moldovans who were rather a rural population; were more educated and 
had representatives in key economic and political positions. If from the political perspective 
the situation was in favor for Moldovans by introducing the use of Moldovan language in 
administration and organizing free elections, then from the economic perspective, the 
count ry is currently dominated by the Russian and Ukrainian minorities. Moreover, if 
Moldovan became the language of politics and administration, then Russian is the language 
of economy.
■ There are also opinions that view the Gagauz, Bulgarians and Roma as disadvantaged mino-
rities. This happens because Gagauz and Bulgarians are minorities that live mostly in rural 
areas, very poor regions in southern Moldova. The Roma represent an ethnic group that 
adheres with difficulty to the social norms and values of the majority and few things have 
been done so far for their integration. 
In all situations where participants indicated the advantage of an ethnic group over the other, 
no examples of corrective policies were offered.
Some participants’ opinions show acceptance of cultural assistance provided by the countries 
to the relevant ethnic groups (setting up universities, radio and television stations, newspapers, 
etc. financed by Russian for the Russian minority or by Ukraine for the Ukrainian minority, etc.) 
Romania’s case seems more special, and ethnic minorities regard suspiciously at the invol-
vement of this state in supporting certain cultural initiatives. There are fears that, for example, a 
TV channel in Moldova funded by Romania could try to influence the opinions in favor of the 
Romanian interests, unknown to Moldova. 
Some respondents also view the aid provided by Turkey to ethnic Gagauz with suspicion. 
This assistance could separate even more the Gagauz minority from Moldova. 
At the same time, there are opinions according to which the best solution is for each state to 
solve its problems alone and that the funding of schools, universities, and TV channels should be 
the responsibility of each government of the relevant state. 
Moldova’s Public Agenda, controversial issues
We divided this chapter in two distinct parts. On one side there were questions regarding the 
relation of participants to the recent past or to the present, on the other side we pursued the 
identification of those issues that have generated or generate the most ardent controversies within 
public debate. 
Items on participants’ agenda
The important events of the recent years perceived by the participants can be grouped in 
several categories: political, economic, socio-economic events. The political events can be further 
grouped in events related to the emergence of the new state, events related to the political changes 
of the transition period, and local issues. Each of these three categories registered different 
ideological positions.
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1a. Politics
A. Issues related to the emergence of the new state
B. Issues related to the political changes of the transition period
C. Other
2b. Economy
3c. Society (See also annex 1, p.24)
1a. Politics
A. Issues related to the emergence of the new state
The respondents identified the following most important events: 
■ The collapse of the Soviet Union 
■ Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova (1991)
■ The adoption of the Constitution (1994)
■  The Transnistrian war (1992) 
As we noted before, these events were interpreted diff erently in those two ideological per-
spectives: Independence as national revival + democratization, and Independence as an opportu-
nity for the emergence of a new nation. 
B. Issues related to the political changes of the transition period
Among these, the most important events perceived by the respondents are: 
■ Granting certain rights to national minorities (e.g. opening of Ukrainian schools, a 
newspaper in Ukrainian, the status of Gagauzia as an autonomous region, adjustment of 
the relevant legislation to the European standards);
■ The victory of the Communists in the 2001 elections; this event is seen from two distinct 
perspectives: 
– At one end are the opinions that this moment guaranteed political stability, consis-
tency of the policies and economic development in Moldova;
„An economic growth“, „the growing accountability of businesses in relation with the 
state budget“, M21; „consolidation of the country“, M22; „stability in politics, economy, 
pensions paid on time“, M26. According to this perspective, the transformation of the 
semi presidential regime into a parliamentary system in 2000 lead to the consolidation 
of state institutions. 
„Improvement of the legal framework regarding the separation of powers within the 
state“, M28; „it looks like the President and the Executive branch have everything under 
control, […] provide assistance and advice to the local public administration“, M21. 
The reforms initiated by the previous governments (privatization, administrative de-
cen tralization, etc) were wrong, and lead to the impoverishment of the population, 
and its abandonment by the political class; returning to these issues may be 
appropriate. 
– At the other end are the opinions that the victory of the communists represents a 
decline in the process of consolidation of democratic institutions; lately there have 
been limitations of democratic rights and freedoms. Despite the existent parliamentary 
regime, one can notice a consolidation of President’s position, which now controls 
the other branches (the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary). 
„We experienced perestroika once: multiparty system. Now we arrived at where we 
started, most of the population pleads for one party. We do not have a truly independent 
newspaper. Human rights and freedoms are restrained“, F1;
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„The exercise of citizens’ rights and freedoms was restricted, for example, freedom of 
expression; there were abuses against the opposition, the ruling party tried to split cer-
tain organizations, media institutions, trade unions etc.“, M9. 
„The system is unstable from the political point of view. In 2000, for example, Moldova 
became de jure a parliamentary republic, but de facto it is a presidential republic: the 
President currently controls the legislative, the executive, and the judicial branches,“ M3.
■ The federalization plan proposed by the Russian Federation (Kozak Memorandum) This 
event is also viewed from two opposite perspectives:
– On one side, those who believe that this plan was a good opportunity for Moldova as 
long as it solved the Transnistrian issue. 
– On the other side, those who believe that this plan threatened the unity of the Mol-
dovan state, maybe even its independence. 
■ Introduction of integrated history course, introduction of Russian classes in schools (these 
issues were also either rejected or supported): 
– According to the advocates of these measures, the history of Moldovans is totally dif-
fe rent from the history of Romanians and must be studied as such; Russian is neces-
sary for Moldovans in order to be able to communicate with other ethnic groups, the 
bilingualism being at the same time a national pride; 
– According to those opposing these measures, the new history course is a phony 
intertwined with political options not historical truths; Russian is not more important 
than any other language of international use, as long as Moldovan is considered the 
official language. 
■ The development of the poverty reduction strategy with the clearance of the international 
financial institutions was an event mentioned by both perspectives. 
■ Health insurance issue.
Besides these events noted from both ideological perspectives, there are the issues noted only 
from one perspective: 
From the NR+D perspective the following issues are important: 
■ The winning of the Ilascu’s case at the European Court for Human Rights. 
■ Negotiation of the action plan for integration with the European Union (2003), 
■ The consolidation of right wing forces in one political formation (Moldova Democrata 
Bloc) 
■ Extended corruption 
From the NN perspective, other issues are important:
■ Economic and political stabilization; 
■ Orientation of state policies towards simple people 
■ Improvement of services for citizens
■ Elaboration of strategies for social, youth and tourism development
„Elaboration and approval of the program for social development, approval of the strategy 
for youth development in Moldova, the affirmation of the Government in the world through 
tourism, rehabilitation of the national heritage (e.g. Capriana Monastery)“, M20. 
C. Other issues perceived by participants
(Only from NN perspective)
■ Installation of Ştefan cel Mare ( „The Great“) monument 
■ Renovation of Capriana Monastery
■ The Wine Festival organized with the involvement of the President. 
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2b. Economy
Again, some things are visible from both perspectives while others are visible only from one 
perspective. The most important events noted by both perspectives are:
■ Stabilization of Moldova’s national currency;
■ Payment of salaries and pensions on time;
■ Lack of agricultural processing facilities in the context of a predominantly agrarian eco-
nomy. 
The aspects noted only from NR+D perspective are:
■ Lack of competition on the market, failure of market economy, impossibility of starting a 
business 
■ Lack of investments
■ Impossibility to start a business
■ Corruption
■ Massive interference of the state with the economy
„Statistics show economic stability, but the situation is deplorable: lack of competition, high 
prices, low salaries, unemployment, and massive emigration. The poorest country in Europe. 
(…) Current problems: Extended corruption, lack of competition, undeveloped market 
economy, impossibility to start a business, lack of processing facilities in agriculture, 
deficiencies in education and social assistance“, F1.
The aspects noted only from NN perspective are:
■ Economic stabilization
■ Economic growth
■ Creation of a socially oriented market economy
3c. Society
The most important events noted by many participants are: 
■ Massive migration of labor force abroad, often under illegal circumstances, and
■ Extreme poverty among ordinary people. 
„The social issues come first: there is no work, jobs and funds, and the results are: poverty, 
disorientation, because there is no clear way of Government activities“, M28. 
Most of the aspects perceived by the participants as related to the recent past are per-
ceived as actual (see B. and C., 2b and 3c.). The noted issues are the same and cannot be 
solved quickly. The future is viewed from an insecure perspective, there are more ques-
tion marks related to Transnistria and the results of the next elections. Some participants 
are pessimistic, perceiving the current situation as a „silence before the storm“. M9, others 
are skeptical and concerned, others, being more optimistic, and are content that there 
are no extremist manifestations or that „the country did not move 180 degrees, did not 
turn 360 degrees“, M14
The issue of definition of national identity, with all its distinguishing features (language, his-
tory, state configuration, options for foreign policy) stays open, and in the opinion of the survey 
participants is a problem that will continue to generate controversies in the future. 
Issues generating ardent controversies
The issues perceived as the most controversial are grouped by two levels of intensity.
Issues with average intensity level: 
■ Scandals related to irregularities within administration or business sector (Megadat 
situation, Dacia Hotel or Eurofarmaco). 
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■ Controversies related to the government’s policies
– On one side, criticism of the former governments for the implemented reforms ( 
„thoughtless“ privatization, administrative decentralization etc.);
– On the other hand, side criticism of the present government for the tendency to 
centralize and restrain the democratic freedoms. 
Issues with a pronounced conflict potential (positions the opinions by the above-
mentioned ideological perspectives):
■ The situation from Transnistria and ways for solving the conflict; here, expressed opinions 
are the most hesitant, the participants were not able to identify clear ways for solving the 
conflict; the adopted positions are rather normative than pragmatic (e.g. „the best solution 
would be to accept the federalization plan“ or „the conflict would be solved if Transnistria 
accepted the solution of the unitary state“).
■ The issue of state configuration: unitary state with autonomous regions or federal state 
with few prerogatives for the central government 
■ Issues of foreign policy orientation: closer to the European Union or closer to Russia and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States 
■ Threat of disintegration of Moldova by unification with Romania, by federalization that 
would leave too little for the Government from Chisinau, or due to the pressures exercised 
by the Russian Federation 
■ The issue of national identity: 
– Who are we: Romanians or Moldovans?
– What is our history: a national history of Moldovans, a continuum of the Moldovan 
political formations, which culminated with the Independence of Moldova or a his-
tory of Romanians and minorities who reside on this territory, isolated by artificial 
borders that obstructed their natural political development? 
– What is the official language and what language should be official: Romanian, Mol-
dovan, Russian or more official languages? 
– If the Moldovans will be subject to „Romanianization“, will the other ethnic minorities 
suffer? Will they also fall under this process of Romanianization? 
Interethnic relations in Moldova
Since the number of participants belonging to different ethnic groups was too small to be 
able to define the in-group and out-group features and stereotypes for each individual group, we 
presented the features through which the participants define their own ethnic group, together 
with the features chosen by other ethnic groups for that particular group (see annex 2). 
What we can say at the first glance from the resulted information is the fact that the various 
ethnic groups barely communicate amongst each other. The problems and aspects related to one 
ethnic group are less visible for the other groups.
The second remark we can make regarding the perception of interethnic relations in Moldova 
is that most of the respondents believe that these relationships are not tense, moreover, they are 
considered even cordial. In their opinions, each ethnic group taken separately is tolerant, respects, 
and understands the position of the other ethnic groups with whom they share the territory. 
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Stereotypes for the ethnic groups from Moldova
Moldovans182 
The positive representation of Moldovans describes them as joyful, hospitable, good singers 
and good dancers. On the other hand, they are kind, peaceful, patient, sympathetic, respect-
ful, decent, hard working and generous.
Observation
The positive features applied to Moldovans represent, unlike the ones assigned to Russians or 
Ukrainians, rather defensive qualities, inaction rather than dynamism. 
The negative representation of Moldovans characterizes them as less educated, less urban, 
unstable (inconsistent, coward, indecisive, impressionable), easier to deceive compared to 
other groups, sometimes humble. They are disoriented and do not know with whom or with 
what to identify. Are not competitive when they have to work with other ethnic groups, the 
other groups are faster. 
Romanians
Romanians are perceived by Moldovans as examples worth following, since they are more 
civilized and preserve better their traditions, culture, and language, and have a well-defined 
group identity.
They are more attached to the European principles and values, and speak correct Romanian, 
are intelligent and romantic; they excel in poetry and philosophy. 
One the other hand, the minorities perceive Romanians rather as foreigners, people that are 
more dangerous, more intolerant than Moldovans.
They want to expel the Russian speaking population from the country; they want unification 
with Romania at any price. They are liars, extremists, fascists, they prosecuted Gypsies during 
the World War II, they were worse than the Nazis. 
Russians
The Russians are considered honest, openhearted, and always ready to sacrifice their lives for 
their friends, and at the same time merciless with the enemies. They belong to a large culture 
(unlike the other ethnic groups from the country), to a large and respectable people, and are 
aware of this fact. They brought their culture, freedom and development to Moldova. 
At the other end, they are described as occupants, colonists, people who held a privileged 
position in the past compared to other ethnic groups, and who have never gotten rid of the 
„big brother“ syndrome. Because of their arrogance, they have never adapted to the local 
traditions, they were not interested in learning the language of the locals. Alcoholics, greedy, 
unpredictable, people who brought their communism and Russian imperialism to Moldova. 
Ukrainians
People caring about their traditions, are at the same time communicative, joyful, like parties, 
have a good sense of humor, they eat, sing and dance well. They are hardworking, ingenious, 
resourceful, and ambitious. 
On the other hand, they are viewed as an ethnic group that let themselves assimilated by Rus-
sians in order to get the advantages ( „big brother’s younger brother“), they are people who 
would do anything to get what they want regardless the means and consequences, they are 
ethnocentric, more chauvinistic than Russians. 
182  Below you will fi nd selections of some positive or negative features collected by the researchers. Th e features listed 
here were always selected based on the criterion of internal consistency of the representation it suggests. However, each 
representation taken separately can be aff ected by distortions, outside of a quantitative study that would test the consist-
ency of the respective features. Go to annex 2 in order to see the full list of collected features.
256 ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
The Gagauz
Thrifty, Christians of Turkic origin, quick-witted, hardworking, they have rich traditions that 
they follow, they like parties, they like wine and dancing. They are united, like the freedom 
and justice, cope well with people around them regardless of ethnic background, and are 
tolerant. They enjoy autonomy, but follow the laws of the Republic of Moldova. 
On the other hand, although they are stupid as Moldovans, they are aggressive as Russians. 
Rural population, unsophisticated, incapable to analyze their perspectives. They are however 
sly and impertinent. 
Observation
Like Bulgarians, the Gagauz represent an ethnic group less known by the out-group partici-
pants as compared to other groups. Many identification features could be only applied to this 
particular group (e.g.: Christian orthodox of Turkic origin – for Gagauz, vegetable growers 
– for Bulgarians). Nevertheless, at times they are regarded as similar ethnic groups. 
Bulgarians
Bulgarians are hardworking, thrifty, successful in business, punctual, smart, wealthy, scrimpy, 
civilized, pragmatic, calculated, and attentive, think a lot and make good decisions, united, 
live in solidarity, follow their traditions, etc. 
They can be considered as something in between the Gagauz and Ukrainians, they do not 
differ as a separate ethnic group, they are just like the other Russian-speakers, ugly (physi-
cally), pro-soviet, they hate the locals for their stupidity, they are harsh, pursue their goals 
regardless of the means or consequences. 
Jews
People who care much about their community, they help each other, smart, educated, resour-
ceful. They are professionally well trained, inclined towards business. Calculated, farsighted. 
Martyrs, suffered from communism and the Holocaust. The people who gave us Jesus Christ. 
Usurers, businesspeople, do not identify with their country of residence, they can always 
betray it. Jews brought the communism; they rule the country by influencing it from the 
dark. They are not too honest, they believe they are smarter, cynical, thy can buy or sell you 
whenever they want, they disregard the rest. 
Gypsies
People who love their traditions, customs, songs, and language. They take good care of their 
children, proud, clean, craftspeople, joyful, singers, and good fellows. Freedom is their broth-
er, they are free. The Gypsies from Moldova are more emancipated, more civilized, and more 
sedentary comparing to Gypsies from Romania. 
They do not adapt to the modern life, nomads, do not respect the social norms recognized by 
the rest of the people. Easy, illiterate, unorganized, fortunetellers, do not send their children 
to school, do not work, a people without goals, horse stealers. 
Common values
Some of the positive features listed by the participants are common for several ethnic groups. 
Thus, the Moldovans, Ukrainians, Gagauz, and Bulgarians are considered hardworking and 
thrifty. If you add the Gypsies, what are common for all these groups are the joy, and the fact that 
they like to sing and dance. Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians share hospitality. Moldovans 
and Russians are considered the masters of the country. 
There are certain features that are lacking among Moldovans but are shared by other ethnic 
groups. Besides Russians and Moldovans, the other ethnic groups are considered communities 
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that follow and cultivate their traditions. Romanians, Russians Bulgarians, and Jews are viewed as 
educated (intellectuals, professionals, etc.) Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and the Gagauz can 
be called brothers, and Russians, Bulgarians and Jews are successful in business 
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Hardworking ■ ■ ■ ■
Joyful ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Hospitable ■ ■ ■
Good singers and dancers ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Thrifty ■ ■ ■ ■
Masters of the country: ■ ■
Keepers of their traditions ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■
Educated ■ ■ ■ ■
Brothers ■ ■ ■ ■
Successful in business ■ ■ ■
* Shows that the relevant label was applied to the ethnic group
Reference groups
Besides some structures more or less dependent on the state (Department of Interethnic Rela-
tions, Institute for Interethnic Relations within the Moldovan Academy of Science), the groups or 
persons perceived as having influence (rather negative then positive) on interethnic relations in 
Moldova are almost exclusively politicians or political parties (the Popular Front, Interfront, Chris-
tian-Democratic Party, Mircea Snegur, Klimenko, Roşca, Dabija, Yedinstvo Movement etc.)
Participants are divided in two different categories concerning governmental structures: 
On one side – those who believe that these structures are useful and contribute to the impro-
vement of the interethnic relations, their most frequently listed activity is organization of 
multiethnic cultural events and festivals; on the other side - people believing that these structures 
are totally inefficient, and their activity does not manage to solve the actual problems. 
„All these [institutions] are formal, and they only create the impression –exhibits, folk 
festivals, etc. However, nobody cares about the problems of the ethnic groups that go way 
beyond these cultural dimensions. The leaders of these organizations are always the same. 
They sit at different cultural manifestations but don’t do anything real“, M27.
The way ethnic groups perceive themselves and are perceived in relation 
with the state
The way Moldovans perceive themselves as citizens of Moldova:
■ Most of the Moldovan respondents believe that being a citizen of Moldova implies an un-
con solidated ethnic identity, obedience, extreme poverty and ultimately emigration: 
„It means to have little opportunities for existence, it means to want to leave the country 
and look for a job abroad, to speak a broken language and to be unclear about your iden-
tity“, M5;
„To strive to survive in a village by doing farming, in a town by doing retail business or to 
create an ideal to leave the country and find a job abroad. To be Romanian and live in 
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Moldova means to wait until the President comes up with another anti-Romanian initiative 
so that you can then react accordingly“, M12;
„Probably, it means to be a person subject to the arbitrary influence of the state, almost 
uncontrolled acts of the state authorities; it means to exercise with great risks you civic and 
constitutional rights. It means to be unable to live a decent life from the incomes generated 
by local businesses, but only from the income generated by foreign enterprises, businesses, 
and non-commercial institutions. Despite this, to be a happy person, which probably helps 
Moldovans to keep away from depression“, M12;
„It means to think how to leave the country sooner to earn a living in Italy, Portugal or any 
other country. I do understand the people who leave the country because they feel humans. 
Many of them feel humans, I do not know why. Even though they work hard, they are paid 
for that and feel useful. Here they don’t feel that“, F10
The way people of other ethnic backgrounds perceive themselves as citizens of Moldova:
■ People who believe in the future of this country think that they live in a beautiful country, 
they enjoy living here and consider themselves citizens of this country. 
„I believe that we should be proud of belonging to this people, because we live in such a 
wonderful country, we have the chance to admire all that and live a decent life“, M7;
„It is a pride. Especially that I have a job here. What else can make me happy?“, M15.
■ People who avoided the answer to the questions related to this topic:
„It is difficult for me to answer this question. I think Moldovans should answer it“, M26;
„I like very much the popular idea in America – there are no nations, there are only Ame-
ricans. Regardless if you are Russian or Ukrainian, you have to serve the country you live 
in, you have to love it and do something for it“, M14.
The way Moldovans perceive Russians as citizens of Moldova: Since Russians are perceived 
as different, and as having a special status in relation to other ethnic groups, we treated this issue 
in a distinct way. Russians are viewed by many of the Moldovan participants as the ethnic group, 
which has had in the past the advantage of power in the detriment of the other ethic groups, and 
which has not yet given up the idea of maintaining this advantage. They are arrogant and continue 
to behave as foreigners or as conquerors.
„(Russians) are different and their situation is different. Maybe the climate here is much 
more favorable. Compared to Siberia, this is a beautiful and rich region. They should learn 
our language, culture, and traditions. They should integrate and become true citizens“, F1;
„For Russians it is a problem because they do not identify themselves with this country 
since it is a young state and it’s normal not to identify yourself with a country that never 
existed“, M2;
„To continue to behave as if you are the nation that dominates in this country. To promote 
your interest, hoping that Russia’s policies would determine Moldova to adopt an Eurasian 
policy“, M12.
The participants formulated two ideas with regard to the Gagauz ethnic group living in 
Moldova:
■ The Gagauz perceive Moldova as their motherland.
„They have settled here a long time ago and I think they view Moldova as their motherland, 
they have the possibility to develop themselves from the ethnic, social and cultural per-
spective“, F1;
„For the Gagauz living here, this is their motherland“, F25;
„I think this is great for the Gagauz. The Gagauz practically live only in Moldova and they 
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have managed to get autonomy. They enjoy many rights. They have opportunities for deve-
lopment“. F8 
■ The Gagauz minority or the assistance and support coming from Turkey are viewed by the 
non-Gagauz with suspicion: 
„To identify more and more with Turkey, to wait for its help and investments, and to listen 
to the advice and suggestions from outside, remaining, at the same time, a separated group“, 
M5. 
„In the last years, more and more Gagauz and Bulgarians leave Moldova and settle in 
Turkey and Bulgaria because of the social and economic problems of Moldova. They are 
allured by the higher living standards and common cultural affinities. Especially that there 
are certain tempting offers from Turkey, scholarships, etc. This exodus of Gagauz ethnics 
proves that they are not too attached to Moldova. The feeling of affiliation to Moldova 
is not so developed because they, however, succeeded in forming the political formation 
Gagauz-Yeri, and I believe that they perceive themselves rather as citizens of this 
autonomous political unit within Moldova“, M6. 
Conflicting issues regarding interethnic relations perceived by the participants
Many participants believe that there are no issues that could generate conflict among ethnic 
groups from Moldova. 
„I don’t think there has ever been an ethnic conflict in Moldova. Maybe only locally. But I 
don’t think so, especially since Moldovans are very tolerant“, M4.
Another opinion adopts the idea of inexistence of relationships between ethnic groups. There 
is neither conflict nor consensus between the minorities and the Moldovan majority, because 
each ethnic group lives in a completely different world. 
People from Moldova live in parallel universes. For example, a Russian radio station always 
broadcasts the weather forecast for Moscow, but I am not interested in that. If I want to 
hear the weather forecast for Bucharest I tune my radio to ProFM or KissFM, because I 
studied in Bucharest for 4 years. Probably there are people who studied in Moscow. The re-
fore, we have parallel worlds, which do not intersect linguistically; they do not intersect at 
all. Probably this exists in other countries but our case is more tragic“. F10
When the conflict topics are identified, these overlap perfectly with the conflict topics from 
the public agenda. 
The conflict issues related to interethnic relations are: 
■ Transnistrian issue: „Even though many of the respondents consider that the conflict is 
rather political than ethnic, the issue can lead to confrontations between the positions of 
Moldovans and those of Russian ethnics/Russians speaking groups. The former would be 
more inclined to the return to the unitary state and would agree with the politics from Chi-
si nau, the latter would side with the separatist regime from Tiraspol. From the perspective 
of Russians/Russian speaking ethnics, the Moldovans could be accused of intolerance to 
what concerns state language or guaranteeing autonomy to Transnistrian territory, a reason 
for which Transnistria separated from Moldova. 
■ The issues related to Moldovan state configuration are closely linked to the other two conflict 
issues: Transnistrian war and national identity would also oppose the opinions of Moldovans 
and Russians, or other Russian speaking ethnic groups. The Moldovan ethnics could be on 
the side of the present formula regarding state organization, while the Russian speaking 
ethnic groups would be on the side of the federal state. Moreover, the minority groups 
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could be afraid of the majority’s intentions to unite with Romania in the future, while the 
majority group could be afraid that federalization would lead to the growth of Russian 
influence in Moldova, and very strong Russian control over some states of the federation, 
even to the loss of Moldovan statehood.
■ Foreign policy options: the Moldovans might wish a pro-European orientation, while the 
ethnic minorities aspire for a foreign policy oriented towards the CIS states. There is the 
assumption that the Russian ethnics support Russia’s policy regardless of the issue. When 
Moscow and Chisinau are on divergent positions, the Russian ethnics would automatically 
disagree with the Moldovans.
■ The issues related to national identity are the ones described above: the language issue, 
ethnic affiliation, history, etc. (See page 16). Moldovans would be discontent by the follo-
wing situation: fear of political identification with Romania and conflicts that this situation 
could generate, they are refused or refuse to assume a Romanian cultural identity. This 
artifice leads to an internal misbalance of the ethnic group and to extreme identity fragility 
among Moldovans. On the other hand, the ethnic minorities influence this way of self-
relation of the majority group. The appropriation of Romanian identity by Moldovans could 
make them feel excluded as ethnic group, but also as citizens of the same state. How long 
can they declare themselves Moldovans of Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian ethnic back-
ground? ( „We are all Moldovans“), how will they call themselves when the Moldovans 
become Romanians overnight? Moreover, there would always be a fear that once they 
become Romanians, the Moldovans would also like to unite with Romania. In both cases 
(minorities, majority) there are identification barriers difficult to overcome. Both situations 
(that of majority and that of minorities) contribute to the stability of the vicious circle crea-
ted in this situation.
■ In the second phase of the study, many participants considered the conflict potential of all 
these topics, with the exception of the Transnistrian issue, as being more reduced compared 
to the estimations of the first phase. Many of the NR+D participants have oriented them-
selves towards the issues related to the politics and economy from the public agenda that 
positioned them in contrast with other ideological perspective, considering the latter as 
having the highest conflict potential. 
■ Other participants considered that there are no debate topics with a high conflict potential, 
and some have reconfirmed the issues identified during the first phase. 
The issues identified by the participants as having the potential to generate a consensus 
among all residents of Moldova, could be those that propose general social and economic goals: 
concentration of all groups on the economic development, assistance in case of natural disasters, 
consolidation of Moldova as an independent country.
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ANNEX 1
Public Agenda, Issues with High Conflict Potential
Category Items on public agenda
1 Politics
A. Issues related to the 
formation of the new 
state
■ The collapse of the Soviet Union. 
■ Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova (1991)
■ The adoption of the Constitution (1994),
■  The Transnistrian war (1992)
B. Issues related to the 
political changes of 
the transition period
■ Victory of the Communists in the 2001 elections
■ Granting rights to national minorities
■ Plan for federalization of the Republic of Moldova
■ Introduction of the integrated history course in schools
■ Introduction of Russian language classes in schools
■ Development of the poverty reduction strategy by the Government with 
the clearance of the international financial institutions. 
■ Medical insurance issues
■ The winning of the Ilascu’s case at 
ECHR. 
■ Negotiation of the action plan for 
integration with the European 
Union (2003), 
■ The consolidation of the right wing 
forces in one political formation 
(Moldova Democrata Bloc). 
■ Extended corruption.
■ Limitation of democratic 
freedoms*
■ Economic and political 
stabilization; 
■ Orientation of state policies 
towards simple people; 
■ Improvement of services for 
citizens
■ Elaboration of strategies for 
social, youth and tourism 
development**
C. Other (noted only 
from NN 
perspective)
■ installation of Ştefan cel Mare ( „The Great“) monument 
■ Renovation of Capriana Monastery
■ Wine festival organized with the involvement of the President. 
2. Economy
■ Stabilization of the national currency
■ Payment of salaries and pensions without delays
■ Inexistence of an infrastructure for agricultural processing
■ Lack of competition on the market, 
failure of market economy 
■ Impossibility to start a business
■ Lack of investments;
■ Corruption
■ Massive interference of the state 
with the economy
■ Economic stabilization
■ Creation of a socially-oriented 
market economy
■ Economic growth**
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3. SOCIETY ■ Massive migration of labor force abroad, often illegal■ Extreme poverty among ordinary people. 
Topics with high 
conflict potential = 
topics that could 
place different ethnic 
groups on 
conflicting positions. 
■ The Transnistrian situation and ways for solving the Transnistrian conflict
■ The issue of state configuration: unitary state with autonomous regions or 
federal state
■ Issues of foreign policy orientation: European Union or Russia and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States; 
■ The danger of losing the Moldovan state
■ Issues related to the national identity (Romanians or Moldovans? history, 
official language, the danger of „Romanianization“
*issues noted only from a certain ideological perspective
 Political issues that can put ethnic groups on conflicting positions (Some issues are subject to 
different interpretations; thus the existence of these opinions from one perspective or another is 
conflicting). 
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ANNEX 2
Features and stereotypes identified by 
the participants describing 
the ethnic groups from Moldova
Below we will present how the participants identified the stereotypes and the features characteristic 
for each ethnic group. 
Ethnic group Features and stereotypes identified by the participants
Moldovan, Moldovans Moldovans are hardworking, diligent, joyful, hospitable, good dancers and 
singers, sympathetic, hilarious, with a good sense of humor, speak broken 
Romanian, do not have serious education, are not intellectuals, if they are, 
then it is the first generation of intellectuals. They are one of a kind. 
Moldovans are good only for agricultural work, they are craving for 
everything coming especially from the east, they criticize themselves, lack 
an ethnic or territorial identity, are backward, farmers, Romanians from 
historical Moldova and Odessa region. They can be kind, thrifty, calm 
but uneducated and ill bred. 
Represent the majority population or the title nation, their name has 
geographic connotation, it is not an ethnonym. 
We are Moldovans, those living in Moldova. 
On the other hand, the Moldovans are inconsistent, indecisive, 
impressionable, coward but at the same time respectful, decent, 
hardworking but poor. They do not evaluate their efforts, troublemakers, 
illiterate, and do not keep their promises. 
They are, at times, tragically pathetic, lazy, generous, live in Moldova, 
puzzled, patient, obedient, docile, „blockhead“, stupid, easy to deceive, 
confused, do not know what to identify with, unorganized, are not united, 
distraught, friendly, humble, coward, people on whose back one can get 
rich, submissive or envious.
Talented but also envious, masters of the country, but in Moldova, a very 
small country, there are too many sociopolitical trends and movements. 
Peaceful, kind-hearted, hearty, polite, lively, patriots, our ancestors. 
Their symbols: Ewe-lamb, wine, mamaliga (polenta), Codru (forest), 
Miorita (traditional ballad), rose, the rulers - Bogdan, Stefan cel Mare 
(the Great), Vasile Lupu, Dimitrie Cantemir. 
It is hard to say anything about them. 
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Romanian, Romanians Romanians are keeper of traditions, devoted to their traditions and their 
affiliation with the Romanian kin, they cultivate their language, the most 
knowledgeable and educated population, represent a nation attached to 
the European principles, trained, speak correct Romanian, nationalists. 
Thus, Romanians want unification with Romania, at any price, they want 
to get rid of the Russian-speaking population, the slogan „baggage, Railway 
station, Russia“ is in their actual case, they want unification. 
There is a negative attitude on behalf of Ukraine towards this nationality. 
On the other hand, Romanians are gypsies, poor, liars, extremists, fascists, 
inconsistent, undecided, impressionable, and coward. Although more and 
more people prefer to recognize their national affiliation (especially the 
young generation), they still face the problem of self-identification. 
They are trickier than Moldovans, there are differences between 
Romanians from Romania and those living in Moldova, the latter are 
pathetic in their attempt to prove their identity. Romanians are also 
hesitant, lack firmness, intelligent, energetic, arrogant, radical, frustrated, 
people that yell and then think of the consequences of their words. 
However, they move faster and are on the right track, they represent 
the local population. 
We have not yet understood that we are of the same blood. 
Romanians are behind Moldovans, you cannot be Moldovan today and 
Romanian tomorrow, they are an imitation of something, during the War, 
they prosecuted the Gypsies, they were worse than the Germans. They are 
citizens of the neighboring state, intelligent, romantic, (poetry and 
philosophy is their vocation), but they deceive you, they confuse you, 
they are neither sincere nor honest, they can pickpocket you, they 
can deceive you. 
Their symbols: Capital, Romanian kin, Danube. 
Russian, Russians They are open, sincere, aware of their affiliation to a great nation, 
convivial, hospitable, communicative, friendly, close, colleagues, neighbors, 
brothers. 
They left their country, they are occupants and colonists, in the past they 
held a better social position, they are marked by the inferiority complex, 
they live in a foreign country, grumpy, arrogant, enclaved, communicate 
only with Russians, do not try to establish a dialog with other ethnic 
groups, but they are better educated than Moldovans. 
They want a revival of the USSR, they dominate the country from the 
economic perspective, they represent a frustrated community that lost 
the privileges it had in the Soviet times, and realize that now they 
are a minority in an independent country, they have the mentality of 
the „besieged“. They are aggressive and consider that the best way of 
defense is the offence. 
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Russian, Russians They belong to a vast culture – Russian culture, are resourceful, consider 
themselves superior in relation with Moldovans, live mainly in urban areas, 
they are foreign to the Moldovan customs and traditions, they have not 
learned the language of the locals, ignore and reject the values of 
Moldovans. Russians living outside Chisinau are more pragmatic and 
more adapted to the customs of the local population. 
Russians claim rights as liberators, they have the „big brother syndrome“, 
they try to benefit from others, are very prompt in conflicts, alcoholics, 
„red“, organized the revolution and wanted to spread communism around 
the world, harsh, defiant, arrogant, „pigs“, vulgar, live with the myth that 
they civilized this place, brought freedom and development, imperialists, 
chauvinists. Are at the same time organized, dominating, they want to 
impose Russian, greedy, think only about present not about future, are 
unpredictable. 
Russians are soviet people, or people like any others, live on huge 
territories, open soul, can give up on everything just to help their friends 
and relatives, you don’t upset them... they feel their blood, oriented towards 
the Russian Federation. Russians are our peers, they are citizens of the 
former USSR. The resources are there, our markets are there, they have 
given up on many things for this periphery, their leaders cared about the 
people. They are great, respectable people, blood brothers, Slavs, they can 
give everything for alcohol, strong, smart, try to impose their opinions 
(cultural, linguistic), „it was better under Russians“. The Russian is 
a bear who walks forwards, who bursts in. 
All Russian speakers can be called Russians, regardless of the ethnic 
background. 
Symbols: Dostoievski, Chekhov, Vladimir (One of the first princes of 
Russia), Petr I, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Russian language.
You cannot say much about them. 
Ukrainian/Ukrainians Ukrainians follow their traditions, respect their language, are 
communicative, good cooks, eat much, drink much, convivial, like to eat 
fat, good people, hospitable, nationalistic. 
One of the oldest ethnic communities from medieval Moldova, the ones 
from rural areas are different from the ones living in urban areas, and they 
preserved their traditions. Those from urban areas largely identify 
themselves with the former majority population of the USSR – the 
Russians. 
There are no big differences between Russians and Ukrainians, the latter 
are however more chauvinistic than Russians. It is one of the most 
Russified ethnic groups from Moldova. They have a weak character 
because they were Russified, they became foreign to the country 
of their origin, are invisible as a separate ethnic group, identify with 
the Russian-speaking population, they are Russians’ little brothers and 
are fooled by the bigger brother, the trunk of the Russian minority, witty, 
selfish, profiting from others, unorganized, passive minority, 
heterogeneous. 
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Ukrainian
Ukrainians
Rural population from Odessa region, live in villages, preserved their 
specific character, traditionalists; men wear traditional clothes, like to 
party, sympathetic, hardworking, best when it comes to folk songs, witty, 
ingenious, and greedy. 
Neighbors, brothers, peers, have a good sense of humor; keep their roots, 
good dancers and good singers. 
Ukrainian is not a nationality, it is a job. They are resourceful, cope with 
each other, they understand and respect each other, „when the Ukrainian 
was born, the Jew hiccupped“, people who find a place to live in Moldova 
and who do not claim anything. They want silence, they want others to 
consider their opinions, they want their language and culture to develop, 
they see first of all the humanity in everyone, then they look at the 
ethnicity, and are hospitable, greedy, joyful. 
Ukrainians are the citizens of the neighbor country. 
Their symbols: „Gorilka“ (A kind of hard liquor), „Gopak“ 
(Traditional dance), Ruthenians, Bogdan Hmelnitsky, Taras Bulba, 
the colors of their flag. 
You cannot say much about them. 
The Gagauz The Gagauz relate better than other ethnic groups to their ethnicity, they 
are largely oriented towards relationships within their group than towards 
other groups. Are thrifty, Christians of Turkic origin, isolated, peaceful. By 
intellect, they resemble Moldovans, as expression they resemble Russians 
(Russian-speaking), aggressive, backward, farmers, traders, Turks, 
betrayers, have an ugly language, and fight for autonomy. 
Are Russified, they did not have sufficient conditions to return to their 
language and traditions after 1991. It is a compact population in the 
southern Moldova, live in rural areas, small ethnic group, came to Moldova 
during the Russo-Turkish war, and they always got along with the local 
population, enjoy autonomy. 
Are one of a kind: Turks of orthodox orientation, men are handsome, 
somewhat mean, confused, hard to label with an ethnic or cultural 
category, not to capable from the intellectual perspective, victims of their 
history, with ambitions inspired from outside, incapable to analyze their 
opportunities and prospects. 
The least educated ethnic group, mean, part of our garden, brothers, peers, 
witty, hardworking, proud, tolerant towards other ethnicities, people 
enjoying autonomy, comply with Moldovan laws, neighbors, persons upset 
by the fate. 
Receive assistance from Turkey which can influence them negatively, 
one could say that they are Turks. Have rich traditions, like parties, 
like good wine and dances, get along with everyone, freedom-loving 
people, hot-blooded, aspire towards freedom, and respect the people 
belonging to other ethnic groups from around them. 
Impertinent, try to impose their opinion, loyal. Are considered rich, 
traders, deceitful. 
You cannot say much about them. 
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Bulgarian, Bulgarians There is no big difference between Gagauz and Bulgarians, they are like 
Russians and Ukrainians (Russian- speaking), they do not differ as separate 
ethnic group, Russified, closed community, united. 
Bulgarians are vegetable growers, thrifty, united, live in compact groups in 
the south of Moldova, hardworking, ambitious, vainglorious, and 
successful in business, punctual, a mathematical average between 
Ukrainians and Gagauz. 
They have also identified with the Russian speaking population. Those 
from Bulgaria have rough features, are ugly. 
Slav people, present in public life, pro-soviet, hate the locals for their 
stupidity, pursue their interests, people you cannot trust too much, 
residents of Taraclia district, poor, active, wealthy, smart. 
Bulgarians and the Gagauz have a common history. 
People with authority, cohabitants, greedy, united, honest, hardworking, 
neat, resourceful, follow their traditions, do not want to be assimilated, 
care about the aspect of their homes, have their own district, comply with 
the Moldovan legislation, can be appreciated, should not lose their culture 
and traditions, good craftsmen. 
Like to party, good wines and dances, good people, harsh, not too open, 
our Slav brothers, attentive, calculated, very pragmatic, like accuracy, think 
much then make a correct decision. 
Their symbols: „Bratushka“ (Little brother), the Bulgarian elephant is the 
best friend of the Russian elephant (old saying), good wine, good sheep 
cheese. 
You cannot say much about them. 
Jew, Jews Jews care much about their community; help each other, united, smart, 
educated, and tricky. Cope well with every situation, adaptable, well 
trained, ready to leave the country, dynamic, inclined towards business, 
nostalgic for Soviet times. 
Usurers, businesspeople, do not identify with their country of residence, 
and they can always betray it. Jews brought the communism. 
Are cosmopolitan, joyful, are tolerant with other ethnic groups, influence 
everything from the shadow. Are perseverant in everything they do, 
consistent, wide intellectual horizons, many of them speak Romanian; 
know how to solve their problems, very ingenious, intelligent. 
Know their purpose, are everywhere, you can send them wherever you 
want, have suffered a lot, transformed the Holocaust into an ideology, 
made profits out of everything. 
Are not always honest. Traders, profit from others, traditionally they place 
themselves in highly influential economic and political positions, think 
they are smarter, they buy and they sell you, cynical, disregard the others. 
Martyrs, have suffered from communism and Holocaust, sensible, 
catalysts, they feel well the economic situation. 
Our religion comes from them, biblical nation protected by the God, 
reasonable, organized, quick-witted, see the shortest way to achieve their 
goals using the principles specific to Jews, calculated, farsighted, 
preoccupied with their future. 
It is better not to deal with them. 
Symbols: Jesus Christ, Jews are scattered everywhere like the Gypsies. 
268 ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Gypsy, Gypsies. Less educated compared to other ethnic groups, do not put much effort 
into education, are not hardworking. They deal with illegal businesses, 
do not get along with the sanitary norms and education, have large 
houses surrounded by garbage. 
Gypsies are dirty, uneducated, thieves, more of a tribe than an ethnic 
group, drug and human traffickers, build homes but never finish them, 
backward community, are not law obedient, have eccentric and 
extravagant customs, large houses and many cars. 
Beggars, families with many children, wealthy, have earned everything 
through illegal means, liars, barely assimilate and socialize, nomads. 
Population loving their traditions, customs, clothes, songs, language. 
They have a problem accommodating to the modern life and they easily 
preserve their ethnic group. 
Gypsies from Moldova are more emancipated, more civilized and more 
sedentary comparing to Gypsies from Romania. However, they are 
nomads, conservative, dishonest, they represent a small group. 
Exotic, inventive, they like abnormal and bizarre things. „The Gypsy 
has money but lacks honesty“. 
Miserable people that need help and compassion. 
Easy, illiterate and unorganized, an interesting people. Care about their 
children, proud people, instable people, neat. Deal with drugs, nomads, 
fortune-tellers, do not send their children to school, do not recognize 
the social principles respected by all, wear dirty clothes, and never 
work. People without goals, horse stealers. 
They were offered the opportunity to affirm themselves, they have 
their own leader (Baron) who solves their problems, one should create 
conditions for them so they feel that they belong to the same social 
entity. 
The Gypsy is a crafts person, musician, free man, good follow, joyful, 
good singer, hard worker (if he tries to do something). 
Symbols: Soroca, Huge houses on Soroca Hill, Budulai 
(Film character), chaos. 
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ANNEX 3
Interview Guide
Delphi Study, Phase one
Issue/objectives Questions
Agenda,
Initiation questions,
Identification of interethnic 
issues
What are the most important events that marked the recent 
history of Moldova? Please explain what were the problems and 
their causes, the successes and their cause. Provide 
arguments. 
What is the current situation?
What are the major current issues? Why?
What are the things that went well and what are the things that 
will go well in the future? Provide arguments. 
Controversial issues
Identification of issues with 
conflict potential. 
What were the topics of public debates that generated 
the most stringent controversies in Moldova?
What were the reasons for these (for each topic)? Who were the 
message carriers and what were their positions (pro or against) in 
relation to each?
Which of these issues generated controversies? Provide 
arguments. 
What issues are likely to generate controversies or conflicts in the 
future? Why?
Identification of in-group 
and out-group features and 
stereotypes
What are the first things that come to your mind when I say:
- Moldovan        - Gagauz
- Romanian        - Bulgarian
- Ukrainian        -Jew
- Russian
- Gypsy (ask one at a time, rotate the list for each interview)
What are the stereotypes for the following ethnic groups from 
Moldova: Moldovans, Romanians, Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauz, 
Bulgarians, Jews, and Gypsies? Which of these ethnic groups 
provide political elites in Moldova? What about economic elites? 
What about cultural elites?
What are the disfavored ethnic groups?
Controversial issues What were the issues that placed the ethnic groups in conflict 
over the time (Moldovans-Russians, Moldovans-Ukrainians, 
Russians-Ukrainians, Russians-Gagauz, etc.)? Provide arguments. 
What are the current issues? What are the issues that registered 
consensus over the time? (issues generating understanding, 
consensus, etc.) Please provide arguments. 
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Opinion leaders, reference 
groups
What are the personalities or organizations dealing with 
interethnic relations in Moldova?
What are the personalities or organizations contributing to the 
improvement of interethnic relationships (Russian-Moldovans, 
Ukrainians-Moldovans, Moldovans-Gagauz, Moldovans-Gypsies, 
etc.)?
What are the personalities or organizations contributing to the 
worsening of interethnic relationships?
National identity/Ethnic 
identity
What are the first things that come to your mind when I say 
‘Republic of Moldova’? 
What characterizes the Republic of Moldova? Provide arguments. 
What does it mean to be Moldovan and live in Moldova?
………………….Russian………………………?
………………….Ukrainian…………………….?
………………….Bulgarian…………………?
………………….Gagauz……………………..?
………………….Jew…………………………?
………………….Gypsy……………………….? 
How do you define national identity?
Perceptions and attitudes on 
politics/policies
What was the Moldovan policy with regard to ethnic minorities 
until now?
What are the rights of ethnic minorities from Moldova? If you 
were to compare the Moldovan legislation with the similar 
legislation from other countries, what would you mention?
What are the relationships between the majority and the 
minorities (who represents the majority and who represents the 
minorities) in Moldova?
What would be your opinion if Romania financed Romanian 
language schools in Moldova? What about universities? What 
about radio and television stations?
…………………….Ukraine for the Ukrainian minority……..?
…………………….Bulgaria for Bulgarian minority……………?
…………………….Russia for Russian minority……………?
…………………….Turkey for Gagauz minority……………?
What were the policies that improved these relationships? Provide 
arguments. 
What were the policies that worsened these relationships? Provide 
arguments. 
Summary What else would you say regarding the issues discussed so far, 
important things I did not think of…?
What are your greatest fears for the future?
What are your hopes?
Thank you very much for your participation!
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ANNEX 4
Self-completed survey form
The research report that you received represents the first stage of a project dedicated to the study of 
interethnic relations in Moldova. The report data were collected through in-depth interviews 
conducted with 29 people from Moldova. You also participated in these interviews. The report 
summarizes the opinion of participants. 
For the second stage of the research, we ask you to express your opinions regarding the issues subject to 
debates. This survey form includes the important issues included in the report (next to each topic from 
the survey form you will find the pages from the report that correspond to the issue). Below each issue, 
you will see a free space. We ask you to fill it in, expressing your opinions and observations regarding 
that matter. 
Q1 Items on Moldova’s public agenda, controversial issues
A. What were the most important recent events in the Republic of Moldova? 
In the attached report, you will find this chapter containing three parts: political, economic and 
socio-economic events. Please express your opinion regarding these issues. 
1. Political events (pages 5-7 from the report)
Economic events (pages 7-8 from the report)
Socio-economic events (page 8 from the report)
B. What were the most controversial issues?
The report formulated three categories of controversial issues, depending on the intensity of their 
appearance in the daily discourse. Please express your opinion regarding the issues included in the 
report or specify others if it is the case. 
Issues with a relatively low conflict potential (p 8 of the report)
Issues with an average conflict potential (p. 8 of the report)
Issues with a high conflict potential (p. 8-9 of the report)
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Q2 Interethnic relations in Moldova
A. What are the features and stereotypes describing better the ethnic groups from Moldova?
In the report, you will find a “picture“ for each ethnic group, realized by applying different features by 
the members of the respective group as well as members of other ethnic groups. Please comment on this 
description for each individual ethnic group (pages 10-14 of the report)
Moldovans……….
Romanians…………..
Russians…………….
Ukrainians……………
Gagauz………….
Bulgarians……………….
Jews………………..
Gypsies…………………
B. How do you describe the interethnic relations in Moldova?
The two outlined positions are:
Inexistence of controversial issues, and inexistence of any relationship between these ethnic groups. 
Do you believe these positions reflect the realities from Moldova? Provide arguments. (Page 14 from the 
report)
There are certain issues that place the ethnic groups in conflict positions: Transnistrian conflict, 
national identity, orientation of Moldovan foreign policy, and configuration of the country. Do you 
agree? Provide arguments. Are there other conflict issues in addition to these? (p. 14-15 from the 
report)
What are the personalities or organizations contributing to the improvement of interethnic relations 
in Moldova? (Page 15 from the report)
What are the personalities or organizations contributing to the worsening of interethnic relations 
in Moldova? (Page 15 from the report)
Q3 Perceptions and attitudes on politics/policies in Moldova
A. What are the perceptions and attitudes towards the Moldovan state?
The relevant opinions were grouped in three categories: “national-optimists“, “unionists“, and “skeptics“. 
How do the Moldovan citizens relate to the Moldovan state? What does this country mean to them? 
(Page 16 from the report)
What is national identity? (pages 16-17 from the report)
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B. How do different ethnic groups perceive themselves in relation with the state?
What does it mean to be Moldovan and live in Moldova? What does it mean to be Russian and live 
in Moldova? What does it mean to be Ukrainian and live in Moldova? What does it mean to be Gagauz 
and live in Moldova? What does it mean to be Bulgarian and live in Moldova? What does it mean 
to be Gypsy and live in Moldova? Do you agree with the conclusions of this text? Provide arguments. 
(pages 17-18 from the report)
C. What were the policies of Moldova regarding the ethnic groups? (Pages 18-19 from the report)
What are the advantaged ethnic groups? Provide arguments. 
What are the disadvantaged ethnic groups? Provide arguments. 
What were the good policies from Moldova regarding the ethnic groups? Provide arguments. 
What were the bad policies from Moldova regarding the ethnic groups? Provide arguments. 
Q4 Personal observations after reading the study
Thank you very much for your participation!
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ETHNO QUESTIONNAIRE: MOLDOVANS/ROMANIANS
Q1. People believe that there 
are several ethnic groups living 
in Moldova (Moldovans, 
Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, 
Bulgarians, etc.). What do you 
consider yourself?
Moldovan 95% -> CONTINUE!
Russian - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Ukrainian - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Gagauz - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Bulgarian - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Romanian 5% -> CONTINUE!
Other: ____ - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Don’t know - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Don’t answer - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Q2. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Moldovans and Russians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 6% 22% 27% 28% 7% 10%
b. 5 years ago 3% 23% 38% 24% 4% 9%
c. last year 2% 19% 45% 19% 5% 9%
Q3. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Moldovans and Ukrainians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 3% 20% 37% 15% 4% 21%
b. 5 years ago 2% 18% 46% 12% 2% 20%
c. last year 2% 15% 49% 11% 3% 19%
Q4. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Moldovans and the Gagauz from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 3% 13% 26% 16% 5% 38%
b. 5 years ago 1% 12% 34% 13% 4% 37%
c. last year 1% 12% 38% 9% 4% 37%
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Q5. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Moldovans and Bulgarians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 2% 12% 30% 11% 4% 41%
b. 5 years ago 1% 12% 36% 8% 3% 40%
c. last year 1% 11% 39% 6% 2% 40%
Q6. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Moldovans and Romanians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 6% 28% 30% 13% 3% 21%
b. 5 years ago 5% 26% 36% 11% 2% 20%
c. last year 4% 21% 36% 15% 4% 20%
Q7. Which of the following statements describe better 
the relationship between different ethnic groups in 
Moldova?
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a. The relationship between Moldovans and Russians 71% 12% 7% 2% 8%
b. The relationship between Moldovans and Ukrainians 71% 7% 6% 2% 14%
c. The relationship between Moldovans and Gagauz 51% 10% 8% 3% 27%
d. The relationship between Moldovans and Bulgarians 58% 6% 6% 3% 27%
e. The relationship between Moldovans and Romanians 74% 4% 3% 3% 16%
Q8. How can you describe the interethnic 
relationships in your area?
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a. The relationship between Moldovans and Russians 66% 6% 4% 17% 2% 5%
b. The relationship between Moldovans and Ukrainians 56% 4% 3% 27% 2% 8%
c. The relationship between Moldovans and the Gagauz 29% 3% 3% 49% 2% 14%
d. The relationship between Moldovans and Bulgarians 31% 2% 3% 50% 2% 13%
e. The relationship between Moldovans and Romanians 53% 2% 1% 32% 2% 10%
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Q9. Thinking of the following ethnic groups from Moldova, do you think that it is possible 
that any of these could become a threat?
Q9_3. Russians can become 
a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible 
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 9% 18% 31% 31% 11%
b. for Moldovans 7% 19% 30% 33% 11%
c. for you or your family 5% 10% 27% 48% 10%
Q9_2. Ukrainians can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible 
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 3% 10% 30% 45% 13%
b. for Moldovans 2% 9% 30% 46% 13%
c. for you or your family 1% 6% 24% 57% 12%
Q9_3. The Gagauz can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible 
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 3% 12% 25% 35% 24%
b. for Moldovans 2% 10% 27% 37% 24%
c. for you or your family 1% 5% 24% 47% 23%
Q9_4. Bulgarians can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible 
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 2% 7% 26% 41% 24%
b. for Moldovans 2% 5% 26% 43% 24%
c. for you or your family 1% 3% 21% 52% 23%
Q9_5. Romanians can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible 
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 1% 4% 23% 59% 14%
b. for Moldovans 1% 4% 20% 62% 14%
c. for you or your family 1% 2% 17% 66% 14%
Q10. To what extent do you 
agree with the following 
statements: The fact that I 
was born in Moldova…
Totally 
Agree
Somewhat 
agree Disagree
Totally 
disagree
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. makes me proud 61% 25% 9% 2% 2%
b. makes my life easier 13% 19% 49% 12% 6%
c. makes me feel ashamed 2% 9% 28% 57% 5%
d. makes my life harder 5% 14% 35% 38% 7%
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Q11. To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements:
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a. People should support their country even if things are not 
quite easy 80% 14% 3% 1% 2%
b. The world would be better if all the people were like 
Moldovans from Moldova. 33% 30% 20% 8% 10%
c. The world would be better if all the people were like Russians 
from Moldova. 5% 20% 36% 19% 20%
d. The world would be better if all the people were like 
Ukrainians from Moldova. 6% 19% 34% 17% 24%
e. The world would be better if all the people were like the 
Gagauz from Moldova. 4% 12% 32% 21% 31%
f. The world would be better if all the people were like 
Bulgarians from Moldova. 4% 14% 32% 18% 32%
g. The world would be better if all the people were like 
Romanians from Moldova. 11% 27% 26% 13% 23%
h. There are many things I should be ashamed of because I am 
citizen of Moldova 7% 21% 30% 30% 12%
i. I prefer to be a citizen of Moldova than a citizen of any other 
country 39% 28% 15% 8% 9%
Q12. To what extent do you 
agree with the following 
statements: The fact that I am 
Moldovan/Romanian
Totally 
Agree
Somewhat 
agree Disagree
Totally 
disagree
Don’t 
Know/No 
answer
a. makes me proud 66% 21% 9% 2% 2%
b. makes my life easier 14% 20% 49% 10% 6%
c. makes me feel ashamed 2% 8% 31% 54% 6%
d. makes my life harder 4% 13% 37% 38% 9%
Q13. Which of the following statements describe best your 
identity? I mainly consider myself …. Show list Q13! 
Multiple choice!
1. First 
choice
2. Second 
Choice Total
Moldovan 70% 11% 81%
Romanian 7% 8% 14%
Resident of this locality 6% 27% 32%
Citizen of Moldova 15% 42% 57%
CIS Resident 0% 2% 3%
European 1% 4% 6%
Eastern European 0% 0% 0%
Don’t Know/No answer 0% 6% 6%
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Q14. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered Moldovan? Show 
list Q14! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices!
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Moldovan parents 36% 10% 5% 51%
b. Speak Moldovan/Romanian language in the family 19% 20% 9% 48%
c. Respect Moldovan traditions 8% 16% 12% 36%
d. Feel Moldovan 8% 11% 11% 30%
e. Perceive Moldovan culture as your own culture 3% 10% 10% 23%
f. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture 2% 3% 3% 9%
g. Honor the Moldovan national flag 1% 3% 5% 9%
h. Live in Moldova 5% 6% 14% 26%
i. Be a native speaker of Moldovan/Romanian 5% 7% 9% 21%
j. Have Moldovan citizenship 4% 8% 9% 21%
k. Be born in Moldova 7% 4% 8% 18%
l. Don’t know/No answer 1% 2% 5% 8%
Q15. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered Russian? Show list 
Q15! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices!
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Russian parents 35% 7% 5% 48%
b. Speak Russian language in the family 14% 17% 6% 38%
c. Respect Russian traditions 7% 12% 12% 32%
d. Feel Russian 7% 10% 8% 26%
e. Perceive Russian culture as your own culture 4% 9% 9% 21%
f. Honor the Russian national flag 2% 4% 4% 10%
g. Live in Russia 4% 8% 9% 21%
h. Be a native speaker of Russian 7% 7% 12% 26%
i. Have Russian citizenship 4% 8% 11% 23%
j. Be born in Russia 8% 6% 9% 23%
k. Don’t know/No answer 9% 11% 14% 33%
Q16. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered Ukrainian? Show 
list Q16! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices!
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Ukrainian parents 36% 7% 5% 49%
b. Speak Ukrainian in the family 14% 17% 6% 37%
c. Respect Ukrainian traditions 8% 12% 11% 32%
d. Feel Ukrainian 6% 12% 9% 27%
e. Perceive Ukrainian culture as your own culture 3% 9% 9% 22%
f. Honor the Ukrainian national flag 2% 4% 4% 9%
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g. Live in Ukraine 4% 7% 9% 20%
h. Be a native speaker of Ukrainian 6% 7% 11% 24%
i. Have Ukrainian citizenship 4% 6% 12% 22%
j. Be born in Ukraine 6% 5% 8% 20%
k. Don’t know/No answer 11% 13% 16% 40%
Q17. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered Gagauz? Show list 
Q17! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices!
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Gagauz parents 37% 7% 5% 48%
b. Speak Gagauz language in the family 13% 17% 7% 37%
c. Respect Gagauz traditions 8% 15% 12% 35%
d. Feel Gagauz 7% 10% 9% 26%
e. Perceive Gagauz culture as your own culture 2% 9% 12% 23%
f. Honor the Gagauz national flag 2% 3% 4% 9%
g. Live in TAU Gagauzia 5% 9% 13% 27%
h. Be a native speaker of the Gagauz language 5% 8% 11% 24%
i. Be born in Gagauzia 8% 5% 9% 22%
j. Don’t know/No answer 13% 16% 19% 48%
Q18. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered Bulgarian? Show list 
Q18! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices!
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Bulgarian parents 38% 7% 4% 49%
b. Speak Bulgarian in the family 14% 18% 7% 38%
c. Respect Bulgarian traditions 8% 14% 13% 34%
d. Feel Bulgarian 6% 9% 10% 26%
e. Perceive Bulgarian culture as your own culture 3% 9% 10% 22%
f. Honor the Bulgarian national flag 2% 4% 3% 8%
g. Live in Bulgaria 2% 6% 7% 15%
h. Be a native speaker of Bulgarian 6% 7% 11% 24%
i. Have Bulgarian citizenship 3% 6% 10% 18%
j. Be born in Bulgaria 6% 6% 8% 19%
k. Don’t know/No answer 13% 16% 17% 46%
Q19. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered Romanian? Show 
list Q19! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices!
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Romanian parents 33% 7% 6% 46%
b. Speak Romanian in the family 17% 16% 6% 40%
c. Respect Romanian traditions 8% 14% 13% 34%
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d. Feel Romanian 8% 10% 10% 28%
e. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture 2% 13% 11% 26%
f. Honor the Romanian national flag 2% 4% 3% 9%
g. Live in Romania 3% 6% 5% 14%
h. Be a native speaker of Romanian 7% 7% 11% 25%
i. Have Romanian citizenship 4% 7% 14% 24%
j. Be born in Romania 6% 6% 8% 21%
k. Don’t know/No answer 9% 11% 13% 33%
Q20. How much do you trust… Very much Much Little
Don’t 
trust
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. People from Moldova 9% 49% 36% 5% 2%
b. Moldovans from Moldova 9% 53% 30% 5% 3%
c. Russians from Moldova 3% 33% 43% 15% 6%
d. Ukrainians from Moldova 2% 29% 43% 16% 11%
e. Gagauz from Moldova 2% 16% 37% 22% 23%
f. Bulgarians from Moldova 2% 19% 36% 19% 23%
g. Romanians from Moldova 7% 35% 34% 12% 12%
Q21. Please specify what 
would be your reaction 
if persons belonging to 
the following ethnic 
groups in Moldova:
a. 
Moldovans
b. 
Russians
c. 
Ukrainians
d. 
Gagauz
e. 
Bulgarians
f. 
Romanians
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a. lived in Moldova 100% 0% 88% 12% 86% 14% 80% 20% 83% 17% 94% 6%
b. lived in your area 100% 0% 83% 17% 80% 20% 71% 29% 75% 25% 91% 9%
c. were your neighbors 99% 1% 77% 23% 74% 26% 64% 36% 68% 32% 86% 14%
d. were your friends 99% 1% 76% 24% 72% 28% 60% 40% 65% 35% 83% 17%
e. were part of your family 95% 5% 65% 35% 61% 39% 51% 49% 56% 44% 76% 24%
Q22. Are you a member of any organization?
Yes 6% -- SKIP TO Q23
No 93% -- SKIP TO Q24
Don’t Know/No answer 0% -- SKIP TO Q24
Q23. How often 
do you attend the 
meetings of this 
organization?
Daily 11% There are no formal meetings of the members 6%
Weekly 11% I do not take part in meetings of the members 8%
Monthly 26% Don’t know -
A few times a year 19% Don’t answer 2%
Once a year 17%
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Q24. Would you participate in a cultural event 
(e.g. festival) with people of other ethnic background?
(public event)
Yes 21%
No 77%
Don’t Know/No answer 2%
Q25-Q30. The following list includes several features. Please find three positive and three 
negative features describing best the Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians 
from Moldova.
OPERATOR: Show list 25! Multiple choice! 
Positive features: For each ethnic group circle in column a. the first choice and in column b. the 
rest of the choices! For each ethnic group one can have up to 3 choices from the list of positive 
features, the first choice in column a. and the rest of the choices in column b.!
Positive features
Q24. 
Moldovans
Q25.
Russians
Q26. 
Ukrainians
Q27. 
Gagauz
Q28.
Bulgarians
Q29. 
Romanians
a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b.
1. Decent 14% 8% 9% 4% 8% 4% 2% 2% 3% 2% 8% 4%
2. Kind-hearted 13% 14% 4% 4% 6% 4% 1% 2% 1% 3% 2% 4%
3. Hearty 9% 14% 3% 6% 4% 6% 1% 3% 1% 3% 3% 6%
4. Independent 4% 4% 12% 12% 6% 6% 3% 3% 1% 2% 5% 7%
5. Civilized 2% 3% 5% 7% 2% 5% 1% 3% 2% 2% 7% 14%
6. Educated 3% 10% 5% 6% 3% 6% 1% 2% 1% 3% 5% 9%
7. Resourceful 3% 9% 9% 17% 5% 7% 3% 5% 2% 3% 3% 8%
8. Joyful 7% 21% 7% 17% 8% 11% 2% 4% 2% 3% 4% 6%
9. Clean 1% 6% 2% 4% 1% 4% 1% 2% 1% 3% 1% 3%
10. Religious 5% 13% 3% 6% 3% 6% 3% 3% 3% 3% 6% 10%
11. United 1% 3% 7% 18% 5% 9% 4% 5% 4% 5% 5% 9%
12. Honest 1% 5% 1% 4% 1% 3% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2%
13. Modest 1% 4% 0% 4% 2% 6% 1% 3% 1% 4% 2% 5%
14. Hard-working 26% 31% 1% 5% 3% 13% 3% 5% 3% 6% 2% 6%
15. Intelligent 0% 2% 1% 7% 1% 4% 0% 3% 0% 3% 5% 11%
16. Hospitable 8% 33% 4% 7% 3% 8% 1% 3% 1% 5% 3% 7%
17. None 1% 0% 6% 1% 6% 1% 9% 1% 7% 1% 4% 0%
18. Don’t Know/
No answer 3% 2% 20% 4% 35% 3% 61% 1% 63% 1% 34% 4%
OPERATOR: Show list 25! Multiple choice! 
Negative features: For each ethnic group circle in column a. the first choice and in column b. 
the rest of the choices! For each ethnic group one can have up to 3 choices from the list of 
positive features, the first choice in column a. and the rest of the choices in column b.! 
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Negative features
Q25. 
Moldovans
Q26.
Russians
Q27. 
Ukrainians
Q28. 
Gagauz
Q29.
Bulgarians
Q30.
Romanians
a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b.
19. Selfish 9% 5% 9% 8% 8% 4% 3% 2% 3% 2% 5% 4%
20. Aggressive 4% 6% 20% 11% 8% 6% 6% 5% 3% 3% 3% 5%
21. Indifferent/
cold 6% 9% 5% 9% 4% 7% 1% 4% 2% 4% 3% 5%
22. Obedient 16% 14% 1% 2% 2% 3% 2% 3% 3% 3% 1% 3%
23. Backward 3% 8% 0% 2% 2% 3% 3% 4% 2% 3% 1% 1%
24. Uneducated 4% 5% 3% 10% 2% 4% 1% 5% 1% 3% 2% 2%
25. Negligent 5% 13% 2% 7% 2% 7% 1% 2% 2% 4% 2% 3%
26. Sad 4% 7% 1% 2% 1% 3% 1% 1% 1% 3% 1% 1%
27. Dirty 1% 3% 3% 4% 2% 4% 2% 4% 2% 2% 2% 4%
28. Superstitious 2% 5% 2% 6% 2% 6% 1% 2% 2% 3% 2% 4%
29. Divided 4% 15% 1% 3% 2% 3% 1% 2% 1% 3% 1% 3%
30. Thieves 4% 9% 2% 6% 2% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 5% 6%
31. Vainglorious 1% 5% 3% 11% 2% 7% 1% 4% 1% 2% 7% 6%
32. Lazy 1% 2% 6% 11% 2% 5% 1% 4% 1% 3% 3% 9%
33. Stupid 1% 2% 0% 2% 0% 1% 0% 2% 0% 0% 0% 1%
34. Hostile 0% 3% 1% 4% 1% 4% 0% 2% 0% 1% 0% 2%
35. None 13% 1% 7% 1% 10% 1% 7% 0% 7% 1% 12% 2%
36. Don’t Know/
No answer 21% 6% 33% 7% 48% 4% 64% 3% 68% 2% 50% 5%
Q31. Which of the following groups are, generally speaking, the richest /the most polit ically 
influential/ the most respected? Rank the first group and the second group!
The richest The most politically influential The most respected
First 
choice
Second 
choice
First 
choice
Second 
choice
First 
choice
 Second 
choice
Moldovans 23% 20% 33% 17% 37% 13%
Russians 39% 21% 32% 25% 19% 25%
Ukrainians 2% 9% 2% 7% 1% 7%
Gagauz 2% 3% 2% 2% 1% 1%
Bulgarians 1% 3% 1% 2% 1% 2%
Romanians 2% 5% 2% 6% 4% 6%
Other________ 2% 1% 0% 0% 1% 0%
Don’t Know/
No answer 29% 39% 29% 40% 36% 46%
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Q32. To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements: 
Moldova should…
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a. support Moldovan students studying in other 
countries 78% 14% 2% 1% 5%
b. guarantee education in Russian for Russian 
children and teenagers 23% 34% 21% 12% 10%
c. guarantee education in Ukrainian for Ukrainian 
children and teenagers 19% 34% 23% 13% 11%
d. guarantee education in Gagauz for Gagauz 
children and teenagers 20% 29% 25% 15% 11%
e. guarantee education in Bulgarian for Bulgarian 
children and teenagers 20% 30% 24% 15% 12%
f. support Moldovan businesses abroad 49% 26% 10% 3% 12%
g. support Moldovan cultural organizations 
abroad 51% 30% 6% 2% 11%
h. support the cultural organizations of different 
ethnic groups in Moldova 30% 36% 16% 4% 14%
i. help develop the identity of the Russian ethnic 
group 14% 21% 29% 17% 20%
j. help develop the identity of the Ukrainian ethnic 
group 14% 20% 31% 15% 20%
k. help develop the identity of the Gagauz ethnic 
group 12% 20% 29% 17% 21%
l. help develop the identity of the Bulgarian ethnic 
group 13% 20% 30% 17% 21%
m. organize cultural events attended by people of 
different ethnic backgrounds from Moldova. 29% 42% 11% 4% 15%
n. grant larger autonomy to the districts where an 
ethnic group represents a majority 11% 17% 25% 29% 19%
Q33. Do you agree with the following statements? 
Russia should…?
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a. support high school and university students of 
Russian background studying in Moldova 54% 33% 5% 1% 6%
b. support Russian businesses operating in Moldova 43% 35% 11% 2% 9%
c. support Russian cultural organizations from 
Moldova 45% 33% 11% 3% 8%
d. help develop the identity of the Russians from 
Moldova 33% 27% 19% 10% 12%
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Q34. Do you agree with the following statements? 
Ukraine should…
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a. support high school and university students of 
Ukrainian background studying in Moldova 50% 36% 5% 1% 8%
b. support Ukrainian businesses operating in 
Moldova 41% 37% 10% 2% 10%
c. support Ukrainian cultural organizations from 
Moldova 43% 34% 11% 3% 10%
d. help develop the identity of the Ukrainians from 
Moldova 32% 29% 18% 10% 12%
Q35. Do you agree with the following statements? 
Turkey should…?
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a. support high school and university students of 
Gagauz background studying in Moldova 45% 32% 7% 3% 12%
b. support Gagauz businesses operating in Moldova 39% 31% 12% 4% 15%
c. support Gagauz cultural organizations from 
Moldova 40% 28% 14% 4% 14%
d. help develop the identity of the Gagauz from 
Moldova 29% 25% 18% 11% 16%
Q36. Do you agree with the following statements? 
Bulgaria should…
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a. support high school and university students of 
Bulgarian background studying in Moldova 47% 33% 7% 1% 12%
b. support Bulgarian businesses operating in 
Moldova 40% 32% 12% 2% 13%
c. support Bulgarian cultural organizations from 
Moldova 41% 30% 14% 3% 13%
d. help develop the identity of the Bulgarians from 
Moldova 31% 27% 17% 10% 15%
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Q37. Do you agree with the following statements? 
Romania should…
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a. support high school and university students of 
Romanian background studying in Moldova 58% 32% 3% 0% 7%
b. support Romanian businesses operating in 
Moldova 53% 32% 5% 0% 9%
c. support Romanian cultural organizations from 
Moldova 52% 30% 7% 1% 9%
d. help develop the identity of Romanians from 
Moldova 46% 30% 8% 4% 11%
Q38. What is your opinion about the Law 
on the rights of minorities in Moldova?
ttoo many 
rights
enough 
rights
not enough 
rights
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. Russians have… 22% 62% 4% 13%
b. Ukrainians have.. 11% 67% 6% 15%
c. Gagauz have.. 10% 64% 7% 19%
d. Bulgarians have… 7% 67% 6% 20%
e. Romanians have.. 6% 69% 10% 15%
Q39. Do you think that ethnic 
background affects the employ-
ment in your area? What do 
you think the situation is?
too many 
opportunities
enough 
opportunities
not enough 
opportunities
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. Moldovans have.. 12% 65% 13% 10%
b. Russians have… 14% 64% 9% 14%
c. Ukrainians have… 7% 63% 14% 17%
d. Gagauz have.. 3% 58% 14% 26%
e. Bulgarians have… 3% 58% 15% 25%
f. Romanians have.. 4% 62% 16% 19%
Q40. Do you think nationality 
matters to have a successful 
business in your area? What do 
you think the situation is?
too many 
opportunities
enough 
opportunities
not enough 
opportunities
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. Moldovans have.. 10% 67% 11% 12%
b. Russians have… 15% 61% 9% 16%
c. Ukrainians have… 8% 62% 12% 18%
d. Gagauz have.. 4% 56% 14% 26%
e. Bulgarians have… 4% 56% 15% 26%
f. Romanians have.. 5% 60% 14% 21%
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Q41. Do you agree with the following statements?
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a. Moldovan children should learn the languages of 
national minorities (Russians, Ukrainians, etc.) 27% 20% 23% 24% 5%
b. Children of other nationalities from Moldova 
should learn Romanian/Moldovan in schools 73% 16% 7% 0% 3%
c. Children of other nationalities should study 
together with Moldovan children 48% 32% 11% 4% 5%
d. There should be mixed marriages 51% 33% 8% 3% 5%
e. There should be organizations and associations 
promoting collaboration between ethnic groups 
from Moldova
42% 35% 7% 3% 13%
f. People should participate in different cultural 
events (festivals) attended by people of different 
ethnic backgrounds from Moldova
39% 35% 11% 3% 13%
g. One should organize different cultural events 
(festivals) with the participation of people from 
different ethnic backgrounds in Moldova
43% 35% 9% 2% 10%
h. One should broadcast radio and television 
programs about the lives of people from different 
ethnic backgrounds in Moldova
41% 37% 10% 3% 8%
i. People should know the customs and traditions of 
different ethnic groups from Moldova 32% 40% 16% 4% 9%
j. One should broadcast programs on the National 
Television in the languages of minorities (Russian, 
Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian)
34% 31% 16% 9% 9%
Q42. Please list three personalities contributing 
to the improvement of interethnic relations in 
Moldova
Q43. Please list three organizations/institutions 
contributing to the improvement of interethnic 
relations in Moldova
a. Vladimir Voronin 15% a. Communist Party of Moldova 6%
b. Vasile Tarlev 6% b. Christian-Democratic Party 2%
c. Iurie Roşca 6% c. United Nations 1%
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Q44. Please list three personalities contributing 
to the worsening of interethnic relations in 
Moldova
Q45. Please list three organizations/institutions 
contributing to the worsening of interethnic 
relations in Moldova
a. Iurie Roşca 11% a. Christian-Democratic Party 5%
b. Vladimir Voronin 4% b. Communist Party of Moldova 2%
c. Eugenia Ostapciuc 2% 2%
Q46. How do the following political 
parties influence interethnic 
relations?
Rather 
improves
Neither 
improves nor 
worsens
Rather 
worsens
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. The Communist Party of Moldova 35% 17% 16% 32%
b. Christian-Democratic Party 13% 18% 26% 43%
c. Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc 12% 26% 6% 56%
d. Agrarian Party 3% 27% 7% 63%
e. Social Democratic Party of Moldova 5% 27% 6% 63%
f. Socialist Party of Moldova 3% 23% 7% 67%
Q47. I will read you a list of problems facing our 
country. Please tell me if you consider each of 
these problems crucial, severe or not too serious. C
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1. Unemployment 48% 48% 1% 2% 1%
2. Terrorism/violence/guerilla wars 15% 46% 27% 7% 3%
3. Low salaries 53% 45% 1% 1% 1%
4. Violation of human rights 24% 55% 12% 7% 2%
5. Housing issue 24% 56% 14% 4% 2%
6. Health condition 39% 53% 6% 1% 1%
7. Environmental issues 24% 50% 15% 8% 2%
8. Corruption 37% 51% 2% 8% 2%
9. Crime level/insecurity 29% 53% 8% 8% 2%
10. Drug trafficking 25% 52% 11% 11% 2%
11. Armed conflicts 14% 42% 31% 11% 2%
12. Ethnic conflicts/tensions 10% 40% 36% 12% 2%
13. Lack of rule of law 20% 53% 15% 11% 1%
14. Lack of press freedom 14% 43% 26% 14% 3%
15. Drug abuse 25% 53% 9% 12% 2%
16. Trafficking in women 38% 48% 3% 9% 1%
17. Relations with the Transnistrian region 40% 48% 5% 6% 1%
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Q48. Do you agree or disagree that…? Agree Disagree Don’t Know/No answer
a. The differences in salaries should be reduced to the 
benefit of the poor. 63% 25% 12%
b. The wellbeing of each individual should depend only on 
his/her working ability and the quality his/her work 62% 28% 10%
c. The state should control the prices of the basic goods. 87% 8% 5%
d. The state should guarantee jobs for all its citizens. 90% 7% 3%
e. Harsher punishments should be introduced in order to 
reduce the crime level. 87% 8% 5%
f. The first thing that a child should learn is to respect the 
adults. 86% 8% 6%
g. Teachers should pay more attention to the gifted 
children, not the average ones. 37% 53% 10%
h. The wellbeing of every individual depends mostly on 
the state. 64% 27% 9%
i. You can trust nobody except yourself. 63% 29% 8%
j. You must fight for your interests by your own. 82% 10% 8%
k. A strong leader is needed in order to improve the 
situation from our country. 78% 13% 8%
Q49. Do you agree with the following 
statement? During the current government…
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1. …the social measures were oriented towards 
ordinary people 16% 24% 35% 14% 12%
2. …the state services rendered to citizens 
improved 9% 25% 40% 15% 11%
3. …corruption expanded at all levels 22% 40% 15% 4% 19%
4. …the freedom of expression of the media was 
limited 13% 27% 25% 5% 31%
5. …the democratic rights of citizens were 
limited 13% 31% 23% 4% 29%
6. The Transnistrian conflict was not solved 
because of the weakness of Moldovan politicians 28% 29% 15% 4% 24%
7. …Moldova’s position was respected abroad 5% 20% 30% 10% 35%
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8. …the number of poor people from Moldova 
decreased 5% 15% 34% 33% 13%
9. …the national currency was stabilized 4% 24% 33% 12% 28%
10. …the national economy was stabilized 3% 21% 35% 10% 30%
11. … salaries and pensions were paid without 
delays 29% 46% 11% 4% 10%
12. …the farmers were supported 5% 21% 33% 21% 19%
13. …market economy was consolidated. 3% 18% 31% 9% 39%
14. …obstacles to foreign investors were created. 6% 16% 24% 6% 48%
15. …small investors were encouraged. 3% 17% 26% 9% 45%
16. …there was illegal interference with the 
economy. 9% 22% 17% 4% 48%
17. …an economic growth was achieved. 4% 19% 33% 11% 33%
18. …market economy failed 6% 18% 22% 4% 50%
19. …measures to stop massive migration were 
not taken. 27% 30% 15% 4% 24%
Q50. If the parliamentary elections were to take place 
next Sunday, would you vote?
I would definitely vote 70%
I would probably vote 18%
I would probably not go 3%
I would definitely not go 5%
I don’t know (don’t read) 3%
I don’t answer (don’t read) 0%
Q51. If parliamentary elections were to take place next Sunday, what party (alliance) would 
you vote for? Read this question (Q51) to all respondents regardless of their answer to Q51! 
Operator! Show list Q51 to the respondent !
Communist Party of Moldova 30%
Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc* (Our Moldova Alliance, Democratic Party and Social 
Liberal Party) 10%
 Christian Democratic Party 10%
Agrarian Party 1%
Social Democratic Party of Moldova 2%
Socialist Party -
Other, please specify ___________________ 0%
Independent candidate, please specify _________ 0%
I would not vote 3%
Don’t know 34%
Don’t answer 8%
* If the respondent mentions a party included in parentheses (Moldova Noastra Aliance, Democratic Party 
or Social Democratic Party) the answer should be included next to „Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc“
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Q52. In your opinion, what should be 
the direction of our country?
Be independent of any alliance/union 7%
We should integrate with the European Union 62%
We should remain within the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) 14%
Don’t know 16%
Don’t answer 1%
Q53. How much do you fear 
the disintegration of Moldova?
Very much 23% At all 14%
Quite much 29% Don’t know 12%
Quite a little 14% Don’t answer 8%
Q54. What do you believe will happen in five years…
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a. Moldova will become a strong country 3% 19% 41% 24% 13%
b. Moldova’s position will be taken in consideration abroad 2% 19% 40% 20% 19%
c. the status of Transnistria will be decided 3% 18% 33% 27% 18%
d. income of the population will grow 1% 21% 40% 23% 16%
e. market economy will consolidate 1% 22% 33% 20% 24%
f. democracy will consolidate 1% 19% 34% 20% 26%
g. young people living in Moldova will have large 
opportunities in the country 2% 18% 33% 30% 16%
Q55. Do you think that an armed conflict 
with the neighboring countries is 
possible? 
Yes 30% -- SKIP TO Q56
No 57% -- SKIP TO Q57
Don’t Know/No answer 13% -- SKIP TO Q57
Q56. If yes, with what country is 
Moldova likely to enter an armed 
conflict?
Romania 0% Transnistrian region 82%
Russia 9% Other, please specify _________ 0%
Ukraine 5% Don’t Know/No answer 4%
Bulgaria -
Q57. In your opinion, what were the reasons for the outbreak of the Transnistrian Conflict?
a. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
b. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
c. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
Q58. What do you think are the solutions for overcoming the current political situation related to 
Transnistria?
a. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
b. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
c. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
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Q59. Do you agree with the following statements?
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a. It is better not to deal with Russians in everyday life. 4% 14% 43% 30% 9%
b. I generally avoid talking to Russians from Moldova 3% 9% 45% 34% 8%
c. It is better not to deal with Ukrainians in everyday life. 2% 12% 44% 31% 12%
d. I generally avoid talking to Ukrainians from Moldova 2% 11% 43% 33% 11%
e. It is better not to deal with the Gagauz in everyday life. 3% 13% 36% 28% 20%
f. I generally avoid talking to the Gagauz from Moldova 3% 12% 37% 29% 19%
g. It is better not to deal with Bulgarians in everyday life. 3% 11% 39% 27% 19%
h. I generally avoid talking to Bulgarians from Moldova 3% 10% 39% 30% 19%
i. It is better not to deal with Romanians in everyday life. 2% 7% 40% 39% 13%
j. I generally avoid talking to Romanians from Moldova 2% 5% 38% 42% 12%
Q60. What is your native language?
Do not read the options for answers! 
Multiple choice!
a. Moldovan 86% e. Gagauz 0%
b. Romanian 17% f. Bulgarian 0%
c. Russian 2% g. Other 0%
d. Ukrainian 0% h. Don’t know/refuse to answer 0%
Q61. What language do you 
usually speak at home?
Do not read the options for answers! 
Multiple choice!
a. Moldovan 85% e. Gagauz 0%
b. Romanian 17% f. Bulgarian 0%
c. Russian 7% g. Other 0%
d. Ukrainian 1% h. Don’t know/refuse to answer 0%
Q62. What is the language you use/used more frequently with your…
a. mother b. father c. grandparents d. children
Moldovan 72% 69% 59% 76%
Romanian 11% 11% 10% 12%
Russian 3% 3% 2% 3%
Ukrainian 0% 0% 0% 0%
Gagauz 0% 0% 0% 0%
Bulgarian 0% 0% 0% 0%
Other 0% 0% 0% 1%
It’s not the case 14% 16% 26% 7%
Don’t know/No answer 0% 1% 2% 0%
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Q63. How well do you speak …?
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I speak it perfectly 91% 56% 27% 2% 0% 0%
Fluently but with an accent 5% 32% 35% 4% 0% 0%
I can make myself understood in most situations 2% 7% 24% 13% 1% 1%
In some situations I make myself understood, 
but with difficulty 0% 1% 7% 17% 2% 1%
I only know a few words 0% 0% 4% 25% 5% 6%
I do not know any word 0% 1% 2% 37% 89% 88%
No answer 1% 3% 1% 3% 4% 4%
Q64. Do you agree with the following 
statements?
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a. I am disturbed when people around me speak 
Russian 5% 9% 20% 27% 36% 3%
b. I am disturbed when people around me speak 
Ukrainian 5% 8% 22% 28% 34% 4%
c. I am disturbed when people around me speak 
Gagauz 7% 9% 21% 23% 30% 9%
d. I am disturbed when people around me speak 
Bulgarian 6% 9% 24% 22% 31% 9%
e. There are many Russians who avoid speaking 
Moldovan/Romanian although they know it 36% 34% 11% 5% 5% 8%
f. There are many Ukrainians who avoid speaking 
Moldovan/Romanian although they know it 29% 32% 15% 8% 4% 12%
g. There are many Gagauz who avoid speaking 
Moldovan/Romanian although they know it 24% 25% 14% 5% 4% 28%
h. There are many Bulgarians who avoid speaking 
Moldovan/Romanian although they know it 23% 25% 15% 6% 5% 27%
i. All residents of Moldova should know Moldovan/
Romanian 73% 12% 7% 4% 2% 3%
j. All residents of Moldova should know Russian 15% 20% 25% 21% 13% 5%
k. In regions where Ukrainians are predominant, 
everybody should know Ukrainian 10% 16% 25% 23% 13% 13%
l. All residents of Gagauzia should know Gagauz 11% 17% 23% 22% 13% 14%
m. In regions where Bulgarians are predominant, 
everybody should know Bulgarian 10% 16% 24% 23% 13% 15%
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Q65. How many official languages should be in Moldova? Q66. Which ones?
One state language 72% -- SKIP TO Q66 a. Moldovan 77%
Two state languages 20% -- SKIP TO Q66 b. Romanian 25%
More than two state languages 3% -- SKIP TO Q66 c. Russian 22%
Don’t know/No answer 5% -- SKIP TO Q67 d. Ukrainian 1%
e. Gagauz 1%
f. Bulgarian 1%
g. Other 1%
h. Don’t know/no answer 0%
Q67. In the next 12 months do you plan to visit a foreign country ?
a. as a tourist
Yes 11% → aa. What country will you go to? ____
No 89%
b. for temporary work
Yes 14% → bb. What country will you go to? ____
No 86%
c. for studies
Yes 2% → cc. What country will you go to? ____
No 98%
d. to settle permanently
Yes 2% → dd. What country will you go to? ____
No 98%
SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC DATA
D1. Gender Male 44%
Female 56%
D2. What is your age? Years old Don’t know 8 No answer 9
D3. Are you presently employed? Yes 32% -- SKIP TO D5!
No 67% → Continue with D4!
No answer 0% → Continue with D4!
D4. If you don’t have 
a job, what is your 
occupation?
High school student, university 
student 7%
Temporary unemployed. 
Looking for a job 26%
Retired (age or sickness) 47% Unemployed. Does not look for a job 6%
Housewife, maternal leave 11% Other (specify) 0%
Don’t know 0%
no answer 2%
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D5. What is your occupation/position at this job? Note as many details for the answer!|__|__|
                                                                    
Don’t know = 98 Refuse to answer = 99
D6. What is 
your 
education 
background
No education 7% Post high school education (college) 11%
Incomplete secondary education 25% Incomplete higher education 3%
Secondary school 22% Completed higher education 11%
Vocational school 17% Master’s degree, PhD 0%
High school 3% Don’t know -
No answer 0%
D7. What is your civil 
status?
Married 65% Unmarried, living together 3%
Divorced 4% Never married 11%
Widow(er) 16% Don’t know -
No answer 1%
D8. How large is your family (including yourself)?
Don’t know 8
No answer 9
D9. This list contains several groups of monthly income. What is the income of your house-
hold? Please consider all salaries, pensions, child allowances and any other income you might 
have. Please tell me the number on the right side of the group corresponding to the net in-
come of your family for the last month. Show list D9!
Under 200 Lei 14% 801-900 lei 3% 1501-1750 lei 2%
201-300 lei 14% 901-1000 lei 5% 1751-2500 lei 3%
301-400 lei 10% 1001-1100 lei 2% 2501-3500 lei 1%
401-500 lei 7% 1101-1200 lei 2% 3501-5000 lei 1%
501-600 lei 5% 1201-1300 lei 1% 5001-7000 lei 0%
601-700 lei 5% 1301-1400 lei 0% Over 7001 lei 0%
701-800 lei 4% 1401-1500 lei 2% Don’t know 7%
No answer 10%
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D10. How do you evaluate 
the current income of your 
family
Money is not enough even for food 38%
The money is enough for food but not enough to buy clothes 41%
We have money for food and we can save a little but it is not 
enough to buy more expensive things (TV or a fridge) 13%
We can afford to buy some more expensive things (TV, fridge) 3%
We can afford to buy anything we want 0%
Don’t know 1%
No answer 3%
D11. Are you a holder of one or more citizenships?
I have only the Moldovan citizenship 98%
I hold only the citizenship of another country (besides Moldova). Please specify ________
I hold the Moldovan citizenship and citizenships of other countries. Please specify 
a. ______________________
b. ______________________
No answer -
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ETHNO QUESTIONNAIRE: RUSSIANS
Q1. People believe that several 
ethnic groups live in Moldova 
(Moldovans, Russians, 
Ukrainians, Gagauz, 
Bulgarians, etc.). What 
do you consider yourself?
Wait for the answer! 
Do not read the options 
for answers!
Moldovan - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Russian 100% -> CONTINUE!
Ukrainian - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Gagauz - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Bulgarian - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Romanian - -> CONTINUE!
Other: __________ - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Doesn’t know - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Doesn’t answer - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Q2. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Russians and Moldovans from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
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a. 15 years ago 11% 19% 37% 20% 7% 6%
b. 5 years ago 5% 23% 43% 19% 5% 4%
c. last year 4% 18% 53% 16% 5% 4%
Q3. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Russians and Ukrainians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
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a. 15 years ago 6% 14% 59% 8% 1% 11%
b. 5 years ago 3% 15% 62% 8% 1% 11%
c. last year 3% 11% 66% 8% 1% 10%
Q4. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Russians and Gagauz from Moldova 
better or worse than …?
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a. 15 years ago 4% 10% 49% 5% 2% 30%
b. 5 years ago 2% 9% 51% 7% 1% 30%
c. last year 2% 6% 56% 6% 2% 29%
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Q5. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Russians and Bulgarians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
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a. 15 years ago 4% 11% 52% 5% 1% 27%
b. 5 years ago 2% 10% 54% 6% 1% 27%
c. last year 2% 8% 57% 6% 1% 26%
Q6. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Russians and Romanians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
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a. 15 years ago 5% 13% 38% 11% 8% 24%
b. 5 years ago 2% 14% 41% 15% 7% 22%
c. last year 1% 10% 44% 16% 6% 22%
Q7. Which of the following statements describe better 
the relationships between different ethnic groups 
from Moldova?
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a. The relationship between Russians and Moldovans 75% 12% 6% 5% 3%
b. The relationship between Russians and Ukrainians 86% 4% 1% 4% 6%
c. The relationship between Russians and Gagauz 68% 5% 4% 5% 18%
d. The relationship between Russians and Bulgarians 70% 5% 4% 5% 17%
e. The relationship between Russians and Romanians 56% 11% 10% 5% 18%
Q8. How can you describe the interethnic 
relationships in your area?
C
ol
la
bo
ra
tio
n 
C
on
fli
ct
 
M
ut
ua
l i
gn
or
an
ce
N
o 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
ps
 
be
tw
ee
n 
et
hn
ic
 
gr
ou
ps
 
O
th
er
D
on
’t 
K
no
w
/N
o 
an
sw
er
a. The relationship between Russians and Moldovans 86% 5% 2% 2% 3% 2%
b. The relationship between Russians and Ukrainians 89% 2% 0% 2% 3% 3%
c. The relationship between Russians and Gagauz 56% 2% 2% 26% 4% 10%
d. The relationship between Russians and Bulgarians 59% 1% 2% 25% 4% 8%
e. The relationship between Russians and Romanians 52% 4% 6% 21% 5% 12%
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Q9. Thinking of the following ethnic groups from Moldova, do you think that is it possible 
that any of these could become a threat?
Q9_l. Moldovans can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 1% 2% 17% 75% 4%
b. for the Russians 1% 4% 19% 71% 5%
c. for you and your family 0% 3% 18% 75% 3%
Q9_2. Ukrainians can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 0% 2% 18% 76% 4%
b. for the Russians 0% 2% 17% 76% 4%
c. for you and your family 0% 1% 17% 78% 4%
Q9_3. The Gagauz can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 0% 4% 16% 69% 10%
b. for the Russians 0% 3% 16% 70% 10%
c. for you and your family 0% 3% 13% 74% 9%
Q9_4. Bulgarians can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 0% 3% 15% 72% 10%
b. for the Russians 0% 1% 15% 72% 11%
c. for you and your family 0% 1% 13% 75% 10%
Q9_5. Romanians can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 1% 8% 20% 59% 11%
b. for the Russians 1% 8% 20% 61% 11%
c for you and your family 1% 7% 19% 63% 10%
Q10. To what extent 
do you agree with the 
following statements: 
The fact that I was born 
in Moldova
Totally 
Agree
Somewhat 
agree Disagree
Totally 
disagree
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. makes me proud 33% 28% 13% 4% 22%
b. makes my life easier 9% 18% 30% 16% 27%
c. makes me feel ashamed 1% 6% 26% 42% 25%
d. makes my life harder 3% 8% 28% 37% 25%
ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA 299
Q11. To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements:
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a. People should support their country even if 
things are not quite easy 85% 11% 1% 0% 2%
b. The world would be better if all the people were 
like Moldovans. 21% 22% 24% 12% 20%
c. The world would be better if all the people were 
like Russians from Moldova. 23% 34% 16% 7% 20%
d. The world would be better if all the people were 
like Ukrainians from Moldova. 17% 28% 23% 9% 23%
e. The world would be better if all the people were 
like the Gagauz from Moldova. 14% 19% 24% 11% 32%
f. The world would be better if all the people were 
like Bulgarians from Moldova. 15% 20% 23% 10% 33%
g. The world would be better if all the people were 
like Romanians from Moldova. 15% 20% 19% 16% 30%
h. There are many things I should be ashamed of 
because I am citizen of Moldova 13% 21% 29% 24% 13%
i. I prefer to be a citizen of Moldova than a citizen of 
any other country 29% 31% 19% 9% 12%
Q12. To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements: The fact that I am 
Russian…
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a. makes me proud 47% 32% 12% 3% 6%
b. makes my life easier 10% 24% 40% 15% 10%
c. makes me feel ashamed 0% 5% 29% 56% 10%
d. makes my life harder 4% 8% 34% 44% 9%
Q13. Which of the following statements describe 
best your identity: I mainly consider myself …
Show list Q13! Multiple choices!
1. First 
choice
2. Second 
choice Total
Russian 46% 12% 58%
Resident of this locality 14% 22% 36%
Citizen of Moldova 31% 36% 68%
CIS Resident 5% 8% 12%
European 2% 5% 7%
Eastern European 0% 0% 1%
Don’t Know/No answer 1% 17% 18%
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Q14. In your opinion, what are the most important things 
for a person to be considered MOLDOVAN? 
Show the list Q14! Multiple choices! 
Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Moldovan parents 33% 8% 3% 45%
b. Speak Moldovan/Romanian in the family 14% 12% 8% 33%
c. Respect Moldovan traditions 8% 13% 10% 31%
d. Feel Moldovan 12% 13% 11% 37%
e. Perceive Moldovan culture as your own culture 8% 16% 7% 31%
f. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture 2% 3% 2% 6%
g. Honor the Moldovan national flag 2% 2% 5% 9%
h. Live in Moldova 5% 9% 12% 27%
i. Be a native speaker of Moldovan/Romanian language 5% 9% 15% 29%
j. Have Moldovan citizenship 4% 4% 8% 16%
k. Be born in Moldova 4% 2% 6% 12%
l. Don’t know/No answer 4% 7% 13% 24%
Q15. In your opinion, what are the most important things 
for a person to be considered RUSSIAN? 
Show the list Q15! Multiple choices! 
Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Russian parents 34% 6% 6% 46%
b. Speak Russian language in the family 14% 13% 11% 38%
c. Respect Russian traditions 9% 12% 9% 31%
d. Feel Russian 13% 18% 11% 42%
e. Perceive Russian culture as your own culture 8% 12% 9% 29%
f. Honor the Russian national flag 1% 5% 4% 10%
g. Live in Russia 4% 7% 8% 19%
h. Be a native speaker of Russian language 7% 12% 15% 34%
i. Have Russian citizenship 2% 4% 8% 14%
j. Be born in Russia 5% 5% 8% 18%
k. Don’t know/No answer 3% 7% 11% 20%
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Q16. In your opinion, what are the most important things 
for a person to be considered UKRAINIAN? 
Show the list Q16! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Ukrainian parents 36% 8% 4% 47%
b. Speak Ukrainian language in the family 11% 13% 9% 34%
c. Respect Ukrainian traditions 8% 15% 9% 32%
d. Feel Ukrainian 11% 16% 10% 37%
e. Perceive Ukrainian culture as your own culture 8% 11% 8% 27%
f. Honor the Ukrainian national flag 3% 4% 3% 10%
g. Live in Ukraine 4% 6% 10% 20%
h. Be a native speaker of Ukrainian language 6% 8% 14% 28%
i. Have Ukrainian citizenship 2% 3% 8% 13%
j. Be born in Ukraine 3% 5% 8% 16%
Don’t know/No answer 8% 11% 17% 35%
Q17. In your opinion, what are the most important things 
for a person to be considered GAGAUZ? 
Show the list Q17! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Gagauz parents 35% 8% 5% 47%
b. Speak Gagauz language in the family 12% 12% 9% 33%
c. Respect Gagauz traditions 7% 14% 8% 29%
d. Feel Gagauz 12% 14% 8% 34%
e. Perceive Gagauz culture as your own culture 8% 12% 10% 30%
f. Honor the Gagauz National flag 2% 3% 3% 8%
g. Live in TAU Gagauzia 8% 11% 15% 33%
h. Be a native speaker of Gagauz language 5% 9% 14% 27%
i. Be born in Gagauzia 3% 5% 9% 17%
j. Don’t know/No answer 9% 13% 18% 40%
Q18. In your opinion, what are the most important things 
for a person to be considered BULGARIAN? 
Show the list Q18! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Bulgarian parents 35% 9% 4% 48%
b. Speak Bulgarian language in the family 12% 13% 9% 34%
c. Respect Bulgarian traditions 8% 12% 9% 29%
d. Feel Bulgarian 12% 15% 10% 36%
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e. Perceive Bulgarian culture as your own culture 7% 11% 11% 29%
f. Honor the Bulgarian national flag 2% 4% 2% 8%
g. Live in Bulgaria 2% 5% 7% 14%
h. Be a native speaker of Bulgarian language 9% 8% 15% 32%
i. Have Bulgarian citizenship 1% 5% 7% 13%
j. Be born in Bulgaria 3% 4% 8% 15%
Don’t know/No answer 9% 13% 18% 41%
Q19. In your opinion, what are the most important things 
for a person to be considered ROMANIAN? 
Show the list Q19! Multiple choices! 
Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Romanian parents 33% 6% 4% 43%
b. Speak Romanian language in the family 11% 11% 9% 31%
c. Respect Romanian traditions 6% 13% 7% 26%
d. Feel Romanian 12% 15% 9% 36%
e. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture 7% 13% 9% 28%
f. Honor the Romanian national flag 2% 3% 2% 8%
g. Live in Romania 5% 8% 5% 17%
h. Be a native speaker of Romanian language 7% 9% 16% 32%
i. Have Romanian citizenship 2% 6% 14% 22%
j. Be born in Romania 5% 4% 8% 17%
Don’t know/No answer 9% 13% 17% 40%
Q20. How much do you trust… Very much Much Little
Don’t 
trust
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. people from Moldova 11% 58% 25% 2% 4%
b. Moldovans from Moldova 12% 59% 25% 3% 2%
c. Russians from Moldova 14% 64% 18% 2% 1%
d. Ukrainians from Moldova 12% 58% 23% 3% 4%
e. Gagauz from Moldova 7% 49% 23% 5% 16%
f. Bulgarians from Moldova 8% 50% 23% 5% 15%
g. Romanians from Moldova 6% 46% 26% 9% 13%
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Q21. Please 
specify what your 
reaction would 
be if persons 
belonging to the 
following ethnic 
groups in 
Moldova
a. 
Moldovans
b. 
Russians
c. 
Ukrainians
d. 
Gagauz
e. 
Bulgarians
f. 
Romanians
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a. lived in 
Moldova 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 94% 6% 95% 5% 93% 7%
b. lived in your 
locality 99% 1% 100% 0% 99% 1% 91% 9% 92% 8% 90% 10%
c. were your 
neighbors 98% 2% 99% 1% 96% 4% 82% 18% 84% 16% 83% 17%
d. were your 
friends 98% 2% 100% 0% 95% 5% 80% 20% 81% 19% 78% 22%
e. were part of 
your family 89% 11% 100% 0% 87% 13% 69% 31% 73% 27% 69% 31%
Q22. Are you a member of any 
organization?
Yes 8% -- SKIP TO Q23
No 92% -- SKIP TO Q24
Don’t Know/No answer - -- SKIP TO Q24
Q23. How often 
do you attend 
the meetings 
of this 
organization?
Daily 17% There are no formal meetings of the members 6%
Weekly 23% I do not take part in meetings of the members -
Monthly 17% Don’t know 9%
A few times a year 23% Don’t answer 3%
Once a year 3%
Q24. Would you participate in a cultural event (e.g. 
festival) with people of other ethnic backgrounds?
Yes 31%
No 66%
Don’t Know/No answer 4%
Q25 - Q30. The following list includes several features. Please find three positive and three 
negative features describing best… the Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulga-
rians living in Moldova.
OPERATOR: Show the list 25! Multiple choices! 
Positive features: For each ethnic group circle in column „a“ the first choice and in column „b“ the rest 
of the choices! For each ethnic group one can have up to 3 choices from the list of positive features, the 
first choice from column „a“ and the other two choices from column „b“! 
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Positive features
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a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b.
1. Decent 19% 6% 18% 8% 6% 4% 7% 3% 5% 4% 10% 4%
2. Kind-hearted 18% 24% 19% 13% 16% 10% 5% 4% 7% 6% 3% 5%
3. Hearty 7% 20% 12% 14% 11% 11% 4% 6% 5% 5% 4% 5%
4.Independent 2% 5% 7% 11% 5% 8% 4% 5% 2% 5% 5% 7%
5. Civilized 2% 5% 4% 13% 2% 5% 1% 3% 1% 4% 8% 13%
6. Educated 2% 7% 3% 15% 3% 7% 2% 3% 2% 4% 2% 7%
7.Resourceful 1% 5% 4% 10% 7% 11% 3% 8% 1% 6% 1% 3%
8. Joyful 10% 19% 7% 14% 9% 18% 3% 6% 2% 7% 3% 6%
9. Clean 2% 3% 1% 4% 2% 5% 2% 7% 2% 4% 2% 5%
10. Religious 3% 12% 1% 6% 3% 8% 5% 6% 5% 5% 2% 9%
11. United 1% 2% 3% 7% 3% 6% 4% 8% 5% 7% 2% 4%
12. Honest 2% 7% 2% 7% 2% 4% 2% 4% 2% 5% 1% 4%
13. Modest 1% 6% 0% 4% 2% 6% 1% 4% 3% 3% 1% 2%
14. Hard-working 18% 25% 4% 11% 5% 14% 4% 8% 6% 10% 2% 6%
15. Intelligent 0% 1% 3% 9% 1% 6% 0% 3% 1% 3% 4% 3%
16.Hospitable 1% 8% 1% 7% 3% 10% 1% 7% 1% 5% 1% 4%
17. None 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0% 3% 0% 4% 0%
18. Don’t Know/No answer 8% 8% 8% 9% 21% 9% 47% 5% 46% 7% 42% 6%
OPERATOR: Show the list 25! Multiple choices! 
Negative features: For each ethnic group circle in column „a“ the first choice and in column „b“ the rest 
of the statements! For each ethnic group one can have up to 3 choices from the list of positive features, 
the first choice in column „a“ and the other two choices in column „b“! 
Negative features
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a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b.
19. Selfish 8% 4% 6% 4% 11% 5% 9% 4% 3% 2% 6% 4%
20.Aggressive 11% 7% 9% 8% 5% 6% 7% 6% 5% 4% 9% 6%
21.Apathetic/cold 3% 7% 5% 8% 5% 5% 2% 6% 3% 4% 6% 6%
22. Obedient 8% 10% 5% 8% 4% 5% 1% 5% 2% 4% 1% 5%
23. Backward 6% 10% 1% 3% 2% 4% 2% 5% 2% 5% 1% 4%
24. Uneducated 5% 9% 4% 7% 3% 5% 2% 5% 1% 4% 2% 5%
25. Negligent 2% 9% 3% 9% 3% 8% 1% 5% 1% 4% 2% 5%
26. Sad 2% 5% 3% 4% 1% 3% 3% 3% 2% 3% 2% 1%
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27. Dirty 2% 3% 2% 3% 2% 3% 1% 3% 2% 4% 2% 3%
28. Superstitious 4% 6% 2% 5% 4% 6% 2% 4% 4% 3% 2% 6%
29. Divided 2% 7% 3% 4% 1% 6% 1% 3% 1% 2% 2% 3%
30. Thieves 3% 5% 1% 2% 1% 4% 1% 4% 2% 3% 1% 5%
31. Vainglorious 1% 3% 1% 6% 2% 5% 1% 4% 1% 4% 3% 5%
32. Lazy 1% 3% 7% 6% 3% 6% 2% 4% 1% 2% 3% 7%
33. Stupid 1% 4% 0% 2% 0% 2% 1% 2% 0% 2% 0% 1%
34. Hostile 1% 4% 0% 2% 1% 4% 3% 3% 1% 2% 2% 7%
35. None 15% 0% 17% 0% 15% 0% 11% 0% 11% 0% 10% 0%
36. Don’t Know/No answer 25% 9% 31% 8% 37% 8% 50% 5% 56% 3% 44% 5%
Q31. Which of the following groups are, generally speaking, the richest /the most polit ically 
influential/ most respected? Rank the first group and the second group!
The richest The most politically influential The most respected
 First 
choice
Second 
choice
First 
choice
 Second 
choice
First 
choice
 Second 
choice
Moldovans 37% 13% 49% 8% 41% 9%
Russians 15% 27% 10% 30% 15% 33%
Ukrainians 1% 6% 2% 2% 1% 2%
Gagauz 3% 1% 3% 2% 1% 3%
Bulgarians 3% 4% 1% 2% 1% 2%
Romanians 1% 3% 3% 7% 1% 2%
Other________ 3% 0% 1% 1% 2% 1%
Don’t Know/No answer 36% 46% 31% 47% 38% 48%
Q32. Do you agree with the following 
statements: 
Moldova should…
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a. support Moldovan students studying in other 
countries 77% 16% 3% 1% 3%
b. guarantee education in Russian for Russian 
children and teenagers 68% 23% 3% 2% 3%
c. guarantee education in Ukrainian for 
Ukrainian children and teenagers 58% 31% 4% 2% 4%
d. guarantee education in Gagauz for Gagauz 
children and teenagers 53% 30% 8% 4% 6%
e. guarantee education in Bulgarian for 
Bulgarian children and teenagers 51% 33% 6% 4% 6%
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f. support Moldovan businesses abroad 48% 31% 9% 4% 9%
g. support Moldovan cultural organizations 
abroad 51% 33% 5% 2% 8%
h. support the cultural organizations of different 
ethnic groups in Moldova 52% 34% 6% 1% 7%
i. help develop the identity of the Russian ethnic 
group 53% 35% 6% 0% 6%
j. help develop the identity of the Ukrainian 
ethnic group 49% 36% 7% 1% 6%
k. help in develop the identity of the Gagauz 
ethnic group 45% 33% 9% 5% 8%
l. help develop the identity of the Bulgarian 
ethnic group 43% 34% 11% 3% 8%
m. organize cultural events attended by people 
from different ethnic backgrounds in Moldova. 50% 34% 5% 1% 10%
n. grant a larger autonomy to the districts where 
an ethnic group represents a majority 33% 26% 13% 11% 17%
Q33. Do you agree with the following 
statements: 
Russia should…
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a. support the high school and university stu-
dents of Russian background studying in Moldova 70% 22% 3% 2% 3%
b. support Russian businesses operating in 
Moldova 59% 28% 4% 2% 7%
c. support the cultural organizations of the 
Russians from Moldova 62% 30% 2% 1% 4%
d. help develop the identity of the Russians from 
Moldova 60% 30% 2% 3% 5%
Q34. Do you agree with the following 
statements: 
Ukraine should…
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a. support the high school and university stu-
dents of Ukrainian background studying in Moldova 62% 26% 6% 2% 4%
b. support Ukrainian businesses operating in 
Moldova 54% 29% 8% 1% 8%
c. support the cultural organizations of 
Ukrainians from Moldova 57% 32% 5% 1% 5%
d. help develop the identity of Ukrainians from 
Moldova 53% 33% 6% 3% 6%
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Q35. Do you agree with the following statements: 
Turkey should…
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a. support high school and university students of 
Gagauz background studying in Moldova 53% 26% 8% 3% 9%
b. support Gagauz businesses operating in Moldova 47% 27% 12% 3% 11%
c. support the Gagauz cultural organizations from 
Moldova 46% 30% 10% 4% 10%
d. help develop the identity of the Gagauz from 
Moldova 42% 31% 11% 5% 11%
Q36. Do you agree with the following statements: 
Bulgaria should…
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a. support the high school and university students 
of Bulgarian background studying in Moldova 53% 30% 7% 3% 8%
b. support Bulgarian businesses operating in 
Moldova 46% 31% 10% 3% 9%
c. support the cultural organizations of Bulgarians 
from Moldova 46% 33% 8% 3% 9%
d. help develop the identity of Bulgarians from 
Moldova 42% 34% 10% 5% 9%
Q37. Do you agree with the following statements: 
Romania should…
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a. support high school and university students of 
Romanian background studying in Moldova 55% 30% 6% 3% 8%
b. support Romanian businesses operating in 
Moldova 49% 30% 8% 4% 10%
c. support the cultural organizations of Romanians 
from Moldova 49% 32% 7% 4% 9%
d. help develop the identity of the Romanians from 
Moldova 44% 33% 8% 6% 9%
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Q38. What is your opinion about the 
Law on the rights of minorities from 
Moldova?
too many 
rights
enough 
rights
not enough 
rights
don’t know/
no answer
a. Russians have… 5% 71% 20% 5%
b. Ukrainians have… 3% 70% 19% 9%
c. Gagauz have… 3% 65% 19% 13%
d. Bulgarians have… 2% 64% 20% 14%
e. Romanians have… 13% 64% 10% 13%
Q39. Do you think that ethnic 
background affects the 
employment in your area? What 
do you think the situation is?
too many 
opportunities
enough 
opportunities
not enough 
opportunities
don’t know/
no answer
a. Moldovans have… 25% 64% 4% 7%
b. Russians have… 6% 69% 17% 7%
c. Ukrainians have… 3% 69% 19% 9%
d. Gagauz have… 3% 63% 19% 15%
e. Bulgarians have… 2% 64% 19% 14%
f. Romanians have… 15% 62% 9% 14%
Q40. Do you think the ethnic 
background matters to have a 
successful business in your area? 
What do you think the situation is?
too many 
opportunities
enough 
opportunities
not enough 
opportunities
don’t know/
no answer
a. Moldovans have.. 22% 67% 3% 8%
b. Russians have… 8% 70% 14% 8%
c. Ukrainians have… 3% 70% 16% 10%
d. Gagauz have.. 2% 65% 17% 16%
e. Bulgarians have… 2% 64% 18% 16%
f. Romanians have.. 13% 65% 6% 16%
Q41. Do you agree with the following statements:
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a. Moldovan children should learn the languages of national 
minorities (Russians, Ukrainians, etc.) 56% 20% 11% 9% 4%
b. Children of other nationalities from Moldova should 
learn Romanian/Moldovan in schools 73% 20% 4% 1% 1%
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c. Children of other nationalities should learn together with 
Russian children 72% 22% 3% 1% 2%
d. There should be mixed marriages 74% 20% 4% 0% 2%
e. There should be organizations and associations promo-
ting collaboration between ethnic groups from Moldova 67% 25% 2% 1% 4%
f. People should participate in different cultural events (fes-
tivals) attended by different ethnic groups from Moldova 67% 23% 4% 1% 5%
g. One should organize different cultural events (festivals) 
with the participation of people from different ethnic 
backgrounds in Moldova
67% 25% 4% 0% 4%
h. One should broadcast radio and television programs 
about the lives of people from different ethnic backgrounds 
in Moldova
67% 24% 4% 1% 4%
i. People should know the customs and traditions of 
different ethnic groups from Moldova 64% 24% 5% 3% 4%
j. One should broadcast programs on the National 
Television in the languages of minorities (Russian, 
Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian)
65% 23% 7% 1% 3%
Q42. Please list three personalities contributing 
to the improvement of interethnic relations in 
Moldova
Q43. Please list three organizations/institutions 
contributing to the improvement of interethnic 
relations in Moldova
a. Vladimir Voronin 31% a. Communist Party of Moldova 17%
b. Vasile Tarlev 10% b. Democratic Moldova Alliance 8%
c. Serafim Urecheanu 6% c. Social-Democratic Party 5%
Q44. Please list three personalities contributing 
to the worsening of interethnic relations in 
Moldova
Q45. Please list three organizations/institutions 
contributing to the worsening of interethnic 
relations in Moldova
a. Iurie Roşca 36% a. People’s Christian Democratic Party 20%
b. Vlad Cubreacov 9% b. Agrarian Party 5%
c. Serafim Urecheanu 5% c. Democratic Moldova Alliance 4%
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Q46. How do the following political 
parties influence interethnic relations
Rather 
improves
Neither 
improves 
nor worsens
Rather 
worsens
Don’t 
Know/
No answer
a. The Communist Party of Moldova 54% 14% 7% 26%
b. Christian Democratic Party 2% 13% 49% 36%
c. Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc 8% 28% 13% 51%
d. Agrarian Party 3% 30% 11% 55%
e. Social Democratic Party of Moldova 4% 29% 10% 57%
f. Socialist Party of Moldova 3% 30% 10% 58%
Q47. I will read you a list of problems facing our 
country. Please tell me if you consider each of 
these problems crucial, severe, or not too serious.
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1. Unemployment 42% 58% 0% 1% 0%
2. Terrorism/violence/guerilla wars 13% 42% 38% 5% 2%
3. Low salaries 44% 54% 1% 0% 0%
4. Violation of human rights 21% 59% 13% 6% 1%
5. Housing issue 27% 60% 11% 1% 0%
6. Health condition 30% 65% 4% 1% 0%
7. Environmental issues 25% 61% 10% 2% 1%
8. Corruption 31% 60% 3% 5% 1%
9. Crime level/Insecurity 23% 66% 6% 3% 1%
10. Drug trafficking 18% 58% 14% 9% 1%
11. Armed conflicts 13% 46% 31% 8% 2%
12. Ethnic conflicts/tensions 13% 46% 34% 7% 1%
13. Lack of rule of law 17% 59% 14% 8% 1%
14. Lack of press freedom 11% 50% 26% 11% 1%
15. Drug use 20% 60% 11% 8% 1%
16. Trafficking in women 30% 58% 6% 6% 1%
17. Relations with the Transnistrian region 22% 67% 6% 3% 2%
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Q48. Do you agree or disagree that…?
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a. The differences in salaries should be reduced to the benefit of the 
poor. 56% 33% 12%
b. The wellbeing of each individual should depend only on his/her 
working ability and the quality his/her work 59% 34% 7%
c. The state should control the prices of the basic goods. 88% 6% 6%
d. The state should guarantee jobs for all its citizens. 90% 6% 4%
e. The state should impose higher penalties in order to reduce the 
crime level. 88% 7% 5%
f. The first thing that a child should learn is to respect the adults. 85% 10% 5%
g. Teachers should pay more attention to the gifted children, not the 
average ones. 41% 53% 6%
h. The wellbeing of every individual depends mostly on the state. 70% 24% 6%
i. You can trust nobody except yourself. 61% 32% 7%
j. You must fight for your interest by your own. 80% 14% 6%
k. A strong leader is needed in order to improve the situation from 
our country. 80% 13% 7%
Q49. Do you agree with the following statements:
During the current government…
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1. …the social measures were oriented towards 
ordinary people 20% 34% 23% 9% 13%
2. …the state services rendered to the have citizens 
improved 13% 31% 34% 10% 11%
3. …corruption expanded at all levels 32% 34% 15% 3% 15%
4. …the freedom of expression of the media was 
limited 14% 20% 29% 6% 31%
5. …the democratic rights of citizens were limited. 14% 26% 28% 9% 22%
6. …the Transnistrian conflict was not solved 
because of the weakness of the Moldovan politicians 20% 31% 20% 8% 20%
7. …Moldova’s position was respected abroad 8% 23% 30% 8% 31%
8. …the number of poor people from Moldova 
decreased 5% 20% 31% 28% 16%
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9. …the national currency was stabilized 5% 30% 28% 11% 25%
10. …the national economy was stabilized 6% 25% 32% 12% 25%
11. … the salaries and pensions were paid without delays 34% 44% 12% 3% 7%
12. …the farmers were supported 3% 25% 28% 8% 36%
13. …the market economy was consolidated 3% 28% 25% 9% 36%
14. …obstacles to foreign investors were created 7% 16% 29% 7% 41%
15. …small investors were encouraged 5% 25% 21% 5% 44%
16. …there was illegal interference with the economy 6% 21% 21% 5% 48%
17. …an economic growth was achieved 7% 26% 27% 7% 33%
18. …market economy failed 7% 23% 25% 6% 39%
19. … measures to stop massive migration were not taken 27% 28% 15% 6% 23%
Q50. If the parliamentary elections were to take 
place next Sunday, would you vote?
I would definitely vote 64%
I would probably vote 20%
I would probably not go 5%
I would definitely not go 8%
I don’t know (don’t read) 3%
I don’t answer (don’t read) 1%
Q51. If parliamentary elections were to take place next Sunday, what party (alliance) would 
you vote for? Read this question (Q51) to all respondents regarding of their answer to Q51! 
Operator! Show list Q5 to 1the respondent!
Communist Party of Moldova 46%
Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc (Our Moldova Alliance, Democratic Party and Social 
Liberal Party) 5%
Christian Democratic Party 1%
Agrarian Party 1%
Social Democratic Party of Moldova 1%
Socialist Party -
Other, please specify ____________________ 0%
Independent candidate, please specify _________ -
I would not vote 4%
Don’t know 34%
Don’t answer 8%
* If the respondent mentions a party included in parentheses (Moldova Noastra („Our Moldova“) Aliance, Democratic 
Party or Social Democratic Party) the answer should be included next to „Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc“
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Q52. In your opinion, 
what should be the 
direction for our 
country?
Be independent of any alliance/union 6%
We should integrate with the European Union 38%
We should remain within the Commonwealth of Independent States 41%
Don’t know 12%
Don’t answer 2%
Q53. How much 
do you fear the 
disintegration of 
Moldova?
Very much 10% At all 23%
Quite much 29% Don’t know 11%
Quite a little 13% Don’t answer 14%
Q54. What do you think will happen in five years…
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a. Moldova will become a strong country 1% 22% 42% 25% 10%
b. Moldova’s position will be taken in consideration abroad 2% 25% 40% 18% 15%
c. status of Transnistria will be decided 5% 25% 34% 19% 17%
d. income of the population will grow 2% 25% 42% 19% 12%
e. market economy will consolidate 3% 26% 37% 17% 17%
f. democracy will consolidate 2% 25% 37% 16% 20%
g. young people living in Moldova will have large 
opportunities in the country 1% 23% 38% 22% 15%
Q55. Do you think that an armed 
conflict with the neighboring 
countries is possible? 
Yes 13% -- SKIP TO Q56
No 75% -- SKIP TO Q57
Don’t Know/No answer 13% -- SKIP TO Q57
Q56. If yes, with what country is 
Moldova likely to enter an armed 
conflict?
Romania 8% Transnistrian region 81%
Russia 2% Other, please specify _________ -
Ukraine 4% Don’t Know/No answer 6%
Bulgaria -
Q57. In your opinion, what were the causes for the outbreak of the Transnistrian Conflict?
a. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
b. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
c. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
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Q58. What do you think are the solutions for overcoming the current political situation 
related to Transnistria?
a. _________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
b. _________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
c. _________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
Q59. To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements:
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a. It is better not to deal with Moldovans in the 
everyday life. 1% 5% 28% 64% 2%
b. I generally avoid talking to Moldovans from 
Moldova 0% 1% 28% 69% 2%
c. It is better not to deal with Ukrainians in the 
everyday life. 1% 3% 27% 66% 2%
d. I generally avoid talking to Ukrainians from 
Moldova 1% 2% 26% 68% 3%
e. It is better not to deal with the Gagauz in the 
everyday life. 2% 5% 22% 58% 12%
f. I generally avoid talking to the Gagauz from 
Moldova 1% 4% 22% 58% 14%
g. It is better not to deal with Bulgarians in the 
everyday life. 1% 4% 22% 61% 12%
h. I generally avoid talking to Bulgarians from 
Moldova 1% 3% 23% 60% 13%
i. It is better not to deal with Romanians in the 
everyday life. 3% 7% 22% 57% 12%
j. I generally avoid talking to Romanians from 
Moldova 2% 7% 21% 58% 12%
Q60. What is your native 
language?
Do not read the options! Multiple 
choice!
a. Moldovan 6% e. Gagauz 1%
b. Romanian 3% f. Bulgarian 0%
c. Russian 94% g. Other 0%
d. Ukrainian 3% h. Don’t know/refuse to answer 0%
Q61. What language do you 
usually speak at home?
Do not read the options! Multiple 
choices!
a. Moldovan 12% e. Gagauz 1%
b. Romanian 6% f. Bulgarian 0%
c. Russian 93% g. Other 0%
d. Ukrainian 4% h. Don’t know/refuse to answer 1%
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Q62. What is the language you use/used more frequently with your…
Moldovenească a. mother b. father c. grandparents d. children
Moldovan 6% 5% 5% 5%
Romanian 1% 1% 1% 2%
Russian 69% 69% 51% 80%
Ukrainian 4% 4% 5% 2%
Gagauz 0% 0% 1% 1%
Bulgarian 0% 0% 0% 0%
Other 0% 0% 1% 0%
It’s not the case 18% 19% 34% 8%
Don’t know/No answer 0% 1% 2% 2%
Q63. How well do you speak …?
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I speak it perfectly 12% 7% 98% 16% 2% 0%
Fluently but with an accent 20% 14% 1% 11% 0% 1%
I can make myself understood in most situations 23% 20% 0% 20% 1% 1%
In some situations I make myself understood, but with difficulty 20% 19% 0% 11% 2% 3%
I only know a few words 17% 17% 0% 24% 11% 15%
I do not know any word 5% 14% 0% 15% 75% 73%
Don’t answer 2% 8% 1% 3% 8% 8%
Q64. Do you agree with the following statements:
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a. I am disturbed when people around me speak 
Romanian/Moldovan 1% 2% 6% 21% 68% 2%
b. I am disturbed when people around me speak 
Ukrainian 1% 0% 7% 21% 69% 2%
c. I am disturbed when people around me speak 
Gagauz 1% 4% 6% 16% 64% 10%
d. I am disturbed when people around me speak 
Bulgarian 1% 2% 8% 17% 63% 8%
e. There are many Moldovans who avoid speaking 
Russian although they know it 16% 21% 20% 11% 24% 9%
f. There are many Ukrainians who avoid speaking 
Russian although they know it 7% 16% 23% 17% 24% 13%
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g. There are many Gagauz who avoid speaking 
Russian although they know it 5% 13% 20% 12% 21% 29%
h. There are many Bulgarians who avoid speaking 
Russian although they know it 7% 15% 19% 12% 19% 28%
i. All residents from Moldova should know 
Moldovan/Romanian 47% 24% 11% 7% 6% 5%
j. All residents from Moldova should know Russian 33% 31% 15% 8% 7% 7%
k. In regions where Ukrainians are predominant, 
everybody should know Ukrainian 13% 23% 25% 17% 13% 10%
l. All residents of Gagauzia should know Gagauz 12% 24% 24% 16% 13% 11%
m. In regions where Bulgarians are predominant, 
everybody should know Bulgarian 12% 24% 23% 16% 14% 11%
Q65. How many official languages should be in Moldova? Q66. Which ones?
One state language 16% -- SKIP TO Q66 a. Moldovan 89%
Two state languages 70% -- SKIP TO Q66 b. Romanian 13%
More than two state languages 9% -- SKIP TO Q66 c. Russian 82%
Don’t know/No answer 5% -- SKIP TO Q67 d. Ukrainian 7%
e. Gagauz 2%
f. Bulgarian 1%
g. Other 2%
h. Don’t know/refuse to answer 0%
Q67. In the next 12 months do you plan to visit a foreign country ?
a. as a tourist
Yes 17% • aa. What country will you go to? ______ |__|__|
No 83%
b. for temporary work
Yes 7% • bb. What country will you go to? ______ |__|__|
No 93%
c. for studies
Yes 1% • cc. What country will you go to? ______ |__|__|
No 99%
d. to settle 
permanently
Yes 4% • dd. What country will you go to? ______ |__|__|
No 96%
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SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC DATA
D1. Gender
Male 35%
Female 65%
D2. What is your age? ___ ___ Don’t know 8 No an-swer 9
D3. Are you presently employed?
Yes 35% -- SKIP TO D5!
No 65% → Continue with D4!
Don’t answer 1% → Continue with D4!
D4. If you don’t 
have a job, what 
is your status?
High school student, 
university student 10%
Temporary unemployed. Looking 
for a job 14%
Retired (age or sickness) 57% Unemployed. Does not look for a job 7%
Housewife, maternal leave 10% Other (specify) 0%
Don’t know -
Don’t answer 1%
D5. What is your occupation/position at this job? Note as many details for the answer!
______________________________________________________________________ |__|__|
Don’t know = 98 Refuse to answer = 99
D6. What is 
your education 
background
No education 1% Post high school education (college) 11%
Incomplete secondary education 13% Incomplete higher education 5%
Secondary school 19% Completed higher education 21%
Vocational school 22% Master’s degree, PhD 1%
High school 1% Don’t know 1%
Don’t answer 4%
D7. What is your civil status?
Married 57% Unmarried, co-living 1%
Divorced 7% Never married 9%
Widow(er) 24% Don’t know -
Don’t answer 2%
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D8. How large is your family (including yourself)? |__|__| people Don’t know 8
Don’t answer 9
D9. This list contains several groups of monthly income. What is the income of your house-
hold? Please consider all salaries, pensions, child allowances and any other income you might 
have. Please tell me the number on the right side of the group corresponding to the net in-
come of your family for the last month. Show the list D9!
Under 200 Lei 6% 801-900 lei 4% 1501-1750 lei 3%
201-300 lei 10% 901-1000 lei 6% 1751-2500 lei 4%
301-400 lei 8% 1001-1100 lei 4% 2501-3500 lei 2%
401-500 lei 7% 1101-1200 lei 2% 3501-5000 lei 0%
501-600 lei 4% 1201-1300 lei 2% 5001-7000 lei 0%
601-700 lei 6% 1301-1400 lei 2% Over 7001 lei 1%
701-800 lei 5% 1401-1500 lei 5% Don’t know 8%
No answer 13%
D10. How do you evaluate 
the current income of 
your family
Money is not enough even for food 32%
The money is enough for food but not enough to buy clothes 38%
We have money for food and we can save a little, but it is not 
enough to buy more expensive things (TV or a fridge) 21%
We can afford to buy some more expensive things (TV, fridge) 5%
We can afford to buy anything we want 1%
Don’t know 1%
Don’t answer 2%
D11. Are you a holder of one or more citizenships?
I have only the Moldovan citizenship 97%
I hold only the citizenship of another country (besides Moldova). Please specify ____________ |__|__|
I hold the Moldovan citizenship and citizenships of other 
countries. Please specify:
a. _____________________
b. _____________________
|__|__|
|__|__|
Don’t answer -
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ETHNO QUESTIONNAIRE: UKRAINIANS
Good morning/Good afternoon/Good evening! My name is _________ and I come on 
behalf of the Institute of Marketing and Surveys IMAS Inc., Chisinau. Currently our institute is 
conducting a survey on the relationship among people from Moldova. For this reason, I would 
like to ask you some questions. We guarantee that you were randomly selected and that your 
answers are strictly confidential. 
Q1. People believe that there are sev-
eral ethnic groups living in Moldova 
(Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, 
Gagauz, Bulgarians, etc.). What do 
you consider yourself?
Wait for the answer! 
Do not read the options for answers!
Moldovan - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Russian - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Ukrainian 100% -> CONTINUE!
Gagauz - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Bulgarian - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Romanian - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Other: ____ - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Don’t know - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Don’t answer - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Q2. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Ukrainians and Moldovans from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 7% 17% 52% 14% 4% 6%
b. 5 years ago 4% 17% 60% 12% 1% 6%
c. last year 4% 15% 66% 9% 1% 5%
Q3. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Ukrainians and Russians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 4% 11% 69% 8% 0% 8%
b. 5 years ago 3% 11% 72% 6% 0% 8%
c. last year 2% 11% 74% 6% 0% 7%
Q4. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Ukrainians and Gagauz from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 1% 5% 38% 5% 1% 51%
b. 5 years ago 0% 4% 40% 4% 1% 51%
c. last year 0% 4% 40% 4% 0% 51%
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Q5. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Ukrainians and Bulgarians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 0% 5% 38% 4% 0% 52%
b. 5 years ago 0% 4% 39% 4% 0% 52%
c. last year 1% 3% 40% 3% 0% 52%
Q6. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Ukrainians and Romanians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 1% 7% 34% 9% 4% 46%
b. 5 years ago 1% 6% 36% 8% 4% 45%
c. last year 1% 6% 38% 8% 3% 45%
Q7. Which of the following statements describe 
better the relationship between different ethnic 
groups from Moldova?
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a. The relationship between Ukrainians and Moldovans 90% 5% 1% 1% 3%
b. The relationship between Ukrainians and Russians 93% 1% 1% 1% 4%
c. The relationship between Ukrainians and Gagauz 58% 2% 3% 2% 36%
d. The relationship between Ukrainians and Bulgarians 57% 2% 2% 2% 38%
e. The relationship between Ukrainians and Romanians 56% 4% 2% 3% 35%
Q8. How can you describe the 
interethnic relationships in 
your area?
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a. The relationship between 
Ukrainians and Moldovans 93% 5% 1% 0% 0% 1%
b. The relationship between 
Ukrainians and Russians 96% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
c. The relationship between 
Ukrainians and Gagauz 34% 1% 1% 52% 1% 12%
d. The relationship between 
Ukrainians and Bulgarians 30% 1% 2% 54% 0% 12%
e. The relationship between 
Ukrainians and Romanians 36% 3% 3% 47% 1% 10%
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Q9. Thinking of the following ethnic groups from Moldova, do you think that it is possible 
that any of these could become a threat?
Q9_l. Moldovans 
can become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible 
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 0% 3% 22% 62% 12%
b. for Ukrainians 0% 3% 23% 63% 12%
c. for you and your family 0% 2% 22% 65% 11%
Q9_2. Russians 
can become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible 
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country - 5% 23% 61% 11%
b. for Ukrainians - 3% 23% 62% 12%
c. for you and your family - 2% 22% 65% 11%
Q9_3. The Gagauz 
can become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible 
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 0% 4% 21% 46% 29%
b. for Ukrainians 0% 3% 20% 48% 29%
c. for you and your family 0% 3% 20% 49% 28%
Q9_4. Bulgarians 
can become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible 
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country - 1% 20% 48% 31%
b. for Ukrainians - 1% 20% 48% 31%
c. for you and your family - 1% 20% 48% 31%
Q9_5. Romanians 
can become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible 
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 0% 6% 27% 44% 23%
b. for Ukrainians 0% 6% 26% 45% 23%
f. for you and your family 0% 5% 25% 47% 23%
Q10. To what extent do you 
agree with the following 
statements: The fact that I 
was born in Moldova…
Totally 
Agree
Somewhat 
agree Disagree
Totally 
disagree
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. makes me proud 26% 32% 16% 3% 23%
b. makes my life easier 5% 12% 41% 12% 31%
c. makes me feel ashamed 1% 6% 32% 31% 30%
d. makes my life harder 1% 6% 35% 27% 31%
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Q11. To what extent do you agree with 
the following statements:
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a. People should support their country even 
if things are not quite easy 75% 22% 1% 0% 2%
b. The world would be better if all the 
people were like Moldovans from Moldova. 14% 22% 19% 14% 31%
c. The world would be better if all the 
people were like Russians from Moldova. 14% 24% 17% 13% 33%
d. The world would be better if all the 
people were like Ukrainians from Moldova. 16% 27% 15% 11% 31%
e. The world would be better if all the 
people were like Gagauz from Moldova. 8% 12% 15% 13% 52%
f. The world would be better if all the people 
were like Bulgarians from Moldova. 8% 12% 15% 13% 52%
g. The world would be better if all the 
people were like Romanians from Moldova. 9% 12% 16% 16% 47%
h. There are many things I should be 
ashamed of because I am citizen of Moldova 8% 15% 35% 24% 18%
i. I prefer to be a citizen of Moldova than 
any other country 25% 30% 23% 6% 15%
Q12. To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements: The fact that I am 
Ukrainian…
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a. makes me proud 40% 32% 14% 2% 12%
b. makes my life easier 8% 15% 49% 9% 19%
c. makes me feel ashamed 0% 4% 37% 40% 18%
d. makes my life harder 1% 8% 41% 33% 17%
Q13. Which of the following statements describe best 
your identity? I mainly consider myself …. 
Show list Q13! Multiple choice!
1. First 
choice
2. Second 
Choice Total
Ukrainian 59% 12% 71%
Resident of this locality 16% 26% 42%
Citizen of Moldova 20% 45% 64%
CIS Resident 4% 8% 12%
European 0% 2% 3%
Eastern European 0% 0% 0%
Don’t Know/No answer 0% 7% 8%
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Q14. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered MOLDOVAN? 
Show list Q14! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Moldovan parents 27% 10% 6% 40%
b. Speak Moldovan/Romanian language in the family 8% 13% 7% 25%
c. Respect Moldovan traditions 7% 11% 15% 30%
d. Feel Moldovan 11% 12% 9% 29%
e. Perceive Moldovan culture as your own culture 7% 12% 10% 26%
f. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture 0% 2% 3% 5%
g. Honor the Moldovan national flag 1% 3% 4% 6%
h. Live in Moldova 7% 7% 10% 21%
i. Be a native speaker of Moldovan/Romanian language 17% 10% 11% 35%
j. Have Moldovan citizenship 2% 4% 9% 13%
k. Be born in Moldova 4% 2% 6% 10%
l. Don’t know/No answer 8% 15% 11% 31%
Q15. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered RUSSIAN? 
Show list Q15! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Russian parents 29% 11% 7% 44%
b. Speak Russian language in the family 10% 13% 6% 27%
c. Respect Russian traditions 7% 12% 14% 30%
d. Feel Russian 9% 11% 11% 29%
e. Perceive Russian culture as your own culture 6% 10% 12% 25%
f. Respect the Russian national flag 1% 4% 4% 8%
g. Live in Russia 4% 5% 4% 12%
h. Be a native speaker of Russian language 20% 9% 12% 37%
i. Have Russian citizenship 3% 4% 11% 15%
j. Be born in Russia 3% 3% 7% 12%
k. Don’t know/No answer 7% 17% 11% 32%
Q16. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered UKRAINIAN? 
Show list Q16! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Ukrainian parents 33% 11% 7% 48%
b. Speak Ukrainian language in the family 10% 15% 7% 29%
c. Respect Ukrainian traditions 7% 10% 15% 29%
d. Feel Ukrainian 11% 16% 13% 37%
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e. Perceive Ukrainian culture as your own culture 6% 10% 12% 25%
f. Respect the Ukrainian national flag 1% 3% 3% 6%
g. Live in Ukraine 4% 4% 5% 12%
h. Be a native speaker of Ukrainian language 20% 9% 14% 40%
i. Have Ukrainian citizenship 2% 4% 8% 13%
j. Be born in Ukraine 3% 3% 7% 12%
k. Don’t know/No answer 3% 16% 9% 26%
Q17. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered GAGAUZ? 
Show list Q17! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Gagauz parents 27% 10% 7% 39%
b. Speak Gagauz language in the family 7% 12% 7% 21%
c. Respect Gagauz traditions 6% 9% 14% 22%
d. Feel Gagauz 8% 12% 12% 25%
e. Perceive Gagauz culture as your own culture 5% 12% 12% 23%
f. Respect the Gagauz national flag 0% 4% 7% 8%
g. Live in TAU Gagauzia 8% 10% 13% 24%
h. Be a native speaker of Gagauz language 19% 7% 11% 32%
i. Be born in Gagauzia 5% 5% 8% 14%
j. Don’t know/No answer 17% 20% 11% 41%
Q18. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered BULGARIAN? 
Show list Q18! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Bulgarian parents 25% 10% 5% 36%
b. Speak Bulgarian language in the family 9% 10% 7% 22%
c. Respect Bulgarian traditions 6% 10% 15% 24%
d. Feel Bulgarian 8% 13% 11% 25%
e. Perceive Bulgarian culture as your own culture 4% 12% 13% 22%
f. Respect the Bulgarian national flag 0% 3% 6% 7%
g. Live in Bulgaria 3% 4% 6% 10%
h. Be a native Bulgarian speaker 21% 9% 12% 35%
i. Have Bulgarian citizenship 3% 4% 7% 11%
j. Be born in Bulgaria 4% 3% 10% 13%
k. Don’t know/No answer 17% 22% 9% 41%
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Q19. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered ROMANIAN? 
Show list Q19! Multiple choice! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Romanian parents 27% 8% 5% 37%
b. Speak Romanian language in the family 8% 12% 6% 23%
c. Respect Romanian traditions 4% 10% 15% 23%
d. Feel Romanian 10% 12% 11% 29%
e. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture 4% 11% 13% 22%
f. Honor the Romanian national flag 0% 2% 2% 3%
g. Live in Romania 5% 8% 8% 17%
h. Be a native Romanian speaker 20% 10% 10% 36%
i. Have Romanian citizenship 1% 3% 10% 11%
j. Be born in Romania 6% 5% 9% 17%
k. Don’t know/No answer 14% 19% 11% 38%
Q20. How much do you 
trust…?
Very 
much Much Little At all
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. People from Moldova 8% 67% 19% 4% 2%
b. Moldovans from Moldova 10% 63% 20% 6% 1%
c. Russians from Moldova 10% 65% 20% 3% 1%
d. Ukrainians from Moldova 13% 67% 17% 2% 1%
e. Gagauz from Moldova 4% 39% 20% 8% 28%
f. Bulgarians from Moldova 4% 41% 20% 6% 29%
g. Romanians from Moldova 4% 40% 21% 12% 23%
Q21. Please 
specify what 
your reaction 
would be if per-
sons belonging 
to the following 
ethnic groups in 
Moldova:
a. 
Moldovans
b. 
Russians
c. 
Ukrainians
d.
Gagauz
e. 
Bulgarians
f. 
Romanians
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a. lived in 
Moldova 100% 0% 99% 1% 100% 0% 92% 8% 92% 8% 91% 9%
b. lived in your 
locality 99% 1% 99% 1% 100% 0% 85% 15% 85% 15% 84% 16%
c. were your 
neighbors 97% 3% 97% 3% 98% 2% 67% 33% 67% 33% 67% 33%
d. were your 
friends 96% 4% 97% 3% 99% 1% 66% 34% 64% 36% 63% 37%
e. were part of 
your family 83% 17% 84% 16% 93% 7% 57% 43% 56% 44% 55% 45%
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Q22. Are you a member of any organization?
Yes 5% -- SKIP TO Q23
No 94% -- SKIP TO Q24
Don’t Know/No answer 1% -- SKIP TO Q24
Q23. How often 
do you attend 
the meetings of 
this organiza-
tion?
Daily 20% There are no formal meetings of the members 15%
Weekly 15% I do not take part in meetings of the members 5%
Monthly 25% Don’t know -
A few times a year 20% Don’t answer -
Once a year -
Q24. Would you participate in a cultural event (e.g. 
festivals) with people of other ethnic background?
(public events)
Yes 21%
No 77%
Don’t Know/No answer 1%
Q25 – Q30. The following list includes several features. Please find three positive and three 
negative features describing best the Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians 
from Moldova.
OPERATOR: Show list 25 Multiple choices! 
Positive features: For each ethnic group circle in column a. the first choice and in column b. the rest of 
the choices! For each ethnic group one can have up to 3 choices from the list of positive features, the first 
choice in column a. and the rest of the choices in column b.!
Positive features
Q25. 
Moldovans
Q26. 
Russians
Q27. 
Ukrainians
Q28. 
Gagauz
Q29. 
Bulgarians
Q30. 
Romanians
a. b a. b a. b a. b a. b a. b
1. Decent 21% 13% 15% 6% 13% 14% 3% 6% 2% 5% 4% 4%
2. Kind-hearted 20% 20% 10% 7% 15% 11% 2% 6% 4% 8% 2% 4%
3. Hearty 7% 13% 16% 12% 7% 16% 3% 12% 2% 9% 3% 9%
4. Independent 1% 3% 8% 11% 2% 5% 3% 14% 2% 15% 2% 10%
5. Civilized 1% 5% 3% 11% 1% 4% 1% 8% 1% 8% 10% 17%
6. Educated 3% 8% 3% 9% 4% 6% 2% 9% 2% 9% 4% 15%
7. Resourceful 1% 4% 5% 15% 3% 7% 2% 13% 2% 11% 1% 5%
8. Joyful 8% 21% 7% 20% 7% 17% 2% 14% 1% 13% 2% 13%
9. Clean 1% 4% 1% 5% 1% 3% 1% 9% 0% 10% 1% 10%
10. Religious 2% 15% 2% 6% 4% 9% 3% 16% 2% 13% 3% 15%
11. United 0% 3% 4% 16% 1% 4% 2% 13% 2% 16% 1% 8%
12. Honest 1% 8% 2% 8% 1% 12% 0% 16% 0% 12% 0% 8%
13. Modest 0% 6% 0% 2% 1% 6% 1% 10% 2% 8% 1% 8%
14. Hard-working 24% 32% 2% 6% 27% 23% 2% 14% 2% 15% 1% 9%
15. Intelligent 0% 2% 4% 7% 2% 4% 1% 5% 0% 8% 2% 12%
16. Hospitable 2% 9% 7% 4% 2% 12% 1% 9% 2% 9% 1% 4%
17. None 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 0% 3% 0% 4% 0%
18. Don’t Know/
No answer 7% 10% 11% 20% 8% 16% 66% 7% 70% 9% 58% 19%
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OPERATOR: Show list 25! Multiple choices! 
Negative features: For each ethnic group circle in column a. the first choice and in column b. the rest of 
the choices! For each ethnic group one can have up to 3 choices from the list of positive features, the first 
choice in column a. and the rest of the choices in column b.! 
Negative features
Q25. 
Moldovans
Q26. 
Russians
Q27. 
Ukrainians
Q28. 
Gagauz
Q29. 
Bulgarians
Q30. 
Romanians
a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b.
19. Selfish 7% 5% 6% 7% 5% 6% 4% 4% 2% 6% 3% 14%
20. Aggressive 8% 5% 10% 10% 3% 6% 5% 16% 2% 6% 2% 10%
21.Indifferent/cold 1% 8% 4% 12% 2% 5% 1% 14% 2% 10% 3% 16%
22. Obedient 8% 14% 3% 6% 6% 8% 1% 8% 2% 10% 1% 16%
23. Backward 4% 7% 0% 4% 2% 8% 1% 11% 0% 10% 1% 5%
24. Uneducated 3% 11% 2% 7% 1% 8% 1% 16% 0% 10% 1% 10%
25. Negligent 3% 9% 6% 21% 2% 14% 0% 14% 0% 21% 1% 13%
26. Sad 3% 11% 1% 5% 3% 11% 1% 7% 1% 6% 0% 7%
27. Dirty 0% 4% 1% 1% 0% 6% 0% 4% 0% 13% 0% 8%
28. Superstitious 6% 16% 2% 10% 4% 16% 1% 7% 1% 13% 1% 9%
29. Divided 2% 9% 1% 7% 1% 10% 0% 7% 1% 13% 1% 7%
30. Thieves 1% 8% 1% 5% 0% 5% 1% 7% 0% 3% 1% 5%
31. Vainglorious 1% 2% 0% 10% 1% 5% 0% 5% 1% 16% 2% 10%
32. Lazy 1% 3% 8% 9% 2% 7% 2% 2% 0% 6% 2% 16%
33. Stupid 1% 4% 1% 0% 0% 3% 0% 5% 0% 6% 1% 2%
34. Hostile 1% 3% 1% 3% 1% 1% 3% 5% 1% 3% 3% 4%
35. None 13% 1% 16% 1% 19% 0% 10% 1% 10% 0% 10% 0%
36. Don’t Know/
No answer 37% 31% 37% 33% 47% 34% 69% 28% 74% 21% 67% 19%
Q31. Which of the following groups are, generally speaking, the richest /have most polit ical 
influence/ are most respected? Rank the first group and the second group!
The richest The most politically influential The most respected
First 
choice
Second 
choice
First 
choice
Second 
choice
First 
choice
Second 
choice
Moldovans 24% 9% 31% 9% 26% 5%
Russians 22% 15% 13% 20% 11% 20%
Ukrainians 2% 7% 2% 4% 4% 7%
Gagauz 2% 3% 1% 3% 0% 1%
Bulgarians 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Romanians 0% 2% 2% 3% 1% 2%
Other________ 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Don’t Know/
No answer 47% 62% 48% 60% 56% 63%
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Q32. Do you agree with the following statements: 
Moldova should…?
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a. support Moldovan students studying in other 
countries 63% 28% 1% 0% 8%
b. guarantee education in Russian for Russian 
children and teenagers 50% 36% 5% 1% 8%
c. guarantee education in Ukrainian for Ukrainian 
children and teenagers 46% 39% 6% 1% 8%
e. guarantee education in Gagauz for Gagauz 
children and teenagers 38% 39% 9% 2% 12%
e. guarantee education in Bulgarian for Bulgarian 
children and teenagers 39% 38% 8% 3% 12%
f. support Moldovan businesses abroad 44% 32% 8% 3% 13%
g. Should support Moldovan cultural organizations 
abroad 42% 41% 5% 2% 10%
h. Support the cultural organizations of different 
ethnic groups in Moldova 39% 42% 7% 2% 11%
i. help develop the identity of the Russian ethnic 
group 38% 43% 7% 1% 11%
j. help develop the identity of the Ukrainian ethnic 
group 39% 41% 8% 1% 11%
k. help develop the identity of the Gagauz ethnic 
group 34% 40% 9% 3% 14%
l. help develop the identity of the Bulgarian ethnic 
group 34% 38% 11% 3% 15%
m. organize cultural events attended by people of 
different ethnic backgrounds from Moldova. 40% 42% 6% 1% 11%
n. grant a larger autonomy to districts where an 
ethnic group represents a majority 26% 28% 14% 12% 20%
Q33. Do you agree with the following statements: 
Russia should…
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a. support high school and university students of 
Russian background studying in Moldova 55% 34% 2% 1% 8%
b. support Russian businesses operating in Moldova 50% 36% 4% 1% 9%
c. support the cultural organizations of Russians 
from Moldova 53% 34% 3% 1% 9%
d. help develop Russians’ identity in Moldova 50% 36% 3% 1% 9%
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Q34. Do you agree with the following statements: 
Ukraine should…
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a. support high school and university students of Ukrainian 
background studying in Moldova 56% 34% 1% 1% 8%
b. support Ukrainian businesses operating in Moldova 54% 34% 2% 1% 9%
c. support the cultural organizations of Ukrainians from Moldova 55% 34% 1% 1% 8%
d. help develop Ukrainians ’ identity in Moldova 53% 36% 2% 1% 9%
Q35. Do you agree with the following statements: 
Turkey should…
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a. support high school and university students of Gagauz 
background studying in Moldova 48% 31% 2% 1% 18%
b. support Gagauz businesses operating in Moldova 44% 30% 6% 2% 19%
c. support the cultural organizations of Gagauz from Moldova 43% 32% 4% 1% 19%
d. help develop the identity of the Gagauz from Moldova 39% 33% 5% 3% 20%
Q36. Do you agree with the following statements: 
Bulgaria should…?
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a. support high school and university students of Bulgarian 
background studying in Moldova 49% 31% 1% 1% 17%
b. support Bulgarian businesses operating in Moldova 44% 30% 6% 1% 19%
c. support the cultural organizations of Bulgarians from Moldova 43% 35% 2% 2% 18%
d. help develop the identity of Bulgarians from Moldova 39% 36% 3% 2% 19%
Q37. Do you agree with the following statements: 
Romania should…
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a. support high school and university students of Romanian 
background studying in Moldova 50% 33% 1% 1% 14%
b. support Romanian businesses operating in Moldova 47% 31% 5% 1% 16%
c. support the cultural organizations of Romanians from Moldova 46% 33% 3% 2% 15%
d. help develop the identity of Romanians from Moldova 42% 34% 5% 3% 16%
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Q38. What is your opinion about 
the Law regarding the rights of 
minorities in Moldova?
too many 
rights
enough 
rights
not enough 
rights
don’t know/
no answer
a. Russians have… 6% 68% 11% 16%
b. Ukrainians have.. 1% 67% 16% 15%
c. Gagauz have.. 2% 58% 10% 29%
d. Bulgarians have… 2% 57% 11% 30%
e. Romanians have.. 6% 60% 7% 27%
Q39. Do you think ethnic 
background affects the employ-
ment in your area? What do 
you think the situation is?
too many 
opportunities
enough 
opportunities
not enough 
opportunities
don’t know/
no answer
a. Moldovans have.. 15% 63% 7% 15%
b. Russians have… 5% 65% 15% 15%
c. Ukrainians have… 2% 64% 18% 15%
d. Gagauz have.. 1% 50% 15% 35%
e. Bulgarians have… 1% 47% 16% 36%
f. Romanians have.. 6% 51% 11% 32%
Q40. Do you think nationality 
matters to be successful in 
business in your area? What do 
you think the situation is?
too many 
opportunities
enough 
opportunities
not enough 
opportunities
don’t know/
no answer
a. Moldovans have.. 10% 69% 5% 16%
b. Russians have… 5% 66% 12% 16%
c. Ukrainians have… 3% 65% 16% 16%
d. Gagauz have.. 0% 51% 12% 37%
e. Bulgarians have… 0% 50% 12% 38%
f. Romanians have.. 3% 53% 8% 35%
Q41. Do you agree with the following statements:
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a. Moldovan children should learn the languages of 
national minorities (Russians, Ukrainians, etc.) 46% 29% 9% 3% 13%
b. Children of other nationalities from Moldova 
should learn Romanian/Moldovan in schools 67% 26% 3% 1% 3%
c. Children of other nationalities should learn 
together with Ukrainian children 65% 27% 4% 0% 4%
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d. There should be mixed marriages 66% 27% 3% 0% 4%
e. There should be organizations and associations 
promoting collaboration between ethnic groups 
from Moldova
59% 32% 3% 0% 6%
f. People should participate in different cultural 
events (festivals) attended by people from different 
ethnic backgrounds in Moldova
60% 30% 2% 2% 6%
g. One should organize different cultural events 
(festivals) with the participation of people from 
different ethnic backgrounds in Moldova
60% 30% 4% 0% 6%
h. One should broadcast radio and television 
programs about the lives of people from different 
ethnic backgrounds in Moldova
61% 30% 3% 0% 6%
i. People should know the customs and traditions of 
different ethnic groups from Moldova 60% 30% 5% 0% 5%
j. One should broadcast programs on the National 
Television in the languages of minorities (Russian, 
Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian)
60% 29% 4% 0% 6%
Q42. Please list three personalities contributing 
to the improvement of interethnic relations in 
Moldova
Q43. Please list three organizations/institutions 
contributing to the improvement of interethnic 
relations in Moldova
a. Vladimir Voronin 39% a. Communist Party of Moldova 15%
b. Vasile Tarlev 8% b. Democratic Moldova 2%
c. Eugenia Ostapciuc 4% c. Social-Democratic Party 2%
Q44. Please list three personalities contributing 
to the worsening of interethnic relations in 
Moldova
Q45. Please list three organizations/institutions 
contributing to the worsening of interethnic 
relations in Moldova
a. Iurie Roşca 27% a. Christian Democratic Party 16%
b. Vlad Cubreacov 3% b. Agrarian Party 2%
c. Mircea Snegur 2% c. Moldovan state structures 1%
Q46. How do the following political 
parties influence interethnic relations?
rather 
improves
neither 
improves 
nor worsens
rather 
worsens
don’t know/
no answer
a. The Communist Party of Moldova 50% 14% 4% 33%
b. Christian Democratic Party 2% 13% 38% 46%
c. Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc 2% 22% 8% 67%
d. Agrarian Party 4% 21% 7% 68%
e. Social Democratic Party of Moldova 2% 21% 6% 71%
f. Socialist Party of Moldova 2% 20% 6% 72%
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Q47. I will read you a list of problems facing 
our country. Please tell me if you consider 
each of these problems crucial, severe, or 
not too serious.
Crucial Severe Not too serious
Don’t 
know
No 
answer
7. Environmental issues 22% 51% 15% 11% 1%
8. Corruption 25% 59% 6% 9% 1%
9. Crime level/Insecurity 19% 69% 8% 4% 1%
10. Drug trafficking 17% 57% 11% 13% 1%
11. Armed conflicts 9% 53% 26% 11% 2%
12. Ethnic conflicts/tensions 7% 42% 36% 13% 1%
13. Lack of rule of law 10% 52% 20% 16% 2%
14. Lack of press freedom 7% 37% 34% 19% 2%
15. Drug abuse 20% 54% 13% 13% 1%
16. Trafficking in women 22% 51% 13% 12% 2%
17. Relations with the Transnistrian region 18% 56% 13% 12% 1%
Q48. Do you agree or disagree that…? Agree Disagree Don’t Know/No answer
a. The differences in salaries should be reduced to the 
benefit of the poor. 70% 20% 10%
b. The wellbeing of each individual should depend only 
on his/her working ability and the quality his/her work 63% 29% 8%
c. The state should control the prices of the basic goods. 84% 5% 11%
d. The state should guarantee jobs for all its citizens. 89% 6% 5%
e. The state should impose higher penalties in order to 
reduce the crime level. 83% 9% 8%
f. The first thing that a child should learn is to respect the 
adults. 87% 7% 6%
g. Teachers should pay more attention to the gifted 
children, not the average ones. 49% 40% 10%
h. The wellbeing of every individual depends mostly on 
the state. 70% 19% 11%
i. You can trust nobody except yourself. 64% 29% 8%
j. You must fight for your interest by your own. 81% 11% 8%
k. A strong leader is needed in order to improve the 
situation from our country. 79% 13% 8%
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Q49. Do you agree with the following statement:
During the current government: 
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1. …the social measures were oriented towards 
ordinary people 24% 37% 20% 7% 14%
2. …the state services rendered to the citizens have 
improved 18% 30% 28% 7% 17%
3. …corruption expanded at all levels 24% 34% 13% 5% 24%
4. …the freedom of expression of the media was 
limited 9% 17% 19% 10% 45%
5. …the democratic rights of citizens were limited. 9% 20% 23% 9% 38%
6. …the Transnistrian conflict was not solved 
because of the weakness of the Moldovan politicians 23% 22% 15% 8% 32%
7. …Moldova’s position was respected abroad 6% 15% 26% 8% 45%
8. …the number of poor people from Moldova 
decreased 5% 13% 25% 37% 21%
9. …the national currency was stabilized 5% 21% 26% 16% 32%
10. …the national economy was stabilized 5% 24% 24% 18% 29%
11. … the salaries and pensions were paid without 
delays 45% 34% 12% 3% 6%
12. …the farmers were supported 6% 17% 24% 21% 33%
13. …the market economy was consolidated 2% 21% 25% 7% 45%
14. …obstacles to foreign investors were created 3% 15% 19% 7% 57%
15. …small investors were encouraged 5% 19% 16% 6% 54%
16. …there was illegal interference with the 
economy 5% 15% 20% 4% 57%
17. …an economic growth was achieved 5% 20% 21% 15% 39%
18. …market economy failed 6% 15% 21% 7% 51%
19. … measures to stop massive migration were not 
taken 23% 20% 15% 9% 31%
Q50. If the parliamentary elections were to take place next 
Sunday, would you vote?
I would definitely vote 61%
I would probably vote 19%
I would probably not go 7%
I would definitely not go 7%
I don’t know (don’t read) 5%
I don’t answer (don’t read) 1%
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Q51. If parliamentary elections were to take place next Sunday, what party (alliance) would 
you vote for? Read this question (Q51) to all respondents regardless of their answer to Q51! 
Operator! Show list Q51 to the respondent!
Communist Party of Moldova 54%
Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc (Our Moldova Alliance, Democratic Party and Social 
Liberal Party) 2%
Christian Democratic Party 1%
Agrarian Party -
Social Democratic Party of Moldova -
Socialist Party -
Other, please specify ___________________________ 2%
Independent candidate, please specify _________________ -
I would not vote 10%
Don’t know 26%
Don’t answer 6%
* If the respondent mentions a party included in parentheses (Moldova Noastra („Our Moldova“) Alliance, 
Democratic Party or Social Democratic Party) the answer should be included next to „Democratic 
Moldova Electoral Bloc“
Q52. In your opinion, what should be 
the direction of our country?
Be independent of any alliance/union 3%
We should integrate with the European Union 21%
We should remain within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) 48%
Don’t know 24%
Don’t answer 4%
Q53. How much do you fear the disintegration 
of Moldova?
Very much 7% Not at all 14%
Quite much 22% Don’t know 24%
Quite a little 20% Don’t answer 13%
Q54. What do you believe will happen in five years…
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a. Moldova will become a strong country 1% 19% 43% 21% 16%
b. Moldova’s position will be taken in consideration abroad 1% 15% 45% 18% 21%
c. status of Transnistria will be decided 2% 18% 37% 19% 24%
d. population income will grow 1% 21% 41% 22% 15%
e. market economy will consolidate 2% 25% 35% 17% 22%
f. the democracy will consolidate 1% 18% 37% 19% 25%
g. young people living in Moldova will have more 
opportunities in the country 2% 15% 39% 24% 20%
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Q55. Do you think that an armed 
conflict with the neighboring countries 
is possible? 
Yes 14% -- SKIP TO Q56
No 65% -- SKIP TO Q57
Don’t Know/No answer 21% -- SKIP TO Q57
Q56. If yes, with what 
country is Moldova likely to 
enter an armed conflict?
Romania 5% Transnistria 81%
Russia 2% Other, please specify _________ -
Ukraine 4% Don’t Know/No answer 7%
Bulgaria 2%
Q57. In your opinion, what were the reasons for the outbreak of the Transnistrian Conflict?
a. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
b. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
c. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
Q58. What do you think are the solutions for overcoming the current political situation 
related to Transnistria?
a. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
b. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
c. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
Q59. To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements:
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a. It is better not to deal with Moldovans in everyday life. 2% 7% 18% 67% 6%
b. I generally avoid talking to Moldovans from Moldova 2% 2% 20% 69% 7%
c. It is better not to deal with Russians in everyday life. 0% 6% 18% 69% 7%
d. I generally avoid talking to Russians from Moldova 0% 4% 20% 69% 7%
e. It is better not to deal with the Gagauz in everyday life. 0% 6% 16% 59% 19%
f. I generally avoid talking to the Gagauz from Moldova 0% 4% 17% 58% 20%
g. It is better not to deal with Bulgarians in everyday life. 0% 5% 18% 56% 20%
h. I generally avoid talking to Bulgarians from Moldova 0% 4% 18% 57% 20%
i. It is better not to deal with Romanians in everyday life. 2% 7% 18% 56% 17%
j. I generally avoid talking to Romanians from Moldova 2% 6% 18% 57% 18%
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Q60. What is your native 
language?
Do not read the options for answers! 
Multiple choice!
a. Moldovan 4% e. Gagauz 0%
b. Romanian 1% f. Bulgarian 0%
c. Russian 25% g. Other 0%
d. Ukrainian 82% h. Don’t know/refuse to answer 0%
Q61. What language do you 
usually speak at home?
Do not read the options for answers! 
Multiple choice!
a. Moldovan 8% e. Gagauz 0%
b. Romanian 4% f. Bulgarian 0%
c. Russian 43% g. Other 0%
d. Ukrainian 66% h. Don’t know/refuse to answer 0%
Q62. What is the language you use/used more frequently with you…
a. mother b. father c. grandparents d. children
Moldovan 2% 1% 1% 5%
Romanian 1% 1% 0% 2%
Russian 19% 18% 11% 41%
Ukrainian 58% 59% 57% 48%
Gagauz 0% 0% 0% 0%
Bulgarian 0% 0% 0% 0%
Other 0% 0% 0% 0%
It’s not the case 17% 18% 25% 3%
Don’t know/No answer 3% 2% 5% 1%
Q63. How well do you speak …?
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I speak it perfectly 11% 7% 80% 89% 0% 0%
Fluently but with an accent 19% 15% 14% 5% 0% 0%
I can make myself understood in most 
situations 26% 20% 4% 4% 0% 0%
In some situations I make myself 
understood, but with difficulty 20% 17% 1% 1% 0% 1%
I only know a few words 18% 15% 0% 1% 7% 7%
I do not know any word 4% 15% 0% 0% 78% 77%
No answer 0% 12% 1% 0% 14% 14%
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Q64. Do you agree with the following 
statements:
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a. I am disturbed when people around me 
speak Romanian/Moldovan 1% 2% 8% 15% 70% 5%
b. I am disturbed when people around me 
speak Russian 0% 1% 6% 13% 76% 4%
c. I am disturbed when people around me 
speak Gagauz 1% 1% 8% 14% 62% 14%
d. I am disturbed when people around me 
speak Bulgarian 0% 2% 8% 14% 62% 14%
e. There are many Moldovans who avoid 
speaking Ukrainian although they know it 6% 16% 23% 18% 24% 14%
f. There are many Russians who avoid 
speaking Ukrainian although they know it 6% 17% 25% 19% 17% 16%
g. There are many Gagauz who avoid speaking 
Ukrainian although they know it 3% 10% 23% 10% 13% 42%
h. There are many Bulgarians who avoid 
speaking Ukrainian although they know it 4% 11% 22% 9% 13% 41%
i. All residents from Moldova should know 
Moldovan/Romanian 43% 25% 14% 7% 6% 6%
j. All residents from Moldova should know 
Russian 37% 30% 16% 8% 5% 5%
k. In regions where Ukrainians are predo mi-
nant, everybody should know Ukrainian 10% 32% 23% 14% 13% 8%
l. All residents of Gagauzia should know 
Gagauz 8% 30% 23% 13% 9% 17%
m. In regions where Bulgarians are predomi-
nant, everybody should know Bulgarian 8% 32% 22% 12% 9% 17%
Q65. How many official/state languages should be in 
Moldova? Q66.Which ones?
One state language 18% -- SKIP TO Q66 a. Moldovan 93%
Two state languages 62% -- SKIP TO Q66 b. Romanian 7%
More than two state languages 13% -- SKIP TO Q66 c. Russian 76%
Don’t know/No answer 7% -- SKIP TO Q67 d. Ukrainian 17%
e. Gagauz 1%
f. Bulgarian 1%
g. Other 1%
h. Don’t know/refuse to answer 0%
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Q67. In the next 12 months do you plan to visit a foreign country ?
a. as a tourist
Yes 11% → aa. What country will you go to? _________ |__|__|
No 89% _________ |__|__|
b. for temporary work
Yes 8% → bb. What country will you go to? _________ |__|__|
No 92% _________ |__|__|
c. for studies
Yes 1% → cc. What country will you go to? _________ |__|__|
No 99% _________ |__|__|
d. to settle permanently
Yes 1% → dd. What country will you go to? _________ |__|__|
No 99% _________ |__|__|
SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC DATA
D1. Gender
Male 39%
Female 61%
D2. What is your age? ____ Don’t know 8 No answer 9
D3. Are you presently employed? Yes 27% -- SKIP TO D5!
No 73% → Continue with D4!
Don’t answer 0% → Continue with D4!
D4. If you don’t 
have a job, what 
is your status?
High school student, 
university student
2% Temporary unemployed. Looking 
for a job
17%
Retired (due to age or sickness) 67% Unemployed. Does not look for a job 4%
Housewife, maternal leave 8% Other (specify) 0%
Don’t know -
Don’t answer 1%
D5. What is your occupation/position at this job? Note as many details for the answer!
______________________________________________________________________ |__|__|
Don’t know = 98 Refuse to answer = 99
D6. What is 
your 
education 
background
No education 5% Post high school education (college) 9%
Incomplete secondary education 26% Incomplete higher education 1%
Secondary school 24% Completed higher education 10%
Vocational school 22% Master’s degree, PhD 0%
High school 0% Don’t know 0%
Don’t answer 2%
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D7. What is your civil status
Married 60% Not married, living together 1%
Divorced 4% Never married 6%
Widow(er) 25% Don’t know -
Don’t answer 3%
D8. How large is your family (including yourself)? |__|__| people
Don’t know 8
Don’t answer 9
D9. This list contains several groups of monthly income. What is the income of your house-
hold? Please consider all salaries, pensions, child allowances and any other income you might 
have. Please tell me the number on the right side of the group corresponding to the net in-
come of your family for the last month. Show list D9!
Under 200 Lei 9% 801 - 900 lei 2% 1501 - 1750 lei 1%
201 - 300 lei 18% 901-1000 lei 4% 1751 - 2500 lei 4%
301 - 400 lei 13% 1001-1100 lei 1% 2501 - 3500 lei 1%
401 - 500 lei 7% 1101-1200 lei 2% 3501 - 5000 lei 1%
501-600 lei 10% 1201 - 1300 lei 1% 5001 - 7000 lei 0%
601-700 lei 8% 1301-1400 lei 1% Over 7001 lei 4%
701 - 800 lei 3% 1401-1500 lei 3% Don’t know 8%
No answer 1%
D10. How do you evaluate 
the current income of 
your family
Money is not enough even for food 41%
The money is enough for food but not enough to buy clothes 38%
We have money for food and we can save a little, but it is not 
enough to buy more expensive things (TV or a fridge) 17%
We can afford to buy some more expensive things (TV, fridge) 2%
We can afford to buy anything we want 0%
Don’t know 0%
Don’t answer 1%
D11. Are you a holder of one or more citizenships?
I have only the Moldovan citizenship 98%
I hold only the citizenship of another country (besides Moldova). Please specify __________ |__|__|
I hold the Moldovan citizenship and citizenships of other 
countries. Please specify 
a. ______________________
b. ______________________
|__|__|
|__|__|
Don’t answer 1%
December 2004 Form #. |__|__|__|__|
Operator Code |__|__|__|__| Date: |__|__| Month: |__|__|2004 
The interview was taken after the |__| visit Interview start time |__|__|:|__|__|
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ETHNO QUESTIONNAIRE: THE GAGAUZ
Good morning/Good afternoon/Good evening! My name is _________ and I come on 
behalf of the Institute of Marketing and Surveys IMAS Inc. Chisinau. Currently our institute 
is conducting a survey on the relationships among people from Moldova. For this reason, I 
would like to ask you some questions. We guarantee that you were selected randomly and that 
your answers will remain strictly confidential. 
Q1. People believe that there are 
several ethnic groups living in 
Moldova (Moldovans, Russians, 
Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, etc.). 
What do you consider yourself?
Wait for the answer! 
Do not read the options for answers!
Moldovan - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Russian - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Ukrainian - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Gagauz 100% -> CONTINUE!
Bulgarian - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Romanian - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Other: ____ - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Don’t know - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Don’t answer - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Q2. In your opinion, is the current relationship between the Gagauz and Moldovans from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 7% 24% 40% 15% 3% 11%
b. 5 years ago 3% 25% 46% 13% 2% 11%
c. last year 2% 27% 47% 11% 1% 12%
Q3. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Gagauz and Ukrainians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 5% 19% 52% 7% 0% 17%
b. 5 years ago 2% 17% 57% 6% 0% 18%
c. last year 2% 19% 56% 6% 0% 17%
Q4. In your opinion, is the current relationship between the Gagauz and Russians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better
The same Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 6% 23% 56% 4% 0% 10%
b. 5 years ago 4% 20% 60% 6% 0% 11%
c. last year 4% 21% 59% 5% 0% 11%
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Q5. In your opinion, is the current relationship between the Gagauz and Bulgarians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 4% 19% 54% 4% 1% 18%
b. 5 years ago 2% 17% 57% 6% 0% 18%
c. last year 2% 17% 57% 6% 0% 18%
Q6. In your opinion, is the current relationship between the Gagauz and Romanians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 3% 11% 26% 6% 2% 52%
b. 5 years ago 1% 10% 28% 7% 1% 53%
c. last year 0% 10% 29% 6% 2% 53%
Q7. Which of the following statements 
describe better the relationship between 
different ethnic groups from Moldova?
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a. The relationship between the Gagauz and 
Moldovans 78% 4% 5% 4% 9%
b. The relationship between the Gagauz and 
Ukrainians 82% 3% 1% 4% 11%
c. The relationship between the Gagauz and 
Russian 85% 3% 1% 4% 8%
d. The relationship between the Gagauz and 
Bulgarians 80% 3% 2% 4% 11%
e. The relationship between the Gagauz and 
Romanians 48% 3% 3% 7% 39%
Q8. How can you describe the 
interethnic relationships in your area?
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a. The relationship between the Gagauz 
and Moldovans 81% 3% 4% 2% 4% 6%
b. The relationship between the Gagauz 
and Ukrainians 79% 2% 2% 7% 3% 7%
c. The relationship between the Gagauz 
and Russians 83% 2% 1% 4% 4% 6%
d. The relationship between the Gagauz 
and Bulgarians 78% 3% 2% 6% 4% 7%
e. The relationship between the Gagauz 
and Romanians 33% 3% 1% 41% 5% 17%
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Q9. Thinking of the following ethnic groups from Moldova, do you think that it is possible 
that they could become a threat?
Q9_l. Moldovans can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 1% 6% 28% 52% 12%
b. for the Gagauz 1% 7% 27% 54% 11%
c. for you and your family 1% 5% 23% 59% 11%
Q9_2. Ukrainians can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 1% 1% 27% 59% 12%
b. for the Gagauz 1% 1% 24% 63% 11%
c. for you and your family 1% 1% 21% 66% 11%
Q9_3. Russians can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 1% 3% 26% 60% 10%
b. for the Gagauz 1% 3% 22% 64% 10%
c. for you and your family 1% 1% 19% 68% 10%
Q9_4. Bulgarians can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 1% 2% 25% 61% 11%
b. for the Gagauz 1% 2% 22% 64% 11%
c. for you and your family 1% 2% 20% 66% 11%
Q9_5. Romanians can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 2% 3% 22% 49% 24%
b. for the Gagauz 2% 3% 19% 52% 24%
c. for you and your family 2% 2% 17% 56% 24%
Q10. Do you agree with the following statements? 
The fact that I was born in Moldova…
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a. makes me proud 45% 32% 11% 4% 7%
b. makes my life easier 7% 28% 40% 11% 14%
c. makes me feel ashamed 2% 13% 19% 54% 12%
d. makes my life harder 2% 14% 32% 38% 15%
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Q11. Do you agree with the following statements?
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a. People should support their country even if 
things are not quite easy 70% 19% 4% 1% 5%
b. The world would be better if all the people were 
like Moldovans from Moldova. 16% 30% 31% 7% 15%
c. The world would be better if all the people were 
like Russians from Moldova. 15% 36% 27% 5% 16%
d. The world would be better if all the people were 
like Ukrainians from Moldova. 17% 28% 34% 4% 18%
e. The world would be better if all the people were 
like Gagauz from Moldova. 22% 41% 19% 4% 14%
f. The world would be better if all the people were 
like Bulgarians from Moldova. 15% 32% 30% 4% 19%
g. The world would be better if all the people were 
like Romanians from Moldova. 11% 26% 25% 12% 27%
h. There are many things I should be ashamed of 
because I am citizen of Moldova 10% 19% 34% 27% 10%
i. I prefer to be a citizen of Moldova than a citizen of 
any other country 23% 29% 25% 12% 11%
Q12. To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements: The fact that I am Gagauz…
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a. makes me proud 54% 29% 10% 3% 4%
b. makes my life easier 10% 29% 42% 8% 11%
c. makes me feel ashamed 1% 12% 18% 58% 10%
d. makes my life harder 2% 10% 30% 44% 14%
Q13. Which of the following statements describe best your 
identity? I mainly consider myself …. Show list Q13! 
Multiple choice!
1. First 
choice
2. Second 
Choice Total
Gagauz 66% 15% 81%
Resident of this locality 14% 29% 43%
Citizen of Moldova 17% 29% 46%
CIS Resident 1% 13% 14%
European 0% 6% 6%
Eastern European 0% 1% 1%
Don’t Know/No answer 1% 7% 8%
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Q14. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered Moldovan? 
Show list Q14! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Moldovan parents 33% 8% 8% 48%
b. Speak Moldovan/Romanian language in the family 14% 11% 6% 32%
c. Respect Moldovan traditions 7% 9% 11% 27%
d. Feel Moldovan 8% 13% 8% 29%
e. Perceive Moldovan culture as your own culture 4% 10% 6% 20%
f. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture 1% 4% 5% 11%
g. Honor the Moldovan national flag 1% 5% 5% 11%
h. Live in Moldova 7% 7% 12% 26%
i. Be a native speaker of Moldovan/Romanian language 4% 8% 12% 25%
j. Have Moldovan citizenship 4% 8% 6% 18%
k. Be born in Moldova 2% 1% 3% 6%
l. Don’t know/No answer 14% 16% 18% 48%
Q15. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered Russian? 
Show list Q15! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Russian parents 31% 9% 7% 47%
b. Speak Russian in the family 14% 13% 7% 33%
c. Respect Russian traditions 7% 9% 11% 27%
d. Feel Russian 8% 9% 7% 24%
e. Perceive Russian culture as your own culture 4% 10% 10% 23%
f. Honor the Russian national flag 1% 4% 4% 9%
g. Live in Russia 6% 6% 7% 19%
h. Be a native speaker of Russian language 5% 14% 14% 33%
i. Have Russian citizenship 5% 6% 8% 18%
j. Be born in Russia 4% 4% 6% 14%
k. Don’t know/No answer 16% 17% 18% 51%
Q16. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered Ukrainian? 
Show list Q16! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Ukrainian parents 30% 10% 8% 49%
b. Speak Ukrainian in the family 13% 11% 6% 31%
c. Follow Ukrainian traditions 9% 8% 12% 29%
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d. Feel Ukrainian 7% 10% 7% 24%
e. Perceive Ukrainian culture as your own culture 4% 10% 7% 22%
f. Honor the Ukrainian national flag 1% 4% 5% 10%
g. Live in Ukraine 5% 7% 7% 18%
h. Be a native speaker of Ukrainian language 5% 13% 16% 34%
i. Have Ukrainian citizenship 4% 4% 7% 15%
j. Be born in Ukraine 4% 4% 5% 13%
k. Don’t know/No answer 17% 18% 20% 56%
Q17. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered Gagauz? 
Show list Q17! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Gagauz parents 40% 9% 7% 56%
b. Speak Gagauz language in the family 13% 16% 8% 38%
c. Follow Gagauz traditions 9% 9% 15% 33%
d. Feel Gagauz 9% 13% 9% 31%
e. Perceive Gagauz culture as your own culture 3% 11% 11% 25%
f. Honor the Gagauz national flag 2% 7% 5% 14%
g. Live in TAU Gagauzia 7% 11% 14% 32%
h. Be a native speaker of the Gagauz language 6% 11% 14% 31%
i. Be born in Gagauzia 3% 6% 6% 16%
j. Don’t know/No answer 7% 8% 10% 26%
Q18. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered Bulgarian? Show 
list Q18! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Bulgarian parents 33% 8% 8% 49%
b. Speak Bulgarian in the family 14% 12% 7% 32%
c. Follow Bulgarian traditions 9% 9% 14% 33%
d. Feel Bulgarian 8% 10% 6% 25%
e. Perceive Bulgarian culture as your own culture 3% 10% 8% 21%
f. Honor the Bulgarian national flag 1% 5% 5% 11%
g. Live in Bulgaria 4% 7% 6% 17%
h. Be a native speaker of Bulgarian language 5% 12% 14% 30%
i. Have Bulgarian citizenship 3% 4% 7% 14%
j. Be born in Bulgaria 3% 4% 5% 13%
k. Don’t know/No answer 17% 18% 20% 55%
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Q19. In your opinion, what are the most important 
things for a person to be considered Romanian? 
Show list Q19! Multiple choices! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Romanian parents 33% 8% 7% 48%
b. Speak Romanian in the family 11% 11% 6% 28%
c. Follow Romanian traditions 7% 8% 11% 26%
d. Feel Romanian 8% 9% 7% 25%
e. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture 2% 9% 6% 17%
f. Honor the Romanian national flag 1% 6% 5% 12%
g. Live in Romania 4% 7% 7% 17%
h. Be a native speaker of Romanian language 4% 12% 14% 29%
i. Have Romanian citizenship 4% 4% 6% 14%
j. Be born in Romania 3% 4% 6% 14%
k. Don’t know/No answer 22% 24% 26% 71%
Q20. How much do you trust… Very 
much
Much Little Don’t 
trust
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. People from Moldova 5% 61% 26% 4% 4%
b. Moldovans from Moldova 5% 60% 25% 6% 4%
c. Russians from Moldova 6% 70% 18% 4% 4%
d. Ukrainians from Moldova 4% 63% 24% 4% 5%
e. Gagauz from Moldova 11% 67% 16% 3% 4%
f. Bulgarians from Moldova 4% 63% 22% 4% 7%
g. Romanians from Moldova 3% 35% 21% 12% 29%
Q21. Please 
specify what 
your reaction 
would be if 
persons 
belonging to 
the following 
ethnic groups 
in Moldova:
a.
Moldovans
b.
Russians
c.
Ukrainians
d.
Gagauz
e.
Bulgarians
f.
Romanians
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a. lived 
in Moldova 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 99% 1% 94% 6%
b. lived 
in your area 99% 1% 100% 0% 99% 1% 100% 0% 98% 2% 92% 8%
c. were your 
neighbors 96% 4% 93% 7% 92% 8% 96% 4% 90% 10% 82% 18%
d. were your 
friends 89% 11% 91% 9% 87% 13% 96% 4% 85% 15% 74% 26%
e. were part 
of your family 74% 26% 73% 27% 70% 30% 100% 0% 72% 28% 60% 40%
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Q22. Are you a member of any 
organization?
Yes 8% -- SKIP TO Q23
No 92% -- SKIP TO Q24
Don’t Know/No answer 0% -- SKIP TO Q24
Q23. How often 
do you attend 
the meetings of 
an organization?
Daily 5% There are no formal meetings of the members 0%
Weekly 27% I do not take part at meetings of the members 0%
Monthly 54% Don’t know 5%
A few times a year 8% No answer 0%
Once a year 0%
Q24. Would you participate in a cultural event (e.g. festival) 
with people of other ethnic background?
(public event)
Yes 20%
No 78%
Don’t Know/No answer 2%
Q25-Q30. The following list includes several features. Please find three positive and three 
negative features describing best the Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians 
from Moldova.
OPERATOR: Show list 25! Multiple choices! 
Positive features: For each ethnic group circle in column a. the first choice and in column b. the rest of 
the choices! For each ethnic group one can have up to 3 choices from the list of positive features, the first 
choice in column a. and the rest of the choices in column b.! 
Positive features
Q25.
Moldovans
Q26.
Russians
Q27.
Ukrainians
Q28.
Gagauz
Q29.
Bulgarians
Q30.
Romanians
a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b.
1. Decent 13% 11% 9% 13% 8% 7% 14% 13% 5% 7% 3% 4%
2. Kind-hearted 14% 15% 12% 13% 10% 9% 12% 12% 7% 10% 4% 3%
3. Hearty 8% 15% 9% 8% 8% 10% 8% 13% 7% 7% 3% 3%
4.Independent 6% 7% 6% 6% 4% 8% 3% 6% 4% 6% 4% 3%
5. Civilized 3% 8% 5% 10% 3% 8% 3% 6% 3% 6% 4% 10%
6. Educated 5% 12% 5% 10% 4% 10% 5% 13% 4% 8% 3% 3%
7. Resourceful 3% 6% 4% 7% 4% 6% 3% 7% 3% 7% 2% 6%
8. Joyful 7% 12% 11% 16% 6% 14% 5% 12% 3% 11% 2% 5%
9. Clean 3% 7% 1% 4% 3% 4% 3% 6% 3% 4% 2% 3%
10. Religious 3% 11% 4% 6% 6% 9% 4% 9% 6% 6% 3% 4%
11. United 2% 4% 1% 8% 5% 4% 2% 6% 5% 6% 4% 3%
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12. Honest 1% 4% 2% 8% 2% 5% 4% 8% 4% 7% 3% 3%
13. Modest 2% 4% 1% 7% 2% 5% 3% 6% 2% 6% 2% 4%
14. Hard-working 6% 14% 2% 7% 2% 11% 13% 19% 8% 12% 2% 6%
15. Intelligent 0% 2% 2% 7% 0% 6% 1% 6% 1% 8% 1% 6%
16. Hospitable 1% 4% 0% 2% 1% 5% 1% 6% 1% 4% 0% 3%
17. None 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 0%
18. Don’t know/
No answer 23% 3% 25% 3% 31% 3% 18% 4% 34% 3% 58% 1%
OPERATOR: Show list 25! Multiple choices! 
Negative features: For each ethnic group circle in column a. the first choice and in column b. the rest of 
the choices! For each ethnic group one can have up to 3 choices from the list of positive features, the first 
choice in column a. and the rest of the choices in column b.! 
Negative features
Q25. 
Moldovans
Q26. 
Russians
Q27. 
Ukrainians
Q28. 
Gagauz
Q29. 
Bulgarians
Q30. 
Romanians
a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b.
19. Selfish 6% 3% 8% 4% 4% 4% 7% 3% 7% 5% 3% 2%
20. Aggressive 3% 3% 2% 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 4% 4% 4% 3%
21. Indifferent/cold 3% 5% 4% 8% 3% 4% 2% 7% 4% 7% 2% 4%
22. Obedient 3% 7% 3% 6% 3% 6% 2% 4% 3% 6% 1% 6%
23. Backward 5% 7% 2% 5% 3% 6% 1% 4% 2% 6% 2% 4%
24. Uneducated 5% 6% 3% 8% 3% 3% 3% 5% 3% 4% 2% 5%
25. Negligent 4% 6% 3% 4% 4% 6% 4% 4% 3% 5% 3% 3%
26. Sad 4% 6% 4% 4% 3% 6% 2% 2% 4% 5% 3% 1%
27. Dirty 4% 4% 5% 5% 2% 5% 2% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3%
28. Superstitious 3% 8% 3% 5% 3% 6% 3% 2% 1% 5% 1% 3%
29. Divided 2% 7% 3% 6% 4% 4% 3% 5% 3% 4% 2% 4%
30. Thieves 1% 8% 1% 7% 3% 4% 2% 4% 2% 5% 1% 3%
31. Vainglorious 1% 4% 1% 7% 2% 6% 2% 3% 1% 5% 1% 4%
32. Lazy 1% 4% 5% 5% 0% 5% 1% 3% 1% 3% 1% 5%
33. Stupid 2% 4% 0% 1% 0% 5% 0% 2% 1% 3% 0% 4%
34. Hostile 2% 3% 0% 2% 0% 1% 1% 3% 1% 1% 1% 2%
35. None 7% 0% 7% 1% 6% 0% 11% 1% 7% 0% 5% 0%
36. Don’t know/
No answer 44% 3% 48% 2% 52% 1% 51% 4% 51% 3% 65% 1%
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Q31. Which of the following groups are, generally speaking, the richest /the most polit ically 
influential/ the most respected? Rank the first group and the second group!
The richest The most politically influential The most respected
First 
choice 
Second 
choice
 First 
choice
Second 
choice
First 
choice
 Second 
choice
Moldovans 26% 10% 28% 7% 19% 12%
Russians 15% 15% 15% 20% 13% 12%
Ukrainians 1% 4% 2% 3% 1% 1%
Gagauz 3% 11% 3% 8% 10% 8%
Bulgarians 2% 4% 1% 2% 1% 4%
Romanians 0% 1% 0% 3% 1% 3%
Other________ 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Don’t Know/No answer 51% 54% 51% 57% 54% 60%
Q32. Do you agree with the following statements? 
Moldova should…
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a. should support Moldovan students studying in 
other countries 56% 30% 8% 1% 5%
b. guarantee education in Russian for Russian 
children and teenagers 41% 39% 11% 3% 5%
c. guarantee education in Ukrainian for Ukrainian 
children and teenagers 39% 43% 9% 3% 7%
d. guarantee education in Gagauz for Gagauz 
children and teenagers 40% 37% 14% 3% 6%
e. guarantee education in Bulgarian for Bulgarian 
children and teenagers 39% 42% 9% 2% 8%
f. support Moldovan businesses abroad 35% 29% 18% 3% 15%
g. should support Moldovan cultural organizations 
abroad 34% 38% 11% 2% 15%
h. support the cultural organizations from different 
ethnic groups in Moldova 37% 37% 14% 1% 11%
i. help develop the identity of the Russian ethnic 
group 38% 43% 7% 2% 10%
j. help develop the identity of the Ukrainian ethnic 
group 38% 36% 14% 2% 10%
k. help develop the identity of the Gagauz ethnic 
group 41% 41% 7% 2% 10%
l. help develop the identity of the Bulgarian ethnic 
group 38% 37% 11% 2% 11%
m. organize cultural events attended by people from 
different ethnic backgrounds in Moldova. 35% 43% 10% 1% 11%
n. grant larger autonomy to the districts where an 
ethnic group represents a majority 29% 30% 20% 4% 17%
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Q33. Do you agree with the following statements? 
Russia should…
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a. support high school and university students of 
Russian background studying in Moldova 65% 28% 2% 0% 5%
b. support Russian businesses operating in Moldova 58% 31% 4% 0% 7%
c. support Russian cultural organizations from Moldova 58% 29% 5% 0% 7%
d. help develop Russians’ identity in Moldova 54% 28% 7% 3% 8%
Q34. Do you agree with the following statements? 
Ukraine should…
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a. support high school and university students of 
Ukrainian background studying in Moldova 61% 30% 2% 0% 6%
b. support Ukrainian businesses operating in Moldova 58% 30% 4% 0% 7%
c. support Ukrainian cultural organizations from Moldova 57% 28% 5% 1% 8%
d. help develop Ukrainians’ identity in Moldova 54% 26% 6% 6% 8%
Q35. Do you agree with the following statements? 
Turkey should…
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a. support high school and university students of 
Gagauz background studying in Moldova 65% 26% 2% 1% 5%
b. support Gagauz businesses operating in Moldova 60% 28% 4% 1% 7%
c. support Gagauz cultural organizations from Moldova 59% 27% 5% 1% 8%
d. help develop the identity of the Gagauz from Moldova 57% 25% 6% 4% 8%
Q36. Do you agree with the following statements? 
Bulgaria should…
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a. support high school and university students of 
Bulgarian background studying in Moldova 62% 30% 2% 1% 6%
b. support Bulgarian businesses operating in Moldova 57% 31% 3% 1% 8%
c. support Bulgarian cultural organizations from Moldova 56% 29% 6% 1% 8%
d. help develop Bulgarians’ identity in Moldova 54% 26% 6% 5% 9%
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Q37. Do you agree with the following statements? 
Romania should…
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a. support high school and university students of 
Romanian background studying in Moldova 57% 29% 2% 2% 9%
b. support Romanian businesses operating in Moldova 53% 31% 3% 2% 11%
c. support Romanian cultural organizations from Moldova 52% 28% 5% 3% 12%
d. help develop Romanians’ identity in Moldova 51% 25% 5% 7% 12%
Q38. What is your opinion about the Law 
on the rights of minorities in Moldova?
too many 
rights
enough 
rights
not enough 
rights
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. Russians have… 9% 71% 7% 14%
b. Ukrainians have… 3% 71% 9% 16%
c. Gagauz have… 6% 66% 15% 14%
d. Bulgarians have… 3% 71% 9% 16%
e. Romanians have… 6% 63% 3% 28%
Q39. Do you think ethnic back-
ground affects the employ-
ment in your area? What do 
you think the situation is?
too many 
opportunities
enough 
opportunities
not enough 
opportunities
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. Moldovans have… 11% 75% 4% 10%
b. Russians have… 5% 79% 5% 11%
c. Ukrainians have… 4% 78% 7% 11%
d. Gagauz have… 6% 76% 7% 10%
e. Bulgarians have… 4% 77% 7% 11%
f. Romanians have… 4% 65% 8% 23%
Q40. Do you think nationality 
matters to have a successful 
business in your area? What do 
you think the situation is?
too many 
opportunities
enough 
opportunities
not enough 
opportunities
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. Moldovans have… 6% 78% 4% 13%
b. Russians have… 4% 77% 6% 13%
c. Ukrainians have… 3% 76% 7% 14%
d. Gagauz have… 4% 76% 8% 13%
e. Bulgarians have… 3% 76% 8% 14%
f. Romanians have… 3% 65% 10% 22%
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Q41. Do you agree with the following statements?
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a. Moldovan children should learn the languages of national 
minorities (Russians, Ukrainians, etc.) 44% 29% 11% 6% 8%
b. Children of other nationalities from Moldova should 
learn Romanian/Moldovan in schools 50% 26% 16% 4% 4%
c. Children of other nationalities should study together with 
the Gagauz children 52% 31% 11% 2% 4%
d. There should be mixed marriages 58% 18% 15% 3% 6%
e. There should be organizations and associations promo-
ting collaboration between ethnic groups from Moldova 48% 32% 8% 3% 9%
f. People should participate in different cultural events 
(festivals) attended by people from different ethnic 
backgrounds in Moldova
47% 26% 15% 4% 7%
g. One should organize different cultural events (festivals) 
with the participation of people from different ethnic 
backgrounds in Moldova
47% 32% 11% 3% 7%
h. One should broadcast radio and television programs 
about the lives of people from different ethnic backgrounds 
in Moldova
50% 26% 12% 5% 7%
i. People should know the customs and traditions of 
different ethnic groups from Moldova 47% 33% 10% 3% 6%
j. One should broadcast programs on the National 
Television in the languages of minorities (Russian, 
Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian)
53% 25% 12% 4% 6%
Q42. Please list three personalities contributing 
to the improvement of interethnic relations in 
Moldova
Q43. Please list three organizations/institutions 
contributing to the improvement of interethnic 
relations in Moldova
a. Vladimir Voronin 15% a. Mayor’s Office 1%
b. Vasile Tarlev 5% b. Schools 1%
c. Tabunşcic 5% c. Parliament 1%
Q44. Please list three personalities contributing 
to the worsening of interethnic relations in 
Moldova
Q45. Please list three organizations/institutions 
contributing to the worsening of interethnic 
relations in Moldova
a. Iurie Roşca 6% a. Christian Democratic Party 1%
b. Serafim Urecheanu 1% b.
c. Dumitru Braghiş 1% c.
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Q46. How do the following political 
parties influence interethnic 
relations?
Rather 
improves
Neither 
improves 
nor worsens
Rather 
worsens
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. The Communist Party of Moldova 29% 19% 10% 41%
b. Christian Democratic Party 5% 22% 19% 54%
c. Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc 6% 22% 11% 61%
d. Agrarian Party 5% 20% 11% 64%
e. Social Democratic Party of Moldova 4% 19% 12% 66%
f. Socialist Party of Moldova 4% 19% 11% 66%
Q47. I will read you a list of problems 
facing our country. Please tell me if you 
consider each of these problems crucial, severe 
or not too serious.
Crucial Severe Not too serious
Don’t 
know
No 
answer
1. Unemployment 52% 42% 1% 2% 3%
2. Terrorism/violence/guerilla wars 19% 56% 14% 8% 2%
3. Low salaries 53% 41% 1% 3% 2%
4. Violation of human rights 26% 57% 6% 9% 2%
5. Housing issue 16% 60% 16% 5% 2%
6. Health condition 37% 52% 4% 4% 3%
7. Environmental issues 28% 56% 7% 7% 2%
8. Corruption 32% 55% 2% 10% 1%
9. Crime level/insecurity 33% 51% 5% 9% 1%
10. Drug trafficking 17% 58% 12% 11% 2%
11. Armed conflicts 15% 44% 26% 13% 2%
12. Ethnic conflicts/tensions 15% 48% 21% 14% 2%
13. Lack of rule of law 21% 54% 10% 13% 2%
14. Lack of press freedom 15% 53% 15% 15% 2%
15. Drug abuse 16% 64% 5% 13% 2%
16. Trafficking in women 26% 60% 1% 11% 2%
17. Relations with the Transnistrian region 28% 52% 6% 12% 2%
Q48. Do you agree or disagree that…?
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a. The differences in salaries should be reduced to the benefit of the poor. 42% 43% 16%
b. The wellbeing of each individual should depend only on his/her 
working ability and the quality his/her work 55% 35% 10%
c. The state should control the prices of the basic goods. 74% 17% 9%
d. The state should guarantee jobs for all its citizens. 77% 17% 6%
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e. Harsher punishments should be introduced in order to reduce 
criminality. 78% 13% 10%
f. The first thing that a child should learn is to respect the adults. 78% 15% 7%
g. Teachers should pay more attention to the gifted children, not the 
average ones. 34% 56% 10%
h. The wellbeing of every individual depends mostly on the state. 63% 26% 11%
i. You can trust nobody except yourself. 58% 32% 10%
j. You must fight for your interests by your own. 76% 15% 9%
k. A strong leader is needed in order to improve the situation from our 
country. 75% 15% 10%
Q49. Do you agree with the following statement? During 
the current government…
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1. …the social measures were oriented towards ordinary 
people 11% 35% 26% 10% 18%
2. …the state services rendered to citizens have improved 7% 29% 37% 8% 19%
3. …corruption expanded at all levels 15% 42% 14% 3% 26%
4. …the freedom of expression of the media was limited 5% 31% 23% 6% 35%
5. …the democratic rights of citizens were limited 6% 36% 21% 6% 31%
6. The Transnistrian conflict was not solved because of the 
weakness of Moldovan politicians 12% 36% 21% 3% 29%
7. …Moldova’s position was respected abroad 6% 20% 23% 9% 41%
8. …the number of poor people from Moldova decreased 4% 17% 33% 22% 24%
9. …the national currency was stabilized 5% 29% 19% 8% 39%
10. …the national economy was stabilized 5% 23% 24% 8% 40%
11. … salaries and pensions were paid without delays 18% 45% 18% 4% 15%
12. …the farmers were supported 5% 26% 37% 8% 23%
13. …market economy was consolidated. 4% 23% 21% 4% 49%
14. …obstacles to foreign investors were created. 4% 17% 21% 7% 50%
15. …small investors were encouraged. 4% 23% 15% 3% 55%
16. …there was illegal interference with the economy. 5% 18% 16% 4% 58%
17. …an economic growth was achieved. 4% 28% 15% 4% 50%
18. …market economy failed 4% 18% 18% 7% 54%
19. …measures to stop massive migration were not taken. 7% 36% 17% 4% 35%
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Q50. If the parliamentary elections were to take place next 
Sunday, would you vote?
I would definitely vote 70%
I would probably vote 14%
I would probably not go 2%
I would definitely not go 8%
I don’t know (don’t read) 6%
I don’t answer (don’t read) 1%
Q51. If parliamentary elections were to take place next Sunday, what party (alliance) would 
you vote for? Read this question (Q51) to all respondents regardless of their answer to Q51! 
Operator! Show list Q51 to the respondent!
Communist Party of Moldova 37%
Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc (Our Moldova Alliance, Democratic Party and Social 
Liberal Party) 5%
Christian Democratic Party 2%
Agrarian Party 1%
Social Democratic Party of Moldova 0%
Socialist Party 1%
Other, please specify ___________________ 0%
Independent candidate, please specify _________ 0%
I would not vote 3%
Don’t know 42%
No answer 8%
* If the respondent mentions a party included in parentheses (Moldova Noastra Aliance, Democ ra-
tic Party or Social Democratic Party), the answer should be included next to „Democratic Moldova 
Electoral Bloc“
Q52. In your opinion, what 
should be the direction forour 
country?
Be independent of any alliance/union 8%
We should integrate with the European Union 18%
We should remain within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) 48%
Don’t know 19%
No answer 7%
Q53. How much do you fear the 
disintegration of Moldova?
Very much 5% Not at all 24%
Quite much 22% Don’t know 20%
Quite a little 18% No answer 11%
Q54. What do you think will 
happen in five years…
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible
To a very 
small extent
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. Moldova will become a strong 
country 2% 20% 35% 18% 24%
b. Moldova’s position will be 
taken in consideration abroad 2% 18% 32% 16% 32%
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c. the status of Transnistria will 
be decided 2% 17% 34% 18% 31%
d. income of the population will 
grow 1% 16% 31% 24% 28%
e. market economy will 
consolidate 1% 18% 29% 18% 34%
f. democracy will consolidate 1% 15% 32% 17% 35%
g. young people living in 
Moldova will have greater 
opportunities in the country
2% 16% 31% 22% 30%
Q55. Do you think that an armed 
conflict with the neighboring 
countries is possible? 
Yes 10% -- SKIP TO Q56
No 74% -- SKIP TO Q57
Don’t Know/No answer 16% -- SKIP TO Q57
Q56. If yes, with what 
country is Moldova likely to 
enter an armed conflict?
Romania 10% Transnistrian region 60%
Russia 6% Other, please specify _________ 0%
Ukraine 13% Don’t Know/No answer 10%
Bulgaria 0%
Q57. In your opinion, what were the reasons for the outbreak of the Transnistrian Conflict?
a. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
b. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
c. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
Q58. What do you think are the solutions for overcoming the current political situation 
related to Transnistria?
a. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
b. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
c. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
Q59. To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements:
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a. It is better not to deal with Moldovans in everyday life. 3% 18% 32% 43% 4%
b. I generally avoid talking to Moldovans from Moldova 1% 9% 37% 49% 4%
c. It is better not to deal with Ukrainians in everyday life. 2% 12% 35% 45% 6%
d. I generally avoid talking to Ukrainians from Moldova 1% 6% 36% 50% 6%
e. It is better not to deal with the Russians in everyday life. 1% 9% 39% 46% 6%
f. I generally avoid talking to Russians from Moldova 0% 6% 39% 48% 6%
g. It is better not to deal with Bulgarians in everyday life. 2% 11% 35% 44% 7%
h. I generally avoid talking to Bulgarians from Moldova 2% 7% 36% 48% 7%
i. It is better not to deal with Romanians in everyday life. 3% 13% 28% 36% 20%
j. I generally avoid talking to Romanians from Moldova 2% 10% 30% 38% 20%
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Q60. What is your native language?
Do not read the options for answers! 
Multiple choices!
a. Moldovan 0% e. Gagauz 97%
b. Romanian 0% f. Bulgarian 1%
c. Russian 14% g. Other 0%
d. Ukrainian 0% h. Don’t know/No answer 0%
Q61. What language do you usually 
speak at home?
Do not read the options for answers! 
Multiple choices!
a. Moldovan 1% e. Gagauz 83%
b. Romanian 1% f. Bulgarian 0%
c. Russian 44% g. Other 0%
d. Ukrainian  0% h. Don’t know/No answer 0%
Q62. What is the language you use/used more frequently with your…
Moldovan
a.
mother
b.
father
c.
grandparents
d.
children
0% 0% 1% 0%
Romanian 0% 0% 0% 0%
Russian 11% 10% 7% 34%
Ukrainian 0% 0% 0% 0%
Gagauz 79% 78% 77% 61%
Bulgarian 1% 1% 1% 0%
Other 0% 0% 0% 0%
It’s not the case 9% 11% 14% 4%
Don’t know/No answer 0% 0% 0% 0%
Q63. How well do you speak …?
a.
 M
ol
do
va
n
b.
 R
om
an
ia
n
c.
 R
us
si
an
d.
 U
kr
ai
ni
an
e.
 G
ag
au
z
f. 
Bu
lg
ar
ia
n
I speak it perfectly 1% 1% 60% 1% 97% 1%
Fluently but with an accent 2% 2% 29% 2% 0% 1%
I can make myself understood in most situations 18% 11% 8% 8% 1% 5%
In some situations I make myself understood, but 
with difficulty 17% 15% 1% 12% 0% 8%
I only know a few words 28% 19% 1% 19% 1% 19%
I do not know any word 33% 50% 1% 57% 1% 64%
No answer 0% 2% 0% 1% 0% 1%
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Q64. Do you agree with the following 
statements:
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a. I am disturbed when people around me 
speak Romanian/Moldovan 2% 8% 14% 24% 50% 2%
b. I am disturbed when people around me 
speak Ukrainian 1% 3% 16% 25% 52% 2%
c. I am disturbed when people around me 
speak Russian 1% 7% 9% 25% 54% 3%
d. I am disturbed when people around me 
speak Bulgarian 2% 3% 15% 23% 53% 3%
e. There are many Moldovans who avoid 
speaking Gagauz although they know it 4% 18% 19% 19% 18% 23%
f. There are many Ukrainians who avoid 
speaking Gagauz although they know it 3% 15% 19% 19% 17% 26%
g. There are many Russians who avoid 
speaking Gagauz although they know it 1% 15% 18% 18% 15% 32%
h. There are many Bulgarians who avoid 
speaking Gagauz although they know it 3% 15% 18% 19% 16% 29%
i. All the residents from Moldova should know 
Moldovan/Romanian 27% 29% 14% 14% 9% 7%
j. All the residents from Moldova should know 
Russian 33% 30% 11% 11% 9% 6%
k. In regions where Ukrainians are predomi-
nant, everybody should know Ukrainian 3% 26% 32% 18% 9% 12%
l. All the residents from Gagauzia should 
know Gagauz 6% 27% 29% 18% 9% 11%
m. In regions where Bulgarians are predomi-
nant, everybody should know Bulgarian 3% 27% 31% 17% 10% 13%
Q65. How many official languages should be in Moldova? Q66. Which ones?
One state language 16% -- SKIP TO Q66 a. Moldovan 92%
Two state languages 50% -- SKIP TO Q66 b. Romanian 1%
More than two state languages 21% -- SKIP TO Q66 c. Russian 83%
Don’t know/No answer 12% -- SKIP TO Q67 d. Ukrainian 3%
e. Gagauz 27%
f. Bulgarian 3%
g. Other 3%
h. Don’t know/No answer 0% 
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Q67. In the next 12 months, do you plan to visit a foreign country?
a. as a tourist
Yes 6% • aa. What country will you go to? ______ __ __
No 94% ______ __ __
b. for temporary 
work
Yes 13% • bb. What country will you go to? ______ __ __
No 87% ______ __ __
c. for studies
Yes 1% • cc. What country will you go to? ______ __ __
No 99% ______ __ __
d. to settle 
permanently
Yes 1% • dd. What country will you go to? ______ __ __
No 99% ______ __ __
SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC DATA
D1. Gender Male 50%
Female 50%
D2. What is your age? ___ Don’t know 8 No answer 9
D3. Are you presently employed?
Yes 32% -- SKIP TO D5!
No 68% → Continue with D4!
No answer 0% → Continue with D4!
D4. If you don’t 
have a job, what 
is your 
occupation?
High school student, 
university student 4%
Temporary unemployed. Looking for 
a job 24%
Retired (age or sickness) 48% Unemployed. Does not look for a job 7%
Housewife, maternal leave 13% Other (specify) 1%
Don’t know 0%
No answer 2%
D5. What is your occupation/position at this job? Note as many details for the answer! |__|__|
Don’t know = 98 Refuse to answer = 99
D6. What is 
your education 
background
No education 8% Post high school education (college) 4%
Incomplete secondary education 25% Incomplete higher education 3%
Secondary school 33% Completed higher education 6%
Vocational school 20% Master’s degree, PhD 0%
High school 1% Don’t know 0%
No answer 1%
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D7. What is your civil status?
Married 74% Unmarried, living together 1%
Divorced 2% Never married 8%
Widow(er) 15% Don’t know 0%
0% No answer 0%
D8. How large is your family (including yourself)? |__|__| people
Don’t know 8
No answer 9
D9. This list contains several groups of monthly income. What is the income of your 
household? Please consider all salaries, pensions, child allowances and any other income you 
might have. Please tell me the number on the right side of the group corresponding to the net 
income of your family for the last month. Show list D9!
Under 200 Lei 5% 801 - 900 lei 3% 1501 - 1750 lei 1%
201 - 300 lei 12% 901-1000 lei 4% 1751 - 2500 lei 0%
301 - 400 lei 13% 1001-1100 lei 3% 2501 - 3500 lei 0%
401 - 500 lei 9% 1101-1200 lei 3% 3501 - 5000 lei 0%
501-600 lei 10% 1201 - 1300 lei 2% 5001 - 7000 lei 0%
601-700 lei 6% 1301-1400 lei 1% Over 7001 lei 0%
701 - 800 lei 7% 1401-1500 lei 0% Don’t know 4%
No answer 15%
D10. How do you evaluate 
the current income of your 
family
Money is not enough even for food 46%
The money is enough for food but not enough to buy clothes 37%
We have money for food and we can save a little, but it is not 
enough to buy more expensive things (TV or a fridge) 15%
We can afford to buy some more expensive things (TV, fridge) 1%
We can afford to buy anything we want 1%
Don’t know 0%
No answer 1%
D11. Are you a holder of one or more citizenships?
I have only the Moldovan citizenship 99%
I hold only the citizenship of another country (besides Moldova). Please specify __________ |__|__|
I hold the Moldovan citizenship and citizenships of other coun-
tries. Please specify a. ___________________ |__|__|
b. ___________________ |__|__|
No answer -
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ETHNO QUESTIONNAIRE: BULGARIANS
Q1. People believe that there are several 
ethnic groups living in Moldova 
(Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, 
Gagauz, Bulgarians, etc.). What do you 
consider yourself?
Wait for the answer! 
Do not read the options for answers!
Moldovan - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Russian - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Ukrainian - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Gagauz - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Bulgarian 100% -> CONTINUE!
Romanian - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Other: ____ - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Don’t know - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
No answer - -> STOP THE INTERVIEW!
Q2. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Bulgarians and Moldovans from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 3% 26% 46% 12% 6% 6%
b. 5 years ago 3% 27% 53% 10% 2% 5%
c. last year 4% 24% 58% 7% 2% 4%
Q3. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Bulgarians and Ukrainians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 3% 22% 49% 6% 1% 18%
b. 5 years ago 4% 22% 53% 3% 1% 17%
c. last year 5% 18% 55% 4% 1% 17%
Q4. In your opinion, is the current relationship between the Bulgarians and the Gagauz from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 3% 24% 52% 8% 1% 11%
b. 5 years ago 4% 23% 55% 7% 1% 11%
c. last year 4% 23% 56% 6% 0% 10%
Q5. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Bulgarians and Russians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Ceva mai 
bune The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 4% 24% 57% 6% 0% 9%
b. 5 years ago 4% 26% 56% 4% 0% 8%
c. last year 5% 23% 60% 4% 0% 8%
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Q6. In your opinion, is the current relationship between Bulgarians and Romanians from 
Moldova better or worse than …?
Much 
better
Somewhat 
better The same
Somewhat 
worse
Much 
worse
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. 15 years ago 3% 18% 31% 9% 3% 36%
b. 5 years ago 3% 17% 33% 8% 3% 36%
c. last year 1% 19% 35% 7% 1% 36%
Q7. Which of the following statements describe better the 
relationship between different ethnic groups from 
Moldova?
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a. The relationship between Bulgarians and Moldovans 83% 6% 7% 1% 4%
b. The relationship between Bulgarians and Ukrainians 88% 1% 2% 2% 7%
c. The relationship between Bulgarians and the Gagauz 85% 4% 3% 3% 5%
d. The relationship between Bulgarians and Russians 91% 2% 2% 2% 4%
e. The relationship between Bulgarians and Romanians 61% 4% 7% 5% 23%
Q8. How can you describe the 
interethnic relationships in your area?
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a. The relationship between Bulgarians 
and Moldovans 86% 4% 4% 3% 0% 3%
b. The relationship between Bulgarians 
and Ukrainians 79% 2% 2% 13% 0% 4%
c. The relationship between Bulgarians 
and the Gagauz 81% 4% 4% 7% 0% 3%
d. The relationship between Bulgarians 
and Russians 87% 1% 2% 6% 0% 3%
e. The relationship between Bulgarians 
and Romanians 49% 3% 6% 30% 1% 11%
Q9. Thinking of the following ethnic groups from Moldova, do you think that it is possible 
that they could become a threat?
Q9_l. Moldovans can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 0% 5% 28% 60% 7%
b. for Bulgarians 0% 5% 28% 60% 7%
c. for you and your family 1% 3% 26% 63% 6%
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Q9_2. Ukrainians can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 0% 3% 27% 63% 7%
b. for Bulgarians 0% 2% 23% 68% 7%
c. for you and your family 0% 1% 22% 70% 7%
Q9_3. The Gagauz can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 0% 4% 32% 56% 8%
b. for Bulgarians 0% 3% 26% 63% 8%
c. for you and your family 0% 3% 23% 66% 8%
Q9_4. Russians can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 0% 1% 30% 62% 6%
b. for Bulgarians 0% 1% 23% 69% 6%
c. for you and your family 0% 1% 22% 71% 6%
Q9_5. Romanians can 
become a threat
Highly 
possible
Very 
possible
Little 
possible Impossible
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. for the country 0% 7% 29% 47% 17%
b. for Bulgarians 1% 6% 28% 48% 17%
c. for you and your family 0% 4% 25% 54% 16%
Q10. Do you agree with the following statements: 
The fact that I was born in Moldova… 
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a. makes me proud 37% 26% 22% 5% 10%
b. makes my life easier 12% 28% 33% 14% 14%
c. makes me feel ashamed 2% 16% 24% 45% 13%
d. makes my life harder 3% 17% 28% 38% 13%
Q11. To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements:
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a. People should support their country even if 
things are not quite easy 60% 26% 10% 2% 1%
b. The world would be better if all the people were 
like Moldovans from Moldova. 12% 25% 36% 12% 15%
c. The world would be better if all the people were 
like Russians from Moldova. 15% 31% 29% 8% 17%
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d. The world would be better if all the people were 
like Ukrainians from Moldova. 12% 22% 40% 7% 19%
e. The world would be better if all the people were 
like the Gagauz from Moldova. 11% 29% 28% 13% 19%
f. The world would be better if all the people were 
like Bulgarians from Moldova. 17% 31% 31% 6% 16%
g. The world would be better if all the people were 
like Romanians from Moldova. 9% 23% 27% 13% 28%
h. There are many things I should be ashamed of 
because I am citizen of Moldova 9% 20% 30% 34% 7%
i. I prefer to be a citizen of Moldova than a citizen of 
any other country 26% 25% 30% 12% 6%
Q12. To what extent do you agree 
with the following statements: 
The fact that I am Russian…
Totally 
Agree
Somewhat 
agree Disagree
Totally 
disagree
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. makes me proud 49% 35% 12% 2% 2%
b. makes my life easier 13% 29% 46% 6% 6%
c. makes me feel ashamed 1% 14% 20% 61% 4%
d. makes my life harder 2% 13% 31% 49% 5%
Q13. Which of the following statements describe best your 
identity? 
I mainly consider myself … Show list Q13! Multiple s
1. First 
choice
2. Second 
Choice Total
Bulgarian 62% 16% 79%
Resident of this locality 14% 20% 34%
Citizen of Moldova 18% 37% 55%
CIS Resident 3% 11% 15%
European 1% 10% 10%
Eastern European 0% 0% 0%
Don’t Know/No answer 1%  5% 6%
Q14. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a 
person to be considered Moldovan? Show list Q14! 
Multiple s Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Moldovan parents 43% 8% 3% 55%
b. Speak Moldovan/Romanian language in the family 12% 18% 5% 35%
c. Follow Moldovan traditions 9% 11% 14% 34%
d. Feel Moldovan 12% 13% 12% 36%
e. Perceive Moldovan culture as your own culture 3% 11% 13% 27%
f. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture 2% 5% 5% 11%
g. Honor the Moldovan national flag 0% 6% 6% 12%
h. Live in Moldova 6% 8% 10% 24%
i. Be a native speaker of Moldovan/Romanian language 2% 9% 14% 25%
j. Have Moldovan citizenship 3% 4% 7% 13%
k. Be born in Moldova 4% 2% 3% 9%
l. Don’t know/No answer 5% 6% 8% 19%
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Q15. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a 
person to be considered Russian? Show list Q15! Multiple choices! 
Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Russian parents 39% 6% 6% 51%
b. Speak Russian in the family 15% 17% 5% 37%
c. Follow Russian traditions 9% 13% 12% 34%
d. Feel Russian 12% 14% 10% 36%
e. Perceive Russian culture as your own culture 3% 13% 14% 30%
f. Honor the Russian national flag 2% 5% 5% 12%
g. Live in Russia 4% 8% 9% 21%
h. Be a native speaker of Russian language 5% 10% 17% 32%
i. Have Russian citizenship 3% 6% 10% 19%
j. Be born in Russia 4% 2% 5% 10%
k. Don’t know/No answer 5% 6% 8% 19%
Q16. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a 
person to be considered Ukrainian? Show list Q16! Multiple 
choices! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Ukrainian parents 41% 7% 5% 53%
b. Speak Ukrainian in the family 16% 18% 5% 39%
c. follow Ukrainian traditions 10% 11% 11% 32%
d. Feel Ukrainian 11% 16% 11% 38%
e. Perceive Ukrainian culture as your own culture 4% 12% 14% 30%
f. Honor the Ukrainian national flag 2% 5% 7% 13%
g. Live in Ukraine 2% 8% 8% 18%
h. Be a native speaker of Ukrainian language 3% 9% 18% 30%
i. Have Ukrainian citizenship 2% 5% 8% 15%
j. Be born in Ukraine 3% 2% 5% 10%
k. Don’t know/No answer 6% 7% 9% 21%
Q17. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a 
person to be considered Gagauz? Show list Q17! Multiple choic-
es! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Gagauz parents 40% 8% 7% 55%
b. Speak Gagauz language in the family 17% 19% 5% 41%
c. Follow Gagauz traditions 9% 13% 13% 35%
d. Feel Gagauz 12% 12% 13% 36%
e. Perceive Gagauz culture as your own culture 4% 12% 14% 29%
f. Honor the Gagauz national flag 2% 7% 9% 18%
g. Live in TAU Gagauzia 3% 9% 14% 27%
h. Be a native speaker of the Gagauz language 4% 10% 13% 27%
i. Be born in Gagauzia 4% 2% 3% 10%
j. Don’t know/No answer 6% 7% 10% 22%
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Q18. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a 
person to be considered Bulgarian? Show list Q18! Multiple 
choices! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Bulgarian parents 45% 7% 6% 59%
b. Speak Bulgarian in the family 18% 22% 7% 46%
c. Follow Bulgarian traditions 9% 10% 17% 36%
d. Feel Bulgarian 12% 13% 13% 38%
e. Perceive Bulgarian culture as your own culture 3% 13% 16% 31%
f. Honor the Bulgarian national flag 0% 7% 6% 13%
g. Live in Bulgaria 2% 5% 3% 10%
h. Be a native speaker of Bulgarian language 2% 13% 17% 32%
i. Have Bulgarian citizenship 2% 4% 6% 12%
j. Be born in Bulgaria 3% 1% 3% 6%
k. Don’t know/No answer 4% 5% 6% 15%
Q19. In your opinion, what are the most important things for a 
person to be considered Romanian? Show list Q19! Multiple 
choices! Maximum 3 choices
1. 2. 3. Total
a. Have Romanian parents 43% 7% 5% 55%
b. Speak Romanian in the family 18% 17% 6% 40%
c. Follow Romanian traditions 8% 13% 12% 32%
d. Feel Romanian 7% 14% 10% 30%
e. Perceive Romanian culture as your own culture 3% 12% 13% 29%
f. Honor the Romanian national flag 1% 6% 6% 14%
g. Live in Romania 2% 6% 7% 15%
h. Be a native speaker of Romanian language 3% 9% 16% 28%
i. Have Romanian citizenship 2% 5% 8% 15%
j. Be born in Romania 4% 1% 5% 10%
k. Don’t know/No answer 9% 10% 12% 32%
Q20. How much do you 
trust…
Very 
much Much Little
Don’t 
trust
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. People from Moldova 4% 64% 23% 4% 5%
b. Moldovans from Moldova 4% 66% 21% 5% 3%
c. Russians from Moldova 6% 71% 18% 3% 3%
d. Ukrainians from Moldova 4% 64% 21% 4% 7%
e. Gagauz from Moldova 3% 60% 25% 8% 4%
f. Bulgarians from Moldova 13% 68% 13% 3% 3%
g. Romanians from Moldova 3% 44% 22% 10% 21%
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Q21. Please 
specify what 
would be your 
reaction if per-
sons belonging 
to the following 
ethnic groups 
in Moldova:
a.
Moldovans
b.
Russians
c.
Ukrainians
d.
Gagauz
e.
Bulgarians
f.
Romanians
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a. lived in 
Moldova 99% 1% 98% 2% 97% 3% 98% 2% 100% 0% 91% 9%
b. lived in your 
area 98% 2% 98% 2% 97% 3% 94% 6% 100% 0% 87% 13%
c. were your 
neighbors 94% 6% 90% 10% 88% 12% 79% 21% 93% 7% 75% 25%
d. were your 
friends 89% 11% 89% 11% 86% 14% 77% 23% 96% 4% 72% 28%
e. were part of 
your family 78% 22% 77% 23% 74% 26% 64% 36% 100%  0% 60% 40%
Q22. Are you a member of any 
organization?
Yes 11% -- SKIP TO Q23
No 87% -- SKIP TO Q24
Don’t Know/No answer 1% -- SKIP TO Q24
Q23. How often 
do you attend 
the meetings 
of this 
organization?
Daily 4% There are no formal meetings of the members 0%
Weekly 21% I do not take part at meetings of the members 2%
Monthly 27% Don’t know 2%
A few times a year 38% No answer 2%
Once a year 4%
Q24. Would you participate in a cultural event (e.g. festival) 
with people of other ethnic background?
(public event)
Yes 34%
No 65%
Don’t Know/No answer 1%
Q25-Q30. The following list includes several features. Please find three positive and three 
negative features describing best the Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz and Bulgarians 
from Moldova.
OPERATOR: Show list 25! Multiple choices! 
Positive features: for each ethnic group circle the first choice in column a. and in column b. the rest of the choices! For 
each ethnic group one can have up to 3 choices from the list of positive features, the first choice in column a. and the 
rest of the choices in column b.! 
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Positive features
Q24. 
Moldovans
Q25.
Russians
Q26. 
Ukrainians
Q27.
Gagauz
Q28.
Bulgarians
Q29.
Romanians
a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b. a. b.
1. Decent 10% 7% 7% 7% 6% 6% 5% 6% 11% 10% 3% 3%
2. Kind-hearted 14% 13% 17% 11% 13% 8% 6% 5% 14% 11% 4% 3%
3. Hearty 9% 15% 9% 14% 9% 10% 5% 10% 4% 13% 3% 5%
4. Independent 4% 13% 5% 12% 4% 9% 5% 9% 2% 7% 6% 6%
5. Civilized 2% 9% 6% 10% 3% 6% 1% 9% 2% 4% 6% 10%
6. Educated 4% 9% 5% 11% 3% 9% 3% 6% 5% 12% 3% 6%
7. Resourceful 5% 6% 4% 12% 3% 8% 6% 11% 6% 8% 3% 5%
8. Joyful 13% 17% 12% 13% 9% 14% 4% 7% 5% 10% 6% 9%
9. Clean 3% 5% 5% 3% 5% 5% 4% 6% 4% 8% 6% 4%
10. Religious 6% 10% 4% 5% 6% 6% 6% 11% 3% 7% 6% 10%
11. United 3% 5% 5% 6% 7% 6% 10% 16% 6% 5% 4% 7%
12. Honest 3% 4% 3% 9% 4% 8% 3% 8% 3% 11% 2% 6%
13. Modest 2% 8% 1% 6% 1% 9% 2% 6% 3% 10% 4% 7%
14. Hard-working 10% 19% 2% 8% 3% 12% 16% 15% 18% 23% 1% 6%
15. Intelligent 1% 3% 3% 9% 2% 6% 1% 4% 3% 6% 1% 5%
16. Hospitable 2% 6% 2% 8% 2% 7% 2% 4% 1% 6% 0% 4%
17. None 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 3% 0%
18. Don’t Know/
No answer 10% 2% 11% 4% 20% 3% 17% 4% 10% 2% 39% 2%
OPERATOR: Show list 25! Multiple choices! 
Negative features: for each ethnic group circle the first choice in column a., and in column b. the rest of the choices! 
For each ethnic group one can have up to 3 choices from the list of positive features, the first choice in column a. and 
the rest of the choices in column b.! 
Q31. Which of the following groups are, generally speaking, the richest /the most polit ically 
influential/ the most respected? Rank the first group and the second group!
The richest  The most politically influential The most respected
First 
choice
 Second 
choice
First 
choice
 Second 
choice
First 
choice
 Second 
choice
Moldovans 35% 8% 50% 5% 34% 11%
Russians 12% 17% 9% 25% 15% 15%
Ukrainians 2% 4% 2% 3% 2% 5%
Gagauz 6% 12% 1% 13% 3% 5%
Bulgarians 5% 10% 1% 7% 6% 12%
Romanians 0% 2% 1% 4% 0% 5%
Other________ 2% 3% 1% 1% 0% 1%
Don’t Know/No answer 38% 45% 35% 42% 39% 46%
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Q32. To what extent do you agree with the following state-
ments? 
Moldova should…
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a. support Moldovan students studying in other countries 63% 23% 12% 0% 2%
b. guarantee education in Russian for Russian children and 
teenagers 52% 27% 12% 7% 2%
c. guarantee education in Ukrainian for Ukrainian children 
and teenagers 42% 34% 16% 5% 3%
d. guarantee education in Gagauz for Gagauz children and 
teenagers 41% 29% 23% 4% 3%
e. guarantee education in Bulgarian for Bulgarian children 
and teenagers 43% 34% 18% 3% 2%
f. support Moldovan businesses abroad 42% 29% 18% 3% 9%
b. support Moldovan cultural organizations abroad 44% 34% 13% 3% 6%
h. Support the cultural organizations of different ethnic 
groups in Moldova 44% 35% 13% 3% 5%
i. help develop the identity of the Russian ethnic group 42% 37% 13% 2% 6%
j. help develop the identity of the Ukrainian ethnic group 39% 38% 16% 2% 5%
k. help develop the identity of the Gagauz ethnic group 40% 36% 18% 1% 6%
l. help develop the identity of the Bulgarian ethnic group 42% 37% 14% 3% 4%
m. organize cultural events attended by people of different 
ethnic backgrounds from Moldova. 47% 36% 11% 1% 5%
n. grant larger autonomy to the districts where an ethnic 
group represents a majority 22% 25% 22% 18% 13%
Q33. To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements? 
Russia should…
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a. support high school and university students of Russian 
background studying in Moldova 68% 25% 3% 1% 2%
b. support Russian businesses operating in Moldova 65% 21% 8% 1% 4%
c. support Russian cultural organizations from Moldova 67% 25% 4% 1% 3%
d. help develop the identity of the Russians from Moldova 61% 21% 9% 4% 5%
Q34. To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements: 
Ukraine should…
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a. support high school and university students of Ukrainian 
background studying in Moldova 66% 27% 3% 1% 3%
b. support Ukrainian businesses operating in Moldova 64% 24% 6% 1% 5%
c. support Ukrainian cultural organizations from Moldova 65% 26% 4% 1% 4%
d. help develop the identity of the Ukrainians from Moldova 60% 23% 6% 6% 6%
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Q35. To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements: 
Turkey should…
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a. support high school and university students of Gagauz 
background studying in Moldova 66% 23% 5% 2% 3%
b. support Gagauz businesses operating in Moldova 61% 23% 7% 2% 6%
c. support Gagauz cultural organizations from Moldova 60% 26% 8% 1% 5%
d. help develop the identity of the Gagauz from Moldova 56% 21% 10% 7% 6%
Q36. To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements: 
Bulgaria should…
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a. support high school and university students of Bulgarian 
background studying in Moldova 69% 25% 2% 1% 2%
b. support Bulgarian businesses operating in Moldova 67% 25% 3% 1% 5%
c. support Bulgarian cultural organizations from Moldova 72% 21% 3% 0% 4%
d. help develop the identity of the Bulgarians from Moldova 65% 22% 5% 2% 6%
Q37. To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements: 
Romania should…
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a. support high school and university students of Romanian 
background studying in Moldova 62% 25% 5% 1% 6%
b. support Romanian businesses operating in Moldova 59% 24% 6% 2% 9%
c. support Romanian cultural organizations from Moldova 60% 22% 8% 2% 8%
d. help develop the identity of the Romanians from Moldova 56% 19% 9% 7% 10%
Q38. What is your opinion about the Law 
on the rights of minorities in Moldova?
too many 
rights
enough 
rights
not enough 
rights
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. Russians have… 9% 70% 14% 7%
b. Ukrainians have… 3% 70% 17% 10%
c. Gagauz have… 10% 69% 13% 8%
d. Bulgarians have… 2% 68% 22% 7%
e. Romanians have… 9% 64% 8% 19%
Q39. Do you think ethnic background 
affects the employment in your area? 
What do you think the situation is?
too many 
oppor-
tunities
enough 
oppor-
tunities
Not enough 
oppor-
tunities
Don’t 
Know/No 
answer
a. Moldovans have… 19% 75% 1% 5%
b. Russians have… 6% 78% 10% 6%
c. Ukrainians have… 3% 81% 10% 6%
d. Gagauz have… 4% 78% 11% 7%
e. Bulgarians have… 3% 77% 14% 6%
f. Romanians have… 11% 68% 6% 15%
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Q40. Do you think nationality matters to 
have a successful business in your area? 
What do you think the situation is?
too many 
oppor-
tunities
enough 
oppor-
tunities
Not enough 
oppor-
tunities
Don’t 
Know/No 
answer
a. Moldovans have… 13% 76% 2% 9%
b. Russians have… 6% 79% 6% 10%
c. Ukrainians have… 3% 81% 6% 10%
d. Gagauz have… 4% 78% 8% 10%
e. Bulgarians have… 4% 77% 10% 9%
f. Romanians have… 8% 71% 5% 16%
Q41. Do you agree with the following statements?
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a. Moldovan children should learn the languages of 
national minorities (Russians, Ukrainians, etc.) 31% 27% 23% 15% 4%
b. Children of other nationalities from Moldova 
should learn Romanian/Moldovan in schools 58% 21% 13% 6% 1%
c. Children of other nationalities should study 
together with Bulgarian children 58% 24% 15% 3% 1%
d. There should be mixed marriages 61% 21% 13% 4% 1%
e. There should be organizations and associations 
promoting collaboration between ethnic groups 
from Moldova
55% 26% 12% 3% 3%
f. People should participate in different cultural 
events (festivals) attended by people of different 
ethnic backgrounds from Moldova
57% 23% 15% 3% 2%
g. One should organize different cultural events 
(festivals) with the participation of people of 
different ethnic backgrounds from Moldova
59% 24% 12% 4% 1%
h. One should broadcast radio and television 
programs about the lives of people of different 
ethnic backgrounds from Moldova
60% 22% 13% 4% 2%
i. People should know the customs and traditions of 
different ethnic groups from Moldova 53% 27% 15% 3% 2%
j. One should broadcast programs on the National 
Television in the languages of minorities (Russian, 
Ukrainian, Gagauz, Bulgarian)
58% 23% 13% 4% 1%
Q42. Please list three personalities contributing 
to the improvement of interethnic relations in 
Moldova
Q43. Please list three organizations/institutions 
contributing to the improvement of interethnic 
relations in Moldova
a. Vladimir Voronin 23% a. Communist Party of Moldova 6%
b. Vasile Tarlev 7% b. Ministry of Culture 3%
c. Mircea Snegur 5% c. House of Nationalities 2%
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Q44. Please list three personalities contributing 
to the worsening of interethnic relations in 
Moldova
Q45. Please list three organizations/institutions 
contributing to the worsening of interethnic 
relations in Moldova
a. Iurie Roşca 19% a. Christian Democratic Party 8%
b. Mircea Druc 6% b. Customs 3%
c. Dumitru Braghiş 4% c. Parliament 2%
Q46. How do the following political 
parties influence interethnic relations?
Rather 
improves
Neither 
improves nor 
worsens
Rather 
worsens
Don’t Know/
No answer
a. The Communist Party of Moldova 46% 27% 8% 19%
b. Christian Democratic Party 4% 35% 30% 30%
c. Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc 9% 40% 14% 37%
d. Agrarian Party 7% 41% 9% 43%
e. Social Democratic Party of Moldova 5% 38% 12% 45%
f. Socialist Party of Moldova 4% 38% 11% 47%
Q47. I will read you a list of problems facing our 
country. Please tell me if you consider each of 
these problems crucial, severe or not too serious.
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1. Unemployment 52% 46% 2% 1% 0%
2. Terrorism/violence/guerilla wars 18% 46% 25% 9% 1%
3. Low salaries 49% 48% 2% 1% 0%
4. Violation of human rights 27% 52% 13% 6% 1%
5. Housing issue 21% 58% 18% 3% 0%
6. Health condition 32% 58% 8% 2% 1%
7. Environmental issues 27% 56% 12% 5% 0%
8. Corruption 33% 53% 8% 6% 1%
9. Crime level/insecurity 23% 62% 10% 3% 1%
10. Drug trafficking 22% 48% 16% 14% 1%
11. Armed conflicts 16% 39% 29% 14% 2%
12. Ethnic conflicts/tensions 19% 35% 32% 12% 2%
13. Lack of rule of law 28% 43% 17% 10% 2%
14. Lack of press freedom 21% 38% 27% 13% 2%
15. Drug abuse 18% 52% 15% 14% 1%
16. Trafficking in women 32% 46% 10% 9% 2%
17. Relations with Transnistria 25% 57% 7% 9% 2%
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Q48. Do you agree or disagree that…? Agree Disagree Don’t Know/No answer
a. The differences in salaries should be reduced to the benefit 
of the poor. 53% 39% 8%
b. The wellbeing of each individual should depend only on 
his/her working ability and the quality his/her work 65% 31% 4%
c. The state should control the prices of the basic goods. 82% 15% 2%
d. The state should guarantee jobs for all its citizens. 86% 12% 2%
e. Harsher punishments should be introduced in order to 
reduce criminality. 86% 12% 2%
f. The first thing that a child should learn is to respect the adults. 84% 13% 3%
g. Teachers should pay more attention to the gifted children, 
not the average ones. 31% 65% 5%
h. The wellbeing of every individual depends mostly on the state. 68% 27% 4%
i. You can trust nobody except yourself. 56% 40% 3%
j. You must fight for your interests by your own. 78% 20% 3%
k. A strong leader is needed in order to improve the situation 
from our country. 72% 22% 6%
Q49. Do you agree with the following statement? During 
the current government…
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1. …the social measures were oriented towards ordinary people 13% 39% 29% 11% 9%
2. …the state services rendered to citizens have improved 9% 27% 37% 19% 9%
3. …corruption expanded at all levels 20% 38% 18% 6% 18%
4. …the freedom of expression of the media was limited 9% 26% 30% 9% 26%
5. …the democratic rights of citizens were limited 7% 31% 29% 9% 24%
6. …the Transnistrian conflict was not solved because of the 
weakness of Moldovan politicians 13% 32% 22% 5% 28%
7. …Moldova’s position was respected abroad 4% 24% 26% 17% 30%
8. …the number of poor people from Moldova decreased 4% 26% 30% 26% 13%
9. …the national currency was stabilized 6% 39% 22% 9% 24%
10. …the national economy was stabilized 5% 33% 29% 8% 25%
11. … salaries and pensions were paid without delays 27% 44% 17% 5% 7%
12. …the farmers were supported 6% 31% 35% 13% 16%
13. …market economy was consolidated. 4% 26% 26% 6% 38%
14. …obstacles to foreign investors were created. 5% 23% 24% 7% 41%
15. …small investors were encouraged. 4% 23% 23% 4% 46%
16. …there was illegal interference with the economy. 3% 21% 23% 6% 46%
17. …an economic growth was achieved. 5% 32% 25% 7% 32%
18. …market economy failed 6% 20% 26% 7% 41%
19. …measures to stop massive migration were not taken. 15% 28% 19% 7% 31%
374 ETNOBAROMETER IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Q50. If the parliamentary elections were to take place 
next Sunday, would you vote?
I would definitely vote 67%
I would probably vote 20%
I would probably not go 2%
I would definitely not go 7%
I don’t know (don’t read) 3%
I don’t answer (don’t read) 1%
Q51. If parliamentary elections were to take place next Sunday, what party (alliance) would 
you vote for? Read this question (Q51) to all respondents regardless of their answer to Q51! 
Operator! Show list Q51 to the respondent!
Communist Party of Moldova 41%
Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc (Our Moldova Alliance, Democratic Party and Social 
Liberal Party) 7%
Christian Democratic Party 3%
Agrarian Party 4%
Social Democratic Party of Moldova 2%
Socialist Party 0%
Other, please specify ___________________ -
Independent candidate, please specify _________ 0%
I would not vote 4%
Don’t know 29%
No answer 11%
* If the respondent mentions a party included in parentheses (Moldova Noastra Aliance, Democratic Party 
or Social Democratic Party), the answer should be included next to „Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc“
Q52. In your opinion, what should be 
the direction of our country?
Be independent of any alliance/union 7%
We should integrate with the European Union 36%
We should remain within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) 35%
Don’t know 19%
No answer 3%
Q53. How much do you fear the 
disintegration of Moldova?
Very much 5% Not at all 26%
Quite much 19% Don’t know 20%
Quite a little 26% No answer 5%
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Q54. What do you think will happen in five years…
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a. Moldova will become a strong country 1% 16% 42% 28% 13%
b. Moldova’s position will be taken in consideration abroad 1% 19% 38% 24% 19%
c. the status of Transnistria will be decided 1% 16% 39% 20% 24%
d. income of the population will grow 1% 20% 42% 22% 15%
e. market economy will consolidate 0% 22% 36% 18% 23%
f. democracy will consolidate 1% 18% 40% 16% 26%
g. young people living in Moldova will have greater 
opportunities in the country 1% 16% 39% 29% 16%
Q55. Do you think that an armed 
conflict with the neighboring 
countries is possible? 
Yes 8% -- SKIP TO Q56
No 81% -- SKIP TO Q57
Don’t Know/No answer 11% -- SKIP TO Q57
Q56. If yes, with what country is 
Moldova likely to enter an armed 
conflict?
Romania 3% Transnistrian region 81%
Russia 3% Other, please specify _________ -
Ukraine - Don’t Know/No answer 14%
Bulgaria -
Q57. In your opinion, what were the reasons for the outbreak of the Transnistrian conflict?
a. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
b. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
c. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
Q58. What do you think are the solutions for overcoming the current political situation 
related to Transnistria?
a. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
b. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
c. ________________________________________________________ |__|__|__|
Q59. To what extent do you agree with the following 
statements:
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a. It is better not to deal with Moldovans in everyday life. 1% 13% 35% 48% 3%
b. I generally avoid talking to Moldovans from Moldova 1% 6% 28% 62% 3%
c. It is better not to deal with Ukrainians in everyday life. 1% 13% 26% 58% 3%
d. I generally avoid talking to Ukrainians from Moldova 1% 8% 27% 61% 3%
e. It is better not to deal with the Gagauz in everyday life. 1% 14% 28% 53% 4%
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f. I generally avoid talking to the Gagauz from Moldova 1% 8% 28% 59% 3%
g. It is better not to deal with Russians in everyday life. 0% 11% 26% 60% 2%
h. I generally avoid talking to Russians from Moldova 0% 8% 27% 62% 2%
i. It is better not to deal with Romanians in everyday life. 2% 12% 27% 44% 15%
j. I generally avoid talking to Romanians from Moldova 2% 10% 26% 48% 14%
Q60. What is your native 
language?
Do not read the options for 
answers! Multiple choices!
a. Moldovan 6% e. Gagauz 2%
b. Romanian 1% f. Bulgarian 92%
c. Russian 22% g. Other 0%
d. Ukrainian 1% h. Don’t know/refuse to answer 0%
Q61. What language do you 
usually speak at home?
Do not read the options for 
answers! Multiple choice!
a. Moldovan 13% e. Gagauz 8%
b. Romanian 1% f. Bulgarian 71%
c. Russian 47% g. Other 0%
d. Ukrainian 2% h. Don’t know/refuse to answer 1%
Q62. What is the language you use/used more frequently with your…
Moldovan
a. mother b. father c. grandparents d. children
4% 4% 3% 6%
Romanian 0% 0% 0% 0%
Russian 16% 15% 12% 32%
Ukrainian 0% 0% 0% 3%
Gagauz 2% 1% 1% 3%
Bulgarian 64% 65% 63% 50%
Other 0% 0% 0% 0%
It’s not the case 12% 13% 19% 4%
Don’t know/No answer 1% 1% 1% 2%
Q63. How well do you speak …?
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I speak it perfectly 12% 10% 67% 4% 8% 89%
Fluently but with an accent 14% 11% 23% 2% 3% 6%
I can make myself understood in most situations 19% 10% 8% 12% 4% 2%
In some situations I make myself understood, but 
with difficulty 15% 9% 1% 17% 7% 1%
I only know a few words 25% 24% 0% 27% 26% 1%
I do not know any word 14% 30% 0% 36% 50% 1%
No answer 1% 5% 1% 2% 2% 0%
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Q64. To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements:
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a. I am disturbed when people around me speak 
Romanian/Moldovan 1% 8% 12% 22% 56% 1%
b. I am disturbed when people around me speak 
Ukrainian 0% 5% 15% 17% 61% 1%
c. I am disturbed when people around me speak 
Gagauz 2% 11% 11% 17% 57% 2%
d. I am disturbed when people around me speak 
Russian 1% 4% 14% 17% 62% 1%
e. There are many Moldovans who avoid speaking 
Bulgarian although they know it 5% 17% 22% 20% 21% 15%
e. There are many Ukrainians who avoid speaking 
Bulgarian although they know it 3% 15% 22% 20% 23% 18%
e. There are many Gagauz who avoid speaking 
Bulgarian although they know it 3% 14% 20% 20% 23% 20%
e. There are many Russians who avoid speaking 
Bulgarian although they know it 3% 15% 19% 19% 23% 22%
i. All residents of Moldovan should know 
Moldovan/Romanian 37% 24% 16% 13% 7% 3%
j. All residents of Moldovan should know Russian 25% 30% 18% 16% 9% 2%
k. In regions where Ukrainians are predominant, 
everybody should know Ukrainian 5% 18% 27% 26% 16% 8%
l. All residents of Gagauzia should know Gagauz 5% 16% 29% 23% 18% 8%
m. In regions where Bulgarians are predominant, 
everybody should know Bulgarian 6% 17% 29% 24% 17% 7%
Q65. How many state languages should be in Moldova? Q66. Which ones?
One state language 23% -- SKIP TO Q66 a. Moldovan 93%
Two state languages 64% -- SKIP TO Q66 b. Romanian 6%
More than two state languages 10% -- SKIP TO Q66 c. Russian 75%
Don’t know/No answer 3% -- SKIP TO Q67 d. Ukrainian 2%
e. Gagauz 4%
f. Bulgarian 8%
g. Other 1%
h. Don’t know/refuse to answer 0%
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Q67. In the next 12 months, do you plan 
to visit a foreign country?
a. as a tourist
Yes 11%
• aa. What country will you go to? 
______ |__|__|
No 89%
b. for temporary work
Yes 10%
• bb.What country will you go to? 
______ |__|__|
No 90%
c. for studies
Yes 0%
• cc. What country will you go to? 
______ |__|__|
No 100%
d. to settle permanently
Yes 1%
• dd. What country will you go to? 
______ |__|__|
No 99%
SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC DATA
D1. Gender Male 45%
Female 55%
D2. What is your age? ____ Don’t know 8 No answer 9
D3. Are you presently employed?
Yes 39% -- SKIP TO D5!
No 61% → Continue with D4!
No answer - → Continue with D4!
D4. If you don’t 
have a job, what is 
your status?
High school student, 
university student 7%
Temporary unemployed. Looking 
for a job 26%
Retired (age or sickness) 47% Unemployed. Does not look for a job 10%
Housewife, maternal leave 9% Other (specify) 1%
Don’t know -
No answer 0%
D5. What is your occupation/position at this job? Note as many details for the answer!
|__|__|
Don’t know = 98 Refuse to answer = 99
D6. What is 
your 
education 
background
No education 4% Post high school education (college) 6%
Incomplete secondary education 17% Incomplete higher education 3%
Secondary school 28% Completed higher education 13%
Vocational school 25% Master’s degree, PhD 0%
High school 1% Don’t know 0%
No answer 1%
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D7. What is your civil status?
Married 71% Unmarried, living together 1%
Divorced 3% Never married 10%
Widow(er) 15% Don’t know -
No answer -
D8. How large is your family (including yourself)? |__|__| people
Don’t know 8
Don’t answer 9
D9. This list contains several groups of monthly income. What is the income of your house-
hold? Please consider all salaries, pensions, child allowances and any other income you might 
have. Please tell me the number on the right side of the group corresponding to the net in-
come of your family for the last month. Show the list D9!
Under 200 Lei 4% 801-900 lei 5% 1501-1750 lei 2%
201-300 lei 10% 901-1000 lei 9% 1751-2500 lei 4%
301-400 lei 10% 1001-1100 lei 6% 2501-3500 lei 3%
401-500 lei 7% 1101-1200 lei 3% 3501-5000 lei 1%
501-600 lei 9% 1201-1300 lei 2% 5001-7000 lei 0%
601-700 lei 7% 1301-1400 lei 0% Over 7001 lei 0%
701-800 lei 6% 1401-1500 lei 3% Don’t know 3%
No answer 7%
D10. How do you 
evaluate the current 
income of your family
Money is not enough even for food 33%
The money is enough for food but not enough to buy clothes 41%
We have money for food and we can save a little, but it is not 
enough to buy more expensive things (TV or a fridge) 20%
We can afford to buy some more expensive things (TV, fridge) 0%
We can afford to buy anything we want 3%
Don’t know 0%
Don’t answer 2%
D11. Are you a holder of one or more citizenships?
I have only the Moldovan citizenship 96%
I hold only the citizenship of another country (besides Moldova). Please specify __________ |__|__|
I hold the Moldovan citizenship and citizenships of other countries. 
Please specify a. _______________ |__|__|
b. _______________ |__|__|
No answer 1%
